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Introduction
This thesis has a specific purpose: it attempts a study o f how the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications is protected in three different systems. That this is the 
object o f the thesis will already be clear from its title. More lengthy considerations are 
needed to justify why I am examining the right to the secrecy of telecommunications at 
all. In addressing this question I find myself reasoning at three different levels, which 
correlate with three different stages of my knowledge of the right to the secrecy o f  
telecommunications.
At the first level, my answer to the question why study the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications is relatively simple: studying this right seems interesting and 
important, given that it protects one of the spheres o f private life, one's 
telecommunications, that appears most threatened by the public power. Indeed, one 
comes across not infrequent press reports about cases of illegal wire-tapping and the 
interception of telecommunications by some branch of the State. Since one assumes that 
only a small percentage of cases of interception ever see public light, one is left with the 
uncomfortable feeling that our telecommunications are simply left to unrestricted 
surveillance by the State, a State left free to intervene when and as frequently as it wish. 
At this first level o f my research, this alone made the right to the secrecy o f  
telecommunications sufficiently worth studying.
At a second level, it is clear that the right to the secrecy o f  telecommunication 
operates in context. The first recognition o f the right dates back to the late eighteenth 
century and at that time the right was couched in terms very similar to those of today. 
This raises the question of the relation of the right to its background context. For while 
the terms o f the right have not changed greatly the background has: we now live in a 
highly technological age. Thus it must be examined whether the 'old right' can stand 
the strain o f the changed circumstances and, if not, to make suggestions as to how this 
could be achieved.
O f course, one could reply that the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications is 
not alone in its status as an 'old right in a new world'. Many other contemporary 
fundamental rights find their roots in the French Declaration des Droits de VHomme et 
du Citoyen of 1789 and have also survived to the present day with their wording 
practically unchanged. Nevertheless, and now I move to the third o f the three levels,
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the case o f  the right to the secrecy of telecommunications seems to me somewhat 
peculiar. This is because in recent times it has had to meet at least three important 
changes both of technological and of sociological character and these have considerable 
ramifications for the actual concepts surrounding the right. The first one o f these 
changes is purely technological and only exists as yet as a threat not yet come into 
being: technological developments threaten to alter the conceptual boundaries of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications. The boundaries of the right are defined by 
the conceptual boundaries of the terms ’secrecy’ and 'telecommunications'; the problem 
is that som e new means of telecommunication threaten to blur the line between 
telecommunications held in secret and those accessible to all; this is most typically the 
case with wireless telephone conversations carried out through radio waves accessible 
from an ordinary radio set. Such new means can challenge the scope o f  the term 
'secrecy', hence also the boundaries o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
The second change concerns the way the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is regarded in present democracies, as opposed to the way it was 
regarded when originally recognised. When this right first arose, and until recent times, 
the secrecy o f telecommunications lay at the disposal o f public authorities, in the sense 
that these found hardly any physical obstacle when they wanted to interfere with it; 
hence the need to grant it legal protection. To a great extent, this is still very much the 
case. Yet today technology has developed sophisticated means which enable not only 
the interception but also a reinforced protection of the secrecy of telecommunications. 
In some extreme cases technology can even make it impossible for a third party to 
interfere with certain telecommunications (this is the case with acts o f  digital 
telecommunication with party-to-party encryption), even if the third party in question is 
the public power and the intended interference has a legitimate purpose. If we combine 
this circumstance with the growth o f organised crime and the importance o f 
telecommunication surveillance to combat it, then the result might be a shift o f  
standpoint from which the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications is regarded. 
Instead o f a defenceless aspect o f privacy in need of legal protection, the secrecy of 
telecommunication might now appear as an aspect o f privacy highly protected on 
technical grounds. Legal intervention might then seem to be required, not so much to 
reinforce its technical protection, but to bind it within adequate legal limits1. In this 
context, it seemed to me an important task to reaffirm the role of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications in present democracies and to insist in drawing a clear line
1 As examples of this position, see E.S. Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A 
Prosecutor's View", 44 Minn. L. Rev. 835 (1960), and H.K. Upset, "The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping 
Problem: A Private Investigator's View", 44 Minn. L. Rev. 873 (1960).
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between the respect that this right continues to deserve as a matter of principle, on the 
one hand, and the regulation o f  exceptional possibilities of interference, on the other.
The right to the secrecy o f telecommunications has had to meet at least a third 
change. This concerns the increasing need to protect the right not only against the State 
but also against third persons. As an aspect o f privacy, the secrecy o f  
telecommunications finds its most immediate enemy in society, yet the State has always 
possessed the means for much more powerful and systematic interferences; hence the 
constitutional recognition o f this right as a fundamental right against the State. The 
problem today is that certain private persons are in a position to endanger the secrecy o f  
certain telecommunications to the same degree as the State (this is notably the case of 
employers with respect to the telecommunications engaged in by their employees at the 
work place), yet as a fundamental right, the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications 
protects individuals in principle only against public acts of interference. It therefore 
seemed important to explore what possibilities Constitutions leave open for protecting 
the fundamental right to the secrecy of telecommunications also against interferences 
carried out by private persons. .
In this thesis, then, I have set myself the task o f exploring how the 'old' right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications can best face the present times and the changes they 
have brought about. To be more precise, I suggest that the fundamental right to the 
secrecy o f telecommunications can be best protected if approached on the basis of the 
three following leading ideas: [1] the right to the secrecy of telecommunications ought 
to be regarded as essentially liberal in character, hence as a negative right o f defence 
against the State, while in addition, but only secondarily, this right also ought to 
impose positive obligations upon the State; [2] the right to the secrecy o f  
telecommunications ought to be regarded as a participatory rather than as an 
individualistic right; [3] the conceptual boundaries o f the right to the secrecy o f 
telecommunications ought to be defined as clearly as possible on the basis of a unifying 
rationale. Before developing these ideas, however, I would like to make it clear what I 
mean by the expression 'fundamental rights'. Given that this expression has been and 
will repeatedly be used in the thesis, it is crucial that we avoid confusion and 
misunderstandings from the beginning.
The expression 'fundamental rights' first appeared in pre-revolutionary France 
at the end o f the eighteenth century ("droits fondamenteaux") and has since been largely
3
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used in constitutional theory, most notably in Germany ("Grundrechte”2). In spite of its 
rather long history, this expression is still not consistently applied either by academic 
authors or in official legal texts; in particular, it is often intermingled with other 
expressions such as "human rights", "public liberties", or "fundamental liberties". 
Some predominant tendencies in the use of the term can nonetheless be singled out both 
in continental Europe and in the United States. In continental Europe, the expression 
"fundamental rights" is most often used to refer to human rights3 insofar as they are 
granted positive constitutional protection within a given national system. Fundamental 
rights are therefore defined on the basis of both substantial and formal traits. The 
substantial trait is that fundamental rights are regarded as human rights, that is they are 
intended to preserve values which in their cultural, juridical context are regarded as 
human rights. The formal trait is that fundamental rights are recognised in a 
Constitution as binding provisions and not as mere programatic principles; this implies, 
first, that fundamental rights have direct binding effect on the three branches of the 
State, including the legislature, and, second, that there is adequate judicial protection 
against their possible violation4.
In the United States, definitions of "fundamental rights" most commonly 
conceive them as the rights implicit in those "fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" or as those rights 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"5. As these definitions indicate, in the United 
States the expression "fundamental rights" is only characterised by substantial features. 
That this is so is confirmed by the fact that, according to the Supreme Court, being 
included in the U.S. Bill o f Rights contained in the first eight constitutional 
amendments is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for a right to be considered 
"fundamental". Nevertheless, once defined as fundamental rights, a formal 
characteristic is attached to them, namely they are made the object o f the protection 
provided by the due-process clauses o f the fifth and the fourteenth amendments. In this
2This expression appeared for the first time used in Title IV of the Paulskircheverfassung of 28th of 
March 1949 (see P. Cmz Villalón, ’’Formación y Evolución de los Derechos Fundamentales" REDC 
No. 25-27, p. 35 at 56).
3The definitions of the expression 'human rights’ also vary. For a critical analysis of this question see 
A.E. Pérez Luño, Derechos Humanos, Estado de Derecho y Constitución, Madrid 1984, p. 21.
4For some examples of this approach to fundamental rights see P. Cruz Villalón, "El Legislador de los 
Derechos Fundamentales" Anuario de Derecho Público y Estudios Políticos, p. 7, Granada 1989; G. 
Peces-Barba, Los Derechos Fundamentales, p. 13, Madrid 1983; C. Starck, "The Constitutional 
Definition and Protection of Rights and Freedoms" in Rights, Institutions and Impact of International 
Law according to the German Basic Law, p. 20, Baden-Baden, 1987. See also A.E. Pérez Luño, 
Derechos Humanos... pp. 30-31 and the bibliography mentioned therein.
$ Hebert v. Louisana, 272 US 312, 316 (1926) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 at 325 (1937), 
respectively; references fromP.G. Kauper, "Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental 
and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case" in The Right of Privacy. A Symposium, New York 1971, 
p. 39 at 40.
4
thesis, and unless otherwise specified, I use the expression "fundamental rights" in its 
continental European sense. Occasionally, when speaking only of the United States, I 
prefer to use the expression "constitutional rights". Now that this terminological point 
has been made clear, let me start to develop the three leading ideas that I have proposed 
for my thesis.
[1] One of the leading ideas o f this study will be that the right to the secrecy o f  
telecommunications is best protected if it is fundamentally regarded as a liberal right of 
defence against the State. Indeed, the recognition o f this right and of fundamental rights 
in general is rooted in the liberal tradition. Modem fundamental rights arose as marking 
the dividing line that has separated civil society from public power. They arose as 
marking the boundaries o f the area of freedom from the public power retained by 
individuals and as reminders that this area may not be infringed by the State. 
Fundamental rights arose, in other words, as rights of defence against the State 
(Abwehrrechte). Liberalism regards freedom as the natural state o f the individual and 
the State as the natural enemy o f freedom. Hence, the area of individual freedom from 
the State is defined as wide as possible, whilst the possibility for the public powers to 
infringe upon the exercise o f rights is considered exceptional and subject to strict 
interpretation6.1  will argue in this thesis that approaching fundamental rights on the 
basis o f this liberal pattern entails significant advantages for the protection of these 
rights7. The case of the right to the secrecy of telecommunication w ill prove very 
illuminating on this point.
However, my claim that fundamental rights ought to be approached on the basis 
of a pattern essentially liberal does not imply that this pattern ought to be purely liberal 
in the most traditional version of the term. A purely liberal approach to fundamental 
rights lies open to criticism in as far as it implies a hands-off attitude o f  the public 
power with respect to the exercise of these rights. Indeed, liberalism accords the 
individual a wide scope of freedom, yet it does not imply a positive commitment of the 
State to make freedoms actually possible. A  purely liberal conception o f fundamental 
rights could thus be rightly accused of being blind to the fact that the exercise o f rights 
can be rendered impossible not only by an active infringement o f the public power but 
also by the absence o f the necessary social or even legal preconditions for their 
exercise.
6"Die Freiheit des einzelnen [ist] prinzipiell unbegrenzt, während die Befugnis des Staates zu Eingriffen 
in diese Sphäre prinzipiell begrenzt ist". C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre p. 126 at 164 (1928) (quotation 
taken from Ossenbühl, "Die Interpretation der Grundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts", (1976) NJW. p. 2100 at 2101).
7Note that I am only referring to rights fundamentally liberal in character, hence to rights originally 
conceived as negative obligations for the State.
5
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These shortcomings of a purely liberal approach to fundamental rights have 
long been felt both in Europe and in the United States. In the United States, they 
became most apparent in the field o f racial discrimination. It was clear that in order that 
racial discrimination could disappear, the public power could not merely adopt an 
attitude o f negative respect for fundamental rights, in general, and for the right to 
equality, in particular. In addition, it would also have to adopt positive measures to 
enhance the equal protection o f fundamental rights. This idea led in 1868 to the 
enactment o f the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, according to which 
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection o f the 
laws". The fourteenth amendment aimed at extending to black citizens the protection of 
laws traditionally granted to white citizens8 and, in order to reach this aim, it intended 
to impose upon the states not only negative obligations (the obligation to refrain from 
acting) but also positive obligations, i.e. the obligation actively to guarantee the equal 
protection o f the laws to every citizen. "Denying includes inaction as well as action and 
denying the equal protection of the laws includes the omission to protect"9. The Warren 
Court's cases on racial discrimination are good examples of the states' positive 
obligations deriving from the fourteenth amendment.
In continental Europe, different approaches to fundamental rights have been 
proposed which stress that these rights have not only a negative dimension but also a 
positive one, so that they also impose positive obligations upon the State. In this sense, 
fundamental rights have been conceived as objective constitutional values10 and as 
'institutional guarantees' (institutioneile Gewährleistungen)11, that is as objective
8On this issue, see John Silard, "A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the 'State Action' Limit on the 
Equal Protection Guarantee", 66 Col. L. Rev. 855 at 267 et seq. (1966).
9U.S. v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81 (No. 15,282) (S.D. Ala. 1871) (quotation taken from J. Silard, "A 
Constitutional Forecast..." at 269, footnote 51; see also footnote 50). Positive obligations rested 
primarily on the states and were under the ultimate control of the federal power. As the Supreme Court 
put it, "ft]he equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican 
government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its 
power. That duty was originally assumed by the states; and it still remains there. The only obligation 
resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right" (US v. Cruikshank, 92 
US 542,544 (1875) -quotation from J. Silard, "A Constitutional Forecast...", footnote 50).
10This conception stems from R. Smend's "integration doctrine" (Integralionslehre), according to 
which fundamental rights are the constituent elements of a cultural system of values (Smend, 
Staatrechtliche Abhandlungen, 1955, p. 264 el seq.). In this respect, see Böckenförde, 
"Grundrechtstheorie und Grundrcchtsinterpretation" (1974) NJW, p. 1529 at 1533.
^For the conception of fundamental rights as 'institutional guarantees' see Häberle, Die 
Wesensgehaltgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz, CT. Müller, Heidelberg 1983. Note that the 
concept of institutionelle Gewährleistungen differs from the concepts of Institutsgarantie and 
Institutionsgarantie developed by Carl Schmitt in the Weimar era. With these two terms Schmitt was 
not referring to any particular dimension of rights but, respectively, to institutions of public law 
(municipal autonomy, freedom to teach, etc) and to institutions of private law (family, property, 
marriage, etc) which were considered so important that the Constitution protected their essential core 
even against the legislative power (see Ossenbiihl, "Die Interpretation der Grundrechte..." at 2103). Yet
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principles o f the constitutional order which as such must not only be respected but also 
positively pursued by the State* 12. Moreover, in Europe as in the United States, it has 
been argued that fundamental rights have a positive subjective dimension, that is that 
they grant the individual a claim that the State develop the necessary means to exercise 
his fundamental rights13. This idea that rights have a positive subjective dimension has 
become more urgent with the development o f the social State, for in this context 
fundamental rights are often recognised which do not require that the State refrains 
from acting but that it adopts some positive measures to enable their exercise14. Also 
traditional liberal rights of defence are often read in the sense that they have a positive 
subjective dimension. In particular, the idea has been put forward that every 
fundamental right enshrines the positive claim that the State develops the necessary 
legal, procedural and organisational background to enable the protection o f  a right both 
against third parties and against the State itself15.
The idea that fundamental rights are objective principles o f the constitutional 
order is today perfectly accepted. More controversial remains the question o f whether 
fundamental rights also have a positive subjective dimension. Commentators16 often 
argue against this view on the grounds that States have limited means at their disposal 
to facilitate the exercise of rights actively, hence that the extent to which they provide 
individuals with means for the exercise of a particular right remains a policy choice, a
in spite of their different meanings, the concepts Institutsgarantie and Institutionsgarantie can still be 
regarded as the most immediate precedents of the present conception of rights as institutional 
guarantees.
12A brief review of the different approaches to rights as institutional guarantees can be found in T. 
Wülfing, Grundrechtliche Gesetzesvorbehalte und Grundrechisschranken, Berlin 1981, pp. 65 et seq.
13 See in particular M. Hund, "Staatliche Schutzpflichten statt Teilhaberechte?" Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Zeidler, Band 2 p. 1445, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 1987. See also Robert 
Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Nomos Verlagsgesellshaft, Baden-Baden, 1985, pp. 414-415. Alexy 
justifies the subjective character of the positive dimension of rights on the basis of the following 
reasoning: fundamental rights are principles, which implies that they enshrine the duty of their 
optimalisation; under a purely objective approach to the State's positive obligations vis-à-vis 
fundamental rights these rights enjoy a lesser protection than under a subjective approach to such 
positive obligations; hence the State's positive obligations must also have a subjective dimension. In 
other words, Alexy considers that the existence of a subjective positive dimension of fundamental 
rights is a requirement of the conception of fundamental rights as principles. The only question is how 
the coverage of this dimension of rights is to be defined. (For the conception of rights as principles and 
the duty of their optimalisation, see Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, pp. 75 et seq.).
14Good examples of this are the Constitutions of the new German Länder, all of which insist on the 
recognition of subjective rights of social character which impose strong positive obligations upon the 
corresponding Land (see E. Denninger, "La Reforma Constitutional en Alemania: entre Etica y 
Seguridad Jurídica" 84 Revista de Estudios Políticos 69 (1994).
15The different ways in which rights can enshrine positive claims against the State and the different 
implications of these different claims are issues which have been carefully analysed by R. Alexy, 
Theorie der Grundrechte, pp. 395 et seq. See also Konrad Hesse, "Bestand und Bedeutung der 
Grundrechte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (1978) EuGRZ, 427 at 433 et seq.
16See Böckenförde, "Grundrechtstheorie Ossenbühl, "Die Interpretation der Grundrechte ..." at 
2104 et seq.; Christian Starck (ed.) Rights, Institutions and impact of International Law according to 
the German Basic Law, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1987, pp. 42 et seq.
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choice which, in addition, is greatly conditioned by financial constraints. Be this as it 
may, the foregoing considerations should have illustrated that a purely liberal 
conception o f fundamental rights appears today as clearly insufficient. Indeed, it was 
never my intention to suggest otherwise. As a matter o f fact, in chapter 4 o f this thesis I 
will insist upon the importance o f recognising a positive dimension to fundamental 
rights, I w ill even insist upon the importance of recognising them a subjective positive 
dimension; moreover, in chapter 7 I will underline the relevant role that the positive 
dimension o f fundamental rights plays in the recognition o f a third-party effect to these 
rights, so that they can apply, though indirectly, in private relationships. Nonetheless, 
my original claim remains unaltered: I believe that fundamental rights ought to be 
approached on the basis of a pattern essentially liberal in character, for this entails 
significant advantages for their protection. Fundamental rights may have, indeed they 
ought to have, a positive dimension, yet this should only come to add to their negative 
dimension, never to replace it. Other considerations, in short, should be annexed to 
liberal rights but not replace them altogether.
One could raise the objection that making the above claim is superfluous or at 
best of very limited interest, since in any case the approach to fundamental rights I am 
arguing for prevails both in literature and in case law. Still today, the prevailing 
approach to fundamental rights is for the most part liberal in character. We still conceive 
of fundamental rights primarily as rights of defence against the State, hence as negative 
subjective claims of the individual against the State, so that most generally an objective 
and eventually a social approach to these rights have only come to complement this 
negative dimension by way o f bringing out some others that the liberal approach 
overlooked17. It has even become a common-place to speak o f the ’double character1 
(subjective/objective) o f fundamental rights. I am well aware that this is the case. My 
feeling is nonetheless strong that insisting on the importance of the basically liberal 
approach to fundamental rights is not at all redundant. For one thing, at the theoretical 
level this approach has been put into question on a few  but important occasions18. 
Moreover, often enough courts turn their back to the liberal approach to fundamental 
rights, w ith the result that the idea that these rights deserve the widest possible 
protection is disregarded; often enough, for example, courts disregard the essentially 
liberal character o f the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications. The respective 
implications o f  a liberal and of a non-liberal approach to fundamental rights will be
l7F. Ossenbühl, "Die Interpretation der Grundrechte ..." at 2100; K. Hesse, "Bestand und Bedeutung 
..." at 430 et seq.
18Let me for example mention the work of Friedrich Müller (Die Positivitat der Grundrechte. Fragen 
einer praktischen Grundrechtsdogmatik, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1969, part. pp. 17 et seq.) or of 
Peter Haberle (Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg,
1983). 1 will refer to both of them more in detail in section 1 of chapter 3.
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addressed in chapter 3, where I will study the structure o f  these rights and, in 
particular, o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. Indeed, as w e will see, the 
negative implications o f a non-liberal approach to fundamental rights come to light with 
particular clarity in the structure o f these rights.
[2] The right to the secrecy of telecommunications is a traditional liberal right of 
defence against the State and ought to continue being basically this, while at the same 
time an additional positive dimension ought to be recognised, even a subjective positive 
dimension. So far I have dealt with the first o f the leading ideas of my study. There is 
however more to the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications than just the question of 
whether and to what extent it should be read on the basis of liberal patterns. I would 
now like to draw attention to a peculiarity of this right: the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications appears to be part o f a more general right, a right which has 
recently been gaining very much in importance. I am referring to the right to privacy. 
The secrecy of telecommunications is recognised as a fundamental right because it is an 
aspect of privacy which is thought to deserve constitutional protection. This is so even 
in cases where the secrecy of telecommunications stands as a completely independent 
right the definition of which need not be drawn by reference to privacy. Even in such 
cases, privacy continues to be the interest lying behind the recognition and protection of 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications and continues to have a word to say in its 
interpretation and understanding. The way privacy is conceived is thus o f decisive 
importance for the conception o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
There are two different ways of regarding privacy and the right to privacy19. 
Privacy can be regarded as a right of the individual the protection of which responds to 
purely individualistic interests. Alternatively, privacy can also be regarded as a right of 
the individual which allows her both free participation in public affairs and the free 
exercise o f her other fundamental rights; in other words, privacy can also be regarded 
as a condition for the existence of a constitutional democracy. This latter conception 
relies upon the assumption that an individual can only act freely if she can keep an area 
of seclusion and secrecy for herself and exclude others from it, that is if there is an area 
where she can develop her personality free from the eyes of society and o f the State. If 
no such area exists, that is, if  all somebody does or enjoys doing (from issues such as
19In the following pages I will repeatedly use expressions such as privacy, the private sphere, the right 
to privacy in a manner that might sometimes appear somewhat confusing or even inconsistent. The 
same goes for expressions such as publicity or the public sphere. Indeed, both privacy and publicity are 
omnibus terms which admit various different uses. The different meanings attached to the term 'privacy' 
will be explored in section 1 of chapter 1, where some attention will also be paid to the term 
'publicity', even if only in a derivative way. I hope that this section will shed some light upon the use 
of both these words in the present introduction.
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what she reads or how much she drinks to the people or places she frequents) were to 
be known to all, then this person would feel too inhibited to participate in public life 
freely, for she would be conditioned by the fear that the information people have about 
her could be used against her at any time.
These two approaches to privacy have very different practical consequences. 
According to the individualistic approach, the protection o f the right to privacy works 
against the interests of democracy. The right to privacy only serves the interests that 
single individuals have in concealing information from the public eye, something they 
do for their own sake simply because they have a preference for developing their 
personality in private. Yet a healthy democracy relies to a great extent in publicity and in 
the availability o f information. The right to privacy is therefore presumed 
'undemocratic' and is accorded rather low weight when balanced against interests 
which are thought to tend towards the common good. The participatory approach to 
privacy, on the other hand, regards the right to privacy as one of the foundations of 
democracy. Recognising for individuals a right to privacy is a condition for their free 
participation in public life, including both political participation and the free exercise of 
fundamental rights; in turn, the free exercise o f fundamental rights and free political 
participation are at the basis o f a constitutional democratic State. The right to privacy 
thus appears a crucial element o f democracy and is granted accordingly strong weight 
when balanced against other competing interests.
I will argue in this thesis that the right to privacy, and therefore the right to the 
secrecy o f telecommunications, ought to be regarded as participatory rights and not as 
enemies o f democracy. This claim is not only justified by the obvious fact that the 
participatory approach is more generous towards these rights than the individualistic 
approach is. Over and above this circumstance, my claim relies on a participatory view 
of the democratic constitutional State. I will rely, in particular, on the approach to the 
constitutional democratic State proposed by discourse theory as developed by Robert 
Alexy20. Let me now try to sketch the main points of this theory.
The point of departure o f  discourse theory is that what is true and what is right 
must be reached through free debate. To be sure, discourse theory does not conceive of 
truth and right in absolute terms; rather, they are both regarded as the outcome of 
consensus. This means that a value is considered more or less true, and defending it is 
considered more or less right, depending on the number o f  people that agree on the *143
20In particular, see his article "A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason", (1992) Ratio 
Juris 231 et seq.; see also Alexy, "Rights, Legal Reasoning and Rational Discourse" (1992) Ratio Juris
143 et seq.
10
É É r i M d i
value in question. The broader the agreement, the closer to truth we are. Yet, discourse 
theory insists, an agreement can only be held valid if the process o f deliberation 
through which it is attained can be held correct, which can only be the case if  
deliberation is based on the free and equal participation of everyone who is interested in 
taking part21. In brief, according to discourse theory truth is not attained through proof 
but through deliberation and persuasion and the truth of values can only be judged by 
testing their formal correctness, that is by testing the formal correctness o f the process 
of deliberation through which they have been asserted22. Discourse is thus proposed as 
a way o f  dealing with moral questions, hence as a way o f solving conflicts o f interests, 
both at a social and at a political level23.
In order to justify this discourse-theoretical approach to the solution o f conflicts 
and the importance laid on deliberation, discourse theory falls back upon human nature 
and draws attention to the interest that most human beings have in correct reasoning. In 
particular, Alexy falls back upon what he calls the "most general form o f life of human 
beings"24, which in his view implies that most individuals make and expect others to 
make "assertions", i.e. "speech acts which raise an implicit claim to truth or 
correctness"25. In other words, the idea is that it is part of the most general form of life 
to ask why, whenever a statement is made. Yet, it is one thing to say that individuals 
generally have an interest in correct reasoning and quite a different thing to say that they 
are always willing to respect the rules of correct reasoning26. This is clearly not always 
the case. Rules thus need to be enacted if  one wants to ensure that decisions will be 
adopted in a discourse-theoretical manner; to put it differently, discourse-theoretical 
deliberation leads to the conclusion that rules need to be enacted in order that discourse 
itself can be preserved.
At the political level, the need o f rules to preserve discourse-theoretical 
deliberation justifies the existence of the State. Thus, discourse theory does not regard 
the State as the result of a compact between individuals and a sovereign, but as the 
result o f discourse and debate; moreover, discourse theory regards the constitutional
21 The requisites for correct discourse are of course more complex than that. They consist both of rules 
relating to the structure of the arguments that can be made in a discourse-theoretical process and of rules 
controlling the discourse process itself. See Alexy, "A Discourse-Theoretical Conception...", at 235.
22As was to be expected, this approach to truth has not gone without criticism. See for example Ota 
Weinberger, "Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against Pseudo-Arguments in Practical 
Philosophy" (1992) Ratio Juris 253, part, at 257.
23Alexy, "A Discourse-Theoretical Conceptionat 237.
24Ibid. at 242.
I^bid. at 240. The justification of discourse theory in all its complexity is developed in pp. 238 et 
seq.
26Ibid. at 244.
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democratic State as the only possible result o f discourse and debate, for a constitutional 
democratic State guarantees the freest and broadest possible political debate. In 
principle, democracy ensures that all individuals can participate in the discourse- 
theoretical process o f taking political decisions on an equal basis. Yet, as a system 
based on majority rule, democracy allows the political majority to take political 
decisions regardless o f  any discourse-theoretical constraint. Some institutional 
mechanisms have to be provided to prevent this result; this is precisely the role assigned 
to the Constitution and to judicial review of the constitutionality of acts o f the public 
powers. Particularly important is the danger that the political majority leaves minorities 
out of the public debate. This can be prevented by way of recognising for all 
individuals certain fundamental rights necessary for discourse, so as to ensure that all, 
even minorities, can enjoy free participation in public life27.
In sum, on the basis o f discourse theory a participatory conception o f  the State 
calls for a constitutional, democratic State as the political system best qualified to 
provide participation. It is in this context that the importance of privacy comes to light. 
As mentioned above, the right to privacy guarantees every individual the position of 
autonomy she needs in order to participate in the public debate and to exercise her 
fundamental rights freely. This is not to say, however, that the participatory approach 
to privacy is blind to the dangers that excessive privacy entails. On the contrary, it is 
well aware that, as the individualistic approach points out, excessive privacy can 
deprive society and the political order from information useful for their own 
preservation; this is why it does not grant the right to privacy absolute protection but 
subjects it to restrictions. The difference between the participatory and the 
individualistic approach to privacy at this point lies in the relative importance that 
privacy is granted when balanced against other interests, which is significantly higher 
in the context o f the former than in the context of the latter.
Let me now anticipate a criticism that could be raised against my present 
contention. One could object that defending a participatory approach to the right to 
privacy does not sit well with my previous claim that the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications ought to be basically conceived as a right of defence against the 
State. Fundamental rights, I said above, are fruits of the liberal tradition and arose as 
marking the line that in modernity separates individuals from the State, thus making this 
line more difficult to trespass over. I then claimed that this conception o f fundamental 
rights ought to be preserved in its essentials. It could very well appear that this
27Ibid. at 248. According to Alexy some basic human rights could also be justified as being a likely 
result of discourse-theoretical debate; yet he admits the difficulties of regarding them as the only 
possible result of such debate (ibid, at 245 et seq.).
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approach to fundamental rights is tied to a contractual conception of the State» which 
draws a line between the individual and the public power. On the other hand» it would 
appear that this approach lies in contradiction with the idea that the State is the result o f  
participation and debate, because this presupposes the non-existence o f  the above- 
mentioned line. Now, it is right to point out that a participatory approach to the State 
can rely on the absence of a division between individuals and the public power, the 
most typical example being the Greek polis. Yet it is wrong to assume that this must 
necessarily be the case. Many participatory theories o f the State assume the modem 
division between the private and the public28. Nor does discourse theory imply the 
inexistence of such a dividing line. Rather, the existence of that line can be regarded as 
necessary to the discourse, because only a division between the private and the public 
can guarantee the autonomy that every individual requires for free deliberation. The 
difference with participatory theories is that, from a participatory point o f view, the line 
between the public and the private does not only split the former from the latter, but 
also helps to define them both. Individual participation in public matters belongs 
precisely to this dividing line, because it helps to construct and to preserve both the area 
of publicity and the area of privacy or negative freedom retained by individuals. If we 
now turn to the right to privacy, we can see that this right can very well be regarded 
primarily as a negative right of defence against the State even if  conceived as a 
participatory right. The difference is that thus regarded privacy stands as a cornerstone 
of democracy, for which it deserves greater respect.
Let me also note that not every version o f liberalism relies on an excluding 
barrier between individuals and the State. My present contention is for example very 
much in tune with, and finds strong support in, Benjamin Constant's liberalism29. 
Constant was a fierce defender o f individual privacy. He praised privacy from the State 
and from the public affairs as the cornerstone for the modem conception o f  liberty: 
whilst "the liberty of the ancients... consisted in an active and constant participation in 
collective power, our freedom must consist o f  peaceful enjoyment and private 
independence"30. Yet at the same time Constant regarded excessive independence from 
public affairs as irresponsible and as a danger for a healthy political system. He liked to
28'Uberal Republicanism' is a case in point (Cass R. Sunstein, "Beyond the Republican Revival" 97 
The Yale L. J. 1539 at 1566 et seq. (1988)). See also Bruce A. Ackerman, "The Storrs Lectures: 
Discovering the Constitution" 93 TheYaleLJ. 1013(1984).
29Most relevant to this argument is the speech given at the Athénée Royal in Paris (1819) "The 
Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the Modems" (in Benjamin Constant. Political Writings. 
Trans, and ed. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 307 et seq.). The 
participatory character of Constant's liberalism is also one of the leading ideas in Stephen Holmes, 
Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modem Liberalism, Yale University Press, 1984 (part. Chapter 
1 and the Epilogue).
30B. Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients....", at 316.
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stress the paradox that excessive civic privatism could undermine the political basis 
necessary for the enjoyment o f  private rights, hence for the enjoyment o f civic 
privatism itself31. He therefore claimed that individuals ought to renounce a certain 
level o f civic privatism and undertake political participation32. In his view, privacy and 
participation in public life (i.e. publicity) were closely interrelated as the two sides of a 
single coin, so that the one was both an end in itself and a means to preserve the other, 
and vice versa. On the one hand, political participation was necessary to ensure a 
political system that would continue to guarantee individual privacy33. Note that 
Constant referred to political participation in discourse-theoretical terms as "la 
discussion publique", as a process o f argumentative, rational discussion which 
encouraged mutual learning and intellectual exchange34. On the other hand, political 
participation, conceived in this discourse-theoretical fashion, was only possible if  
individuals enjoyed a certain area o f  privacy and freedom from social regulation35. In 
sum, Constant went beyond the liberal uninterestedness for the public and the idea of 
'coexistence through mutual indifference' and enriched liberalism with a claim for 
participation through discourse and debate. He thus argued that a participatory and a 
liberal approach to the State could coexist in a fruitful combination.
I hope that the foregoing considerations have succeeded in supporting my 
contention for a participatory approach to the right to privacy and to the right to the 
secrecy o f  telecommunications. I also hope that they have shown the coherence of 
regarding these rights both in a participatory light and as essentially liberal in character. 
Throughout this thesis I try to offer further support to my present contention on a more 
practical basis. In particular, I try to offer some evidence o f the different implications 
both of an individualistic and of a participatory approach to privacy and the secrecy of 
telecommunication, which will give me a chance to show the advantages of the former 
over the latter. We will first be confronted with these two different approaches in 
chapter 1, yet their respective practical implications, particularly the practical 
implications of the individualistic approach, will come to light in more detail in chapters
31S. Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making..., at 247. See also Constant, "The Liberty of the 
Ancientsat 326.
32A balance thus had to be reached between privacy and publicity that would respect the modem 
conception of freedom. Constant regarded representative democracy as the result of this balance. 
Representative democracy allows individuals to participate in public affairs while at the same time it 
frees them from the yoke of these public affairs and leaves them time for their private ones, that is it 
lets them enjoy their liberty in the modem sense of the word (Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients 
at 325-326). This role of representative democracy as a compromise between privacy and publicity 
(a compromise which results in so-called private citizenship) has also been emphasised by Bruce A. 
Ackerman, "The Storrs Lecturespart, in the second lecture, pp. 1032 et seq.
33B. Constant, "The liberty of the Ancients ...", at 323.
34S. Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making..., at 245.
35S. Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making..., at 245-246.
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4 and 5, where I will study the object of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, 
and in chapter 6, where I will study the content of the right.
[3] We have now seen that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is an 
aspect of the more general right to privacy, hence that the way the right to privacy is 
conceived affects the conception of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. This 
close connection between privacy and the secrecy o f telecommunications leads me to 
the third leading argument o f  the thesis, i.e. the idea that drawing the conceptual 
boundaries o f a right in clear terms has significant advantages for the protection of this 
right. Developing this argument seems above all important on account o f the 
uncertainties that surround the definition o f the right to privacy36. In addition, the 
importance o f this argument is enhanced by the rise of telecommunication technologies 
which challenge the present boundaries o f the right to the secrecy o f  
telecommunications. The role that new technologies can play in the definition of this 
right will come to light below. For the moment I will concentrate on the threat that the 
uncertainties surrounding the definition of the right to privacy pose for a clear definition 
of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
The scope o f the right to privacy is highly controversial, that is, it is highly 
controversial exactly which areas of reality the right to privacy embraces and which 
other areas are left out of its scope. In addition, most o f the areas that arguably make up 
the right to privacy are not even held together by a common rationale; rather, many an 
area responds to a rationale o f  its own, which makes the scope o f this right even more 
inaccessible and difficult to grasp. The conceptual boundaries of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications, on the other hand, can easily be drawn in clear terms. To this 
end, it suffices to give the terms 'secrecy' and 'telecommunications' a rather clear 
definition, which does not appear as too difficult a task. Yet, problems o f uncertainty 
and ill definition can also affect the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, precisely 
because this is an aspect of the broader and ill-defined right to privacy. In principle, this 
circumstance need not affect the definition o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, as long as this is recognised as a right independent from privacy, 
that is to say as an independent right that covers an autonomous sub-area within the 
broader area o f privacy. On the other hand, problems might arise if  the right to the 
secrecy o f telecommunications only receives indirect recognition as part o f  the right to 
privacy. For then the risk is high that the secrecy o f  telecommunications be not 
regarded as an autonomous and well-defined area within the broader and ill-defined 
area of privacy, but simply as part of the bric-a-brac that makes up the right to privacy,
36The controversy surrounding the definition of the right to privacy will be addressed in chapter 1.
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as one of the many aspects of privacy that one needs not define beyond the definition of 
privacy itself. On this account, I will argue in this thesis that one should avoid 
subordinating the recognition o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications to the 
recognition of the right to privacy.
Now we may ask, why is it so important that the scope of a right be defined in 
clear terms? O f course, clear definitions help us to establish in which cases a particular 
right is at stake, thus increasing legal certainty. Yet one could wonder whether, and if 
so, "where, when and how far w/icertainty has value"37, for clear definitions can make 
the boundaries of rights rather rigid, too rigid for them to be enlarged so as to embrace 
new circumstances that seem worthy of protection. It thus appears that ill-defined rights 
are more suitable tools to administer material justice than well-defined rights are, since 
the former are more open than the latter to meet new social demands. Let me illustrate 
this point with an example that concerns the rights to privacy and to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. The right to privacy is ill-defined, yet by the same token it allows 
that situations that it does not cover as yet, but that start to be perceived as deserving to 
be considered part of the right, can be included within its scope. The right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications, on the other hand, only covers situations which fit the 
definition o f the term 'telecommunications' and of the term 'secrecy'. This means that 
this right cannot be claimed in cases of person-to-person conversations or in the context 
of telecommunications which are not actually and objectively held in secret, however 
much both these situations might seem worthy o f protection. Now, technological 
developments have presently produced new means of telecommunication which work 
through open channels and which therefore do not provide a solid basis for secrecy. 
Yet some of these new means appear to be so similar to some traditional ones that they 
arouse in the user expectations o f secrecy as high as these traditional means do (I am 
thinking, for example, o f cordless telephones which carry conversations through 
ordinary radio waves accessible to all from an ordinary radio station). Should the 
secrecy of such open-channel means o f telecommunication be included within the right 
to the secrecy o f telecommunications? To be sure, their secrecy can at any rate be 
protected by reference to the right to privacy. The question is whether it should be 
protected as part o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, given how close the 
situation created by these new means is to the traditional scope of this right. If yes, then 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications must suffer some loss in clarity (the term 
'secrecy' would have to be defined on the basis of some looser rationale, instead of by 
reference to the objective existence o f secrecy). If on the other hand this right is to
37Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism - An Answer to Dean Pound" 44 Harv. L. Rev. 
1222 at 1242 (1930-31) (emphasis in original).
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maintain its well-defined boundaries, then it cannot embrace these new means of 
telecommunication.
In brief, the choice is between legal certainty and flexibility. In this thesis I will 
defend the view that legal certainty ought to be preferred to the insecurity o f ill-defined 
rights (hence that open-channel telecommunications ought not to be included within the 
scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications), even at the expense of some 
loss in flexibility. This claim is grounded upon one consideration: the ill definition of a 
right can result not only in an enlargement of its scope, but is also likely to make this 
scope narrower. If in an effort to enlarge the scope of a right its conceptual boundaries 
are made too flexible, then there is the risk that the definition of this right can no longer 
find a common, unifying rationale. If this occurs, the right in question stops being a 
valid point of reference for any legal claims and it becomes difficult to ascertain both 
what this right covers and what it does not cover. Anything can be included within its 
scope and anything can be excluded from it; the scope of this right can be made all- 
embracing, as well as be reduced to a minimum.
If such a situation is reached, the task of deciding what belongs to the scope of 
rights thus loosely defined is ultimately undertaken case by case by the judiciary. This 
might appear as the best solution, for the judiciary can and should act as a recipient of 
the existent social demands concerning the definition of rights. However, leaving the 
definition of fundamental rights at the expense of social demands is precisely part of the 
trouble. Indeed, society can demand that rights embrace new circumstances that seem 
worthy of protection, yet more often than not social demands are likely to go into the 
opposite direction and to encourage that the scope of rights be narrowed. I insisted 
above upon the idea that fundamental rights are held by the individual as instruments of 
defence against the State. Yet I also suggested that in many ways fundamental rights are 
tools laid in the hands of political and social minorities, so that the majority cannot 
exclude them from public debate and a discourse-theoretical way of proceeding can 
prevail. Indeed, it is only too natural that the majority tries to take advantage of its 
position in order to take decisions in an authoritarian manner rather than on the basis of 
discourse, hence that they try to leave minorities out of public debate. It is therefore to 
be expected that the leading voice of society often has a preference against fundamental 
rights being defined in too generous terms and that majoritarian social claims require 
that the scope of a right be narrowed beyond its present boundaries. As I will try to 
illustrate in this thesis, the right to privacy is a case in point
The best way to make sure that the scope of fundamental rights is not left up to 
the simple preferences of the majority, hence that fundamental rights can preserve the
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role of minorities in public deliberation, is by giving these rights a rather clear 
definition, that is a definition which responds to a clear and coherent unifying rationale. 
My contention for a clear definition of rights therefore goes beyond the advantages of 
legal certainty itself -after all legal certainty has also been argued for by sociological 
theories of law on the grounds that the solution o f cases ought to fulfil social 
expectations38. It is also a quest for a certain stability of rights as instruments of 
defence of minorities against the self-centred preferences of the political and social 
majority. I would however like to make one point clear. I am not arguing that law 
should ignore social demands concerning the recognition of new situations as the object 
of fundamental rights. Quite the opposite, law should be encouraged to meet such 
demands. Yet I insist that these should be met by means different to the enlargement of 
the scope of a fundamental right beyond its clear unifying rationale, for this solution 
can very well lead to the undesirable results described above. If new situations arise 
which are thought to deserve protection and which cannot be couched within the 
rationale of any of the existing rights, then it is better to create a new right that embraces 
such new situations rather than to make a well-defined right stop being so. In the case 
of telecommunications carried out through open channels, for example, my contention 
implies that their secrecy should not be covered by the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, for the boundaries of this right would have to be made too loose, 
yet that the protection of their secrecy should be couched within a different area of the 
right to privacy,
I would like to make yet another point clear. My contention that rights ought to 
be well defined does not imply that a right such as privacy ought not to exist at all, on 
the grounds that this definition is intrinsically unclear. It does imply, however, that the 
ill-defined character of the right to privacy ought to be reduced to a minimum. To this 
end, one ought above all to avoid controversy and agree on a definition of privacy. 
Moreover, one ought to agree on a definition which restricts the scope of the right to 
privacy to some of the contended areas with a view to making the unifying rationale of 
the right as clear and easy to identify as possible. In chapter 1 I will propose a 
definition of the right to privacy which tries to fulfil these conditions. Furthermore, the 
coverage of the right to privacy ought to be reserved for those sub-areas of privacy 
which do not stand as autonomous rights. As soon as a part of privacy starts to take 
shape as an autonomous sub-area, and in as far as this appears as better defined than 
privacy itself, such an area should be cut out from the broad scope of privacy and 
defined as an independent right. The right to the secrecy of telecommunications stands
38See, e.g., John Dewey, "Logical Method and Law", 10 The Cornell L. Q. 17, part, at 26 (1924-25); 
Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism ..." at 1244 (1930-31).
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as one such area, hence it should always be regarded as an independent right the 
rationale of which ought be kept clear. The different implications of an independent 
recognition of this right and of recognising this right by reference to the right to privacy 
will come to light in chapters 4 and 5, as I study the object of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications.
The three arguments developed above will constitute the leading thread of my 
study of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. This study will take the form of 
a comparison, that is I will try to develop the three above arguments as I compare the 
way the secrecy of telecommunications is protected in different systems. As elements of 
this comparison I have chosen the European Convention on Human Rights (henceforth 
ECHR), Germany and the United States of America. Germany and the United States 
stand as representative examples of the two different approaches to the rights to privacy 
and to the secrecy of telecommunications illustrated in points 2 and 3 above. In 
Germany, privacy is viewed as a participatory right, so that the recognition and 
protection of the right to privacy (hence the recognition and protection of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications) is regarded as an essential condition for democracy. In 
addition, the German Basic Law recognises the secrecy of telecommunications as a 
fundamental right independent from, though somewhat related to, the right to privacy, 
hence the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications can be and actually is defined in 
rather clear terms. In the United States, the approach to privacy and to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is the complete opposite. To begin with, the right to privacy (hence 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications) is regarded as a purely individualistic 
interest the protection of which is thought to go against the well-being o f society and 
democracy. In addition, the right to the secrecy of telecommunications receives 
constitutional recognition and protection only in as far as it is part of the broader right to 
privacy. A comparison between Germany and the United States will help us to 
appreciate the advantages for the right to the secrecy of telecommunications that the 
double position adopted by Germany has over the one adopted by the United States.
The third element of this comparison, the ECHR, will enrich this study of the 
right of the secrecy of telecommunications in at least two different ways. First of all, 
the ECHR places itself at the borderline between certainty and flexibility in the 
definition of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. To be sure, the ECHR 
defines this right in clear terms, yet it also offers an example of the dangers entailed by 
a non-clear definition of this right; to be precise, it offers an example of the dangers of 
defining this right by reference to a non-clear and rather loose rationale. Second and 
most important, the ECHR illustrates very clearly the ideas I developed in point 1 
above. It illustrates the advantages of conceiving the right to the secrecy of
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telecommunications essentially as a negative right of defence against the State in the 
most liberal fashion» while it also shows the possibility and the advantages o f adding a 
positive dimension, even a subjective positive dimension, to this essentially negative 
right. This conception of the secrecy of telecommunications in the ECHR differs from 
the way in which it is conceived in Germany and in the United States: neither the 
German Constitutional Court nor the United States Supreme Court have sustained the 
liberal character of this right with consistency; nor have they taken the step of 
recognising in this right an additional positive subjective dimension.
In addition, the ECHR has significant influence upon the recognition and 
protection of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in Germany. Admittedly, 
the Convention does not prevail over the German Basic Law or even over German 
ordinary laws. According to art. 59 of the Basic Law, international treaties enjoy the 
same level in the hierarchy of norms as federal laws do. Yet the position predominantly 
sustained both by German authors and by the Federal Constitutional Court is that the 
Convention, as interpreted by the Convention's organs, must be complied with in the 
interpretation and application o f German fundamental rights even by the Constitutional 
Court39.
Including the ECHR within this thesis forces me to be more precise as to its 
object. The purpose of this thesis is to study the right to the secrecy  of 
telecommunications, which in principle excludes any considerations as to the freedom 
to engage in telecommunications. This is not to deny the obvious fact that, in order that 
telecommunications can be granted complete protection, both their freedom and their 
secrecy must be guaranteed. Nevertheless, I have preferred to regard the freedom to 
communicate and the secrecy o f telecommunications as two different rights and have 
chosen to study only the second one.
Freedom to and secrecy o f telecommunications are also regarded as independent 
constitutional rights in both Germany and in the United States. In Germany, art. 10 of 
the Basic Law recognises the secrecy of telecommunications; on the other hand, the 
freedom to communicate is not explicitly recognised as a fundamental right, yet it has 
been couched by the Constitutional Court within the general right of freedom 
recognised in art. 2.1 of the Basic Law40. In the United States, the freedom to and the
390n this issue, see Jochen Abr. Frowein, "The Federal Republic of Germany" in M. DeImas*Mary 
(ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. International Protection versus 
National Restrictions, pp. 121-129, Kluwer Academic Publishers. The Netherlands, 1992.
40See BVerfGE 90, 255 at 259 et seq. The issue of art. 2.1 and the general right of freedom it 
recognises will be addressed in section 2 of chapter 1.
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secrecy of telecommunications have been classified by the Supreme Court under the 
heading of two different rights» namely the right to free speech (first amendment)41 and 
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures (fourth amendment), respectively. 
Only in the context of European Convention on Human Rights is the situation different. 
Art. 8 of the Convention recognises a "right to respect for correspondence" which 
embraces both the freedom to engage in and the secrecy of telecommunications. The 
doctrinal developments of this article thus apply to both these rights; in fact, part of the 
doctrine applied to the secrecy of telecommunications has originally been developed 
with reference to the freedom to engage in telecommunications. The two rights in 
question thus exert some influence upon each other, additionally, their common 
recognition has some influence upon the scope of the right to correspondence taken as a 
whole. In the light of these circum stances, the freedom to engage in 
telecommunications will have to be paid some attention in the context of the ECHR.
Let me now draw out what will be the structure of this thesis. In chapter 1 1 will 
address some preliminary questions concerning the reasons why the secrecy of 
telecommunications should be protected as a constitutional right. I will also propose a 
definition of privacy for its use in the context of the thesis. In chapter 2 1 will study the 
historical development of the right of the secrecy of telecommunications. Only then will 
I focus on the object of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, that is on the 
scope embraced by this right. This will be studied for three chapters: chapter 3 will deal 
with the structure of the right to the secrecy of telecommunication and will draw a 
distinction between the coverage and the protected scope of this right. Chapter 4 will 
then concentrate on its coverage and chapter 5 on its protected scope. After the object, 
attention will be shifted to the content of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, 
that is to the juridical claims with which its holders are provided to defend its exercise; 
this will be the purpose of chapter 6. Finally, in chapter 7 1 deal with the issue of who 
are the subjects of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, that is the double 
issue of who are the holders (who can claim its protection) and who are the addressees 
of this right (against whom can the right be claimed). A last remark: as far as Germany 
and the United States are concerned, this thesis will concentrate on the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications as recognised in their respective Federal Constitutions. 
Accordingly, attention will focus primarily on the constitutional texts and case law, 
whereas the statutory regulation of this right will be taken into account only in as far as 
it contributes to the understanding of the constitutional right itself. *463
41See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General of the C/.S., 381 US 301 (1965); Ginzburg v. US, 383 US
463 (1966): Bount v. Rizzi, 400 US 410 (1971); US v. Reidel, 402 US 351 (1971); Procunier v. 
Navarette, 434 US 555 (1978);7ttrner v. Safley. 482 US 78 (1987); Sable Communications of Cal. 
Inc. v. Federal Communication Commission, 492 US 115 (1989).
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CH APTER 1: REASONS FO R PR O TEC TIN G  TH E SECRECY  OF 
TELECO M M U N IC A TIO N S
Introduction
The protection of telecommunications is a pervasive concern in western legal 
systems. Most contemporary written Constitutions and Bills of Rights recognise the 
secrecy o f telecommunications as a fundamental right. This is the case with those 
countries in the EEC with a written constitutional document1, with the only exception 
of Ireland. Moreover, in Constitutions where the secrecy of telecommunications is not 
explicitly mentioned, it has been found to fall within the scope of some other 
constitutional clause. That is notably the case with the United States of America where 
the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution2 has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to cover not only the secrecy of private letters -"papers"- but also the 
secrecy of telephone conversations3. It thus seems that most western constitutional 
systems agree in ranking the secrecy of telecommunications among the rights deserving 
of constitutional protection, in particular among the so-called 'fundamental rights'.
Now we may ask, what are the reasons why the secrecy of telecommunications 
deserves constitutional attention as a fundamental right both in Europe and in the United 
States of America? The immediate, uncontroversial answer is that the secrecy of this 
particular mode of communication belongs to the privacy of individuals, privacy being 
a value worthy of constitutional protection. This answer, however, only brings to light 
further questions: why is privacy a value worthy of protection?; if it is, why is it not 
simply and overtly protected as such by constitutional texts?; more fundamentally, why 
do Constitutions pay particular attention to the area of privacy embodied by the secrecy 
of telecommunications?
1Ait. 22 of the Constitution of Belgium (1831); art. 72 of the Constitution of Denmark (1953); art. 10 
of the Basic Law of Germany (1949); art. 19 of the Constitution of Greece (1975); art. 15 of the 
Constitution of Italy (1947); art. 28 of the Constitution of Luxembourg (1868); art. 13 of the 
Constitution of the Netherlands (1983); art. 34 of the Constitution of Portugal (1976, first revision 
1982); art. 18 of the Constitution of Spain (1978). Constitutions dating from the XIX century only 
mention the protection of letters (Belgian Constitution) or of both correspondence and telegrams 
(Constitution of Luxembourg).
2"The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized"
3Case of Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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The following sections will attempt to give an answer to the above questions. 
Before facing them, however, I will focus on the definition of privacy. Given the 
central role played by privacy in the protection o f the secrecy of telecommunications, 
the definition of this temi appears as an appropriate starting point.
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Section 1: The Concept of Privacy
1 . A First Look a t the C oncept o f Privacy
Defining privacy has not proven to be easy. Commentators have disagreed 
about the concept and the scope o f privacy since it became a matter of juridical concern. 
Disagreement has increased over time, as new situations arose in which privacy could 
arguably be seen to be at stake. Given the complex background of the concept of 
privacy, this section will not attempt another definition of it. Rather, it will be devoted 
to the more modest but no less difficult task of throwing some light upon the problems 
that are involved in its definition. This section is meant to clarify what the word 
'privacy' means in different contexts and, more importantly, it is meant to clarify what 
privacy means in this thesis. Also for the sake of clarity, I will begin by looking at the 
origins of the term in juridical circles. Only then will I consider the issue of how 
privacy should be defined as it stands today.
1 .1  T he Origins o f 'P r iv a c y '
The legal origins of privacy can be traced back to the United States at the end of 
last century, more particularly to the famous article o f Charles Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy", which today stands as a classical piece of legal 
literature4. It is in Warren and Brandeis' article that privacy was for the first time clearly 
asserted as a valuable social interest which ought to be explicitly protected by judges. In 
order to support their claim, Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy had already been 
considered as an implicit value worthy of protection in the common law. Common-law 
rights to intellectual and artistic property already existed and their judicial protection 
was re-interpreted as indicative o f a broader interest in privacy. Thus more specific 
rights brought to light broader principles5. This interest in privacy implicit in the 
common law led Warren and Brandeis to conclude that privacy itself was to be 
considered as a common-law right. Being a common-law right, privacy ought to be 
entitled to independent recognition and receive general and consistent application.
44 Harv. L. Rev. 193(1890).
5As main examples they refer to the cases of Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652; 
Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825); Tuck v. Priester, 19 Q.B.D. 639 (1887); Pollard v. 
Photographic Co.t 40 Chi, Div. 345 (1888); Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 J. &  W. 394 (1820).
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Privacy, of course, had a very specific meaning for Warren and Brandeis. Their 
article appeared as a reaction against the increasing intrusion of the press into peoples' 
private lives, an intrusion which, in their view, was "overstepping in every direction 
the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency"6 7. The prime aim of their article was to 
find a legal basis for a tort action against such intrusions. The concept o f privacy was 
thus suitably shaped to support a battle against the powerful mass media. Describing it 
as "the right to be let alone'17, Warren and Brandeis conceived privacy as the right of an 
individual to keep his peace of mind (to protect "his thoughts, sentiments and 
emotions"8) by way of preventing unconsented publication and reproduction of his 
works of art, papers, image and voice, or of any fact regarding him -in other words, of 
any aspect of his personality, as long as the public or the general interest were not 
concerned.
Although the publication of the article by Warren and Brandeis had little 
immediate effect upon law-making and case law9, the attention of other writers was at 
once drawn to privacy10. The innovative character of their ideas had a positive
6Ibid. p. 196. Their article was a reaction against the sensationalist coverage of the social life of 
members of Warren's family.
7Ibid. 195,205. The expression was taken from the work of Judge Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on 
the Law of Torts, 2nd ed, 1888, p. 29. On the basis of this particular source, the appropriateness of 
using the phrase for Warren and Brandeis' purposes has been called into question. Walter F. Pratt 
("Warren and Brandeis Argument for a right to Privacy", (1975) Public Law, 161 at 163) has contended 
that Judge Cooley "wrote of 'the right to be let alone' as explicative of 'the right to immunity from 
attacks and injuries'; he was simply listing and explaining what he considered to be rights which every 
government is expected to recognise....The expression 'the right to be let alone' which has become a 
trademark of the Warren and Brandeis article had originally no relation to privacy even though Warren 
and Brandeis used it as synonymous with privacy".
8Ibid. p. 205.
9In the nineteenth century, only a few cases were -timidly- solved on the independent basis of a right to 
privacy. According to William L. Prosser ("Privacy", 48 Calif L. Rev., 383, 385, notes 8-10 (I960)) 
these cases were just the following: Manola v. Stevens (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1890), unreported (see
N.Y.Times, June 15,18, 21, 1890); Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas. 402, 
18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 980 (Super. Ct. N.Y.City 
1893); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E.22 (1895); Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 
280 (D.Mass. 1894). According to the same source (p. 386, note 15), the first case clearly recognising 
a right to privacy was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190,50 S.E. 68 (1905), 
although we will have to wait until the thirties to see a settled judiciary trend in favour of the direct 
protection of privacy in tort cases (see also Hairy Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law -Were Warren and 
Brandeis Wrong?" Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 31, 326, 327, (1966)). For the most 
influential early cases denying a right to privacy see Louis Nizer, "The Right of Privacy -A Half 
Century Developments" 39 Mich. L. Rev., 526, 531-534 (1941).
10Let me mention some of the literature I have had access to: O'Brien, "The Right to Privacy", 2 Col.
L. Rev., 437 (1902); Larremore, "The Law of Privacy", 12 Col. L. Rev. 693 (1912); Lisle, "The 
Right of Privacy (a Contra View)", 19 Ky. L J. 137 (1931); Winfield, "Privacy", 47 L. Q. Rev., 23 
(1931); Nizer, "The Right of Privacy", 39 Mich. L. Rev., 526 (1941); Feinberg, "Recent 
Developments in the Law of Privacy", 48 Col. L. Rev. 713 (1948); Ludwig, "Teace of Mind" in 48 
Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy", 32 Minn L. Rev. 734 (1948); Symposium on Privacy in Law 
and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 31, 252 (1966); Hyman Gross, "The Concept of Privacy", 42 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 35 (1967); Charles Fried, "Privacy", 77 Yale L. J. 475 (1968); The Right to Privacy. A 
Symposium on the Implications of Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S.479 (1965), Da Capo Press, 
New York, 1971; Pennock and Chapman (ed.). Privacy, Nomos XIII, New York (1971); Louis Lusky,
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influence upon most contemporary authors, a large number of whom welcomed and 
accepted them* 11. Their article, however, was and still is heavily criticised on different 
grounds: for example, the need and viability o f protecting privacy has been 
challenged12; the "mass communication tort of privacy" has been criticised13; doubt has 
been cast on the reliability of the cases put forward to illustrate that privacy already 
enjoyed some limited and indirect protection in the common-law tradition14; even the 
pioneering character of the article has been questioned15. Similarly, the guide-lines 
concerning the concept of privacy offered by Warren and Brandeis have not always 
been accepted16.
Thus, Warren and Brandeis' article introduced the issue of the protection o f 
privacy, but left the question of the definition of privacy far from settled. Yet, even if  
writers had unanimously agreed with the ideas contained therein, this would still be the 
case; for Wanen and Brandeis did not give complete enough an answer to the question 
at issue. Affirming that the concept of privacy includes freedom from unwanted 
intrusion of the press in one's own affairs, if admitted, is clearly insufficient17. Outside 
that area, different aspects of individuals' lives have actually been identified with 
privacy in a more or less debatable way, as will be discussed below. The reference to 
the "right to be let alone" is not much more helpful. Vivid though it may be, the 
expression is "hyperbolic on its face"18, too vague and ill-defined, so that, although
"Invasion of Privacy: a Clarification of Concepts", 72 Col. L. Rev. 693 (1972); Louis Henkin, 
"Privacy and Autonomy", 74 Col. L. Rev. 1410 (1974); Walter F. Pratt, "Warren and Brandeis 
Argument Gary L Bostwick, "A Taxonomy of Privacy; Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate 
Decision", 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1447 (1976); Barren, "W. &  B., The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.. 
193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation", 13 Suffolk U. L. Rev.. 875 (1979); Richard A. 
Posner, "The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court", Sup. Ct. Rev. 173 (1979); Ruth 
Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of Law" 89 Yale L. J. 421 (1980); W.A. Parent, "Recent Work on 
the Concept of Privacy", 20 Am. Phil. Q. 341 (1983); Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy. An Anthology. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1984; David Bedingfield, "Privacy or 
Publicity? The Enduring Confusion Surrounding the American Tort of Invasion of Privacy", 55 
Modern L. Rev.. Ill (1992). See also Notes, 12 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1912); "The Right to Privacy 
Today", 43 Harv. L Rev.. 297 (1929-30); 30 Cornell L. Q. 398 (1945); 'The Right to Privacy in 
Nineteenth Century America", 94 Harv. L. Rev.. 1892 (1981).
11 "With a few exceptions, writers have agreed, expressly or tacitly, with Warren and Brandeis" (W.L. 
Prosser, "Privacy", at 384).
12Denis O ’Brien, "The Right to Privacy" at 445; Note, "The Right to Privacy Today" 43 Harv. L. 
Rev.. 297 (1929-1930).
13H. Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law ..." at 333-339.
14Walter F. Pratt, "Warren and Brandeis Argument..."; H. Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law ..." at 
329-330.
15Note, "The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America", 94 Harv. L Rev., 1892 (1981). It is 
argued that the concept of privacy as understood by Wanen and Brandeis had already been accorded some 
-limited- explicit protection in the legal world.
16See, e.g., Barren, "W. &  B., The Right to Privacy,Bedingfield, "Privacy or Publicity? 
Lisle, "The Right of Privacy..."; Harry Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law
17See in this regard H. Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law..." at 330.
18L. Lusky, "Invasion of Privacy ..." at 696.
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writers have liked to adhere to it on account of its powerful image, it has not always 
provided a solid enough basis for consensus.
As a result, for over one century, authors, particularly in the United States, 
have struggled to analyse the concept of privacy systematically. Since the principle of 
the protection of privacy has been largely accepted by American courts, a great part of 
this effort has gone on rationalising court decisions adopted on the basis of a general 
privacy tort, on classifying them according to the aspect of privacy seen to be at stake, 
and frequently on criticising their understanding of the right to privacy19.
1 ,2  'Privacy* Today
As the above historical overview shows, the rise of privacy in juridical circles 
was controversial and unsystematic. This background explains the diversity of 
viewpoints from which privacy is approached today and the lack of agreement on its 
definition. Certainly, there exists a prima facie agreement as to its core. In this respect, 
legal literature barely mirrors what could be described as the basic popular 
understanding of privacy in the context of our western societies. It seems, in fact, 
uncontroversial that privacy includes the right to seclusion or solitude20 (right to 
repose21, right to anonymity22 or against unwanted intrusion23). The same may be said
19for example, W. Feinberg, "Recent Developments ..." at 717) classifies the privacy tort cases in four 
groups, according to the "interests of personality" protected by them: interest in life history, in 
likeness, in name, and interest in privacy "as ordinarily understood", that is, as protection against 
unwanted intrusions. Prosser ("Privacy" at 389), focusing on the activities proscribed in privacy tons 
cases, identifies four different tons under that common headline: "intrusion upon the plaintiffs 
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; 
publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; appropriation, for the defendant's 
advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness". G.L. Bostwick's ("A Taxonomy of Privacy ...") 
classifies the protected areas of privacy: privacy of repose, of sanctuary and of intimate decisions, the 
latter being the most recent category, introduced by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 
(381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
20W. S. Prosser, ’'Privacy", at 389-392; R. A. Posner, "The Uncertain Protection of Privacy ..." at 
175 (who refers to seclusion as "physical privacy"); R. Gavison, 'Privacy and the Limits of Law" at 
428.
21 Gary L. Bostwick, "A Taxonomy of Privacyat 1451-1456.
22R. Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of Law" at 428.
^W. Feinberg, "Recent Developments..." at 725.
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of the references to privacy as to the "control of information about oneself*24 (privacy 
as secrecy25 or sanctuary26).
Outside that area of consensus, the scope of privacy has been heavily debated. 
Let me give the two most significant examples. First, the Supreme Court o f the United 
States has identified privacy with "autonomy", understood, in particular, as a right to 
make one’s own intimate decisions such as those concerning the use of 
contraceptives27. This identification has been criticised28 on the grounds that the terms 
"privacy" and "autonomy" stand for different concepts and for different kinds of rights 
of freedom. To be more precise, it has been argued that the former describes an area 
where individuals should be free from intrusion, whereas the latter refers to 
individuals' freedom to act in the way they wish, that is it describes an area of 
individual liberty. It has even been argued that by using the term 'privacy* to refer to a 
freedom to act the Supreme Court wrongly "equates privacy with the purposes for 
which people want privacy"29. These criticisms are particularly relevant since the idea 
of personal autonomy to take intimate decisions has been the cornerstone of the 
recognition of privacy as a general, all-embracing constitutional right.
Second, American courts have included within the realm of the right to privacy 
protected in tort law the "right to one's name and likeness"30, i.e. the right of every 
individual to control the use made of his own name and his own image -a typical case 
of violation of this right is the unconsented use of the plaintiffs name or likeness (e.g. 
of a photograph) in advertising or for other purposes31. The inclusion of this right as 
part of privacy has been contested. It has been argued against it that one's name and 
likeness, rather than being aspects of the right to privacy are part of the "right of 
publicity (...) which is a right to make money out of one's public prominence"32, "a
24Louis Lusky, "Invasion of Privacy ..." at 693; Charles Fried, "Privacy" at 482. Parent criticises the 
idea that privacy can be defined as 'control of information about oneself, yet his definition of privacy as 
"absence of undocumented personal knowledge about a person" corresponds to this very idea of control 
(see Parent, "Recent Work..." at 343 and 346 -emphasis added).
25C. Fried, "Privacy" at 482; R.A. Posner, "The Uncertain Protection of Privacy ..." at 175; R. 
Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of Law" at 428.
26G.L. Bostiwick, "A Taxonomy of Privacy ...", at 1456-1465.
27Case of Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
28See L. Henkin, "Privacy and Autonomy" at 1425 et seq.; Posner, "The Uncertain Protection of 
Privacy ..." at 193; Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of Law" at 438; Parent, "Recent Work ..." at 
343.
29Posner, 'The Uncertain Protection of Privacy..." at 193.
30Feinberg, "Recent Developments ..." at 721; Prosser, "Privacy" at 389.
3Examples of such cases can be found in Feinberg, "Recent Developments ..." at 721 et seq.; 
Bedingfield, "Privacy or Publicity? ..."; M. B. Nimmer, "The right of publicity", 19 Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 203 (1954); and H. R. Gordon, "Right of Property in Name, Likeness, 
Personality and History" 55 Nw. U. L. Rev., 553 (1960).
32Hofstadter and Horowitz, The Right of Privacy, Central Book Co., New York, 1964, p. 6.
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commercial right akin to copyright or trademark"33; in other words, a kind of property 
right. Criticisms on this point also have important consequences for the definition of 
privacy. The reason is that the protection of the right to one's name and to one's 
likeness played a central role in the development of a judicial trend towards the 
protection of privacy in the field of tort law34.
2 , T he Distinction between "Privacy" and  "Publicityw.
The reference to the right of publicity made above offers a valuable hint as to 
how to approach the definition of privacy. The concepts of privacy and publicity can be 
juxtaposed in such a way that each one of them is defined in opposition to the other. As 
an approach to that defmition and to a better understanding of the intricacies involved 
therein, it will thus be illuminating to contrast the concept of privacy with the concept of 
publicity. This is what I shall try to do in the following pages.
The distinction between privacy and publicity can be drawn in two different 
contexts. I will refer to them as 'the context of civil society' and 'the context of the 
political organisation of power'. In the context of civil society, the opposition between 
publicity and privacy can be drawn in the following way. Publicity can be identified 
with the areas of one’s self that are exposed to other individuals in such a manner and 
to such an extent that they can be considered as part of a space occupied by all. Privacy, 
on the other hand, embraces those other aspects of one's self that each individual 
withdraws from general knowledge and keeps apart from society. It follows from this 
distinction that, in this 'civil' context, societies and social relationships can only be 
based on publicity. That is to say, only publicity or the public aspects of the lives of a 
group o f individuals provide the grounds needed for the existence o f a society. 
Societies, in fact, can be conceived as networks of reciprocal relations among
33D. Bedingfield, "Privacy or Publicity? ..." at 112. The phrase "right to publicity" was first used by 
Jerome Frank in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Cum (202 Fed. 2nd 866 (1953)). This case 
encouraged the recognition of publicity values as rights worthy of protection which are distinct from 
the right to privacy and closer to the right to property. Although some cases followed this trend (see 
Hofstadter and Horowitz, The Right of Privacy, at 64 et seq.), the judicial protection of publicity rights 
has continued to be intermingled with the recognition of a right to privacy (see D. Bedingfield, 
"Privacy or Publicity? ..."). For a thorough analysis of the confusion surrounding the distinction 
between "privacy" and "publicity" in this context and of the implications of this confusion, see M. B. 
Nimmer ("The right of publicity") and H. R. Gordon ("Right of Property in Name...").
34The right to one's name and likeness appears in Feinberg's and in Prosser's classifications of the tort 
cases on privacy (see above footnote 19), the second one of which has been largely influential in the 
development of the law of privacy (incidentally, note that even Prosser has doubts as to the privacy or 
the property nature of this right -"Privacy" at 406-407). Furthermore, in some states, such as New 
York (N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52), the right to one's name and likeness has embodied all the 
protection accorded to privacy (see H.D. Krause, "The Right to Privacy in Germany -Pointers for 
American Legislation?" (1965) Duke L. 7„ 481,503).
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individuals' areas of publicity. The relevance of this close connection between publicity 
and society for the protection of privacy will come to light below.
V
Moving to the context of the political organisation of power, the term 'publicity' 
refers to the political power, whereas ’privacy' refers to civil society to the extent that it 
is distinct from the former. Thus, in the political context, the term privacy embraces 
both privacy and publicity as described in the 'civil' context. This line between privacy 
and publicity in the political context has not always been drawn. To be precise, 
'political' privacy has been opposed to 'political' publicity only since the medieval 
political structures were replaced by the modem State35. Both in ancient and in 
medieval times, the social and political organisations of communities coincided. In the 
ancient cities, political participation was an essential aspect of being part o f society36. 
Similarly, medieval societies were organized into different strata of free citizens which 
were related to one another not only by social and economic links but also by links of 
political dependence. No clear borderline could then be drawn between political 
structures and social relations; rather, the former were so complex that they overlapped 
with all aspects of the latter. As a consequence, a distinction between political publicity 
and privacy did not exist in pre-modem communities.
The public and the private -'political'- spheres have been kept separate only 
since modem States arose. As a matter of fact, these arose on the basis of a distinction 
between the public person or sovereign and the private person or citizen37. In this new 
context, a line was drawn between the rights and duties of the former and those of the 
latter, similarly, a distinction was imposed between the role to be played by citizens as 
persons or as members of society38 -private rights and duties- and the rights and duties
35In this ’political' sense, privacy can be identified with negative freedom, that is, with "the area within 
which the subject is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be without interference by 
other persons [or the State]", as opposed to positive freedom, which has to do with the control over 
decisions concerning oneself, hence with the control over political power (Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays 
on Liberty, p. 121-122. Oxford 1969). In the context of this terminology, it has been pointed out that, 
contrary to positive freedom, negative freedom "is not a prominent ideal, or perhaps an explicit ideal at 
all, before the Renaissance, or even, in its full form, the beginning of the eighteenth century” -that is 
to say, before the rise of modem States (I* Berlin, ib. Introduction, p. xli-xlii).
36Although slaves belonged to the community in the broad sense, strictly speaking they were not 
members of society. The civil society was exclusively composed by free individuals (see in this regard
J. Pérez Royo, Introducción a la Teoría del Estado, Barcelona 1980, pp. 129 et seq).
37The theory of the social contract illustrates this point. In a State "outre que la personne publique, 
nous avons à considérer les personnes privées qui la composent, et dont la vie et la liberté sont 
naturellement indépendantes d'elle”. In this context the State was conceived as "un engagement 
réciproque du public avec les particuliers, et que chaque individuase trouve engagé sous un double 
rapport: savoir, comme membre du souverain envers les particuliers, et comme membre de l'État envers 
le souverain" (J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, in Écrits Politiques, Le livre de poche, Paris 1992, 
pp. 240 and 229 resp.).
38Cifr. J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social at 240.
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of citizens as subjects -public rights and duties39. Fundamental rights arose as 
examples of this latter category of rights. Conceived as public rights of citizens against 
the State, they came to offer protection to 'political' privacy, that is they came to 
strengthen the line which separated the State ('political' publicity) from the sphere of 
society ('political' privacy)40. The distinction between fundamental and private rights 
of citizens was thus made to lie in their respective addressees (the public power as 
opposed to other members of society), not necessarily in their object, which could very 
well coincide.
The lack of a distinction between political privacy and publicity in pre-state 
political structures had some consequences upon 'civil' privacy as well, that is, upon 
those areas that individuals may retain and keep separate from their social relations. In 
particular, that lack of distinction tended to narrow the scope o f 'civil' privacy and to 
weaken its actual protection. As was noted above, civil societies are built on the basis 
of a prior surrender of some areas of an individual's self to 'civil' publicity, since 
'civil' publicity appears as an essential requirement for the existence of societies. It is 
thus only natural that societies tend to enlarge the area of publicity upon which their 
existence is based, so that they can prevent anti-social conduct and thus ensure their 
preservation and growth. As a result, societies, far from providing for a mechanism for 
the protection of an individual's privacy, intrinsically stand as a major threat to it. The 
scope of an individual's 'civil' privacy and its actual protection must therefore be 
primarily guaranteed against society. To this end, individuals must rely on a power 
different from and politically superior to society41. Such a power, as pointed out 
above, cannot be found in pre-modem political organisations, for here social and 
political structures coincide, hence political power was as unable as is society to protect 
'civil' privacy. Direct protection of an individual's privacy thus appeared as rather 
unfeasible.
39In the writings of some modem authors such as Locke and Kant the contrast between society and the 
State implies an opposition between the natural character of the former and the artificial character of the 
latter. As a consequence, "natural law" would be identified with "private law", that is, with those laws 
ruling the relations among people as members of society; on the other hand, "public law", which 
regulates the structure and functioning of the State and its relations with citizens as subjects, would be 
considered an artificial creation of the State (see J. Pérez Royo, Introducción a la Teoria ... at 173 et 
seq).
40See S. Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modem Liberalism, Yale University, 1984, 
p. 56.
41 The difference in the position of individuals vis-à-vis society and vis-à-vis a political power 
independent from the former is illustrated by the theories of social contract. Two kinds of 'social 
contract* have been distinguished: "One was concluded between individual persons and supposedly gave 
birth to society; the other was concluded between a people and its ruler and supposedly resulted in 
legitimate govemment". In the first case, individuals "lose, by virtue of reciprocation, their isolation, 
while in the other instance it is precisely their isolation which is safeguarded and protected(Hannah 
Arendt, On Revolution, 1965, Penguin Books, rep. 1990, p. 169-171 -emphasis added).
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mThe pre-modem world, however, did not leave 'civil* privacy absolutely 
defenceless. Privacy was the object of indirect protection, namely through the 
protection accorded to private property. In pre-modem societies, in fact, private 
property was conceived as "a sort of private enclave split off from the general political 
[hence social] domain"42. It was, hence, the only possible "dividing line between 
public and private"43. On these grounds, property was the most important, though 
indirect, source of protection not just of privacy, but of all individual freedoms.
The only direct source of protection of individual privacy is therefore a political 
power distinct from society itself to which this latter has to submit, a power to which 
people relate as independent individuals from a position of equality. In other words, 
only a political power such as the State44 is in the position to guarantee a space where 
individuals can be free from the interference of other persons45. To offer the possibility 
of protecting, however, should not be mistaken for actual protection. Even in modem 
political structures freedom in general and privacy in particular continue to be 
guaranteed by means of the protection of private property46. The evolution of the 
protection of privacy in the United States, as will be dealt with in a later chapter, is a 
very good example of the predominant role of property in the protection of individual 
rights.
To summarise, the foregoing notes on the distinction between privacy and 
publicity offer a point of departure from which to approach the question of what is the 
scope of the term 'privacy'. In particular, they were meant to convey the idea that the 
term privacy can be defined with respect to two different contexts, namely the civil and
42Stephen Holmes, Benjamin Constant and the Making ,. at 64.
43Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, at 252.
44I am aware of the simplicity of this conception of the State, which responds to liberal political 
patterns. In contemporary societies the boundaries between State and society are not so clear-cut. 
Simultaneous and reciprocal movements of approach are taking place: as the State moves toward 
society, the latter produces institutions which rival with the former in public power and organization 
(see, e.g., R. M. Unger, Law in Modem Society, New York, 1976, pp. 192 et seq.). Nevertheless, the 
liberal premise of the separation of State and society still underlies the structure of contemporary States 
to such an extent that the political distinction between "privacy" and "publicity" as depicted above can 
still be considered basically valid.
45It is telling that in the early modernity 'civil' privacy was often confused with the definition of an 
area of 'political* privacy, that is they spoke of the protection of 'civil' privacy when they were really 
referring to the distinction of society from the State. This is clear in statements such as Saint-Just's: 
"La liberté du peuple est dans sa vie privée" (quotation taken from Spiros Simitis, "Reviewing Privacy 
in an Information Society" 135 U. Pa. L. Rev., 707 at 730).
46As has been pointed out, property rights offered the only realm for the protection of freedom all 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for then the State, in its liberal conception, had 
amongst its primary aims "not...to guarantee liberties but to protect property; it was property, and not 
the law as such, that guaranteed freedom.... [W]ho said property, said freedom, and to recover or defend 
one's property rights was the same as to Fight for freedom" (H. Arendt, On Revolution at 180). Only in 
the twentieth century have persons and personal freedoms become the object of direct protection.
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the political. In the civil context, privacy must be opposed to and claimed against 
society; in the political context, privacy must be opposed to and claimed against the 
political power. In both cases, the protection of privacy must be provided for by the 
State.
3 .  'Civil* Privacy and  'P olitical1 P rivacy
As noted above, privacy can be defined with respect to two different contexts, 
which have been referred to, respectively, as civil and political. On the basis of this 
distinction, the concepts which fall within the scope of privacy could be classified into 
two groups, the group of those concepts considered to be 'civil' privacy and the group 
of those considered to be 'political' privacy.
3 .1  'Civil* P rivacy
It is worthy of note that, in its civil sense, privacy embraces all those concepts 
which are undisputably regarded as aspects of privacy by all: both privacy as secrecy 
and privacy as seclusion or solitude47 must be fundamentally opposed to and claimed 
against society and against the degree of civil publicity that society imposes on 
individuals. Yet, although the undisputed areas of privacy belong to its civil sense, not 
all concepts claimed to be 'civil' privacy are uncontroversial. The protection of one's 
name and likeness is a case in point.
As was mentioned above, the inclusion of this right as part of 'civil' privacy by 
American courts has aroused doctrinal controversy. This controversy can now be better 
understood, since it concerns precisely the borderline between 'civil* privacy and 
publicity. The underlying idea seems to be that 'one's name and likeness' ought not to 
be considered part o f 'civil' privacy but part of'civil' publicity, since at the core of this 
right there lies the economic profit which can derive from the -public- exploitation of 
one’s name and likeness. To be more precise, commentators ultimately make the 
criticism that the right to the public exploitation o f one's name and likeness ('civil' 
publicity) has been unduly mixed up with the aspects of ’civil' privacy (seclusion and 
secrecy) which are related to these two personal values. This confusion recalls the time
47NonetheIess, the scope of the political concept of privacy proves useful to assert when an intrusion 
has taken place. In this context, account must sometimes be taken of the "public" or "private" character 
of documents, persons, premises or activities. All these cases fall within the political realm of the 
distinction privacy/publicity as described above. With respect to this, see StrOmholm's Working Paper 
on the Right of Privacy, Nordic Conference of Jurists, Stockholm, 1967, pp. 30-36.
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when property provided the only grounds for the protection of individuals' privacy, 
that is the time when one's property rights had to be claimed in order that one's privacy 
was protected. In other words, American judges seem to interpret property-right claims 
(claims concerning the exploitation of one's name or likeness) as formal claims of 
which the real purpose is to protect an area of privacy and therefore label them as 
privacy claims.
Although 'civil' privacy can be fundamentally claimed against society, political 
power is by no means innocuous with respect to it. This is why there are areas of 'civil' 
privacy, in particular areas o f privacy as secrecy and as seclusion, which are often 
considered to be also part of 'political' privacy worthy of particular protection and thus 
recognised as fundamental rights of freedom against the State. The branch o f the State 
by which 'civil' privacy can be most seriously endangered is the executive. This 
branch, "corps intermédiaire établi entre les sujets et le souverain pour leur mutuelle 
correspondance, chargé de l'exécution des lois et du maintien de la liberté"48, is in fact 
in close contact with individuals and may bring to force actual limits to civil privacy, 
just as society does49. Moreover, the position of the executive to constrain privacy is 
much stronger than that of society. Accordingly, more effective protection against 
possible excesses of the executive power is needed. These considerations are important 
in the protection of the right to seclusion and secrecy and, more particularly, in the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications. Interference with private telecommunications has 
always proven to be a very effective means to the end of law enforcement. In fact, the 
secrecy of telecommunications is more strongly protected against the activities of the 
police or other investigative bodies which form part of the executive than it is against 
society in general.
The judiciary and the legislative branches have a less immediate influence upon 
'civil* privacy. These branches decide the extent to which 'civil' privacy must be 
protected against immediate interferences with it; in other words, they settle the scope 
of the object and content of 'civil' privacy. In this respect, the legislative acts at the 
abstract level and subject only to the Constitution, should there be one50; in the absence 
of any constitutional dependence, the area of civil privacy that must be protected as a 
right and the content of its protection is decided by the legislature. The judiciary, for its
48J J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, at 264.
490ften the executive and society even associate to threaten 'civil* privacy: it is for example not 
unusual that information gathered by privacy firms such as banks or credit-card companies is processed 
by the government; similarly, data collected by the government is also used for private purposes (see S. 
Simitis, "Reviewing Privacy ..." at 726).
50Together with national Constitutions, the legislative is also obliged to respect supra-national 
conventions to the extent that they have been duly ratified by the State.
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part, acts at the concrete level, that is, on a case-by-case basis, and is bound by 
legislation and, ultimately, by the Constitution. TTiis means that the capacity of the 
judiciary to have a direct influence on the scope and content of ’civil' privacy is in 
inverse proportion to the existence and clarity of constitutional and legislative 
provisions in the issue.
3.2 'Political1 Privacy
As opposed to the aspects of privacy mentioned above (privacy as seclusion, as 
secrecy, as the right to one's name and likeness), the question of whether or not 
individual autonomy may be protected as privacy arises within the framework of the 
political concept of privacy. The affirmative answer to the above question has been led 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision on the case o f Griswold v. 
Connecticut51. This case concerned the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute 
forbidding the use of contraceptives and applied, as in the case at stake, even to married 
couples. The Court ruled that such a statute limited individual autonomy to take intimate 
decisions and was thus contrary to the constitutional right to privacy. Such a right, it 
admitted, is not explicitly recognised in the Constitution; yet it stated that it can be seen 
to arise from the "penumbras, formed by emanations"52 of some constitutional 
guarantees.
The above position of the Court has been heavily criticised on various grounds, 
many of them beyond the scope of current concerns53.1 would just like to note that the 
inclusion of instances of individual autonomy such as the right to use contraceptives 
within a general right to privacy has been contested. As has already been mentioned, 
this inclusion has been criticised on the basis that privacy, understood as freedom from 
intrusion, must not be mistaken with autonomy, understood as freedom to act. Let me 
add at this point that the cornerstone of this criticism lies in the distinction between 
'civil' privacy and 'political' privacy, something which has not generally been
51 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Douglas, 
and counted with three concurring opinions (one of which joined by two more justices) and two 
dissenting ones.
52Griswold v. Connecticut, at 484.
53Several issues were at stake in Griswold: the creation of a general constitutional right to privacy 
from the 'penumbras' and 'emanations' of particular constitutional rights; the conception of privacy as 
autonomy; the notion of fundamental right; the extension of the due-process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to the newly created right to privacy; last but not least, the role of the Supreme Court as a 
judiciary organ, that is. the tension between self-restraint and judicial activism. The position of the 
Court with respect to each one of these issues has been the object of heated doctrinal debate. For all­
round comments and criticisms on this case, see, e.g„ The Right of Privacy. A Symposium on the 
implications of Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965). New York, 1971.
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perceived54. In fact, understood as freedom from intrusion, privacy appears as a right 
originally addressed against society and which is only derivatively claimed against the 
public powers; in other words, the right to privacy originally protects the individual 
against acts of intrusion by society. Understood as freedom to act, autonomy is on the 
other hand a right exclusively addressed against the public power, that is it is an 
instance of the negative freedom ('political privacy') retained by citizens vis-à-vis the 
State.
It should remain clear that commentators have not contested that the right to use 
contraceptives can be the object of constitutional attention; they have only criticised the 
idea that an area of autonomy can be recognised as part of the right to privacy, even if 
this area belongs to the field of intimate decisions. Being an instance of negative 
freedom, nothing prevents this area from being thought of as deserving recognition and 
protection as a constitutional right, provided that this right is not labeled as 'privacy'. 
As a matter of fact, before the Griswold judgment the Supreme Court had granted 
constitutional recognition and protection to areas of autonomy in the context of family 
life without any mention of privacy55 and these decisions had remained 
uncontroversial. Had this jurisprudential line been followed, the questions raised by the 
inclusion of autonomy under the heading of privacy could have been altogether 
avoided56.
It ought to be pointed out that the idea of guaranteeing autonomy as an aspect of 
privacy was not original to the U.S. Supreme Court. At the time Griswold was 
decided, the German Constitutional Court had already elaborated a consistent doctrine 
in this direction, according to which the freedom to take personal decisions (in 
particular in matters concerning family or sexual life) is regarded as part of the right to 
privacy57. This doctrine clearly coincides with the one introduced in Griswold, to the 
extent that it could arguably have influenced this latter case. It is however worthy of 
note that in Germany this doctrine has not given rise to the criticisms it has been 
subjected to in the United States. This can easily be explained on the basis of the 
constitutional background of this doctrine in Germany. In Germany the right to take
54See, however, Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of Law" at 438.
55See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 at 399; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 at 534- 
535; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 535 at 541; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158 at 166. All 
these cases were referred to by Justice White in his concurring opinion to the Griswold judgment.
56After Griswold, the Court has continued to consider that a general right to privacy embraces 
instances of autonomy, in particular in cases concerning intimate decisions. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. 
Baird (405 US 438 (1972)) and Carey v. Population Services International, (431 US 678 (1977)), 
where privacy is read to cover the right of unmarried couples to use contraceptive; or Roe v. Wade, 
(410 US 113 (1972)), where privacy is read to include the right of women to abort.
57See, e.g., BVerfGE 39,1 at 43 (on the right to abortion); 60,123 at 134 (on the right of transexuals 
to change their apparent sex in order to accommodate their physical to their psychical sex).
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personal decisions has been developed within the context of art. 2.1 of the German 
Basic Law, which recognises a right to the free development of one's personality. As 
will be explained in the next section, this right is generally understood as embracing the 
general freedom to act without public interference, freedom which according to most 
commentators equals a negative freedom against the State. In other words, art. 2.1 of 
the German Basic Law recognises a right to 'political' privacy, hence a right which can 
very well cover the 'autonomy to take intimate decisions'. In this context, it is irrelevant 
that this aspect of autonomy has been recognised within areas of the right to the free 
development of one's personality which the Constitutional Court defmes as 'privacy'. 
The reason is precisely that here 'privacy' appears an aspect of a general right to 
'political' privacy, that is as a right originally addressed against the State. In Germany, 
autonomy is therefore uncontroversially regarded as an aspect of the constitutional right 
to privacy because this right is primarily conceived as 'political' privacy, that is as a 
right which is originally addressed against the State.
4 .  F o u r D ifferent Levels to A pproach Privacy.
A source of much confusion when discussing the concept of privacy is that it is 
often unclear at which level the discussion is being held. In fact, the word privacy can 
be and is actually used in at least four different ways, frequently without due 
clarification. These are the descriptive level, the value level, the legal level and the 
'interest' level. The following paragraphs will attempt to distinguish between these four 
different levels at which the concept of privacy can be approached58.
4 .1  D escriptive Level
The word 'privacy' can be used in a purely descriptive sense. 'Privacy' thus 
appears as an aseptic term, the definition of which implies no explicit juridical or moral 
connotation. Logically, this appears as the most primitive notion of privacy. Versions 
of such a neutral definition can be found in dictionaries. The definitions of privacy they 
offer are based on two concepts, the concept of seclusion -what has been called a state 
of "zero relationship"59- and the concept of secrecy. Privacy is for example defined
58A similar approach to the definition of privacy can be found in R. Gavison ("Privacy and the Limits 
of Law" at 423). Also she distinguishes different contexts (three) in which one can speak of privacy, 
namely privacy as a neutral concept, privacy as a value and privacy as a concept useful in legal 
contexts.
59Edward Shils, "Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes", Law and Contemporary Problems, 
Vol.31,281 (1966).
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both as a "state or condition of being withdrawn from the society of others, or from 
public interest; seclusion" and as "a condition approaching to secrecy or 
concealment","a private matter, a secret"60.
It is noteworthy that this two-fold definition of privacy is at the basis of the 
doctrinal consensus about the meaning of privacy and is only concerned with privacy as 
a civil concept, that is, as the area of an individual’s self that is separate from society. 
Societies, in other words, are always viewed as public entities; in no way do 
dictionaries identify privacy with society and oppose it to political power. Despite the 
historical importance of such an identification in political theory and in the actual 
protection of civil privacy, ’lay-language’ inteiprets privacy merely as a civil concept.
Touching on a different point, attention must be drawn to the fact that the 
definitions of privacy are not fixed irrespective of context. This is true even at this 
descriptive level. The simple fact that definitions rely on words makes them relative at 
least to the language used. A definition of privacy given in English on the basis o f an 
English term can thus have only limited validity outside the Anglo-Saxon world, 
through more or less accurate translations61. Nevertheless, given the American origins 
and long tradition of the concept of privacy, the English word "privacy” and the 
concept attached to it enjoy wide acceptance in non Anglo-Saxon cultures. Both are 
often referred to by French, Italian, and Spanish authors62, who thus compensate for 
the lack, in their mother tongue, of a term suitable to express the intricacies of the 
concept of privacy63.
6077i£ Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. XII, p. 515 (2nd ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford): "privacy: l.a.;
3.a; 4.a."
61 As a matter of fact, the English word "privacy" does not have a perfectly equivalent term in most 
western European tongues. That is the case in French ("Privacy: Retraite; isolement. Intimité." 
Larousse Dictionary Français-Anglais. English-French, 1981, p. 518); German ("Privacy: 1. 
Zurückgezogenheit, Ungestörtheit, Abeschiedenheit, Einsamkeit, Eigenleben. 2. Heimlichkeit, 
Gegeimhaltung" Langenscheidts Enzyklopädisches Wörterbuch Englisch-Deutsch, Vol. 1/2, 1963, p. 
1081); Italian ("Privacy: 1. Intimità. 2. Riserbo, segretezza." Grande Dizionario Inglese-Italiano, 
Italiano-Inglese, Aldo Garzanti Ed. 1961, p. 623); Portuguese ("Privacy: Retiro, solidào, retraimento; 
reserva, segredo" J. Albino Ferreira: Dicionârio Inglês-Português, Porto. Nova EdiçSo 1970; p. 590); 
and Spanish ("Privacy: Soledad, retiro, aislamiento; vida privada; intimidad; secreto, reserva; sigilo" 
Collins Spanish-English, English-Spanish Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1988, p. 464).
62See, e.g. Mario Are, ’Interesse alla qualificazione e tutela della personalità" Studi in mernoia di 
A.Asquini, Vol. V, p. 2193, note 51 (Cedam, Padova, 1965); Giselher Rüpke, Der 
verfassungsrechtliche Schutz der Privatheit, p. 29 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1976); 
Antonio E. Pérez Lufio, Derechos Humanos, Estado de Derecho y Constitución, p. 327 (Tecnos, 
Madrid, 1984); François Rigaux, "Liberté de la vie privée" Revue Internationale de Droit Comparée, p. 
541 (1991).
63Sometimes, however, authors like to stress the conceptual differences between the English notion of 
privacy and similar notions used in their mother tongue. Thus, e.g., F. Rigaux, "Liberté de la vie 
privée" at 541: "La notion américaine de privacy a aussi un contenu plus étendu que la notion française 
de Vie privée"'; see also similar clarifications in M. Are ("Interesse alla qualificazione..." at 2193) with 
respect to the Italian expression "diritto alla riservatezza".
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Reasoning on the basis of cultural relativity, the descriptive definitions of 
privacy offered by dictionaries appear as too simplistic. Dictionaries, in fact, overlook 
the fact that, in our cultural context, privacy is defined on the basis of an idea of 
control. This idea of control can be divided up into two elements, an element of volition 
and an element of reversibility4. Privacy is not any situation of solitude or secrecy. 
Privacy is a situation of solitude or secrecy in as far as this situation has been 
voluntarily chosen and in as far as, in addition, this situation can any time be reversed, 
that is in as far as Mthe abrogation of privacy by intrusion from the outside or by 
renunciation from the inside is practically possible"64 5. The distinction between 
involuntary and voluntary, irreversible and reversible solitude and secrecy corresponds 
to two stages in the logical evolution of the concept of privacy as a state66. 
Contemporary western societies seem to belong to the second one of these two stages, 
since in this context states of involuntary (or a-voluntary) or irreversible isolation or 
secrecy are no longer regarded as privacy: as has even been pointed out, "to refer for 
instance to the privacy of a lonely man on a desert island would be to engage in 
irony"67. To summarise, volition and reversibility are elements of the descriptive 
definition of privacy and they convey the idea that privacy only exists where some 
control can be exercised over a situation of solitude or over a situation of secrecy. At 
the descriptive level, privacy can therefore be defined as the control over one’s solitude 
or secrecy68.
64The Oxford English Dictionary, ("privacy: l.b.) does mention the element of choice in the concept 
of privacy, but only as connected to the existence of a right to privacy, something which will be 
developed below. My contention is that elements of choice such as volition and reversibility must 
already be present in a value unladen, purely neutral definition of privacy. Against this contention, R. 
Gavison believes that in order "to be nonpreemptive [i.e. value unladen], privacy must not depend on 
choice" ("Privacy and the Limits of Law" at 427). In my opinion, however, the act of choosing can 
very well be individualised and regarded in purely aseptic terms, without making any value judgments 
as to the rightness of the actual choice; moreover, a description of privacy without regard to elements 
of choice seems too poor in content to stand for the way privacy is currently understood.
65E. Shils, "Privacy: Its Constitution ..." at 281. This author describes privacy as "the absence of 
interaction or communication or perception within contexts in which such interaction, communication, 
or perception is practicable"; in other words, privacy only exists "where there is a feasible alternative to 
privacy" (ibid., pp. 281-282)
S^tanley I. Benn: A Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press (1988), p. 266. In the context 
of "privacy as a state", the author contrasts the "simple state of ...not sharing...with anyone" with the 
"more complex variant notion of a state in which...there is sharing only because [and insofar as] the 
subjects want to share".
67Ch. Fried, "Privacy" at 482.
68Referring only to privacy as secrecy, Charles Fried ("Privacy" at 483) defines privacy as "control 
over knowledge about oneself'.
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4 .2  Value Level
The introduction o f volitional elements into the definition of privacy leads the 
way to a more complex approach to its definition, in particular it introduces the issue of 
its definition as a value. Privacy, as has been explained, presupposes not only factual 
solitude and secrecy but a real possibility of choosing between solitude and secrecy, on 
the one hand, and publicity, on the other hand. As with all options, the option for 
privacy entails value considerations, that is the individual must decide internally which 
aspects of her life she believes should be withdrawn from the public eye. More 
significantly, the community as a whole must also form an opinion as to the extent to 
which individuals' predilection for privacy ought to be respected; in other words, as to 
what is the socially acceptable scope of privacy.
The value considerations formulated above constitute what is commonly 
referred to as the "right to privacy". When an individual speaks of her right to privacy 
she alludes to what she considers her legitimate area of seclusion and secrecy. For a 
community, the expression is a synonym of what is believed to be the general state of 
mind as to the legitimate scope of privacy, that is, the scope of privacy that must be 
respected. The definition of this "right to privacy" will focus on the latter -general- 
views. On this point, some comments are in order.
First, it should be made clear that the expression "right to privacy" is not meant 
to convey the idea of a right strictly speaking, that is o f a legal right. The notion of 
privacy dealt with here is that o f a non-legal "right". Privacy thus "suggests its 
connotation of inherent "rightness" -social, political, economic, and especially 
moral"69; it provides "a reason for claiming or striving toward or awarding a legal 
right"70. It is not, however, a legal right itself.
Second, the so-called "right to privacy" relies on a descriptive definition of that 
term. This means that the "right to privacy" results from the application of value 
considerations to the initial linguistic notion of privacy. This means that the definition 
of the "right to privacy" can be narrower than the purely descriptive definition of 
privacy but cannot be larger than this one71. In preceding paragraphs, descriptive 
privacy has been identified with the control over one's solitude and secrecy. Following
69Karl. N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence -The Next Step" 30 Col. L Rev., 432,440 (1930).
70Ibid.
71 Nevertheless, it will be explained below that the legal notion of privacy can be broadened beyond the 
original, lay bounds of this term, which may affect the notion of the non-legal "right to privacy" and 
favour its parallel broadening; yet in this case we are facing two different concepts of privacy sheltered 
under the same term in a misleading way.
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the foregoing considerations, the definition of a "right to privacy" may affect the 
circumstances under which such solitude and secrecy should be considered a legitimate 
right. Further, a "right to privacy" may also overlook certain aspects of the concept of 
solitude or of secrecy72, or o f both; moreover, a "right to privacy" may conceivably not 
exist at all73. That notion, on the contrary, may not cover areas outside the boundaries 
of a descriptive definition of privacy. Such areas simply belong to the scope of some 
different non-legal right.
Finally, it is wort calling attention to the cultural relativity of the notion of "right 
to privacy". Cultural bias is certainly not an exclusive feature of the value notion of 
privacy; it is, however, a particularly important feature when privacy is approached at 
this level. Due to its value implications, the content of the "right to privacy" is open to 
widely differing interpretations according to cultural grounds and, more significantly, it 
also varies within a given society at a given time. Pluralistic societies are privileged 
witnesses of this. In them, value views may not even be shared by relatively small 
groups o f individuals with similar backgrounds and living conditions. This is specially 
so in the case of the "right to privacy", a "right" which has been claimed only recently 
and in order to face new and continuously changing situations. Not surprisingly, social 
opinion about the scope of the legitimate exercise of privacy is not yet very stable74. In 
addition to this, and as a result of the same reasons, the juridical meaning of privacy 
lacks the support of a settled tradition which could act upon its moral conception. Let us 
now turn to this juridical face of the concept of privacy.
72R. A. Posner ("The Uncertain Protection of Privacy ..." at 175), for example, expresses his 
disagreement with the protection of secrecy as an aspect of privacy. Although secrecy is admittedly an 
aspect of privacy, Posner believes that it is generally not a moral right. This position rests on his 
belief that "an individual's claim to be allowed to conceal information about himself...is frequently 
nothing more that a claim to be allowed to manipulate other people's opinion", which he considers a 
-morally- rejectable "element of fraud".
73This is, however, highly unimaginable. As has been remarked, "once a civilization has made a 
distinction between the "outer" and the "inner" man..., between society and solitude, it becomes 
impossible to avoid the idea of privacy" (Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: a Philosophical 
Prelude", Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 31,272, 273 (1966)). As I understand it, this "idea of 
privacy" refers to the "right to privacy", to a "private space in which man may become and remain 
himself (ibid., ref. note 7 to Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 1964 p. 10). In fact, value 
considerations are so rooted in the concept of privacy that it is difficult to imagine that its neutral 
definition is not backed by some social approval, at least to some basic degree, as to the legitimacy of 
its exercise.
74Ch. Fried ("Privacy" at 47S), e.g., speaks of "the view of morality upon which my conception of 
privacy rests" (emphasis added).
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4 .3  Legal Level
The term privacy can also be used in a strictly juridical sense, to refer to the 
particular area of privacy, as defined above, which is protected by law. Privacy, in 
other words, can be used to refer to the right to privacy, in the strict sense of the 
expression. The difference between the right to privacy in this strict, legal sense and its 
wider meaning commented on above lies in the juridical protection that only the former 
is granted. Formal legal recognition is not enough to give rise to a legal right. A legal 
right exists maybe not by virtue o f the fact that an available remedy exists for its 
violation, but at least by "the official recognition that some kind of remedy could be 
had"75, again, in case of its being violated. Should this remedy not exist, the so-called 
"right" would remain in the field of purposes and good intentions, even if it is explicitly 
recognised. This is not the appropriate place to study the extent to which the right to 
privacy, in the systems where it is formally recognised, enjoys the actual protection of 
some legal remedies against its violations. It is important, however, to bear in mind that 
actual protection, as a conceptual feature of legal rights, is a crucial part of the concept 
of privacy in the juridical sense.
The logical relationship between the legal right to privacy and the notions of 
privacy which were previously defined, is similar to the one existing between the moral 
"right to privacy" and the descriptive definition of this term; that is, the right to privacy 
may be narrower than the definition of privacy at the preceding levels, but it may not, in 
principle, be wider. Let us see the extent to which this logic is actually respected.
[1] The area of privacy juridically protected must rest, in the first place, on the 
descriptive notion of privacy as described above. Not all systems, however, mirror this 
theoretical pattern. In particular, American courts have recognised a right to privacy 
outside the scope of its descriptive notion as seclusion and secrecy. This is, as already 
pointed out, the case of the protection of 'the right to one’s name or likeness’ and of 
’the right to autonomy to take intimate decision’ as aspects of the right to privacy.
Despite criticisms pointing to the fact that the inclusion of the two rights 
mentioned above within the scope of the right to privacy is conceptually groundless, 
such an inclusion seems to be consolidated practice among American courts. After all, 
"the [Supreme] Court is entitled to use ordinary language in a technical legal sense"76, 
that is it is perfectly legitimate for the Court to re-define a term in order to use it in a
75K. N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence..." at 440.
76R.A. Posner, "The Uncertain Protection of Privacy..." at 192.
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technical legal sense, so that a single word stands for two different concepts, one lay 
and one legal. Such a way o f proceeding could certainly create a good deal o f 
confusion, yet this can be avoided, at least to some extent, if the terms in question are 
only re-defined in coherent and clear terms. The definition of the right to privacy as 'the 
right to one's name or likeness' appears to be coherent and clear and so does the 
definition of privacy as 'the right to autonomy to take intimate decisions', provided that 
the term 'intimate' is also given a clear and coherent definition. This does not seem a 
difficult task, particularly since the concept o f 'intimacy'77 can be reduced to the 
concepts of 'seclusion' and 'secrecy', which are uncontroversially regarded as aspect 
of the lay meaning of privacy. On this basis, the right to privacy appears to embrace not 
only a right to seclusion and/or secrecy but also a right to take decisions in areas where 
one has a right to seclusion and/or secrecy.
The above re-definitions of privacy in the 'legal sense' can however be 
criticised on different grounds. Let me start with the right to one's name and likeness. 
The fact that this right is covered under the right to privacy raises an objection of a 
technical character, namely that thereby property rights are protected by means of tort- 
law actions against the violation of privacy, something which has proven inadequate in 
procedural terms and substantially insufficient78. As for the right to autonomy to take 
intimate decisions, it seems inadequate that rights so different in nature as privacy and 
autonomy (remember the distinctions 'freedom from/freedom to', 'freedom -primarily- 
against society/freedom against the State’) be recognised under the same heading. This 
seems inadequate in particular because a right which results from the fusion of such 
diverse elements will inevitably lack internal coherence, that is it will lack the degree of 
distinctiveness that is necessary to make it a meaningful provision79. Though thus 
briefly exposed, these two reasons are of considerable weight and strongly advice that 
'one's name and likeness' and the 'autonomy to take intimate decisions’, respectively, 
be excluded from the concept of privacy as a right. It seems however that American 
courts have thus far disregarded these criticisms in their approach to the right to 
privacy.
[2] The actual existence of the same sort o f logical relation between privacy as a 
non-legal right and privacy as a legal right is more difficult to show. The reasons for 
this are the difficulties in defining privacy as a non-legal right. In this sense, one can
77"Intimacy: Ijl: The state of being personally intimate..."; "intimate: 2. Pertaining to the inmost 
thoughts or feelings; proceeding from, concerning, or affecting one's inmost self; closely personal" 
The Oxford English Dictionary , VoI.VUI, pp. 6-7). For the definition of privacy as 'seclusion', see 
footnotes 59-60 above and accompanying text.
78See in this regard M.B. Nimmer, "The right of publicity" 204 et seq.
790n this point see R. Gavison, "Privacy and the limits of Law" at 437.
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but expect the legislative power to take account of the worse or better defined social 
feelings concerning the due protection of privacy and to legislate accordingly. As has 
been pointed out, defining the values which must guide that protection is "the task of 
moral philosophy, reflected in the political function of legislation"80. Given the lack of 
juridical tradition of the term privacy, the moral standards of society should exert great 
influence on the definition of its protected area.
4 .4  'In te re s ts ' Level
The word privacy is frequently used to refer not to a right itself, but to the 
reasons ("interests") justifying the protection granted to some right81. Usually referred 
to as a right, privacy is not really one in these cases, either in the legal or in the non- 
legal sense of the expression. Rather, it plays the role of the interest which lies behind 
the protection of other substantive rights (e.g. the secrecy of telecommunications). As 
such, it offers guide-lines for the interpretation and application of these rights, and can 
be of help particularly in the solution of borderline cases. At this level, privacy thus 
comes "to urge that substantive rights themselves...exist only for a purpose,...the 
protection of [an] interest"82, and to offer itself as one such interest.
5 .  A D efinition o f P rivacy
The foregoing considerations should have made the issue of the concept of 
privacy somewhat clearer. Their purpose, however, was not to provide a universal 
answer to all the problems the definition of privacy entails, nor was it to propose a 
generally valid definition of that concept. The preceding pages only intended to shed 
some light upon the confusion which often surrounds references to and discussions 
about the notion of privacy, as a prior step to giving an ad hoc definition of privacy, 
suitable to explain the use that will be made of the term in this thesis.
The point of departure for this ad hoc definition of the expressions 'privacy', 
’right to privacy' and 'interest in privacy' is the purely descriptive definition of privacy
80Glenn Negley, "Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy" 31 Law and Contemporary Problems, 
319 at 325 (1966).
81 It is perhaps in this sense that the Supreme Court of the United States referred to a general 
constitutional right to privacy arising from the ’"penumbras, formed by emanations from ... [some 
constitutional] guarantees that help give them life and substance" 0Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965), at 484).
82K.N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence ..." at 441.
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proposed above. This means that, unless otherwise specified, the term 'privacy' will 
only refer to the control that an individual has over his area of seclusion and secrecy. 
The expression *right to privacy' will usually be used in its purely legal, technical sense 
and will refer to those areas o f control over one's seclusion and secrecy that are actually 
recognised as a right in a particular system (in general, my references to the right to 
privacy will concern the right to privacy recognised at the constitutional level). Finally, 
the expression 'interest in privacy' will refer to the interest in granting individuals 
control over their personal area of seclusion and secrecy, in as far as this interest 
underlies certain legal and constitutional provisions.
The decision to restrict the use o f the term 'privacy' to the areas of seclusion 
and secrecy is not only conditioned by my personal opinion on the concept of privacy; 
to an important extent, it is also the result o f an effort to set aside much of the confusion 
which surrounds the definition of this term. This ad hoc definition of privacy manages 
to restrict the scope of the right to privacy to areas which respond to a common or at 
least similar rationale, while at the same time it avoids the most controversial questions 
concerning the scope of the right to privacy, i.e. whether this right embraces the right to 
individual autonomy and the right to one's name and likeness. As a result, the 
expression 'right to privacy' becomes easier to handle and more fruitful to work with. 
This is not to say that we can skip all the problems of ill definition that the right to 
privacy entails. As a general, all-embracing right, privacy is necessarily ill-defined; the 
expression 'control over one’s seclusion and secrecy' is not easy to grasp in its full 
scope and it aims at giving an idea of the content of the right, rather than at drawing its 
boundaries with any clarity. Yet, although the scope of privacy will continue to be 
rather unclear, it will at least not be utterly confusing.
Furthermore, by way of restricting the use of the term 'privacy* to the areas of 
seclusion and secrecy we manage to concentrate on those areas, amongst all the ones 
that this term is thought to cover, which have some relevance in the recognition of the 
secrecy of telecommunications as a constitutional right. Therefore, the rights to 
individual autonomy and to one's name and likeness do not belong to the right to 
privacy as understood in this thesis, not only because I do not believe that they are not 
part of the concept of privacy and not only because their inclusion within this right is 
highly controversial, but also and primarily because they do not at all relate to the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications, which is after all the subject matter of this thesis. 
Only a right to, or an interest in, privacy understood as control over one's seclusion 
and secrecy can justify the recognition of the secrecy of telecommunications as a right. 
Thus neither of the neglected areas, whether belonging to privacy or not, is of any 
interest to the present thesis.
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Section 2: Reasons for Protecting Privacy
1 . The Pro tection  o f Privacy as a  C ontem porary  Concern
Although privacy is nowadays uncontroversially regarded as a value which 
deserves legal protection, it can still be considered a "relative newcomer to the human 
rights scene"83. The late arrival of privacy in the legal world must be explained on the 
basis of reasons which, rather than strictly legal, are of a sociological nature. For it is 
true that the rise of the State provided an adequate political framework to make the 
protection of privacy possible; additionally, a suitable state of mind for such protection 
was reached at the end of the eighteenth century, within the context of the Declarations 
of Rights. Constitutions and constitutional rights, however, are the product of their 
historical circumstances. They portray the values which are considered worthy of 
protection at a given time in a particular society; to be more precise, they arise as a 
response to the particular threats that the public power entails for these values. Rather 
than mere abstract intellectual claims against the State, constitutional rights are justified 
by their specific context and intend to meet some specific needs. In the case of privacy, 
it seems that the importance of the values it enshrines and the need to grant them direct 
and independent protection have only recently been felt.
Negley writes: "It is a historical commonplace that problems often await 
acknowledgment until circumstantial developments force them upon our attention. After 
centuries of failure to recognize privacy as a factor pertinent to moral and political 
speculation, we suddenly find ourselves concerned with the right of privacy as one of 
the most critical problems of contemporary political and legal analysis"84. Some 
features of contemporary societies can account for the increasing importance that is 
nowadays attached to the protection o f privacy. In the first place, this century has 
witnessed the growth of mass, pluralistic societies, no longer controlled by uniform 
moral values. These societies enshrine some contradictory features. On the one hand, 
they are dominated by strong individualistic feelings. Members of such societies show 
a high level o f permissiveness towards other individuals' behaviour and at the same 
time expect their own values to be respected. On the other hand, the anonymity and lack 
of direct communication among citizens which characterises mass societies also 
sharpens the natural curiosity of human beings with respect to one another's lives. The
83S.I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom, at 264.
84Glenn Negley, 'Philosophical views..." at 320.
success of a sensationalist press is the best example of this phenomenon. In the second 
place, technology has been developed to such an extent that today it stands as an 
important threat to privacy. By means of technological devices, people's private lives 
can be easily observed, their private conversations taped, data about their private lives 
obtained and systematised so that almost complete information about them can be had.
The foregoing considerations give some reasons why privacy ought to be 
protected today: privacy ought to be protected because contemporary societies pose 
serious threats to the respect that privacy deserves. Yet this leads to a more fundamental 
question, however, i.e. why does privacy deserve any respect in the first place? It is 
my belief that questions o f this sort can only be approached in sociological terms: 
privacy ought to be respected and eventually protected simply because it enshrines 
certain values that society regards as being worthy of respect and protection. 
Throughout the twentieth century western societies have developed a feeling that 
privacy (control over one's seclusion and secrecy) stands for values which are worth 
protecting, such as an individual's anonymity and independence. One can still go one 
step further it has sometimes been argued that privacy must be protected because it is 
an aspect of an individual's personality, which contemporary western societies regard 
as a value which deserves respect and protection even over and above the respect and 
protection that privacy does deserve85.1 would now like to make some comments on 
the recognition and protection of an individual’s personality as a right.
2 . The Right to Personality or “allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht”
2.1 The Recognition of a Right of Personality
The so-called "right o f personality" dates back to the end of last century in 
Germany and Switzerland, that is, to the time when the need for a right to privacy was 
first being discussed in American doctrinal circles. The idea of a 'general right of 
personality* ("allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht") was first dealt with by Otto von 
Gierke86, who tried to go beyond the patrimonial conception o f certain rights and 
stressed their personal nature. This conception o f a non-patrimonial, general right of 
personality was soon accepted in Swiss law, where it was placed at the core of the law
85See e.g. Roscoe Pound, 'Interest of Personality", 28 Harv, L. Rev. 343 et seq. (1915) W. Feinberg, 
Feinberg, "Recent Developments ..." at 717; Ch. Fried, "Privacy" at 486; H.Gross, 'The Concept of 
Privacy" at 34; E. J. Bloustein, "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: an Answer to Dean 
Prosser", 39 New York Univ. L. Rev. 963 part, at 971 et seq. (1964).
860tto von Gierke, 1 Deutsches Privatrecht, pp. 703 et seq. (1895).
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of torts87. In Germany, on the other hand, the right of personality did not immediately 
obtain direct legislative protection88.
The German Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, known as the B.G.B.), 
enacted in 1896, did not include any immediate reference to the right of personality. 
Such a right was considered to be too wide a general clause, too open a right to fit into 
the scheme of the B.G.B., the provisions of which were drafted by reference to rather 
well-defined situations. Some of its articles, however, provided grounds for an implicit 
protection of a general right of personality. This is the case for arts. 22689, 82390 and 
82691. The most controversial of these provisions is section 1 of art. 823, which is 
precisely the cornerstone of the German law of torts. This provision contains a 
catalogue of the rights which are within its scope of coverage. This catalogue, it is true, 
contains no explicit reference to personality or to personal rights; yet it doses with the 
open clause "and any similar right". The interpretation of this clause has been 
controversial. Under a flexible reading, the right of personality could arguably fall 
within its scope. Yet, during the first half o f this century, the leading opinion amongst 
courts and commentators was that the expression "any similar right" was to be put in 
connexion with the right listed immediately before it, which is the right o f property. 
The above expression was thus thought to cover only rights with the nature of property 
rights.
Arts. 226, 823.2 and 826 offer more promising paths to the inclusion of the 
right of personality under their respective scopes of coverage. The terms in which these 
provisions are drafted are general enough to allow their application to the protection of
87Zivilgesetzbuch, art. 28: "Where anyone is injured in his personal relations by the unauthorized act 
of some other person, he is entitled to demand that the continuance of the act should be restrained.
A claim for compensation for pecuniary loss or for the payment of a sum of money as moral damages 
is only admissible in the cases which are specified by the law."
Obligationenrecht, art. 49: " Where anyone is injured in his personal relations owing to the wilful or 
negligent act of some other person he is entitled to compensation in respect of pecuniary loss, and, 
where this is justified by the exceptional gravity of the injury or o the wilful or negligent act, he may 
also claim payment of a sum of money by way of moral damages. The judge may, however, decree 
some other kind of reparation to be made either in place of or in addition to the award of money by way 
of moral damages"
88It is noteworthy that the right of personality was first conceived of in the sphere of tort law, that is, 
in the same sphere where privacy was first conceived of as a right in the United States.
89Art. 226 "gives a remedy in the case a right has been exercised for no other purpose than to inflict 
harm on some other person" (H.C. Gutteridge, "Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy" The Law 
Quarterly Review, p. 203,208 (1931)).
90I."One who, intentionally or negligently, wrongfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, 
property or any similar right of another is obligated to compensate him for damage arising therefrom." 
Il."Gne who violates a provision of law intended to protect another incurs the same obligation. If the 
wording of the provision makes possible its violation without fault, liability for compensation arises 
only in the presence of fault "
9l"One who intentionally damages another in a manner violating good morals is obligated to 
compensate him for such damage".
any aspect of personality, even if these are not explicitly guaranteed by law. This is 
notably the case for section 2 of art. 823. Courts soon saw in this provision an 
instrument for the civil protection of the right to honour and they made of it the basis 
for the civil action of defamation in German law92. As a result, personality received 
some protection, even if  indirect and partial, in tort law. The tort-law practice proved 
much less generous towards personality in the context of arts. 226 and 826. For the 
first half of the century, in fact, the former was only seldom invoked at all and then 
only in cases which involved patrimonial rights. The latter, on the other hand, was very 
often at stake but mainly in such matters as labour disputes and practices in business; it 
was rarely claimed in cases concerning personality93. It thus seems that, during the first 
half of the century, the right o f personality remained for the most part strange to the 
German law of tort and, more generally, to all of the German legal system.
)< ;-
The consolidation of the right to personality within the German legal system 
took place at the constitutional level. Art. 2.1 of the German Basic Law for the first 
time recognised a right to the free development of one's personality94. Thereby, the 
Basic Law provided the grounds for the protection of a general right of personality 
(allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht) against acts of public power, upon which, as is 
known, fundamental rights are binding95. Moreover, the enactment of art. 2.1 caused a 
shift in the position that personality occupied within the German legal system as a 
whole. In particular, personality grew in importance in the field of the law of torts. On 
the basis of its constitutional recognition, the Federal Court o f Appeals 
(Bundesgerichtshof) started to consider that a general right to personality could be 
included amongst those "similar rights" alluded to  in section 1 of art. 823 of the
B.G.B96.
The example o f art. 2.1 of the BVerfG has been followed by other European 
Constitutions, such as the Italian (art 2) and the more recent Constitutions of Greece 
(art. 5.1) and Spain (art. 10.2). Furthermore, the impact of the fundamental right to 
personality, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, seems to have transcended 
Europe and had some influence upon the American concept of privacy, to the extent that
92Note that those who defame violate "a provision of law intended to protect another", since 
defamation is a crime punishable under the German Criminal Code.
93H.C. Gutteridge, "Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy" at 208 (1931).
94Art. 2.1: "Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality, insofar as he does 
not infringe the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code."
95Basic Law, art. 1 (3): "Following basic rights shall be binding as directly valid law on legislation, 
administration and judiciary".
96The first clear decision in this sense was BGHZ, 13,334 et seq., pronounced as early as 1954. For 
an account of the vicissitudes of recognising a general right of personality in the context of civil law, 
see B VerfGE 34,269 at 270 et seq.
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personality has been referred to in the United States as the European "rough equivalent 
of our 'right to privacy1"97. In fact, as pointed out above, the construction of a general 
constitutional right to privacy that the Supreme Court undertook in the case of Griswold 
seems inspired by the German fundamental right to personality. It thus seems important 
at this point to comment at more length on the scope of the right to personality in 
Germany, in particular on the way it has been interpreted by the German Constitutional 
Court.
2.2 The Fundamental Right to the Free Development of one's Personality
According to art. 2.1 of the German Basic Law, "everyone shall have the right 
to the free development of his personality, insofar as he does not infringe the rights of 
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code". When confronted 
with the wording of this provision, one is tempted to regard it as the constitutional 
version of the private-law right to personality that the B.G.B. did not recognise. Thus 
understood, art. 2.1 would appear to recognise a right the point of reference of which is 
the person98 and which would cover areas such as one's "life, health, physical and 
moral safety, personal freedom, honour, privacy (understood as Geheimnissphäre), 
name, portrait (Bild), family life, matrimonial relationships, commercial and economic 
freedom"99. These are not however the terms in which art. 2.1 was initially approached 
by the Constitutional Court; indeed, these arc not the terms in which the right to the free 
development of one’s personality was conceived during the preparatory work giving 
rise to the Basic Law. Rather, the right was then conceived and enacted as a general 
right of freedom (allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit), that is, as a right to act free from 
public interference within the limits imposed by the moral code, the rights of others and 
the constitutional order100. In the light o f this background, the Constitutional Court has 
stated since its earliest cases on art. 2.1 that this provision recognises a general right to 
free action within the above-mentioned limits; in other words, art. 2.1 recognises a 
fundamental right to negative freedom101.
97Harry D. Krause: "The right lo privacy in Germany..." at 484.
98See De Cupis, I Diritti della Personalità, voi. I, p. 29, Milano 1959. Mario Are, "Interesse alla 
Qualificazioneat 2169.
"See thè reference to Oseris Das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht in Gutterridge, "Comparative Law 
of thè Right to Privacy" at 211, footnote 37 and accompanying text.
100Klaus-Berto v. Doemming, Rudolf Werner Füsslein &  Werner Matz, "Entstehungsgeschichte der 
Artikel des Grundgesetzes" 1 Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 1 at 46 (1951).
101R. Scholz, "Das Grundredcht der freien Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit in der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts" 100 AÖR 1975, pp. 80 and 265 at 95; K. Hesse, Grundzüge des 
Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 16th ed. Heidelberg 1988, p. 165; Pieroth/Schlink, 
Grundrechte Staatsrecht II, 4th ed. Heidelberg 1988, p. 94. See cases cited in Scholz, 'Das Grundredcht 
der freien Entfaltung ..." at 87, note 49. Against the conception of negative freedom as an all-
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However, the recognition of a general right of action within art. 2.1 does not 
exhaust the potential of this provision; its wording allows and even suggests the 
recognition of a general right of personality. The Constitutional Court102 soon 
developed the doctrine tha t a general right o f  personality {allgemeines 
Persönlichkeitsrecht) is indeed included within the right to the free development of 
one's personality, read in conjunction with the right to human dignity recognised in art. 
1.1103. A general right of personality and a general right of freedom thus define the 
scope of art. 2.1 and, although no clear line has ever been drawn between these two 
rights104, they can be referred to, respectively, as the passive and the active element of 
an all-embracing right to the free development of one's personality105.
The way the Constitutional Court has conceived the general right of personality 
has not remained unaltered overtime. Initially, as the Court began to regard the right as 
part o f art. 2.1, it also started to divide its scope into three different areas, each of 
which was thought to deserve a different level o f constitutional protection. Two of 
these areas were made up by the right to the free development of one's personality in 
private and embraced, first, a sphere of absolute intimacy or seclusion that an individual 
could enjoy from society (Intimsphäre) and, second, a sphere of an individual's privacy 
from which society was not completely excluded (Geheimnissphäre); the third area 
embraced the right of an individual to develop his personality within society. The idea 
of the Court was that the first one of these three areas, i.e. the area where the individual 
develops his personality in complete seclusion from society, deserved absolute 
protection against the State, so that infringement upon this area could under no 
circumstances be considered in accordance with the Constitution. On the other hand, 
both the second and the third areas of the right to personality could be subject to 
restrictions provided that these pursued interests of overriding importance. The 
importance of these interests had to be greater the more an individual's privacy was 
restricted and lower the more restrictions potentially affected the social sphere of an 
individual's right of personality106.
embracing right, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1977, pp. 266 et 
seq.
102See BVerfGE 27,1 at 6; 27,344 at 350 et seq.
103Art. 1.1: "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
State authority".
104Scholz, 'T)as Grundredcht der freien Entfaltung..." at 82,89 el seq.
105BVerfGE 54, 148 at 153. For this issue, see Jarass, "Das allgemeine PersOnlichkeitsrecht im 
Grundgesetz" (1989) NJW 857 at 858,859.
106See R. Scholz, "Das Grundredcht der freien Entfaltung..." at 265 et seq. In other words, the first of 
the above-mentioned levels was thought to constitute the ‘essential content' of the right to the free 
development of one's personality, while restrictions of the second and third of these levels were subject 
to the principle of reasonableness. The requirements that limitations of fundamental rights respect the
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Eventually, the Constitutional Court abandoned the doctrine of the three 
spheres. In fact, dividing the right of personality into fixed categories appeared rather 
artificial; in addition, it implied that the constitutionality of restrictions of the right of 
personality could be judged only once it had been decided which one of the above three 
spheres had been restricted, which is also a rather artificial way of proceeding. Now the 
Court prefers to regard the right o f personality as an undivided whole and simply to 
rely on the principle of reasonableness whenever it has to judge the constitutionality of 
a restriction of this right107. The Court has not attempted a complete definition of the 
object of the general right of personality; this is regarded as a general clause where 
every aspect of an individual's personality is recognised as a right, hence the difficulty 
of giving an all-embracing definition of its object. Instead of this, the Court has pointed 
to some of the particular rights of personality covered by art. 2.1, making it clear that 
the object of the general right of personality goes over and above the object of these 
particular ones108. For example, the Court has pointed to the right to personal honour, 
to the right to one's image, to the right to one's spoken word and, most important for 
us, it has pointed to the right to privacy understood both as secrecy and as 
seclusion109.
Art. 2.1 thus embraces a right to privacy, understood in terms which coincide 
with the definition proposed at the end of Section 1: privacy is regarded as a right to 
seclusion and secrecy; furthermore, it is regarded as a right to control over one's 
seclusion and secrecy. This idea of control has always qualified the definition of the 
right to privacy by the Constitutional Court, which since its early decisions on this right 
has depicted privacy, in more or less explicit terms, as a right to self-determination 
within the area of one's seclusion and secrecy (Sebstbestimmungsrecht) 110. However, 
the importance of this idea of control has grown greater in more recent years, 
particularly in the area of privacy as secrecy, in the face of the pervasive collection, 
storage and use of personal data by the public power. Today, control over one's 
personal data, that is the possibility of deciding when and within which limits one is to 
give away information about oneself, is rightly regarded as a crucial aspect of the right 
to privacy. The importance of this aspect of privacy has been openly acknowledged and
essential content of these and comply with the principle of reasonableness will be dealt with in detail in 
chapter 5.
107See, e.g., BVerfGE 65, 1; 84,192 at 195; 84, 239 at 279-280; 87, 153 at 169; 87, 234 at 267; 
88,89,69 at 82-83; 90,263 at 271. As already noted, I will address the principle of reasonableness in 
chapter 5.
108BVerfGE 54, 148 at 153; 72, 155 at 170.
109See BVerfGE 54,148 at 154 and cases cited therein.
110See, e.g., BVerfGE 27, 1 at 7; 27. 344 at 350; 34, 238 at 246; 54, 148 at 155.
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given its due by the Constitutional Court, which in a path-breaking decision, the so- 
called Census decision, referred to a 'right to informational self-determination* 
(informationelle Sebstbestimmungsrecht) as included within art. 2.1111.
Both the recognition of the right to privacy as part of the general right of 
personality and the insistence upon the importance of the right to informational self- 
determination are characteristic of the German approach to privacy. The above- 
mentioned Census decision of the Constitutional Court added yet another feature to the 
German constitutional right to privacy, a feature which has also become characteristic 
of this right. I am thinking of the idea that the right to informational self-determination 
does not merely exist as a product of democracy, but is also a condition for the very 
existence of democracy itself112. This idea could be sketched as follows. In order that a 
person can lead an autonomous life, he needs to be aware of what the State knows 
about him and how this information is being used; otherwise he will always be reluctant 
to undertake certain actions, for fear that these may reach the State's notice, who may 
use their knowledge to his disadvantage113. He will even be reluctant to exercise his 
fundamental rights. For example, the suspicion that all members of a certain, say gay, 
association are being registered by the State might stop some from joining in, which 
amounts to a clear hindrance of their freedom to associate. The same goes for free 
speech, freedom of religion, freedom to assemble, the free choice of profession, etc. In 
order that individuals be able to participate in society freely, even in order that they can 
exercise their fundamental rights, they must stand in a position of autonomy, which 
implies, if not that the State be completely ignorant of anything individuals do not wish 
it to know, at least that this knowledge be limited and that individuals know what the 
State knows about them and exactly what use is being made thereof. Guaranteeing such 
a position of autonomy is of importance not only for single individuals; rather, it is 
something that concerns society as a whole and the democratic order itself, because 
autonomy is a condition for participation and for the unhindered exercise of 
fundamental rights. In sum, informational self-determination stands as a requisite for 
democracy.
111The census decision of 1983 (BVerfGE 65,1 at 41) was path-breaking in this respect; since then, 
the expression 'informational self-determination' has become a common-place reference to the right to 
privacy (see, e.g., BVerfGE 72, 155 at 170; 82, 236 at 269; 84,192 at 195; 88, 87 at 97; 90, 255 at 
260). The relevant aspects of the census decision have been brought to light and commented, amongst 
others, by Spiros Simitis, "Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung - Grundbedingung einer 
verfassungskonformen Informationsordnung" (1984) NJW 398.
112BVerfGE, 65,1 at 43.
1I3Although I am only referring to the State as addressee of the constitutional right to privacy, this 
right also has an indirect 'third party effect' or 'Drittwirkung\ which means that it also applies, even if 
only indirectly, against other members of civil society (in support of this position, see Spiros Simitis, 
"Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung ...” at 401). The question of the third party effect of 
fundamental rights will be studied in chapter 7.
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The above approach to the right to informational self-determination has become 
current coinage in the German legal literature. It finds its theoretical basis in a 
discursive conception of the State114. In the Census decision the Constitutional Court 
seemed to assume, as discourse theory does, that in politics like in any other field truth 
is the result of consensus. To be precise, discourse theory regards truth as the result of 
consensus reached through a process of free deliberation among all individuals that 
want to participate. At the political level, discourse theory looks upon the constitutional 
democratic State as the system which can best guarantee free debate. Democracy 
ensures that all individuals can participate in the process o f taking political decisions, 
while, through judicial review, the Constitution and the recognition of constitutional 
rights ensure that the political majority continue to take decisions in a discourse- 
theoretical manner and that minorities will not be left out o f public debate. From the 
point of view of discourse theory, therefore, free public deliberation and a 
constitutional democratic State depend upon each other: free deliberation is ensured by a 
constitutional democracy, yet a constitutional democracy is only justified in as far as it 
provides the conditions for free public debate. This means that a constitutional 
democratic State must guarantee free participation and the free exercise of fundamental 
rights for the sake of its own preservation. Now, both free participation and the free 
exercise of fundamental rights require that individuals be placed in a position of 
autonomy, which in turn requires that individuals enjoy a right to informational self- 
determination, that is that they know what the State knows about them and how the 
information is being used. The conclusion is that, under this approach, protecting the 
right to privacy does not appear as a purely individual interest but as an interest of 
political character ranking very high on the scale of importance.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not adopted the same participatory 
approach to privacy as the German Constitutional Court115. The American Supreme 
Court regards privacy as an individual right the protection o f which responds to purely
114Discourse theory is discussed at more length in the Introduction to this thesis.
115For a comparison between the German and the American way of approaching privacy, see Paul 
Schwartz, "The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right 
of Informational Self-Determination" 37 Am. J. of Comp. L. 675 (1989); see also Paul Schwartz, 
"Das Ubeisetzen im Datenschutz: Unterschiede zwischen deutschen und amerikanischen Konzepten der 
'Privatheit"' (1992) RDV 8. The Court's individualistic approach to privacy is also criticised by Donald
L. Doemberg, "The Right of the People': Reconciling collective and Individual Interests under the 
Fourth Amendment", 58 New York Univ. L. Rev. 259 (1983) and by James J. Tomkovicz, "Beyond 
Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province", 
36 The Hastings L. J. 645 (1985). See also S.E. Sundby, ""Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy 
or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?" 94 Col. L. Rev. 1751 (1994), where the author's 
quest for 'trust' in the exercise of the right to privacy appears as a claim that there should be a more 
participatory approach to this right.
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individual interests116. Privacy is recognised as a right because single individuals 
regard it as a value worthy o f protection for their own sake, that is for the sake of the 
development of their own personality as individuals. It is therefore amongst the most 
individualistic interests guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus conceived, the right to 
privacy clashes with the interests of society and even with those of democracy. For one 
thing, the well being and preservation both of society and of the democratic order rely 
to a great extent on publicity and on the availability of information, while the right to 
privacy aims precisely at concealing information from the public realm. The right to 
privacy is thus regarded to be 'undemocratic'. As a result, it is defined in very 
restrictive terms and, in addition, this right is accorded rather low weight when 
balanced against interests which are thought to tend towards the social or the political 
good, that is, when balanced against interests which are regarded more 'democratic'. 
All this will be studied in depth in chapters 4 and 5.
We have now seen how differently the right to privacy is perceived in Germany 
and in the United States. In Germany, the right to privacy is regarded as a condition for 
the free participation of the individual in politics and for the free exercise of 
fundamental rights, hence it appears as a basic pillar for a constitutional democratic 
State. In the United States, on the other hand, the right to privacy is regarded as a 
purely individualistic interest which stands as a potential enemy of democracy, since it 
aims at concealing information from the public realm. I would now like to note that 
both these visions of the right to privacy integrate a complete picture of the right. 
Indeed, the right to privacy is rightly regarded as a condition for constitutional 
democracy, yet it is just as true that the concealment of information from the public can 
also entail important threats to democracy. The real difference between the German and 
the American approach to privacy is that only the former succeeds in taking both these 
aspects of the right to privacy into account. In Germany, the right to privacy is 
primarily regarded as a condition for constitutional democracy; yet, on account that 
excessive privacy can also endanger democracy, the protection of this right is subject to 
certain limits, so that in some cases, which are regarded as the exception to the rule, the 
individual is not entitled to know what information the State has of her - in chapter 5 we 
will study the restrictions imposed upon the sphere of privacy embraced by the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications. The difference with the United States is that here 
privacy is only regarded as an individual interest. The drawbacks of this approach to
1 ^Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has hinted at the connection between privacy and the exercise of 
certain fundamental rights on at least one occasion. The occasion was the case of Griswold v. 
Connecticut, in which the Court argued that the freedom of association recognised in the first 
amendment (see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 at 462) implies a right to privacy in one's 
associations, as a result of which "the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected 
from governmental intrusion" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 at 483 (1965)).
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privacy will come to light more clearly as we study the object of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications.
Let us now come back to Germany and to the German rights to privacy and 
personality. Before closing the present considerations as to these rights» I would like to 
make some remarks concerning the relationship between them and the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications recognised in art. 10 of the Basic Law. As a source of 
recognition both of a general right of freedom and o f a general right of personality» the 
right to the free development of one's personality o f art. 2.1 appears as a general clause 
where every instance of negative freedom and every aspect of an individual's 
personality» are embraced. As a result, the German spectrum of freedoms against the 
State can be considered complete, without gaps. However, art. 2.1 does not come into 
play in the context of every aspect of negative freedom and personality; rather, it acts as 
a 'subsidiary* ('fall-back') constitutional provision, that is as a provision which applies 
only in the context of particular instances of negative freedom or of personality which 
are not protected within more specific fundamental rights117 18. To be more precise, art.
2.1 covers, first, instances of negative freedom and personality which are covered but 
not protected as part of a more specific right (subsidiäres Freiheitsrecht); second, it 
covers instances of negative freedom and personality which are close to the area 
covered by a specific right, but which are not -or not yet- considered as lying within the 
scope of the coverage of this latter {supplementäres Freiheitsrecht); finally, it covers 
instances of negative freedom and personality neither covered nor protected as part of a 
more specific fundamental right (speziales Freiheitsrecht)m .
Given the subsidiary character of art. 2.1, it would seem that the general right 
of personality it recognises, in particular the right to privacy included therein, is hardly 
relevant in the context of the secrecy of telecommunications, since this enjoys specific 
recognition and protection as a fundamental right in art. 10 o f the Basic Law119. Yet 
there are at least two ways in which this provision can here prove to be o f importance. 
To begin with, it can be o f assistance where art. 10 either does not cover 
{supplementäres Freiheitsrecht) or does not protect {subsidiäres Freiheitsrecht) the 
secrecy of a particular example of an act o f telecommunication. In addition to this, art.
2.1 can help the interpretation of art. 10; the doctrine of the Constitutional Court on the 
right to privacy can be a guide-line for the interpretation and specific application o f art. 
10, particularly helpful for the solution of border-line cases. The extent to which art.
117See, e.g., BVerfGE 34,269 at 281; 54,148 at 153; 72, 155 at 170.
118See Scholz, "Das Grundredcht der freien Entfaltung..." at 113.
119See BVerfGE 67, 157 at 171.
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2.1 is of assistance in the context of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications will 
come to light in chapter 4.
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Section 3: The Constitutional Protection of Privacy and of 
the Secrecy of Telecommunications Confronted
Despite the growing importance of privacy in western social and legal milieu, 
privacy is hardly ever accorded straightforward recognition at the constitutional level. 
This situation contrasts with the protection of the secrecy o f telecommunications, an 
aspect of privacy which, openly or implicitly, is considered a fundamental right in most 
western constitutions120. In this section I will try to find an explanation for this 
paradoxical sounding situation, that is I will try to answer the question why privacy, 
unlike the secrecy of telecommunications, is hardly ever overtly and never simply 
recognised as a right in constitutional texts.
This question will be answered on the basis of two complementary issues, 
which will be analysed in turn: first, the two values at stake have a completely different 
juridical background; this is dealt with in point (1) below. Second, their respective 
conceptual features are just as different as are their juridical backgrounds are; this is 
considered in point (2) below. As will be seen, these two issues also account for the 
fact that the United States pays more attention to the protection of privacy than do 
western European countries. Finally, before closing this section I will also face the 
issue of why the secrecy of telecommunications is protected in most contemporary 
western Constitutions and will compare the position of this right in the United States of 
America and in continental European systems; this will be the object of point (3) below.
1. The Juridical Background
The secrecy of telecommunications can be viewed as one of the classical rights 
'against the State' of modem constitutional theory, so that its present recognition as a 
fundamental right is backed by a long European tradition (see chapter 2). Privacy as an 
independent value, on the other hand, has only recently been accepted into the world of 
rights. On this basis, it is possible to argue that the protection of privacy was probably 
not ripe enough a juridical concern at the time the Constitution of the United States and 
most contemporary European Constitutions were enacted. Such an argument seems to 
be supported by the case of the EC countries: only the three youngest of the EC national
120See, e.g., footnotes 1 and 2 above and accompanying text
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Constitutions -namely the Constitutions of the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain121- 
include an overt recognition of privacy.
This explanation, however, does not give a fully convincing answer to the 
original question. The doubt may still arise as to why the 'old' western Constitutions 
have not been amended to meet the new need to protect privacy. As far as this issue is 
concerned, the case o f the United States has to be distinguished from that of most 
Constitutions in western Europe; since in the United States such constitutional reform 
has actually taken place. Yet this constitutional reform has taken place in a very 
unorthodox way. To be more precise, the wording o f the constitutional text has never 
been altered for the sake of privacy; rather, the amendment has been carried through via 
the 'creative' interpretation o f certain constitutional provisions by the Supreme 
Court122. Let me explain how this has been accomplished.
In order to place privacy amongst the constitutional rights, the Court has acted 
in two different directions. First, it has interpreted some constitutional amendments as 
means to the service of the protection of privacy. The amendments in question are 
mainly the third123, the fourth124 and the clause against self-incrimination of the 
fifth125. As a result, a case for the protection of privacy is seen to arise indirectly
121 Articles 10 of the Dutch Constitution (’right to respect for privacy"); art. 26 of the Portuguese text 
('right to the protection of the intimacy of private and family life") and art. 18.1 of the Spanish one 
("right to...personal intimacy"). The original Portuguese term "intimidade", or the Spanish one 
"intimidad" are taken here as synonyms of "privacy". The Diccionario Moderno Español-Inglés, Inglés- 
Español (1976) translates the Spanish term "intimidad" both as "intimacy" and "privacy" (p. 527), and 
the English term "privacy" as "intimidad" or "vida privada" (both expressions used in the Portuguese 
Constitution). The confusion of terms stems from the fact, already referred to above, that there is no 
such a word as "privacy" either in Portuguese or in Spanish. As for the rest, the conceptual features of 
the English word "intimacy" lead to the key ideas of "seclusion" and "secrecy", which constitute the 
core of the uncontroversial concept of privacy (see footnotes 59-60 above and accompanying text).
122It is, in fact, characteristic of American constitutionalism -conditioned by the American system of 
judicial control of constitutionality- that the development of the Federal Constitution has mainly taken 
place through its judicial interpretation, in such a way that the amending procedures provided ad hoc by 
Article V of the Federal Constitution have rarely been used: "El desarrollo de la Constitución no se hará 
tanto por vía de reforma como por vía de interpretación. En la práctica, es ésta la que ocupa el lugar y 
cumple la función que inicialmente se había pensado para aquélla" (Javier Pérez Royo, "La Reforma de 
la Constitución" Revista de Estudios Políticos, No. 22 -separata-, p. 16). See also M. Shapiro. & 
Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, 5th ed.. New York - London, 1979, p. 78.
123"No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, 
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law". Despite its narrow scope -the amendment 
rose to prevent situations such as those created by the English Quarterly Act, whereby colonists were 
made to host King George's troops- the amendment seems thought out to protect the interest in the 
privacy of one's home. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has only referred to the amendment to 
remark that it is "another facet of...privacy" (Griswold v. Connecticut, at 484).
124Although somehow the idea of privacy was always behind the judicial interpretation of the fourth 
amendment, this has only been consistently read as a provision meant to protect privacy since the case 
of Katz v. Ú.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This point will be explained at length in chapter 2.
12S"No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...". 
Paradoxically, the case usually mentioned for having first interpreted this clause as an aspect of privacy
59
whenever either of these provisions is at stake. Second, the Court has interpreted the 
Constitution in such a way that it embodies a general, all-embracing constitutional right 
to privacy. Ruling on the existence o f such a general right was at the core of its -very 
controversial- decision in the case o f Griswold v. Connecticut* 126. Incidentally, note 
that in this case the Court 'created’ a general constitutional right to privacy with a view 
to making it embrace the right to autonomy and that the right to autonomy has been left 
outside the scope of privacy as defined in this thesis; however, this constitutional right 
to privacy was 'created' in such all-embracing terms that one can assume that it also 
covers privacy conceived as control over seclusion and secrecy. The grounds for this 
general constitutional right to privacy were found in the "relationship lying within the 
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees"127. Such 
'zones of privacy' were identified, not only in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments, but also in the First128 and Ninth129 or, to be sure, in their 'penumbras’, 
formed by 'emanations' of the guarantees contained therein.
As the foregoing paragraphs show, in the United States the right to privacy is 
granted direct constitutional protection as a fundamental right, even if this protection 
results from a 'judicial' amendment of the Constitution and privacy is still not explicitly 
mentioned in the constitutional text. However imperfect this constitutional protection 
might be, the situation in the United States contrasts with the situation in most western 
European countries, where no constitutional reform of any kind has been attempted to 
recognise privacy as a right130. It ought to be noted in this context that most western 
European Constitutions have actually undergone several amendments after their 
enactment, often in recent years131. Concerned with different sorts of problems -some
(case of Boyd v, U.S.t 116 U.S. 616 (1886)), is the case which introduced a reading of the fourth 
amendment as a means to protect private property, not privacy as such.
126381 U.S. 479 (1965).
127Ibid., at 485.
128Literally, the first amendment protects the freedom of religion, of expression, of assembly and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievance. Nevertheless, the Court referred to NÀACP v. 
Alabama (357 U.S. 449, 462), where the freedom of association had been held a peripheral First 
Amendment right, and subsequently interpreted that freedom of association implies a right to privacy in 
one's associations. From this, the Court deduced that "the First Amendment has a penumbra where 
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion" (Griswold v. Connecticut, at 483).
129*The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people". Despite its suggestive breadth, the Griswold case appears to be the first 
time that "a majority of the Supreme Court...relied upon the 9th amendment in a serious way" 
(Thomas I. Emerson, "Nine Justices in search of a doctrine" The Right of Privacy. A symposium on 
the implications of Griswold v. Connecticut, New York, 1971, p. 31).
130One must however bear in mind that, as explained above, some European Constitutions recognise 
the right of personality of individuals, wherein privacy is comprehended.
131Take, e.g. the Constitutions of Belgium (last reform in July 7, 1988), Germany (last reform in 
August 31,1990), Ireland (last reform in 1987), or Luxembourg (last reform in 1984/5?).
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of which touched on the subject at issue here132- these amendments have not been 
taken as occasions for the introduction of a right to privacy. They have thus made it 
clear that the 'unripeness' o f the issue can no longer, at least not exclusively, be 
claimed to justify the absence of privacy in those constitutional text. A complete 
explanation o f that absence would require the examination of some different issues. 
These issues relate, in particular, to the conceptual complexities that the term 'privacy' 
enshrines.
2. The Conceptual Features.
As has been noted above, the conceptual features of "privacy” and "secrecy of 
telecommunications" are totally different. The difficulties involved in a definition of the 
former term have already been largely commented on; even if privacy is exclusively 
conceived as the control over one's seclusion and secrecy, even then its conceptual 
boundaries continue to be ill-defined. The expression "secrecy of telecommunications", 
on the contrary, refers to an area narrow enough to be a relatively well defined concept. 
The same can be said about the right associated to its protection. Problems about the 
scope of this right certainly arise, but these tend to be concerned with concrete points or 
with some technical details of its definition. They do not have the basic character of the 
difficulties affecting the scope of privacy or the right to privacy. In the end, many of 
those conceptual problems have been solved by virtue of the long tradition of the right.
Indeed, as this last remark points out, some connection exists between the 
tradition o f a term and the level of precision its definition has attained. In the case of 
privacy, continental Europe offers a good example o f this. The strangeness of the 
concept o f privacy and of its corresponding right in the continental European tradition is 
underlined by the fact that the word 'privacy', as noted above, does not even find 
accurate translation in most European tongues. Not surprisingly, most western 
European Constitutions have preferred to concentrate on the autonomous recognition of 
concrete aspects of privacy, better defined and more solidly rooted in their 
constitutional history. The secrecy of telecommunications133, together with the
132This is notably the case of the Seventeenth Amendment to the German Constitution (1968) which, 
among other changes in the system of fundamental rights, included an amendment of art. 10 of the 
Federal Constitution narrowing the rights of individuals with regard to the interception of their private 
communications. Similarly, the last reform of the Constitution of Luxembourg included an extension 
of the protection of private communications (art 28) from correspondence to telephone conversations.
133See footnote 1.
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inviolability of one's premises134, are the most traditional examples. Moreover, some 
new Constitutions also prefer to guarantee certain particular aspects of privacy which 
have of recent become particularly endangered, such as the protection of personal data, 
by way of making them the object of an independent right, without referring to the 
general right to privacy; this is notably the case of the Constitutions of the new German 
Länder, all of which recognise a right to data protection135. Furthermore, even in those 
European Constitutions where a general right to privacy is actually mentioned, this does 
not stand as a substitute for the recognition o f concrete spheres of privacy as 
independent rights136. Backed by their own tradition and by the importance of their 
more accurate definition, these rights appear just as if privacy had not previously been 
mentioned.
Nevertheless, the fact that the right to privacy is mentioned is not without 
importance. To begin with, it pays homage to the interest in privacy lying behind the 
specific rights listed above, thus providing an explicit positive criterion for their 
interpretation. More significantly, a general right to privacy arises as the only source of 
protection for some of the areas embraced by the concept o f privacy. In fact, there are 
areas of privacy the importance of which has been acknowledged only recently, areas 
which are therefore not protected as independent rights. In other words, there are new 
situations and ways whereby privacy may be threatened and against which law has not 
yet developed particular defensive mechanisms in the form of specific rights. This is 
today the case with the protection o f personal data. The wrongful handling of personal 
data entails new and powerful forms o f menace to individuals' privacy against which 
the only basis for protection is the direct appeal to privacy as a general right. In fact, the 
need to respond to such new dangers has often triggered the recognition of privacy as a 
fundamental right137.
134As for the EEC countries, see Belgian Constitution, art. 10; Danish Constitution, art. 72; German 
Constitution, art. 13; Greek Constitution, art. 9; Irish Constitution, art. 40; Italian Constitution, art. 
14; Constitution of Luxembourg, art. 15; Constitution of the Netherlands, art. 12; Portuguese 
Constitution, art. 34; Spanish Constitution, art. 18.2. In the United States, such protection is provided 
by the Fourth Amendment.
135Art. 11 of the Constitution of Brandenburg (20 Aug. 1992); art. 6 of the Constitution of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (23 May 1993); art. 33 of the Constitution of Sachsen (27 May 1992); art. 
6 of the Constitution of Sachscn-Anhalt (17 July 1992).
136This is also true in the case of countries where a right of personality is constitutionally recognised. 
The wideness and indeterminacy of this right also adviced, like in the case of privacy, the parallel 
recognition of some aspects of personality as independent rights.
137The need to protect personal data is stressed in the three EEC Constitutions where privacy is 
recognised as a fundamental right (Constitution of the Netherlands, art. 10.2; Portuguese Constitution, 
arts. 26.2 and 35; Spanish Constitution, art. 18.4).
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3 . The Protection o f the Secrecy o f Telecommunications as a 
Fundamental Right
We have now dealt with the first two questions posed at the beginning of this 
chapter, i.e. the questions as to why privacy should be protected and as to why privacy 
does not generally receive straightforward recognition and protection in constitutional 
documents. I would now like to address the third and last one of those questions, i.e. 
what makes the secrecy of telecommunications worthy of protection as a fundamental 
right?
In section 2 I argued that the recognition o f the right to privacy should be 
regarded as a result of a combination of two factors: first, this right embraces values 
which society regards as being worthy of respect; second, society considers that the 
respect these values deserve is threatened, hence that these values should be protected. 
This argument also applies to the secrecy of telecommunications. The secrecy of 
telecommunications is an important aspect of privacy; this means that the value 
judgement which lies behind the idea that the secrecy of telecommunications should be 
respected is included within the more general value judgement that privacy should be 
respected. One can therefore assume that society has been concerned with the respect 
for the secrecy of telecommunications at least since it started to be concerned with the 
respect for privacy.
In the case of Europe, the right to the secrecy of telecommunications counts 
with a much longer tradition than the right to privacy: as will be explained in the next 
chapter, the secrecy of letters started to be considered a value worthy of independent 
protection more than two centuries ago, whereas a more general right to privacy has 
only recently started to be recognised. In the United States the need to protect the 
secrecy of telecommunications has not been felt since so long. Here the secrecy of 
letters was explicitly recognised as a right neither in the federal Bill of Right, nor in 
those Bills of Rights enacted by the states. The importance of protecting this particular 
area of privacy was only perceived when telecommunications started to play a central 
role in individuals' lives and technological development started seriously to endanger 
their secrecy. At that point the secrecy of telecommunications was given protection both 
at the statutory level138 and as a constitutional right. Note however that this right has 
never been made the object of explicit constitutional recognition; rather, it has been 
considered included within the right against searches and seizures recognised in the 
fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution. In this sense, the Supreme Court had no
138Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Slat. 1064, U.S.C.
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problem to state that the right to the secrecy of letters was included within the right 
against searches and seizures of "papers"139; yet other means of telecommunications 
could only be considered implicit in the fourth amendment from the moment when this 
started to be interpreted as a provision which aims at the protection of privacy140.
One can therefore conclude that the secrecy of telecommunications is regarded 
as a value worthy of respect both in Europe and in the United States, although the need 
to offer legal protection to this value was felt at a much earlier stage in Europe. This 
circumstance accounts for the contrast which exists between the constitutional 
recognition of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in Europe and its 
constitutional recognition in the United States. This contrast can be sketched as 
follows. First, in Europe this right enjoys explicit recognition, whereas in the United 
States it has just arisen by virtue of a certain judicial interpretation of a certain 
constitutional provision. Secondly, European Constitutions conceive the secrecy of 
telecommunications as an independent fundamental right, they conceive it as an 
autonomous stand-point o f opposition to the power o f the State, despite the link 
existing between it and privacy; on the other hand, the U.S. Constitution regards this 
right as an aspect of the more general right to privacy. Finally, and in connection with 
the above circum stance, European constitutions define the secrecy of 
telecommunications in rather clear terms, whereas in the U.S. Constitution this right is 
recognised as part of the ill-defined right to privacy. The implications of these two 
different approaches to the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications will 
come to light in their full importance as I will compare in detail the recognition and 
protection of this right in the ECGR, Germany and the United States.
i39Ex Parte Jackson, 96 US 727 (1877).
140Katz v. US, 389 US 347 (1967).
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO  
THE SECRECY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
Before starting to compare the recognition and protection o f the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunication in the ECHR, Germany and the United States, it seems 
wise to have a brief look at its historical background in the three respective systems. 
This brief look at history will bring to light how different are the constitutional 
traditions in relation to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in Europe, on the 
one hand, and in the United States, on the other. In Europe, most particularly in 
Germany, this right has long enjoyed explicit recognition and protection as a 
constitutional right, so that there its history is neat and easy to trace. This is far from the 
case in the United States. Here the secrecy of telecommunications has only recently 
been recognised as a constitutional right; moreover, it has never been, and still is not, 
the object of direct constitutional attention. Its constitutional recognition is the result of 
two circumstances: first, the secrecy of telecommunications is regarded as an aspect of 
privacy; second, the Supreme Court is now of the opinion that the right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures recognised in the fourth amendment aims at the 
protection of privacy. As a result of a combination of these two circumstances, the 
Court now regards the interception of telecommunications as a case of search and 
seizure. My study of the history of this right will consist of an analysis of the 
interpretative steps that have led the Supreme Court to include the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications within the ambit of the fourth amendment This analysis will prove 
more complex than the review of the constitutional history of the secrecy of 
telecommunications in Germany; more attention in the present chapter will thus be 
dedicated to the United States.
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Section 1: The European Convention on Human Rights and
Germany
1 . The Background of the Secrecy of Telecommunications as a 
C onstitu tional R ight
In Europe, the secrecy of telecommunications has a long and solid history as a 
constitutional right. One can trace the constitutional history of this right in France as far 
back as the revolutionary period at the end of the eighteenth century, when the secrecy 
of the letters entrusted to the postal service was already perceived as a value worthy of 
constitutional protection. The right to the secrecy of postal letters appeared in a number 
of drafts of the French Déclaration des Droits de VHomme et du Citoyen of 17891 and, 
although it was not mentioned in the final version of this Déclaration2, this right was 
explicitly recognised by the Assemblée Nationale one year later3. Moreover, the fact 
that the Déclaration does not explicitly mention the secrecy of letters does not mean that 
it did not recognise it as a right: for reasons that will be explained below, it seems likely 
that the secrecy of letters was considered to be covered within art. 11 o f the 
Déclaration, which recognises the freedom of opinion and expression. I will come back 
to this point later.
The case of revolutionary France thus shows that the protection of the secrecy 
of telecommunications was a social concern at that time, so imposing that the eyes of 
the new constitutional order were immediately turned towards it. France was not an 
isolated case. Also other legal orders in continental Europe reacted to the social demand 
that the secrecy of letters be guaranteed. This was notably the case for Germany. In
*See Stéphane Riais, La Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, Hachette 1988; in 
particular, see: "Le projet de déclaration des droits de Condorcet" (p. 549); "Le projet de déclaration des 
droits contenu dans le cahier de doléances de la Noblesse des bailliages de Mantes et de Meulan" (p. 
556); "Le projet de déclaration des droits contenu dans le cahier de doléances du Tiers état de la prévôté 
et vicomté de Paris hors les murs" (p. 565); "Le premier projet de déclaration de Sieyès" (p. 603); "Le 
second projet de déclaration de Sieyès" (p. 616); "Le projet de déclaration de Thouret" (p. 638); "Le 
projet de déclaration de Custine" (p. 645); "Le projet de déclaration de Rabaut Saint-Étienne" (p. 683); 
"Le projet de déclaration de Bouche" (p. 688); "Le projet de déclaration de Gouges Cartou" (p. 708); "Le 
projet de déclaration de Boislandry" (p. 728); "Le projet présenté par Mirabeau au nom du Comité des 
Cinq" (p. 748).
2The absence of a référencé to lhe secrecy of letters in the final text of the Déclaration, in disregard of 
the above-mentioned drafts, raised the criticisms of Rabaut Saint-Étienne during the preparatory work 
(Riais, La Déclaration des Droits de VHomme et du Citoyen, at 248).
3Decree of the Assemblée Nationale of 10 of August 1790, Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, 
Première Série, Tome XVII, Paris, 1984, pp. 695 et seq.
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Germany4, secrecy of telecommunications started to receive legal as early as at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, when the first regulations of the post declared that 
postal authorities ought to respect the secrecy of any letter or any other act of postal 
sending5. However, for the recognition of the secrecy of telecommunications as a 
constitutional right we would still have to wait over hundred years, namely until the 
Constitution of Hesse was enacted in 1831. Following the lead of the first system of 
regulation of the post, art. 38 of the Constitution of 1831 guaranteed that the secrecy of 
any act of postal sending would be respected by the postal authorities. The right thus 
defined was literally referred to as the right to 'the secrecy of letters' 
('Briefgeheimnis')6.
The Constitution of Hesse set the trend of using the expression 
'Briefgeheimnis' to refer to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. This 
terminology was rather inaccurate, however, given that this right covered not only 
letters but any act of postal sending and that, moreover, it did not cover the secrecy of 
letters in every circumstance, but only in as far as they had been entrusted to the postal 
system. Nevertheless, and in spite of this, both art. 142 of the Constitution of 18497 *
and art. 33 of the Constitution of 1850s accepted the use of the term 'Briefgeheimnis' 
to refer to the right to the secrecy of any act of postal sending against interference by 
postal authorities. Note, however, that art. 142 of the Constitution of 1849 guaranteed 
secrecy also beyond the framework of the postal service against interference carried out 
by public authorities not attached to the postal service9.
The constitutions that followed the one of 1850 and which preceded the 
enactment of the Weimar Constitution in 1919 did not mention the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications10. During this lapse of time, this right was only protected by 
statute, namely in regulations of the postal service and in the Criminal Code11. Also in
4For this issue see Badufa, Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Art. 10, Par. 2 et seq., pp. 7 et seq; 
Maunz-Dürig-Herzog, Grundgesetzeskommentar, Art. 10, pp. 7 et seq.
5Kap. VIII, § 4 Preußische Postordnung v. 10. 8. 1712; Abschnitt V, § 3 Preußische Allgemeine 
Postordnung v. 26. 11. 1782.
6§ 38 Verfassungs-Urkunde für das Kurfürstentum Hessen v. 5.1.1831: "Das Briefgeheimnis ist auch 
künftig unverletzt zu halten. Die absichtliche unmittelbare oder mittelbare Verletzung desselben bei der 
Posverwaltung soll peinlich bestraft werden'*.
7§ 142 Verfassung der Deuschen Reiches v. 28. 3.1849: "Das Briefgeheimnis ist gewährleistet. Die 
bei strafgerichtlichen Untersuchungen und in Kriegsfällen nothwendigen Beschränkungen sind durch die 
Gesetzgebung festzustellen".
sArt. 33 der Preußischen Verfassungs-Urkunde v. 31.1.1850: "Das Briefgeheimnis ist unverletzlich".
9Badura, Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Art. 10, Par. 7, p. 8.
10Verfassung des Norddeutsches Bundes v. 26. 7.1867; Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches v. 16.4. 
1871.
U§ 58 Abs. 2 Gesetz über das Postwesen des Norddeutschen Bundes v. 2. 11.1867 and § 5 Gesetz 
über das Postwesen des Deutschen Reiches v. 28.10.1871. § 299 and § 354 StGB.
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these statutes the secrecy of telecommunications was literally referred to as the 'secrecy 
of letters' or 'Briefgeheimnis'. Yet the Criminal Code started to draw a conceptual 
distinction between two different rights to .the 'secrecy o f  letters': whereas in one 
provision the expression ’Briefgeheimnis' referred to a right recognised vis-à-vis postal 
authorities ('Briefgeheimnis im engeren Sinne'), in another it was used in a more 
comprehensive way to refer to the secrecy of telecommunications beyond the 
framework of the postal system and protected against violations by any public authority 
('Briefgeheimnis im wetteren Sitine*)12. This was only the first one of a series of 
conceptual distinctions which would soon prove necessary when referring to the 
secrecy of telecommunications, for in the second half of the nineteenth century the law­
maker had to meet the development o f new means of telecommunication, such as the 
telegraph and the telephone, and the need for the protection of their secrecy13.
The new variety of means o f telecommunication was first reflected in the 
Weimar Constitution of 1919. The right to the secrecy of telecommunications was 
recognised in art. 117, which distinguished, first o f all, between the protection of this 
right vis-à-vis postal authorities, on the one hand, and its protection vis-à-vis any 
public authority, on the other, thus confirming the distinction already announced by the 
Criminal Code; second, this provision also distinguished the secrecy of letters from the 
secrecy of other means of telecommunication14. With the expression 'secrecy of the 
postal system' ('Postgeheimnis') art. 117 referred to the right to the secrecy of any act 
of postal sending vis-à-vis postal authorities; in other words, the expression 
Tostgeheimnis* was used as an alternative and more accurate way of referring to the 
right formerly known as 'Briefgeheimnis'. Also the expression 'Briefgeheimnis' was 
now used in a more accurate way, since it referred to the right to the secrecy of letters, 
whether or not entrusted to the postal system, vis-à-vis any public authority. Finally, 
the expression 'secrecy o f the telegraph and of telecommunication system' 
(Telegraphen- und Fernsprechgeheimnis') was used as an equivalent to the expression 
'Briefgeheimnis' in the context o f telegraphic communications and telephone 
conversations, i.e. it referred to the right that the secrecy of telecommunications carried 
out by means of telegraph and telephone be not infringed upon by any public authority, 
whether or not attached to the post. It is this conceptual pattern of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunication that was finally inherited by art. 10 of the Basic Law of
12See § 354 and § 299 StGB, respectively. For this issuc, sec Badura, Kommentar zum Bonner 
Grundgesetz, Art. 10, Par. 13, p. 11.
13§ 8 Telegraphengesetz von 1892; § 5 Postgesetz von 1871; § 355 StGB.
14Art. 117 Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs v. 11. 8.1919: "Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post-, 
Telegraphen- und Femsprechgeheimnis sind unverletzlich. Ausnahmen können nur durch Reichsgesetz 
zugelassen werden*'.
6 8
1949, the only difference being that here the expression 'Telegraphen- und 
Femsprechgeheimnis' had been replaced by the expression'Fernmeldegeheimnis\
In sum, as the above paragraphs illustrate, the secrecy of telecommunications 
has a long and tidy history as a constitutional right in Germany. The point o f departure 
is the revolutionary France of the end of the eighteenth century, which triggered off the 
assertion of the secrecy of telecommunications as a constitutional right. This tradition of 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in Europe has also led to its recognition 
within art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; moreover, art. 8 of the 
ECHR has a precedent at a comprehensive international level in art. 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 194815, by which art. 8 of the European Convention 
was to a great extent inspired.
2 . The Interest in Protecting the Secrecy of Telecommunications:
Privacy as the Negative Side of Freedom of Expression
There is one important difference between the historical conception of the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications and the way this right is presently perceived. I am 
thinking of the interest which lies behind the recognition of this right. My approach to 
the secrecy of telecommunications relies upon one assumption, i.e. that we are facing 
an aspect of privacy and that this is why the secrecy of telecommunications ultimately 
deserves protection. That this is the case has seemed to me too obvious even to need 
justification and is also commonly accepted or even taken for granted by commentators. 
However, the idea that the secrecy of telecommunications is an aspect of privacy has 
not appeared so straightforward throughout the history of this right. When the secrecy 
of telecommunications first arose as a constitutional right it was not openly regarded as 
an aspect of the right to privacy, but as an aspect of the freedom of opinion and of 
expression. This is clear upon a reading of the drafts of the French Déclaration des 
Droits de VHomme et du Citoyen which include a recognition of this right: in all these 
drafts16 the secrecy of telecommunications is regarded as an aspect of individual 
freedom and, in particular, as inherent to the freedom to express one's opinions via the 
post. This explains why, as noted above, an explicit mention of the secrecy of 
telecommunications was finally considered redundant and thus excluded from the final
15"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation".
16See footnote 1 above.
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version of the Déclaration of 1789: this right was seen implicit in the recognition in art. 
11 of the freedom to express one’s opinion in writing17.
In the late eighteenth century, the confidentiality of the post and the freedom of 
expression were thus tied together under a common rationale. At first sight, such a 
close tie strikes one as being in contradiction with our present conception of these two 
rights, according to which they respond to completely opposite rationales: today, the 
secrecy of telecommunications is approached as an aspect of privacy, whilst freedom of 
expression is heavily dependent upon the idea of publicity, in the sense that it covers 
the free expression of opinions made in public18. The connection between secrecy and 
free expression, however, is far from ill-founded and on a second look proves to be 
perfectly coherent with the distinction between privacy and publicity. For one thing, 
freedom of expression covers not only the freedom to choose when, how and about 
what we want to speak in public; it also covers the freedom to choose whether we want 
to speak in public at all. In other words, freedom of expression does not only cover the 
freedom actually to speak one's mind in public, but also the freedom not to speak one's 
mind in public, either because one wants to speak in private or simply because one 
wants to remain silent. It is to this negative aspect o f the freedom of expression that the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunication relates.
Seen in the light of the above considerations, the connection between freedom 
of expression and the secrecy of telecommunications, on the one hand, and the 
connection between this latter right and privacy, on the other, no longer appears as 
contradictory; rather, the one is a confirmation of the other. As a negative aspect of 
freedom of expression, secrecy of telecommunications guarantees that thoughts and 
opinions can be expressed in secret, something which is the realm of privacy. Indeed, 
free expression and the secrecy of telecommunications relate as publicity relates to 
privacy, the dividing line between them  being the right to informational self- 
determination discussed in chapter 1, that is, the right to decide whether or to what 
extent information about oneself is to be made public or to remain private (i.e. secret). 
Therefore, the fact that the drafts o f the French Déclaration placed freedom of 
expression and secrecy of telecommunications in a close relationship does not imply 
that the interest in the protection of privacy did not underlie the recognition of this latter
17Art. 11: "La libre communication des pensées et des opinions est un des droits les plus précieux de 
l'homme: tout citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, sauf à répondre de l'abus de cette 
liberté dans les cas déterminés par la loi" (emphasis added).
18Defining the term *public' as used in connection with freedom of expression (i.e. how public must a 
speech be in order that freedom of expression be involved?) is by no means easy. The difficulties of this 
definition, and of the borderline cases it gives rise to, has been analysed by Frederick Schauer, '"Private1 
Speech and the 'Private' Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School District", (1979) The Supreme Court 
Review 217.
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right. The interest in privacy did underlie the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. If it was not explicitly mentioned it is simply because at that time 
the legal world had not yet started to think of privacy as such as an interest worthy of 
protection, as we saw in chapter 1.
The approach to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications as the negative 
aspect o f freedom of expression has survived until recent times19. It lies, for example, 
behind the enactment of art. 10 of the German Basic Law. During the constituent 
debates that gave rise to the Basic Law, in particular when the order in which order the 
different fundamental rights would be recognised was being discussed, the idea was 
put forward that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications should come 
immediately after freedom of expression, given (and this point was very much taken for 
granted) the immediate relationship between the two20. Although this order of 
fundamental rights did not prevail in the final draft of the Basic Law, the fact that it was 
proposed shows the extent to which post-war Germany continued to link secrecy of 
telecommunications to freedom of expression, instead of relating it directly to privacy. 
This should not come as a surprise since, as was argued in chapter 1, the idea that 
privacy is an independent value worthy of protection had not yet found fertile soil in 
Europe at the time the German Basic Law was enacted. Even the right 'to the free 
development of one's personality' recognised in ait. 2.1 was not enacted as a general 
right to personality {allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht)y which, as noted in chapter 1, 
embraces a right to privacy; rather, it was enacted as a general right of freedom 
{allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit), that is as a right to act free from the interference of the 
public power21. This background explains that the drafters of the Basic Law turned to 
the most traditional justification of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications and 
regarded it as part of the negative freedom to express one's opinions. Of course, since 
1949 things have changed in the German legal order. Since then the Constitutional 
Court22 has developed the doctrine that art. 2.1 embraces a general right to personality 
and explicitly regards privacy as an aspect of this right. Within this new theoretical 
framework, the secrecy of telecommunications has been connected to art. 2.1, in 
particular to the right to privacy contained within this right23.
19A1so the right to privacy has been referred to as the negative aspect of freedom of expression. See C-
E. Eberle, "Datenschutz durch Meinungsfreiheit" (1977) DÖV 306.
20"Brief- und Postgeheimnis und Lehrfreiheit 'stehen ja unmittelbar im Zusammenhang mit der 
Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung"' (Klaus-Berto v. Doemming, Rudolf Werner Füsslein & Werner Matz, 
"Entstehungsgeschichte der Artikel des Grundgesetzes" 1 Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der 
Gegenwart 1 at 46 (1951).
21Ibidem at 54 et seq (1951).
22See BVerfGE 27,1 at 6; 27,344 at 350 et seq.
23See BVerfGE 67, 157 at 171. Still today, however, the Constitutional Court continues to 
acknowledge the character of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications as the negative aspect of 
the freedom of expression. See BVerfGE 90,255.
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The conception of the secrecy of telecommunication as the negative aspect of the 
freedom of expression also underlies the recognition of this right within the ECHR. In 
this document, the secrecy of telecommunications and freedom of expression are 
recognised in art. 8 and in ait. 10 respectively, that is they are recognised as fully 
independent rights; yet art. 8 includes within a single right (the right to respect for 
correspondence) both the secrecy o f  telecommunications and the freedom to engage in 
telecommunications. Rightly understood, the freedom to engage in telecommunications 
can only be approached as an aspect of the right to privacy, hence it can only cover the 
freedom to engage in telecommunications held in secret. For one thing, as has already 
been mentioned the freedom to engage in communications held in public (freedom of 
expression) is already recognised in art. 10 of the ECHR; moreover, privacy is the 
rationale behind the rest of art. 8, which also recognises the rights to private life, family 
life and home. Regarding privacy as the rationale behind the freedom to engage in 
telecommunications thus responds, first, to the need to draw a clear line between the 
scope of art. 8 and the scope of art. 10 and, second, it responds to a demand for 
coherence when reading art. 8 as a whole (the importance of respecting the internal 
coherence of art. 8 and o f keeping the line between arts. 8 and 10 clear will be 
discussed at length in chapter 4). In the light of the above considerations, we can assert 
that art. 8 recognises the freedom to engage in telecommunications only in as far as 
these are held in secret. What I would like to point out is that the joint recognition of 
this freedom and of the secrecy of telecommunications within a single right results from 
and reinforces the view that the secrecy of telecommunications is part o f the negative 
aspect of the freedom of expression: the secrecy of telecommunications is placed hand 
in hand with the freedom not to express one's opinions in public, to be precise, with 
the freedom to express one's opinions through means which guarantee that the 
communication is being held in secret.
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Section 2: The United States
In tro d u ctio n
In the United States, as already touched upon, the constitutional history of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications is far more complex than it is in Germany. In 
fact, this right does not enjoy straightforward constitutional recognition; rather, its 
existence is the result of the interpretation of a certain constitutional provision: to be 
precise, it is the result of an interpretation of the fourth amendment as a provision 
which aims at the protection of privacy. This circumstance indicates that in the United 
States secrecy of telecommunications has always been regarded, unlike in Europe, as 
an aspect of privacy. It also indicates that analysing the constitutional history of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications must consist of analysing how the 
interpretation of the fourth amendment has evolved to lead to the coverage of this right. 
This will be the purpose of the present section.
1, The Historical Background of the Fourth Amendment.
In the United States secrecy of telecommunications has been recognised as a 
constitutional right within the framework of the fourth amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. The amendment reads as follows:
"The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized".
The wording of the fourth amendment strikes one as being unusually precise for 
the recognition of a constitutional right24. It does not protect the security of people in 
the abstract; rather, the fourth amendment is concerned with security only in as far as 
this may be endangered in some very specific circumstances, namely in searches and
24Think, e.g., of the general terms of the freedoms recognised in the first amendment (freedom of 
religion, of expression, of assembly and to petition the government for a redress of a grievance) or even 
of the due process guarantees recognised in the fifth to the eighth amendments, although these are 
already so precise that they have been considered closer to "a miniature code of criminal procedure" than 
to a set of constitutional guarantees (Lawrence M. Friedman, A History o f American Law, New York, 
1973, p. 103).
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seizures carried out (by public officials, as we must understand it) on persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, if they do not fulfil certain requirements. Indeed, to repeat this level 
of precision is unusual in the recognition o f constitutional rights, yet it also 
characterises other amendments to the Constitution of the United States, notably the 
second25 and the third26. The inclusion within the U.S. Bill of Rights of provisions so 
narrow in scope can only be explained by reference to the social and political context of 
the time in which they were enacted. The America of the late eighteenth century was 
confronted with specific problems that had arisen during British domination and to a 
great extent conceived the Bill o f Rights as an instrument for the solution of such 
problems, at least of those which were thought to deserve a constitutional answer. Both 
the second and the third amendments27 responded to this approach to the Bill of Rights. 
So did the fourth amendment, which was enacted with the very specific purpose of 
eradicating the pervasive issue of ‘'general search warrants permitting officers to search 
where they please for smuggled goods"28.
The evils of general search warrants or sim ilar instruments had been 
experienced both in England and in the British colonies in America. Unknown in the 
early common law, general search warrants were first allowed in England with respect 
to stolen property; thereafter they developed to allow search for any property the 
possession of which was not permitted, such as contraband goods and the means or 
instruments of a crime29. In practice, however, general warrants were often issued and 
used with a view to finding evidence among the papers of political suspects30. General 
search warrants were not long-lived in England, however. Soon courts started to 
condemn as trespass the searches accomplished on the basis of general search
^"A  well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed".
26"No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor 
in time of war, but in a manner to be described by law".
27The right of the people to keep and bear arms of the second amendment expressed the insistence of 
Americans after the Independence war that they should be able to defend themselves from foreign 
invaders and ambitious leaders and, eventually, against one another in their just bom country. For its 
part, the third amendment arose to prevent situations such as those created by the English Quarterly 
Act, whereby colonists were made to host King George's troops.
28John Kaplan, "Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law" 49 Cal. L  Rev., pp. 
474, 476(1961).
29Ibidem, p. 475.
30See Osmond K. Fraenkel, "Concerning Searches and Seizures" 34 Harv. L. Rev., 361 at 362 (1920- 
1921).
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warrants31, until these were declared illegal by the House of Commons32. At the same 
time, the British colonies in America were also being exposed to instruments similar to 
general search warrants, i.e. writs of assistance, relied on by British revenue officers to 
ransack Americans' houses in search of smuggled goods33. Also Americans undertook 
a legal struggle against such instruments, which they regarded as "the worst instrument 
of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental 
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book"34. Unlike in England, 
this struggle was not successful; yet it has been praised as "the first scene of the first act 
of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain"35.
The enactment of the fourth amendment is a fruit of the background described 
above. On account o f this, the risk existed that the fourth amendment would remain a 
precept narrow in scope and most probably of short-lived application. Indeed, it would 
have been coherent to understand it simply as a ban on general search warrants or 
similar instruments, a ban which would have diminished in significance as the issue of 
such search warrants would have been discarded in practice. From the beginning, 
however, it was clear that the fourth amendment also allowed scope for a more 
ambitious interpretation, notably on account of the term 'unreasonable'. Indeed, the 
fourth amendment does not only prohibit searches and seizures based on general search 
warrants but, more generally, all unreasonable searches and seizures. American courts 
had to decide whether the expression 'unreasonable searches and seizures' was a 
synonym with the expression 'searches and seizures carried out under general 
warrants' or whether, on the other hand, the former expression was somewhat wider. 
In other words, American courts had to decide whether or not the fourth amendment 
ought to be given life beyond the very particular circumstances that had conditioned its 
enactment. They did not hesitate to do this36.
31Fraenkel ("Concerning Searches and Seizures" at 363) refers to the cases of Huckle v. Money (1763), 
Money v. Leack (1765) and the most important case of Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's 
Messengers (1765). The opinion delivered by Lord Camden in this last case has been celebrated as a 
"monument of English freedom, and (...) the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law" (Boyd 
v. t/.S., 116 U.S. 616,626 (1886)).
^Common Law Journal, April 22 and 25 (1766). Reference from Fraenkel, "Concerning Searches and 
Seizures" at 363, note 17.
33O.K. Fraenkel, "Concerning Searches and Seizures" at 364; J. Kaplan, "Search and Seizure: A No- 
Man's Land..." at 476.
34These words are James Otis's, attorney general of Massachussets, who led the legal struggle referred 
to above and resigned as a consequence of his lack of success (quotation from Boyd v. U.S. at 625).
35These are words of John Adams quoted in Fraenkel, "Concerning Searches and Seizures" at 365, note 
26.
36This has also been the case for the second amendment, now regarded as the recognition of a right to 
bear arms. The third amendment, on the other hand, has been condemned to a very short life; in fact, it 
has only once been invoked in a serious lawsuit (case brought in 1979 by New York prison guards 
protesting against the occupation of their state-provided housing by the national Guard) and has only 
been referred to by the Supreme Court to remark that it is "another facet of...privacy" (Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 484).
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In sum, the historical background of the fourth amendment provides useful 
information for the better understanding of this provision -in fact, both commentators37 
and the Supreme Court itself38 sometimes like to refer to this background in support of 
some point of view or other-, yet courts' decisions have had the effect o f greatly 
detaching the fourth amendment from the background of its enactment. By means of 
this detachment, courts have placed the definition of the scope of the fourth amendment 
in their own hands and have made this definition primarily dependent on the way the 
term 'unreasonable' is interpreted. Looking at the judicial interpretation of the fourth 
amendment will be the objective of the rest of this Section.
2 . The Judicial Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
F r. ^
2.1 A Basic Scheme of the Fourth Amendment.
The rest of this Section will be devoted to studying how the judiciary, or to be 
precise how the Supreme Court, has interpreted the fourth amendment. In particular, I 
will try to depict what has been the evolution of the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
this provision and how the right to the secrecy of telecommunications has finally been 
included therein. To this end I will draw up a scheme of the fourth amendment which, I 
believe, offers interesting insights into the different interpretative trends of the fourth 
amendment. In particular, this scheme will show that these trends belong to more 
general trends of legal philosophy successively at issue in the United States.
The scheme I propose for my analysis is a combination of two different patterns 
to approach to law and legal provisions. These patterns have been proposed, 
respectively, by Roscoe Pound39 and by Karl Llewellyn40. Pound suggested that the
37A good example is the article by Akhil Reed Amar "Fourth Amendment First Principles", 107 Han. 
L. Rev., 757 (1994).
38See, e.g., Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Burdeau v. U.S. 256 U.S. 465 (1920); Marron v.
U.S., 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145 (1947); separate opinion of Justice Fortas 
and the Chief Justice in Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
39Roscoe Pound was one of the leading prophets of sociological jurisprudence. He led a revolt against 
the juridical formalism prevalent at the turn of the century, providing much of the basis for the legal 
realism developed in the 1920s and 1930s: the conception of law as social engineering, the emphasis 
on interdisciplinary cooperation, the need of factual data about the law in action, the concern about the 
nature of judicial decision, etc. Yet Pound failed to carry his ideas to their last consequences and never 
shared the more radical views of legal realists (Pound, 'The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence", 44 Han. 
L. Rev. 697 (1930-31); see also William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, Univ. 
of OkJa. Pr„ 1985, pp. 22 et seq.). Among Pound's leading articles, see "Do we Need a Philosophy of 
Law?" 5 Col. L. Rev., 339 (1905); "Mechanical Jurisprudence" 8 Col. L. Rev., 606 (1908); "Liberty 
of Contract", 18 Yale L. Rev., 454 (1908-09); "Common Law and Legislation" 21 Han. L. Rev., 383 
(1907-08); 'The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence": 124 Han. L. Rev., 591 (1910-11);
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whole of what we call law is made up by three different elements: "(1) a number of 
legal precepts more or less defined (...); (2) a body of traditional ideas as to how legal 
precepts should be interpreted and applied and causes decided (...); (3) a body of 
philosophical, political and ethical ideas as to the end of law and as to what legal 
precepts should be in view thereof (,..)"40 1. For his part, Llewellyn offered an 
interesting insight into the evolution of the traditional approach to law, which he drafted 
in terms of an "interests -rights/rules -remedies" analysis42. Note that at least the last 
two elements of this pattern for analysis -i.e. rights/rules and remedies- and maybe 
even the first one -interests43- could be couched within the first element mentioned by 
Pound, i.e. 'legal precepts'44.
II, 25 Harv. L, Rev. 140 (1911-12); III, ibid, at 489; "Judge Holmes's Contributions to the Science of 
Law" 34 Harv. L Rev., 449, 451-452 (1920-21); 'The Theory of Judicial Decision": I, 36 Harv. L. 
Rev., 641 (1922-23); II, ibid, at 802; III, ibid, at 940.
40KarI N. Llewellyn is one of the main representatives of the American 'realist movement' of the first 
third of the century. Although American legal realism never constituted a coherent 'school' of thought, 
one could describe it as a movement the focal point of which was the actual recording of things as they 
are. In the words of Twining, "[a] realist is one who, no matter what his ideological or philosophical 
views, believes that it is important regularly to focus attention on the law in action at any given time 
and to try to describe as honestly and clearly as possible what is to be seen" (W. Twining, Karl 
Llewellyn.... at 74). Among Llewellyn leading articles, see "A realistic Jurisprudence -The Next Step" 
30 Col. L. Rev., 431 (1930); "Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound" (44 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1222 (1930-31); "The Constitution as an Institution", 34 Cot. L. Rev. 1 (1934); "The 
Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: the Problem of Juristic Method", 49 The Yale L. J. 1355 
(1940).
41R. Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision. I. -The Materials of Judicial Decision" at 645). Here 
Pound explicitly set aside the controversial question of the nature of law and concentrated instead on the 
"three quite distinct things (...) included in the idea of law" (ibidem) and which have been reproduced in 
the text. Pound believed that "much of the controversy as to the nature of law turns on which one of 
these [three things] is to be taken as the type and as standing for the whole" (ibidem).
42This pattern appeared in K.N. Llewellyn's article: "A realistic Jurisprudence ...". Here Llewellyn 
developed a theory of law which relied on two main ideas. First, any attempt to define law must be 
discarded: "A definition both excludes and includes... And the exclusion is almost always rather 
arbitrary" (p. 432); instead, Llewellyn concentrated on "the focus of matters legal, ... a point of 
reference...to which ... all matters legal can most usefully be referred,... a focus... with the bearing 
and boundaries outward unlimited" (ibidem). Second, closely linked to the above idea, all "the 
traditional precept-thinking" approach to law (i.e. any approach that is fixed on words, on "merely 
verbal formulae: precepts") must be rejected (p. 434); instead, Llewellyn focused on behaviour, 
particularly on the relations of law and society as reflected in judicial behaviour. Llewellyn offered his 
"interests -rights/rules -remedies" pattern for the analysis of law from the new standpoint he put 
forward. He gave these three terms a particular meaning: the term "interests" was read as "groupings of 
behaviour claimed to be significant" (p. 445); rights/rules were regarded as verbal formulations of the 
desire to produce a certain behaviour which, in order to have any actual importance, had to take account 
of "the relevant prevailing practices and attitudes of the relevant persons" (p. 452); remedies were 
descriptions of "the actual doings of the judges and the actual effects of their doings on the data claimed 
to represent an interest" (p. 446).
43See e.g. Pound, "Interests of Personality" at 344 et seq. and "Judge Holmes's Contributions to the 
Science of Law" at 451-452.
^Pound's and Llewellyn's respective approaches to law remained substantially different: whereas Pound 
remained partially faithful to the traditional precept-thinking, Llewellyn broke off with it to focus 
directly on behaviour. This difference is illustrated in their debate in Pound's "The Call for a Realist 
Jurisprudence" and Llewellyn's "Some Realism about Realism...".
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A combination of the two patterns described above results in the following 
scheme: [1] Law consists first o f all of a set of legal remedies, provided as instruments 
for the effectiveness of legal rules and rights. [2] Behind the legal remedies are the legal 
rules and rights, which play a  double role. On the one hand, they are substantive 
values, they act as the substantive point of reference for legal remedies, thus making 
sense of the existence of these remedies. On the other hand, legal rights and rules are 
also instruments; they stand as means to protect some higher and more abstract values, 
which can be called "interests". [3] Legal interests thus are the third element of law. [4] 
Interests, however, are not determined haphazardly, but by the "philosophical, political 
and ethical ideas as to the end of law" at issue at a given time. [5] Finally, the extent to 
which the influence of these ideas can be felt in law is greatly conditioned by the 
"traditional ideas as to how legal precepts should be interpreted and applied and causes 
decided". Let me now apply this scheme to an analysis of the fourth amendment.
[1] - [2] Legal Remedies and Rights
In a first approach to the fourth amendment one can draw two immediate 
conclusions: first, security against unreasonable searches and seizures is recognised as 
a constitutional right; second, there must be some legal remedy against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. This second conclusion is (at least it should be) as immediate on 
a reading of the fourth amendment as is the first one; for, following Llewellyn’s view 
on this point, substantial right and legal remedy are two complementary aspects of a 
single conceptual unit. Indeed, it is certain that remedies cannot stand by themselves: 
they are not independent aims, but mere instruments the purpose of which "is to be 
protections of something else"45; conversely, it is just as certain that the recognition of 
a legal right (if this is to be considered to be such and not a mere form of words) 
necessarily requires that there is some remedy against its violation, if not "a description 
of an available remedy, at least an official recognition that some kind of remedy could 
be had"46. For, however well defined in shape and scope, legal rights remain 
something "which you cannot see"47, hence considerations about their real existence 
and actual scope must concentrate on the remedies ("which you can see"48) provided 
against their violation, i.e. on the scope of actual protection accorded them by law. In 
sum, in a first approach the fourth amendment appears to be two-folded in nature or, as
45K.N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic J u r i s p r u d e n c e a t  437.
^Ibidem, p. 440.
47Ibidem, p. 438.
^Ibidem.
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Llewellyn would put it, it acts in a double way in the legal world49: first, it recognises a 
constitutional right against searches and seizures; second, it indicates that there must be 
some remedies against violations of this right; better, the fourth amendment makes the 
recognition of the right against searches and seizures dependent upon the existence of 
some remedies against its violations. Note that the fourth amendment does not point to 
or mentions any particular remedy at all. In fact, the question o f which remedies there 
ought to be has been a most controversial point in the interpretation of this provision.
T31 Legal Interest
The recognition and actual protection of the right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures is not the final aim of the fourth amendment, but 
merely a means. "Substantive rights themselves, like remedies, exist only for a 
purpose. Their purpose is now perceived to be the protection of [some] interest"50. 
This means that the prima facie protection of the right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is merely a means for the protection of some interest and that it is 
the aim of protecting this interest which ultimately controls the interpretation of that 
right. Two interests have controlled the interpretation of the fourth amendment since its 
enactment. Initially, this interest was thought to be the protection of private property, 
yet in the 1930s the Supreme Court gradually started to substitute privacy for property, 
something which it only fully accomplished in the 1960s. Today, the interest in the 
protection of privacy controls the interpretation of the fourth amendment right against 
searches and seizures.
[4] 'Ideas as to the End of Law'
Nor is the protection of a particular interest through the recognition of a 
constitutional right fortuitous or self-justified51. Whether constitutional protection is 
accorded to one particular interest as opposed to some other is conditioned by the trends 
in ideas which control legal thought, that is, by the ,fbody of philosophical, political and
49In Llewellyn's view, speaking of the "nature” of rights or rules does not make much sense, unless 
one is referring to the way rights and rules act in the legal worid, i.e. to the way they actually influence 
people's behaviour.
50K.N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence at 441.
51 The important role of the 'ideas as to the end of law' is also acknowledged by Llewellyn: "The 
conception of society [is] in flux, and in flux typically faster than the law, so that the probability is 
always given that any portion of law needs reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it 
purports to serve" (Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism at 1236).
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ethical ideas as to the end of law", envisaged by Pound as "the third element that goes 
to make up what we call 'the law'"52. In the case of the fourth amendment, the choice 
of either a property or privacy rationale has responded to very specific ideal pictures "as 
to the end of law" brought about by very specific social orders.
The choice for property belongs to the rural agricultural society that dominated 
the early History of America, a society where social contacts were few and individualist 
feelings strong53. The law-of-nature theory and the common law came to offer legal 
support to this sense of individualism and ensured that the sanctity o f property and the 
individual liberty attached to it were at the centre o f legal attention54. These living 
conditions changed with the rise of industrialism, which made social and economic 
relations much more complex. Soon private property and the individual freedom it 
provided started to lose its importance as expressions of individual personality and 
emphasis began to be put on more social considerations. In this context, it no longer 
made sense to read the fourth amendment as an instrument for the protection of private 
property. For not only did this accord private property a predominant role that it was no 
longer thought to deserve; in addition, reading the fourth amendment as a means for the 
protection of property deprived the right against searches and seizures of the flexibility 
it required to meet the new social needs. Privacy started to appear as a sound alternative 
to property. For one thing, privacy arose as a social concern along with industrialism; 
moreover, as a new legal notion, privacy lacked the firm legal elaboration that property 
had and appeared, by contrast, as an ill-bounded, flexible concept. Thus the fourth 
amendment, understood in accordance with this flexible concept of privacy, had found 
the scope it needed for interpretation and evolution in an era o f transformation, 
especially at the turn of the century.
52R. Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision, I ...” at 651. The scope of this third element of Law 
remains somewhat unclear. On its basis. Pound could be according a legal nature to moral and 
philosophical trends since they are taken account of by the judiciary, as seems to have been the 
position of many realists (see Robert S. Summers, "Pragmatic Instrumentalism" 66 Cornell L. Rev. 
861 at 897 (1981)). Pound did not seem to go this far, however, for he relied on a certain process of 
translation of these "ideal pictures" into law, a process consisting of the acquisition of "a certain fixity 
in the judicial and professional tradition" (Pound, "The theory of Judicial Decision, I ...” at 654). 
Moreover, Pound even argued that if any "fixed” picture should be disregarded by a judge in any 
particular case, then the decision in question "is not law" (ibidem at 655).
53See L. M. Friedman, A History o f American Law, at 100; Edward S. Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' 
Background, III" 42 Harv. L  Rev., 365,394 et seq. (1928-29).
54The rise of American law under the influence of natural law philosophy and the case law tradition has 
been analysed in detail by R. Pound on several occasions, especially in "A Theory of Judicial Decision, 
II". See also his "Do We Need a Philosophy of Law"; "Liberty of Contract"; "Common Law and 
Legislation". See also Edward S. Corwin, 'The 'Higher Law' Background, III" at 394 et seq.
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r51 Ideas as to the Interpretation and Application of Law.
Although supported by the "ideas as to the end of law" at issue at the time, the 
passage from property to privacy as the interest behind the fourth amendment did not 
prove easy to accomplish. In order to understand why this was the case we must move 
a step forward in our analytical scheme and refer to the "traditional ideas as to how legal 
precepts should be interpreted and applied and causes decided".
As noted above, legal development in nineteenth-century agricultural America 
was backed by natural law theories and by the common law tradition, both of which 
provided the background of substantial law, suitably liberal in character, that young 
America lacked. Natural law theories and the common-law tradition did much more 
than this, however: they also furnished the American system with techniques 
concerning the interpretation and the application of law. The common law supplied its 
tradition of judge-made law, where statutes are exceptional, ad hoc solutions to special 
situations and accordingly require strict interpretation; the common law thus granted 
judges an instrument with which it might disregard written law when its content was 
not considered reconcilable with judge-created legal patterns. For its part, natural law 
evolved to give rise in the late nineteenth century to the so-called analytical theory of 
judicial decision. This theory postulated "a wholly mechanical process of finding 
prescribed legal precepts definitely laid down by the state in advance and (...) an 
equally mechanical application of the precepts when found"55. On this basis, cases 
were solved according to a "method of deduction from predetermined conceptions"56, 
so that facts were made to fit pre-existing rules, which were mechanically applied to 
them. To express the point with the words of Pound, for analytical jurisprudence 
"[legal] conceptions are fixed. The premises are no longer to be examined. Everything 
is reduced to simple deduction from them. Principles cease to have importance. TTie law 
becomes a body or rules"57.
Conditioned by the background described above, courts were bound to 
concentrate on the application of old legal standards and to remain fundamentally closed 
to considerations coming from outside of the settled law. As a result, pieces of 
legislation that, in an effort to meet new social or economic demands, did not follow 
these standards were systematically struck down58. Law had become a reality
55R. Pound, 'The Theory of Judicial Decision, I”, at 652.
56R. Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence", 8 Col. L. Rev. 605, 610 (1905).
57Ibidem, p. 612.
58In the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century years, the Supreme Court was repeatedly 
confronted with new legal standards introduced by the law maker and tended to consider them
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completely closed in itself, hence it could only serve the "ideas as to the aim of law" 
lying behind their liberal legal sources, whereas the ones imposed by the new social 
environment remained completely alien to it. The struggle of legal theorists at the turn 
of the century was to make courts develop different "ideas as to the application and 
interpretation of law", in particular the ideas inherent to a sociological approach to law, 
so that they could take account of the new social and economic needs and of the "ideas 
as to the aim of law" attached to these new needs. Only this fundamental change in 
approach to law could allow privacy to emerge as the interest behind the fourth 
amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. This change started to 
take place in the 1930s, when the Supreme Court started to accept the patterns of 
reasoning of sociological theories of law and abandoned the formal application of old 
legal patterns. Only then could privacy take over from property as the interest behind 
the fourth amendment
I have now developed the theoretical background which will help us to 
understand how the fourth amendment was interpreted by the Supreme Court and how 
this interpretation has evolved over time. It is to the fourth amendment that we now 
turn.
2 .2  The Fourth Amendment as seen by the Supreme Court.
During the nineteenth century, fourth amendment cases at the Supreme Court 
were rare59; the Supreme Court only started to deal at length with some o f the issues 
this provision entails around the turn of the century60, at the time when American living 
conditions were being deeply transformed by the rise o f industrialism. In most early 
decisions on the fourth amendment, the Court did not specify the interest guiding their 
reading of this provision. Sometimes the issue was plainly ignored61; on other 
occasions the Court referred to values which the fourth amendment sought to protect 
and which from the beginning could be identified with either property or privacy; yet 
the Court tended to avoid any explicit choice between the two. Property and privacy
unconstitutional. Examples of such decisions of the Court on social and labour legislation dating from 
this period are put forward by R. Pound in "Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?", at 345.
59Cifr. Note, "Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy under the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments" 90 Harv. L. Rev., 945 at 952, note 42 (1977). The lack of jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court to hear appeals by criminal defendants until 1891, together with the fact that the 
government could not appeal criminal cases until 1907, are offered as (at least partial) explanations.
60The first fourth amendment case commented on at length by the Supreme Court was Ex parte 
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
61 See e.g. Ex parte Jackson, 96 US 727 at 733; Adams v. N.Y., 192 U.S. 585 at 597 (1904); Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 74 (1906); Wilson v. U.S., 211 U.S. 361 at 376 (1911); Weeks v. U.S., 232
U.S. 383 at 395 (1913); Silverthome v. Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385 at 392 (1919).
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were often put forward together, in what seemed to be a mere illustration of the aims 
that the fourth amendment intended to achieve62. Nevertheless, cases arose in which 
the Supreme Court did have to opt for either property or privacy. This choice was to 
have the widest consequences in the understanding of the amendment
2.2.1 The Property Reading of the Fourth Amendment.
The first choice made by the Supreme Court was for property and was made in 
Boyd v. U.S.63, where the Court developed what would remain as the key-points for 
the property reading of the fourth amendment. Before coming to these points, it will 
prove illuminating to look at the legal background of Boyd. This case was brought 
against Section 5 of an "Act to amend the customs revenue laws, and to repeal 
moieties", of 22 of June 1874, intended to prevent attempts to import merchandise in 
violation of the revenue laws. Its Section 5 provided that if in a case brought under this 
Act the attorney representing the government believed that "business books, invoice or 
paper belonging to, or under control of, the defendant or claimant, will tend to prove 
any allegations made by the United States", then he may make a written motion to the 
court where the proceeding is pending asking it to "issue a notice compelling the 
defendant or claimant to produce such book, invoice, or paper in court"64. If upon 
judicial notice and without reasonable justification the papers were not produced, 
Section 5 provided that "the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as 
confessed"65. The Supreme Court decided that Section 5 violated both the fifth 
amendment right not to hold witness against oneself and the fourth amendment right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. I will concentrate on the latter.
The considerations of the Court as to the fourth amendment rested on two key 
points: first, the fourth amendment was a means to protect private property; second, 
compelling someone to produce her private papers is tantamount to having public 
officers seize these papers after a search on her private dwelling. As will now be 
explained, both these points of departure derive from the "ideas as to how law should 
be interpreted and applied" characteristic of the turn of the century, that is, they derive
62Even after it had clearly opted for property in the case of Boyd v. U.S., the Court referred, e.g., to 
the prevention of "violations of private security in person and property" (Adams v. N.Y., 192 US 585 
at 598); to the protection from "invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens and the seizure of 
their private papers,,nVcc£r v. U.S., 232 US 383 at 390); to the "security and privacy of the home or 
office and of the papers of the owner1' (Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298,305 (emphasis added).
63Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 626 (1886).
64Quoted in Boyd v. U.S., 116 US 616 at 619-620.
65Ibidem.
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from the application of analytical jurisprudence and from the predominance of the 
common law. -
The first point offers an example o f analytical jurisprudence. The Supreme 
Court relied upon one of the liberal conceptions it was bound to apply, i.e. the idea that 
the right to private property deserves absolute protection against public power, indeed 
that the protection of private property sets an absolute limit to the scope of action of 
public power. On this basis, searches and seizures were thought unreasonable 
whenever private property was their object; conversely, searches and seizures were 
thought reasonable only when they were addressed to goods over which the holder had 
no property rights. Reasoning on these grounds, the Court found that private papers 
fall outside the power to search and seize that public officials may be accorded. "Papers 
-said the Court- are the owner's goods and chattels (...) his dearest property; and (...) 
they will hardly bear an inspection"66.
The second point (that is, the idea that the compulsory production of private 
papers equals their forcible seizure by public officers) reflects the common-law view 
that statutes are exceptional elements in a judge-made law system and must thus be 
subject to strict interpretation. Let me explain why I believe this to be the case. In its 
decision in the case of Boyd, the Supreme Court had a glance at the history of Section 5 
of the Act of 22 of June 1874. This Section had come to replace Section 2 o f an Act of 
2 March 1867, which in turn had replaced Section 7 of an Act of 3 March 1863. The 
object of these two Acts was similar to that of the Act of 1874; furthermore, their 
respective Sections 2 and 7 also regulated the possibility for the court to have access to 
the defendant's or the claimant’s private papers in order to examine them at trial. There 
was, however, a crucial difference between the Acts of 1863 and 1867, on the one 
hand, and the Act of 1874, on the o ther unlike this latter, the two former Acts 
authorised access to the defendant's or claimant's private papers via search and seizure 
pursuant to a judicial warrant. The risk then existed that these two Acts could give rise 
to constitutional objections under the fourth and the fifth amendments. It was in order 
to avoid this risk that Section 5 o f the Act of 1874 was enacted in the terms explained 
above (it does not allow for searches and seizures o f private papers for the mere 
purpose of obtaining evidence, but instead authorises the Court to oblige the holder of 
these papers to produce them at trial). The Supreme Court saw this as a skilful 
manoeuvre of the law-maker and thought it its duty to react against it, so as to preserve 
the spirit of the Constitution against attempts at its indirect violation67. This was
I^bidem, pp. 627-628.
67However, as the Supreme Court admitted, previous "decisions in the Circuit and District Courts 
[had] sustain[ed] the constitutionality of the law under consideration, as well as that of the prior laws of
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particularly important because the fourth amendment, both as a prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures and as protection of the right to property, was 
deeply rooted in common law. It is to preserve the spirit of the Constitution that the 
Supreme Court equated the compulsory production of private papers to its forcible 
search and seizure.
2.2.2 Implications of the Property Reading of the Fourth Amendment
Thus the Supreme Court initially regarded the fourth amendment as an 
instrument for the protection of private property. This conditioned the reading of the 
fourth amendment in at least three ways. First, it imposed a particular interpretation of 
the term 'unreasonable'; second, the protection against 'seizures' was considered more 
relevant than the protection against 'searches'; third, certain remedies against violations 
of the amendment were provided for.
[A] 'Unreasonable'
The property reading of the fourth amendment imposed a very specific notion of 
the searches and seizures that were to be considered 'unreasonable': the term 
'unreasonable' referred to any search and seizure carried out 'against private property', 
so that these could under no circumstances be held to be constitutional. The question of 
what searches and seizures are unreasonable was thus answered by reference to another 
question, i.e. what are searches and seizures undertaken against private property. In 
Boyd the Supreme Court ruled that no private property could be claimed upon "stolen 
goods or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment 
thereof'68 (later the Court would add the means and instrumentalities o f a crime to this 
list69); for "it is unlawful for a person to have [such goods] in his possession"70 and, 
in addition, "the government is entitled to [their] possession"71 even if it is only to 
return them to their lawful owner. The Boyd Court thus ruled that reasonable searches 
and seizures were only those addressed against goods upon which the government had 
some possessory title, and that searches and seizures of any other goods carried out on 
the mere grounds that they might possibly be used as evidence at a trial ought to be 
automatically considered unreasonable ('mere-evidence rale').
1863 and 1867" {Boyd v. U.S. at 635); yet the Court declared the above-mentioned decisions 
unconvincing: "we find nothing in the decisions to change our views in relation to the principal 
question at issue" (Boyd v. U.S. at 638).
6*Boyd v. U.S. at 623.
69See Weeks v. U.S., 232 US 383 at 392 (1913); Carroll et al. v. U.S., 2647 US 132 (1925).
7®Boyd v. U.S. at 624.
71 Ibidem, at 623.
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This interpretation o f the term 'unreasonable' according to an interest in the 
protection of private property gives rise to a problem: it does not account for a formal 
requirement explicitly imposed by the fourth amendment upon searches and seizures. 
The fourth amendment requires that searches and seizures not rely upon a warrant 
unless validly issued according to standards that it itself sets and which aim at 
precluding the issue of general search warrants72. The interest in the protection of 
privacy offers no justification for this formal requirement of reasonableness; yet it could 
not be disregarded by the Court, since it is explicitly imposed by the fourth amendment 
itself. The Supreme Court thus had to accept that 'unreasonable' searches and seizures 
where also those carried out under an invalid warrant, yet it confined this formal 
meaning of the term 'unreasonable' to searches and seizures otherwise considered 
'reasonable', that is to searches and seizures addressed to private property upon which 
the holder has no legitimate possessory claim73. In other words, the formal requirement 
of reasonableness imposed by the fourth amendment (i.e. that searches and seizures be 
not carried out under an invalid warrant) only played a secondary role with respect to 
the material requirement of reasonableness developed by the Supreme Court itself (i.e. 
that searches and seizures be not undertaken against private property legitimately held). 
Even within this framework, however, the need to comply with this formal requirement 
of reasonableness is at odds with the property interpretation of the fourth amendment, 
which thus proves unable to account for the wording of this provision.
[B] Searches versus Seizures
Property, at least material property74, is more greatly endangered by seizures 
than by searches. Accordingly, the fourth amendment was thought to offer protection 
mainly against 'unreasonable seizures', i.e. against seizures of private property. As far 
as the protection of private property was concerned, 'unreasonable searches' could only 
be defined indirectly, i.e. as searches intended to accomplish an 'unreasonable seizure'. 
The factual circumstances of the case of Boyd are a good example of the marginal 
attention accorded to searches within this framework: the Court found a violation of the 
fourth amendment in a case where papers had been compulsorily produced by their 
owner, that is in a case where papers had been seized, yet not searched for. 
'Unreasonable searches' were the object of direct attention only within the formal 
meaning o f the term 'unreasonable', that is, only in as far as the term referred to
72"The entry upon premises...by virtue of a judicial writ...is not within the prohibition of the fourth 
or the fifth amendment" (Boyd v. U.S., at 624).
73Cifr. Boyd v. U.S. at. 624.
74Deprivation of intellectual property raises different problems of which no account will be taken here, 
since to my knowledge the fourth amendment has only been applied in relation to material property.
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searches carried out without valid warrant when no legitimate possessory rights were at 
stake.
[C] Remedies against Violations o f the Fourth Amendment the So-Called 
'Exclusionary Rule'.
As announced above, the Boyd Court reached the conclusion that there had 
been a violation not only of the fourth amendment but also of the fifth amendment 
clause against self-incrimination. It ought to be added now that the Court placed these 
two provisions and their respective violation in a close relationship: property 
unreasonably seized, reasoned the Court, may not be used at trial against its lawful 
holder, for this would be tantamount to forcing the latter to declare against herself. 
From the combination of the fourth amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the 
fifth amendment the Court drew a very singular remedy against unreasonable seizures: 
pieces of evidence thus unreasonably seized could not be admitted at trial, a remedy 
henceforth referred to as the 'exclusionary rule'75.
2.2.3 The Position of Privacy in the Subsequent Case Law
The position of the majority in the case of Boyd did not remain uncontested. In 
a separate opinion, Justice Miller joined by Chief Justice Waite offered a completely 
different interpretation76. First, they rejected the material reading of the term 
'unreasonable' defended by the majority, according to which unreasonable searches 
and seizures are those directed against private property legitimately held; instead, they 
advocated that 'unreasonable' ought to be read exclusively in the formal terms proposed 
by the wording of the fourth amendment, according to which unreasonable searches 
and seizures are those carried out upon an invalid warrant (i.e. under too general a 
warrant). Second, they viewed the amendment as directed mainly against searches, 
rather than against seizures. Finally, they rejected the equation of the compulsory 
production of private papers with forcible searches. In other words, the dissenting 
Justices disagreed on every point upon which the property interpretation of the fourth 
amendment relied. Indeed, as will be seen below, their approach already provided the 
key points for a privacy reading of this provision, although the idea that privacy ought 
to replace property as the only interest behind the fourth amendment was not even 
suggested.
75Note that the above considerations only concerned seizures of private property. The question of 
which remedies ought to be provided against searches and seizures carried out under an invalid warrant 
had not yet been raised before the Court at the time Boyd was decided.
I^Boyd v. U.S. at. 641 et seq.
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This dissenting opinion would not long remain disregarded by the majority of 
the Court. It is true that, in subsequent cases,, the Court still chose to follow the key- 
points of the doctrine developed in Boyd. Soon, however, the Court started to rely also 
on the concept of privacy in its interpretation of the fourth amendment. Initially, the 
presence of privacy did not alter the original scheme of the fourth amendment as 
structured in Boyd, yet privacy slowly changed this original scheme. The influence of 
privacy upon the reading of the fourth amendment became increasingly important, until 
the Court finally considered privacy the only interest behind this provision.
The circumstance that privacy was placed next to property as an interest behind 
the fourth amendment and that it finally replaced property can be explained, first of all, 
as the result of a quest for coherence in the interpretation of this provision. For, as was 
argued above, the interest in the protection o f privacy could offer justification to the 
formal requirement of reasonableness, according to which searches and seizures may 
not be based upon invalid warrants (i.e. upon warrants too sweeping in scope). The 
need for such theoretical justification proved most urgent, since in most fourth 
amendment cases the Supreme Court had to decide on the formal rather than on the 
material reasonableness of searches and seizures77.
A second and yet more powerful explanation of the increasing importance of 
privacy lies in the evolution of the "ideas as to how law should be interpreted and 
applied, and cases decided" that began in the 1930s. This evolution was the result of 
two circumstances. First, the attitude of the Supreme Court towards written law 
changed significantly. The Court started to show greater respect for innovations 
introduced into the common law by statutes and started to deal with these innovations 
from a position of self-restraint. Second, the old mechanical jurisprudence was replaced 
by mechanisms proposed by the sociological theories of law that had arisen as we have 
seen in the first third of the century as a reaction against it. These theories, as we have 
touched on, emphasised the need to take account of the social circumstances 
surrounding cases, of seeking the help of different social sciences for the interpretation 
o f law, of stressing the importance of factual data about the law in action. The Supreme 
Court gradually accepted these new ideas. Already in 1931 it stated that "each case is to 
be decided on its own facts and circumstances"78 by means of balancing the importance *192
77See, e.g., Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Carroll et al. 
v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Agnello et al. v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Marron v. U.S., 275 U.S.
192 (1927); U.S. v. Lefkowitz et al., 235 U.S. 452 (1932); Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145 (1947); 
Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Trupiano et al. v. U.S., 334 U.S. 145 (1948); McDonald et al. 
v. U.S., 335 U.S. 451 (1948); U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
^Go-Bart Importing Co. et al. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
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of the different interests at stake79. This change of attitude had immediate consequences 
upon the interpretation of the fourth amendment. The openness towards social factors 
made the Court take account of the actual "ideas as to the end of law" at issue at the 
time80, which necessarily led to increase the importance of privacy as an interpretative 
criterion of the amendment81. This process of evolution ended when the Court 
proclaimed that privacy is the only point of reference for the interpretation of the fourth 
amendment.
2.2.4 Implications of the Privacy Reading of the Fourth Amendment: the Recognition
of a Constitutional Right to the Secrecy of Telecommunications
As a provision aimed at the protection of privacy, the fourth amendment started 
to be depicted by features that were the complete opposites to the ones it had previously 
been seen as having. The word 'unreasonable* started to be interpreted exclusively in 
formal terms; searches started to be regarded at the centre of the prohibition of the 
fourth amendment, since they entailed a greater danger for privacy than seizures; the 
relationship between the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment clause against self­
incrimination started to be loosened and finally abandoned (note, however, that the so- 
called exclusionary rule has been preserved under the privacy reading of the fourth 
amendment, something which will be discussed at length in chapter 6). Finally, and 
most importantly for us, only regarding privacy as the interest behind the fourth 
amendment has permitted that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications be 
included within the coverage of this provision and can thus receive constitutional 
protection. Let me now dwell on this last point.
In the United States, the question of the constitutional protection of the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications has always been approached within the framework 
of the fourth amendment. Cases of interception of telecommunications, both written 
and oral, have been brought before courts as cases of unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Yet so long as property remained the interest behind the fourth amendment the 
Supreme Court firmly held that the interception of telecommunications other than
79See. e.g., Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Johnson v. US, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); McDonald et 
at. v. US, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
80In US. v. Classic et al. (313 U.S. 299 (1941)) the Court stressed the flexibility of the Constitution 
to evolve and thus cover the protection of new situations unknown to the founding fathers.
81In Jones v. US. (362 U.S. 257, 266 (I960)) the Court declared that the constitutional right 
recognized in the fourth amendment ought to be considered free from "subtle distinctions, developed and 
refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law" (see also Chapman v. U S, 
365 U.S. 610(1961)).
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written ones fell outside the scope of the right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures82, unless there had been "physical invasion of the petitioner's premises", i.e. 
trespass83. In other words, under the property reading of the fourth amendment the 
Supreme Court denied that the mere interception of wire telecommunications 
(wiretapping) could be regarded as a case of search and seizure.
This position was sustained even as privacy started to gain in importance as an 
interpretative criterion of the fourth amendment. As has already been mentioned, it took 
the Court some time to substitute privacy for property as the only interest controlling 
the interpretation of the fourth amendment. This step proved particularly difficult in the 
context of the issue whether the fourth amendment covered the secrecy of 
telecommunications, to the extent that this issue remained the last aspect of the fourth 
amendment controlled by the interest in private property84. For one thing, even if one 
admits that interceptions o f telecommunications infringe upon individual privacy and 
that the protection o f privacy is a final aim of the fourth amendment, even then 
regarding such interceptions as instances of searches and seizures requires a certain 
degree of flexibility in the interpretation o f these two terms. For a long time the 
Supreme Court was not willing to be as flexible as that. The Court must also have felt 
that such flexibility would be difficult to avoid if the fourth amendment prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures was to be regarded exclusively as a means for the 
protection of privacy; hence the reluctance of the Court to make privacy the only interest 
behind the prohibition.
Only as late as 1967 did the Supreme Court proclaim that privacy is the only 
interest behind the fourth amendment85 and only then did the Supreme Court appear 
willing to read the terms ’searches' and 'seizures' with the flexibility required for then 
to could cover cases o f interception of telecommunications. Some months after this step 
had been taken, the Court finally went the last step further and declared that the secrecy 
of oral communications was covered by the fourth amendment86. The secrecy of all 
telecommunications has since been regarded as part of the fourth amendment right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
82See Olmstead et al. v. U.S., 277 U.S. 433 (1928) and Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
^Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 at 510. See also Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 at 457; On Lee
v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 at 751-752; Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129.
84This position met the opposition of some members of the Court, however. As very telling 
examples, see the dissenting opinions of Justices Brandeis, Homes and Butler in Olmstead v. U.S. (227 
US 438 at 471 et seq. (1928)) and those of Justices Murphy, Frankfurter and Chief Justice Stone in 
Goldman v. U.S. (316. US 129 at 136 et seq. (1942)).
85Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
86Katz v. U.S. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In this case the Court stated that the fourth amendment covers 
the secrecy of telephone conversations, even if these are held from a public booth.
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In sum, in the United States, the secrecy of telecommunications owes its 
recognition as a constitutional right to the fact that the interest in the protection of 
privacy has become an object o f constitutional attention. The secrecy of 
telecommunications was thus bom to the world of constitutional rights as an aspect of 
privacy. Of course, the fact that the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications enjoys 
constitutional recognition and protection, even if this is not direct and explicit, ought to 
be celebrated. Yet depending on privacy for constitutional recognition also has the 
important drawback that the scope of this right will suffer from the ill-definition of 
privacy; for even if privacy is approached exclusively as the control over one's 
seclusion and secrecy, even then the boundaries of privacy and of the right to privacy 
are considerably more unclear than the boundaries of (the right to) the secrecy of 
telecommunications. Good though the recognition of a constitutional right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications is, it would have been better to recognise it as a right 
autonomous from privacy in the way it is recognised in Germany, even if this would 
have required a real constitutional amendment.
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CHAPTER 3: THE OBJECT OF THE RIGHT TO THE SECRECY OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ITS STRUCTURE
Introduction
I have already mentioned at previous stages of this thesis that the recognition of 
fundamental rights is rooted in the liberal tradition. Fundamental rights were first 
recognised as rights of defence against the State, that is as rights to the non-interference 
of the State with the freedoms kept by individuals, and were thought to deserve the 
widest possible protection against such interference. This was the case with the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications. I would now like to take up this argument and insist 
upon the idea that fundamental rights were and still remain for the most part the fruit of 
liberal thinking; moreover, I would like to develop the idea that, indeed, it is best for 
fundamental rights that this still be the case. In this chapter, I will argue that 
fundamental rights are best protected if they are basically regarded as negative rights of 
defence against the State. At the same time, I do encourage the recognition of positive 
obligations on the State with respect to these rights, yet my contention is that the 
recognition of a positive dimension of fundamental rights ought not to alter the basic 
negative dimension o f such rights1.
I will try to develop this argument throughout the following section, while 
considering the structure of fundamental rights, in general, and of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications, in particular. In fact, the consequences of approaching 
fundamental rights basically as negative rights against the State come to light with 
particular clarity when addressing the structure of these rights. In section I, I will try to 
show that the structure of fundamental rights generally corresponds to a liberal 
approach to rights and will argue that this 'liberal structure' entails considerable 
practical advantages in the actual protection of fundamental rights. Sections II, III and 
IV deal with the structure of the fundamental right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
in the ECHR, the German Basic Law and the Constitution of the United States, 
respectively. In each one of these sections I will study the extent to which the structure 
of this right corresponds to liberal patterns; this analysis will show the concrete 
implications that both the compliance and the non-compliance with such patterns has in 
the case of the secrecy of telecommunications.
^ote that I am referring to rights which are fundamentally liberal in character, hence to rights which 
were conceived of as imposing negative obligations upon the State.
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Section 1: The Structure of Fundamental Rights
1. The Two-Step Structure of Fundamental Rights
Constitutions usually recognise rights in two step manners. The first step is the 
recognition o f a right in its full conceptual scope; the second step is the placing of 
limitations on the part o f that right to which protection is granted. In other words, 
Constitutions make a distinction between the scope of coverage and the scope of 
protection of rights2. The scope of each relates to the other like a principle relates to a 
rule3. The definition of the coverage of a fundamental right lays down a constitutional 
principle in the sense that it imposes a prima-facie constitutional command that the right 
in question be protected. This prima-facie command becomes a constitutional rule, that 
is a command of immediate, definite application, only within the scope of protection of 
rights. Now note that principles are commands to optimalise4, that is they command 
"that something must be realised to the highest degree possible"5. This means that the 
recognition of a right (principle) implies the command that the scope of protection 
actually accorded to this right (rule) be as wide as possible. Looking at this relationship 
between the coverage and the protected scope of fundamental rights, one can conclude 
that this two-step structure of fundamental rights corresponds to a liberal approach to 
rights, according to which individuals enjoy freedom as a matter of principle and this 
freedom may be interfered with by the State only under certain -more or less 
exceptional- circumstances, I would now like to say a few more words about the 
expressions ’scope of coverage* and ’scope of protection' of fundamental rights.
2As is to be expected, the two-step structure of fundamental rights has been depicted in various different 
terms by commentators. To begin with, German commentators often refer to what I here call 'scope of 
coverage' as 'Schutzbereich' (which unfortunately translates into 'scope of protection') (see e.g. W. 
Heyde, "Regelungsspielraum des Gesetzgebers bei Grundrechten" Festschrift Jur Wolfgang Zeidler, Band 
2, p. 1429 at 1432. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 1987). In addition, the two-step structure of 
fundamental rights is usually depicted by way of opposing this Schutzbereich (also referred to as 
Normbereich, Tatbestand, Grundtatbestand or Reichweite) to the limits (Schranken) of fundamental 
rights. I however find it clearer to depict the structure of rights by way of dividing it into two spheres, 
i.e. the sphere of the coverage and the sub-sphere of the protection of fundamental rights. Also in this 
context, Robert Alexy (Theorie der Grundrechte, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1985, p. 
296) speaks of a two-sphere model (Zwei-Bereiche-Modell), spheres which he calls the potential (i.e. 
the coverage) and the actual (i.e. the scope of protection). In the English speaking world, Ronald 
Dworkin prefers to refer to the range and the force of rights (see. Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, 
London, 1977, p. 261).
3I here rely on a distinction between principles and rules such as the one drawn by R. Dworkin (Taking 
Rights Seriously, at 22 et seq.) and by R. Alexy (Theorie der Grundrechte, at 71 et seq.).
4See Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 75.
5Robert Alexy, "Rights, Legal Reasoning and Rational Discourse", (1992) Ratio Juris 143 at 145.
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The scope of coverage of a constitutional right is the area of reality that is 
limited by the conceptual boundaries of the right in question. It is, therefore, the result 
of defining the right. For example, the coverage of a right recognised as the ’secrecy of 
telecommunications' is defined by the conceptual boundaries of the terms 'secrecy' and 
'telecommunications'. It seems a matter of course that in order that a right can be called 
constitutional its conceptual boundaries must be drawn out in a Constitution. The 
problem with this is, however, that Constitutions do not usually offer detailed 
definitions of the rights they recognise: the complexity that the definition of a right 
entails makes it beyond the reach of constitutional texts to undertake such a task. All 
they actually do is to provide certain indications, more or less explicit, more or less 
precise, as to the concept of each right. A  definition o f fundamental rights must be 
attained by way of interpreting (or, as some prefer to say, by way of concretising6) 
such constitutional indications, a task which must be accomplished by the law-maker 
and by the judiciary. Interpreting the Constitution is certainly not easy; nor does 
interpretation necessarily lead to a single, pre-established result. Indeed, it is only too 
normal that different interpreters have different and equally plausible views as to the 
scope of a constitutional provision. In spite of this, the Constitution appears as the only 
possible source of the definitions of constitutional rights in the sense that the interpreter 
of the Constitution cannot contribute to defining a fundamental right, but can merely 
express her opinion about what is implicit in the Constitution
j
The protected scope of a constitutional right is the area within the coverage of 
the right which a Constitution is willing to protect. As was mentioned above, the liberal 
approach to fundamental rights implies that these have as wide a scope of protection as 
possible7. This circumstance helps us to understand why this scope is normally defined 
from the outside: rather than define the area o f a right which is protected, Constitutions 
prefer to define the area of a right that may go unprotected, that is the area o f a right 
which can be lawfully encroached upon. However narrow, such an area of non- 
protection usually exists. The reason is that the exercise of constitutional rights is likely 
to collide with the exercise of other such rights or with other constitutional principles,
6The expression 'concretising a legal provision' has two different meanings: first, it can be used as a 
synonym for the act of 'interpreting' a provision; second, 'concretising' can be the act of choosing 
among the different alternative solutions which are made available by a provision. The first meaning 
describes the task of the law-maker within the context of the coverage of fundamental rights; the second 
meaning describes the task of the law-maker within the context of the protected scope of rights, where 
as will be explained below the law-maker can choose among alternative possibilities in the application 
of the Constitution (in this context, see Manuel Medina Guerrero. La Vinculación Negativa del 
Legislador a los Derechos Fundamentales -Trabajo de investigación presentado en concuso para 
provisión de plaza de Profesor Titular, Universidad de Sevilla, España, 1992- pp. 18 et seq.).
7As Dworkin has put it, "[f]or a true liberal, any constraint upon freedom is something that a decent 
government must regret, and keep to the minimum necessary to accommodate the other rights of its 
constituents" (Taking Rights Seriously, at 268).
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so that when such constitutional conflicts arise some of the principles at stake must, at 
least to some extent, remain unprotected. Conflicts among constitutional principles 
must be solved by way of striking a balance. In this context one can look at the 
protected scope of a constitutional right as the result o f a balance having been struck 
between that right and other constitutional principles which conflict with its exercise.
As was argued above, the conceptual boundaries of a fundamental right are 
drawn out in Constitutions, from which they must be inferred by way of interpretation. 
This is not necessarily the case for the protected scope of a right. This is defined by 
Constitutions only in as far as these strike a balance between a right and other 
constitutional principles or at least as they give indications as to how to strike a balance. 
Constitutions strike a balance when they subordinate the protection of a right to the 
protection of other constitutional principles, or when they subject restrictions of a right 
to conditions which aim at the protection of other principles8. Most often however 
Constitutions do not strike a balance but merely provide guide-lines for balancing 
rights, that is they set out the general conditions under which conflicts among 
constitutional rights must be solved. In such cases, the law-maker and the judiciary are 
called to play an active role in the definition of rights; for their task is not only to 
interpret the above-mentioned guide-lines: they must actually decide how these guide­
lines apply in the solution of a particular case, that is, they must strike the actual balance 
among fundamental rights. In other words, in the context of the protected scope of 
rights the law-maker and the judiciary are often called upon not only to interpret the 
Constitution but also to make a choice among the different definitions of the protected 
scope of a right allowed by the Constitution9.
The criteria of how to strike a balance are inevitably influenced by policy 
considerations. For decisions on the worth of different and colliding principles, when 
these are compared with one another, are to a great extent policy decisions, that is, they 
greatly rely on the standards that set out the goals o f the community, generally 
consisting of some economic, political or social improvement10. As observed above, 
such decisions are to some extent taken by Constitutions but they are mostly left in the 
hands of the law-maker and of the judiciary, in as far as case-by-case considerations are
8See, e.g„ arts. 5,1; 8,2; 9,2; 10,2; 11,2 of the ECHR; arts. 2.1, 5.2, 9.2, 10.2.2, 11.2 of the GG; or 
the fourth amendment to the US Constitution. The constitutional definition of the protected scope of a 
right is sometimes formulated in such terms that it risks being mistaken for an element of the 
definition of the very coverage of the right in question (think of the "right to assemble peaceably and 
unarmed' recognised in art. 8.1 of the German Basic Law).
9In other words, the law-maker is called upon to 'concretise' the constitutional text, in the second one 
of the two meanings of this word (see footnote 6 above).
10Cifr. in R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 22.
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needed in the application of balancing criteria. What I would like to stress is that all the 
policy questions that balancing entails remain outside the scope of coverage of 
constitutional rights. Certainly, the recognition of a particular right in some particular 
terms might be regarded itself as the result o f a particular policy (e.g. the decision that 
rights such as privacy or free speech exist and have certain conceptual features results 
from a certain picture o f the social and political goals of the community); yet this is the 
very policy that led to the enactment of the Constitution itself, hence it is a policy which 
played its role at a pre-constitutional stage and, moreover, a policy the results of which 
have been accorded an important degree of stability. The policy questions involved in 
the actual application of rights via the striking o f a balance do not affect rights at the 
level of their recognition, but only at the level of their application. In other words, 
rights are not balanced on the basis of their intrinsic worth but on the basis of how they 
relate to other rights and values when they have to be applied in a particular case11.
2 . Alternative Wavs to Structure a Fundamental Right
As was mentioned above, the distinction between the coverage and the 
protection of a fundamental right derives from a liberal conception of fundamental 
rights and is the prevailing approach to fundamental rights in positive constitutional 
law. Even though this distinction finds wide support amongst commentators12, it is not 
accepted in all theoretical camps in all cases. Justifications of alternative views have 
been couched within institutional or social theories of fundamental rights. Before going 
into the main analysis of this chapter it will be useful to look at the main alternatives to 
the two-step structure of fundamental rights so that we can best appreciate the 
implications that different structures of fundamental rights have upon the protection of 
these rights.
11 See in this context H. Schneider, Die Güterabwägung des Bundesverfassungsgericht bei 
Grundrechtskonflikten, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1979, pp. 221-223; K. Hesse, 
Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 16. ergänzte Auflage, C.F. Müller, 
Heidelberg 1988 Par. 306 et seq. p. 121; R. Wendt, 'Der Garantiegehalt der Grundrechte und das 
Übermaßverbot', 104 AÖR 414 at 433 et seq.
12See, e.g., W. Heyde, "Regelungsspielraum des Gesetzgebers..." at 1432 et seq.; Konrad Hesse, 
Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts..., Par. 306 et seq. p. 123 et seq; Albert Bleckmann, Staatsrecht II, 
Allgemeine Grundrechtlehren, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln-Berlin-Bonn-München, 1985, p. 265; 
Christian Starck (ed.) Rights, Institutions and impact of International Law according to the German 
Basic Law, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1987, pp. 25, 28. A more lengthy and 
sophisticated defence of the two-step structure has been made by Robert Alexy, Theorie der 
Grundrechte, at 249 et seq.
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2.1 Institutional Theories of Fundamental Rights
A classical rejection of the distinction between the scope of coverage and the 
scope of protection of rights is the one formulated by Friedrich Müller13. According to 
Müller, the definition o f fundamental rights must be based on all the factual 
circumstances that they embrace. In order to identify such circumstances, account must 
be taken of all the norms where these rights are recognised and regulated, 
independently of whether they affect their scope o f coverage or their scope of 
protection; for it does not make any sense to say that a right covers areas which, as a 
matter of fact, it does not protect.
Similar positions are often sustained in the framework of institutional theories 
of fundamental rights, that is in the framework of theories which stress that, over and 
above their subjective dimension, fundamental rights are objective elements of the 
constitutional order, so that their subjective dimension derives from their objective 
one14. These theories conceive the Constitution as a complete organic system in which 
the whole legal order is integrated. In the context o f fundamental rights this means that 
the Constitution appears as the only source of definition not only of the coverage of 
these rights, but also of their protected scope. It also means that limitations on rights are 
inherent in the Constitution, so that they cannot really be considered (external) 'limits’ 
or 'restrictions', but must simply be regarded as part of the conceptual boundaries of 
fundamental rights as defined by Constitutions. As a result, the coverage and the 
protected scope of rights becomes identical. This result is heavily dependent on the idea 
that Constitutions are perfectly integrated systems which do not allow for conflicts 
among fundamental rights or other constitutional principles. At most, there can be 
situations which look like conflicts, but these can be solved by reference to the 
conceptual boundaries of the rights or principles at stake, that is by way of making an 
adequate reading of such boundaries. As a result, fundamental rights only exist in as far 
as they do not collide with other rights and principles, i.e. in as far as they enjoy 
constitutional protection.
Equating the scope of coverage with the scope of protection relies on an 
assumption that fundamental rights are not a combination o f constitutional rules and
13See Friedrich Müller, Die Positivität der Grundrechte. Fragen einer praktischen Grundrechtsdogmatik, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1969, esp. pp. 17 et seq.
14The most characteristic example undoubtedly is Peter Häberle, Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Art. 19 
Abs. 2 Grundgesetz. C.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 1983. See also Fr. Klein, in Das Bonner Grundgesetz, 
Bd 1 XVI, p. 122.
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principles, but are exclusively constitutional rules15. Equating the coverage with the 
protected scope of rights thus implies that rights do not have a prima-facie aspect, but 
are provisions which contain definite solutions for every case which falls within their 
coverage. In other words, fundamental rights are not regarded as provisions the actual 
application of which comes as a result of balancing, but as provisions which can be 
directly applied in an all-or-nothing manner. At the purely theoretical level, this 
approach to fundamental rights might appear attractive. In practice, however, it 
negatively influences the protection of fundamental rights as subjective rights of the 
individual in at least three different ways.
[1] In the context of a single-level approach to fundamental rights, the 
requirements with which limitations on these rights must generally comply do not 
apply: the imposition of limitations on rights requires no particular justification, nor 
must they fulfil any requirements, respect any limits or be subject to strict 
interpretation. The reason is that restrictions on fundamental rights are considered 
inherent in the concept of each right, to the extent that, strictly speaking, rights cannot 
be subject to 'restrictions' or 'limits' but simply to the definition of their 'conceptual 
boundaries'. Under these circumstances, the danger is great that the scope of 
coverage/protection of fundamental rights be minimised16.
Admittedly, the point of departure for the definition of fundamental rights is the 
Constitution, so that in principle the law-maker is merely called upon to identify all the 
limits and restrictions imposed upon these rights (now regarded as part of their 
conceptual boundaries) by way of interpreting the constitutional text. The truth is 
however that to a great extent restrictions o f fundamental rights are imposed on the 
basis of policy considerations, considerations which cannot be (and indeed they should 
not be) identified in the Constitution and which are generally made by the law-maker 
itself. This implies that under a one-level approach to fundamental rights, the 
conceptual definition o f these is to a great extent left in the hands of the law-maker, so 
that, in order to identify it, account must be taken of all the norms in which these rights 
are recognised and regulated17. Even courts have something to say in this regard, for 
whenever a court decides whether or not a  right has been violated it is actually 
contributing to defining the right in question.
15For the application of the distinction between rules and principles to the present discussion, see R. 
Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 249 et seq.
16See A. Bleckmann, Staatsrecht II. Allgemeine Grundrechtslehren, München 1984, pp. 265 et seq.
17In fact, F. Müller defined coverage ('Normbereich') as "der Sachbestandteil von [allen] 
Rechtsvorschriften" (F. Müller, Normbereiche von Einzelgrundrechten in der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1968, p. 9).
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[2] Note that under the one-level approach to fundamental rights balancing 
occurs within the scope of the coverage of these rights. This implies that the 
subordination of certain rights to certain others does not take place at the functional 
level, that is independently of the recognition of rights. Rather, it appears as a feature 
inherent in the definition o f rights, so that the specification of the particular relative 
position of rights within the Constitution is a conceptual issue. This circumstance 
influences the coverage of rights in two complementary ways. On the one hand, if 
balancing occurs within the scope of the coverage of rights, then the definition of every 
right appears to be in some sense less stable, to the extent that it is shaped by the case- 
by-case considerations which are made whenever a balance is arrived at. On the other 
hand, courts are likely to develop some more or less fixed rules concerning the relative 
position of certain rights with respect to certain others. In as far as this is so, 
constitutional rights would appear conceptually ordered according to their worth, so 
that each of them would occupy a fixed relative position within a fixed constitutional 
scale. The result of this would probably be a progressive disregard of the factual 
circumstances of particular cases, so that the balancing activity would be deprived of 
any flexibility and rights and values would risk becoming rigid, ordered concepts to be 
applied mechanically.
[3] Finally, the fact that fundamental rights are balanced within the scope of 
their coverage influences the allocation of the so-called 'burden or reasoning'
('Argumentationslasf) in the context of violations of fundamental rights. The burden of 
reasoning can be defined as the obligation of one of the parties in a judicial case to 
argue that a particular situation either falls or does not fall within the scope of the 
application of a particular rule. In the context of violations of fundamental rights, the 
allocation of the burden of reasoning amounts to deciding which party must argue that a 
particular action falls or does not fall within the coverage of a fundamental right and, 
additionally, that it falls or does not fall within the scope of protection of this right18.
Within the framework of a two-step structure of fundamental rights, someone 
who complains of the violation of a right must argue that the right in question has been 
infringed, whereas it is for the authorities accused of the violation to argue that the
18Xhe so-called 'burden of reasoning' ought not to be mistaken for the 'burden of proof, which refers to 
the obligation of one of the parties in a judicial case to prove controversial facts. The burden of proof 
in constitutional cases is allocated on the basis of more complex and detailed rules than the burden of 
reasoning (particular rules are, for example, that the burden falls on the party closer to the fact in 
question or on the party seeking to alter the status quo). In Germany, the allocation of both the burden 
of proof and the burden of reasoning in constitutional litigation has been analysed by Heinrich Weber- 
Grellet, Beweis- und Argumentationslast im Verfassungsrecht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Rechtssprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1979.
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infringement in question did not affect the protected scope o f this right19. This 
allocation of the burden of reasoning respects two considerations: first, the burden o f 
reasoning should concern positive facts (the person who complains o f an interference 
must reason that this did take place, whereas the public authority must reason that the 
interference in question did comply with the constitutional requirements for such 
interferences); second, each of the parties at trial should reason on the basis of the facts 
to which it is closer (the person who complains of an interference must direct her 
arguments to the fact that she has been prevented from exercising one of her rights, 
whereas the public authority accused of the interference must direct its arguments to the 
way this interference has been carried out)20.
If the borderline between scope o f recognition and scope of protection 
disappears, the above allocation of the burden o f reasoning is altered. For one thing, if 
a right only exists within its scope of protection, the person who complains that one of 
her rights has been infringed must argue that the action complained of interferes with 
the right in question to the extent that it is protected. This means that someone who 
claims that she has been the victim o f a violation of a right must argue, first, that the 
interference complained of occurred and, second, that this interference was contrary to 
the Constitution (i.e. that it did not comply with certain requirements or, more 
generally, that it was not the result of a due balance between the different interests at 
stake)21. Reasoning in such terms might prove rather difficult: for one thing, it 
concerns negative facts, i.e. the fact that certain actions o f the public powers did not 
comply with certain requirements; moreover, it concerns issues which for the most part 
remain beyond the control of private individuals, in particular in as far as balancing 
criteria have not been clearly settled by written norms.
The three reasons given above argue against equating the scope of coverage 
with the scope of protection of fundamental rights. Not surprisingly, law-makers, 
courts and commentators generally approach these two issues as two different 
concepts, so that the coverage of fundamental rights is defined on a solid basis and their
19For a similar opinion, see B. Schiink, Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht, Berlin 1976, pp. 195 et seq.; 
Klein in Benda/Klein, Lehrbuch des Verfassungsprozeßrechts, C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 
Heidelberg, 1991, p. 102. A question different from that of the allocation of the burden of reasoning is 
the question of the scope of this burden, that is, the question of the extent to which public authorities 
must argue in order to satisfy the judge in question or the Constitutional Court that they have not 
infringed the protected scope of a right. This issue has been dealt with by H. Weber-Grellet (Beweis- 
und Argumentationslast at 55 et seq.), who defends the idea that the scope of the burden of reasoning of 
the public powers is directly proportional to the importance of the right they attempt to restrict.
20H. Weber-Grellet (Beweis- und Argumentationslast at 36) regards the closeness to the controversial 
fact as a fxtor for the allocation of the burden of proof in constitutional litigation.
21This position is explicitly sustained by F. Müller (see Manfred Stelzer, Das Wesensgehaltsargument 
und der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, Springer-Verlag, Wien - New York, 1991, p. 95).
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protected scope is subject to policy considerations. Nevertheless, it is not so infrequent 
amongst courts and commentators22 to assume that certain fundamental rights are 
subject to certain limitations which are implicit in their coverage, even though these 
limitations go beyond the purely conceptual definition of the right in question. In other 
words, despite the general tendency to separate the coverage from the protection of 
fundamental rights, the idea is sometimes accepted that certain non-conceptual 
limitations do not limit the scope of protection of these rights but, rather, that they 
define their scope of coverage. The consequence of this idea is that the scopes of these 
two notions are equated, even if only up to a point.
This equation of the coverage with the protected scope of fundamental rights 
has two immediate consequences. First, in as far as external limitations of fundamental 
rights are thought to be inherent in the recognition of these rights23, such limitations 
apply automatically, that is they need not comply with the requirements with which 
limitations o f the protected scope of rights must generally comply. Second, since 
inherent limitations are thought to shape the coverage of fundamental rights, victims of 
the violation of a right subject to inherent limitations must argue not only that their right 
has been interfered with but also that the interference in question cannot be justified as 
being an ’inherent limitation’ to the right in question.
So far we have dealt with the alternative to the two-level structure of 
fundamental rights which derives from an institutional theory of fundamental rights. Let 
me now turn to the second alternative to this structure that I planned to comment on. I 
am referring to the structure of fundamental rights which is inherent in various social 
theories of these rights.
2 .2  Social Theories o f Fundamental Rights
The two-level structure o f rights is also contested within the framework of 
social theories of fundamental rights, that is within the framework of theories which 
consider that fundamental rights imply positive claims that the State make their exercise 
possible. This is true in the context of the three possible variations of positive claims
22See A. Bleckmann, Staatsrecht II, pp. 265 et seq., for examples of authors who defend different 
'inherent- limitations' theories. See also footnotes 44,57, 62 et seq. and 86 et seq. and accompanying 
text below.
23Refemng to such limitations both as "inherent" and as "external" should not appear as contradictory. 
They are "inherent" because they determine the scope of the recognition of a right, that is, they define 
the boundaries of a right as it is recognised by the Constitution. At the same time, they are "external" 
because they are not imposed by the conceptual features of a right, but by circumstances which are 
alien to those features.
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against the State; these are, first, positive claims that the State ensure the actual 
protection of traditional liberal rights against third parties, second, positive claims that 
the State develop an adequate organisational and procedural apparatus for the actual 
protection of such liberal rights against the State itself and, finally, positive claims in 
the context of social rights in the narrow sense. In these three instances, positive 
subjective rights have a completely different structure from rights conceived as negative 
claims24. Let me explain why this is the case.
Conceived as rights of defence against the State, fundamental rights require 
that, in principle, the State refrains from every interference with these rights, that is that 
it refrains from every act which interferes with these rights as conceptually defined; 
only as a second step may an act of interference be justified on the basis that it does not 
encroach upon the protected scope of the right in question. Conceived as positive 
claims, on the other hand, fundamental rights do not require that the State takes every 
possible measure which might enable the exercise of all rights. The State is certainly 
obliged to render the exercise of rights possible and to this end it must take adequate 
measures; yet the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation to decide which 
particular measure it wants to adopt. This could not be otherwise, for the extent to 
which the State facilitates or even enables the exercise of rights is, as all positive 
decisions of the State, is conditioned by policy issues and, furthermore, constrained by 
financial considerations. In other words, in the definition of the coverage of positive 
subjective rights States are accorded a certain margin to find a balance between the 
interest in the protection of the particular right at issue and other conflicting interests.
The balance referred to above appears to be similar to the one which is usually 
sought after in the context of rights as negative claims. There is however one crucial 
difference between the two: the balance reached in the context of rights as negative 
claims defines the protected scope of these rights, whereas the balance described above 
defines the coverage of rights as positive claims. This means that considerations which 
usually define the protected scope of rights now come to define the coverage of positive 
rights. The result is that these rights appear to have a one-step structure.
The consequences of this one-step structure of rights as analysed in the context 
of rights as institutional guarantees are equally applicable in the context of rights as 
positive claims. To begin with, first, the requirements with which limitations of 
fundamental rights must generally comply do not apply in the context of positive rights,
24See Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 420 et seq. Although Alexy is only referring to positive 
claims for protection against third parties, this distinction in the structure of negative and positive 
claims can be applied to all three categories of the latter.
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the limitations o f which partly constitute their conceptual boundaries. Second, the fact 
that positive rights need to be defined in the context o f a balance might make the 
conceptual boundaries o f these rights shake under the pressure of case-by-case 
considerations; conversely, this fact can also lead to a conceptual ordering of positive 
rights according to their worth within a fixed constitutional scale. Finally, the allocation 
of the burden of reasoning is altered, so that a complaint of a violation of a positive 
right must show not only that no action has been taken to enable the exercise of the 
right in question but also that an omission to take action was unlawful.
~ It ought to be noted, however, that in the context of positive subjective rights 
the consequences of the single-step structure must be considered less serious and, in 
any case, more tolerable than in the context of rights as institutional guarantees. This 
statement is based on two considerations. First, the recognition of rights as positive 
claims against the State does not come to replace but merely to complement the 
recognition of the traditional negative dimension of the same rights, thus enlarging the 
range of the subjective dimension o f fundamental rights. As a result, the consequences 
of a single-level structure in the context of subjective rights are limited to the positive 
aspect of the right in question, so that a two-step structure of these rights as negative 
claims remains unaltered. Second, the fact that rights have a subjective positive 
dimension, even if they have a single-step structure, already has positive consequences 
for the individual, whose position vis-à-vis the State is thereby strengthened. This is 
particularly true, as pointed out above, since positive claims are usually constrained by 
policy and financial considerations; it has even been affirmed25 that allowing for 
individual claims in this context would amount to granting the individual direct entrance 
into the political process. Thus according the State a certain margin to set the coverage 
of the positive dimension of rights seems a fair price to pay for the recognition of such 
a dimension.
The above considerations give us the necessary background to understand the 
structure of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in the ECHR, Germany and 
the United States, which will be studied in the following sections. Here we will see 
that, as a traditional right of defence against the State, the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is recognised in a two-step manner in the three systems under
^See Böckenförde, "Gnmdrechtstheorie und Grundrechtsintopretation" (1974) NJW\ 1529; Ossenbühl, 
"Die Interpretation der Grundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”, (1976) NJW, 
p. 2100 at 2104 et seq.; Hesse, "Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland” (1978) EuGRZ, p. 427 at 433 et seq.
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consideration, yet that these three systems tend to regard certain non-conceptual 
limitations to this right as inherent in its coverage. In addition, we will see that the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications is sometimes recognised with a positive subjective 
dimension -in particular within the ECHR-, that in the context of its positive subjective 
dimension this right has a single-level structure and that this circumstance does not 
affect the two-level structure of its negative subjective dimension.
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Section 2: The European Convention on Human Rights
Introduction
Article 8:
"I. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.
II. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of his 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection o f health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others."
The way the ECHR approaches the recognition and protection of rights is 
rooted in the liberal tradition. The right to respect for correspondence (art. 8) is a clear 
example of this26. To begin with, the use of the terms "respect" and "interference" 
suggests that art. 8 recognises rights which only have a negative subjective dimension, 
that is, it suggests that art. 8 only requires that States refrain from any active behaviour 
against the exercise of the right it recognises. In addition, these rights appear to have a 
two-step structure. Art. 8, in fact, is structured in two paragraphs: paragraph 1 
enunciates the ensemble of rights it recognises (among which is the right to respect for 
correspondence) thus defining the scope of coverage of the provision, whereas 
paragraph 2 establishes the conditions under which the exercise of these rights may be 
lawfully interfered with and may therefore remain unprotected, that is paragraph 2 
defines the boundaries of the protected scope of art. 8 rights. Finally, the wording of 
art, 8 clearly suggests that paragraph 2 relates to paragraph 1 as the exception to the 
rule: only exceptionally may the protected scope of art. 8 rights be limited beyond their 
scope of coverage.
J
This 'liberal' reading of the structure of art. 8 rights strikes me as being the 
most obvious. Yet the Convention's organs have not always agreed with it. To begin 
with, they have affirmed that these rights have not only a negative but also a positive 
dimension and have interpreted this latter as a single-level structure. Moreover, the 
Convention's organs have not always respected the two-step structure of art, 8 rights 
even within the context of the purely negative dimension of these rights. To be sure, the
26See also arts 5,9,10 or 11. All these provisions have a structure similar to that of ait. 8. They all 
refer in the first place to the coverage of the right or rights they protect and then describe their protected 
scope from without, that is, they set some conditions under which interference with the exercise of 
those rights may be considered lawful.
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fact that paragraph 2 limits the protected scope of the rights recognised in paragraph 1 
has never been questioned. In spite of this, however, in their early case-law the 
Convention's organs took the following position: first, they accepted the idea that 
certain external, i.e. non-conceptual, limitations to art. 8 rights could affect the scope of 
the coverage of these rights as well as their scope of protection, thus blurring the 
border-line between the scope of both; second, they took the view that limitations to the 
protected scope of art. 8 rights did not need to be exceptional. These early views, 
however, had a limited life. In the 1970s, they were revised by the Convention's 
organs, which finally rejected them. As a result, the initial interpretation of the structure 
of art. 8 was replaced by the opposite interpretation: the idea that there could be 
limitations inherent in the recognition of art. 8 rights was rejected, further the 
limitations to the protected scope of a i t  8 rights were regarded as exceptional.
This section will deal with the structure of the right to respect for 
correspondence in the context of its positive and of its negative dimension. In this latter 
context, I will concentrate on the change in the position o f the Convention's organs 
dealing, first, with the issue of the 'inherent limitations' and, second, the exceptions 
provided for by art. 8.2, in as far as the interpretation of the right to respect for 
correspondence has been thereby affected; subsequently, I will try to place this double 
change in the context of the general evolution of the case-law of the Convention’s 
organs.
1 . The Structure o f Art. 8 Rights in their Positive Dimension
The idea that art. 8 might recognise subjective rights with a positive dimension 
seems to be discarded by the inclusion of the terms "respect" and "interference" in its 
wording. The term "respect" is used in paragraph 1 to define the coverage of art. 8 
rights and denotes an idea of 'refraining from acting'27; the term "interference", for its 
part, is used in paragraph 2 to describe the scope of non-protection of these rights and 
denotes an idea of active behaviour against the exercise o f rights28. Thus perfectly 
coupled, these two words literally suggest that only passive behaviour ("respect") is 
imposed upon the addressees of art. 8 rights and that only active behaviour 
("interference") is exceptionally allowed, hence generally forbidden. As a result, the
27Respect: "4.c. To treat with consideration; to refrain from injuring or interfering with; to spare" (The 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, Vol. XHI, p. 733)
28Interfere: "4.a. (of things) To come into collision or opposition, so as to affect the course of; 4,b. 
(of persons) To meddle with; to interpose and take part in something, esp. without having the right to 
do so" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII, p. 1102)
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scope of recognition and the scope of protection of art. 8 rights appears to have the 
same dimensions. Nevertheless, in spite of the literal meaning of these two terms, the 
Convention's organs hold the view that the subjective rights recognised in art. 8 also 
have a positive dimension. The scope of this new dimension of the art. 8 right, and in 
particular of the right to respect for correspondence, will be studied in detail in the 
following chapter. For now, I will concentrate on the structure of this dimension.
As was commented on in Section 1, positive subjective rights are recognised 
with a single-level structure and, as we will now see, a rt 8 is not an exception to this 
rule. In this context, the Convention's organs have declared the existence of positive 
subjective rights on the basis of a re-interpretation of the term "respect". In particular, 
they have stated that "there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect 
for private or family life"29. The problem is that the Convention's organs have not 
made a similar re-interpretation of the term "interference", whereby they have broken 
the symmetry between both terms. As a result, the scope of coverage of art. 8 no longer 
has the same dimensions as its scope of protection, because the former embraces art. 8 
rights both as positive and as negative rights, whereas the latter only embraces them in 
their negative form. This implies that the protected scope of the right to correspondence 
is limited beyond its recognition only when it appears as a negative right, that is only 
when positive interferences with its exercise are at stake. In other words, the art. 8 right 
to correspondence has a two-level structure only in as far as it is a negative right. As a 
positive right, its recognition and its protected scope coincide.
The negative consequences of the single-level structure of a right have been 
discussed in Section 1, where it was also seen that in the context of positive subjective 
rights these consequences must be considered less serious and even tolerable. I would 
like to point out now that in the case of art. 8 these consequences have thus far been 
avoided in practice. Let me explain.
As is known, the exercise of rights with a single-level structure can only be 
limited at the level of the coverage of these rights, not at a functional level. This means 
that the scope of art. 8 positive rights, i.e. the scope of a State's positive obligations 
deriving from them, must be assessed exclusively within the context of art. 8 .130. As 
will be seen in the following chapter, the Contracting Parties have been accorded a wide
29Marckx v. Belgium, judgment of 13 July 1979, Series A, vol. 31, Par. 31, p. 15; Airey v. Ireland, 
judgment of 9 Oct. 1979, Series A, vol. 32, Par. 32, p. 17.
30In this sense, see Marckx v. Belgium judgment. Series A, vol. 31, Par. 31, p. 15; Airey v. Ireland 
judgment. Series A, vol. 132., Par. 32, p. 17; Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, Op. Com. of 1 March 
1979, Series B, vol. 36, Par. 52, p. 26.
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'margin of appreciation' to set the limits of their own positive obligations. This 'margin 
of appreciation' is however subject to the ultimate control of the Convention's organs, a 
control, and this is the interesting point, which they exercise on the basis of the 
following criterion: "In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard 
must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the 
community and the interests of the individual ... In striking this balance the aims 
mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 8 may be of a certain relevance, although 
this provision refers in terms only to 'interferences' with the right protected by the first 
paragraph -in other words is concerned with the negative obligations flowing 
therefrom"31. It thus seems that the criteria which define the functional limits of art. 8 
negative rights are also invoked to define the coverage of art. 8 positive rights, so that 
the negative and the positive obligations of the States arising from art. 8 coincide.
This strong parallel between the negative and the positive dimensions of art. 8 
rights shows that the consequences of the single-level structure of the latter have thus 
far been avoided. In fact, the Convention's organs have relied on this parallel in order 
to avoid the point that in their positive dimension art. 8 rights have a single-level 
structure32 and have also drawn a line here between coverage and protection: whereas 
the coverage of art. 8 positive rights is lim ited on the basis of the criterion of 
responsibility of a State, the scope of protection of these rights is limited by the 
functional limits contained in art. 8.2. In line with this structure is also the approach of 
the Convention's organs to the burden of proof. That is, they have ruled that applicants 
must only show that their rights are not or have not been 'respected' by a State and that 
the State in question must be held responsible for it, whereas it is for a State to show 
that the situation complained of is justified on the basis of art. 8.2.
This line of argument has been developed and followed by both the 
Commission and the Court. The case-law o f the Commission is, however, much 
clearer in this regard. In its decisions on art. 8 positive rights, the Commission usually 
relies on a distinction between their coverage and their protection33; it has even started
31Rees v. U.K., judgment of 17 Oct. 1986, Series A, vol. 106, Par. 37, p. 15; Gaskin v. U.K., 
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, vol. 160, Par. 42, p. 17.
32A good example of this is the case of Powell and Rayner v. U.K. , judgment of 21 Feb. 1990, 
Series A, vol. 172. Here, the issue of whether the case involves positive or negative obligations for the 
State is explicitly considered irrelevant and ignored in the judgment of the Court.
33See Rees v. U.K., Op. Com. of 12 Oct. 1984, Series A, vol. 106, pp. 24 et seq.; W. v. U.K., Op. 
Com. of 4 Dec. 1985, Series A, vol. 121, pp. 44 et seq.; Gaskin v. U.K.t Op. Com. of 13 Nov. 1987, 
Series A, vol. 160, pp. 28 et seq.; Powell and Rayner v. U.K., Op. Com. of 19 Jan. 1989, Series A, 
vol. 172,. pp. 26 et seq. See also Ap. No. 9310/81, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 July 1986,47 D&R p. 5; 
Ap. No. 10153/82, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Oct. 1986, 49 D&R p. 67; Ap. No. 11366/85, Dec. Adm. 
Com. of 16 Oct. 1986, 50 D&R p. 173; Ap. No. 11468/85, Dec. Adm. Com. of 15 Oct. 1986, 50 
D&R p.199; Ap. No. 13728/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 17 May 1990, 65 D&R p. 250; Ap. No.
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to refer to violations of a State’s positive obligations as "interferences”, within the 
meaning of art. 8.2* 34. The Court, on the other hand, has up to now been more careful 
not to make such explicit distinctions, as if it were trying to keep an appearance of 
coherence with the single-level structure that such rights theoretically have35. On one 
occasion (which however has remained an isolated case) it has even made the applicants 
bear the burden of proving that art. 8, taken as a whole, had been violated36. Whether 
or not expressed in more or less explicit terms, the case-law of the Convention's organs 
has directed towards the harmonisation of the positive and negative rights contained in 
art. 8 on the assumption that they both had a two-level structure. As a result, the scope 
of all obligations (positive and negative) that art. 8 imposes upon the Contracting 
Parties is subject to the functional limits contained in art. 8.2. For the reasons given in 
Section 1, this line of evolution must be considered beneficial for art. 8 positive rights.
2 .  The Structure oLArt. 8 Rights in their Negative Dimension
2 .1  The Question o f  'Inherent Limitations'
Initially, the Convention’s organs or, more precisely, the Commission37, stated 
that the coverage of the art. 8 negative right to respect for correspondence had 
limitations other than those imposed by its conceptual boundaries. In particular, lawful 
imprisonment and detention were often regarded as conditions which affected the scope 
of coverage of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, rather than their protected 
scope.
The Commission was initially of the opinion that "the ordinary control of a 
prisoner's correspondence is to be considered as an inherent feature of
13756/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 March 1990, 65 D&R p. 265; 15817/89, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 
Oct. 1990, 66 D&R p. 251.
34Ap. No. 9310/81, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 July 1986, 47 D&R% p. 5 at 12;
Ap. No. 13728/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 17 May 1990. 65 D&R p. 250 at 263; Ap. No. 13756/88, 
Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 March 1990, 65 D&R p. 265 at 277; Ap.No. 15817/89, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 
Oct. 1990, 66 D&R p. 251 at 255.
35Compare, e.g., the judgments to the cases of X and Y v. The Netherlands (Series A, vol. 91, Par. 
23, p. 11), Rees v. U.K. (Series A, vol. 106, Par. 37, p. 15), W. v. V.K. (Series A, vol. 121, Par. 60, 
p. 27), Gaskin v. U.K. (Series A, vol. 160, Par. 42, p. 17), Powell and Rayner (Series a, vol. 172, 
Par. 41, p. 18), Cossey v. U.K. (Series A, vol. 184, Par. 36, p. 15), with the respective Opinions of 
the Commission to these cases.
36IV. v. UJC. judgment. Series A, vol. 121, Par. 61, p. 27.
37A s will be explained below, this early approach to art. 8.2 was mainly developed in the 
Commission's Decisions of Admissibility.
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imprisonment"38. Taken alone, this statement does not necessarily imply a limitation to 
the coverage o f the right. The fact that only 'ordinary' or 'normal' control is allowed 
suggests rather the opposite, that is, that only the protected scope of the right is at stake: 
the right to correspondence does not seem to automatically disappear in cases of 
imprisonment; it only yields to 'ordinary' controls. It must only be decided which 
controls can be deemed 'ordinary' or 'normal', something which one would expect to 
be decided on the basis of the particular circumstances of the individual case at stake: 
the circumstances of the prison in question and its security needs should be balanced 
against the importance accorded to the right to correspondence and the conditions under 
which it is to be exercised in that particular case. It seems, therefore, that lawful 
imprisonment could easily have been interpreted as a limitation to the exercise of the 
right to correspondence and hence as a limitation subject to paragraph 2 of art. 8.
In several instances39, the Commission decided on a prisoner's right to respect 
for correspondence in line with the above interpretation, since they judged that 
restrictions to this right were violations of art. 8 (1) and only questioned whether or not 
they could be justified under art. 8 (2). Most o f its decisions, however, did not follow 
this pattern of reasoning40. The reason is that restrictions imposed on prisoners' 
telecommunications were consistently considered to be 'normal', that is, they were 
consistently justified as being part of a 'normal' or 'ordinary' control. This 
circumstance encouraged the belief that, more often than not, the deprivation of liberty 
was thought to impose an automatic limit to the right to respect for correspondence, 
regardless of any consideration as to the circumstances of the case. In fact, in most 
cases of lawful deprivation of liberty, this right was plainly not considered to be at 
stake, hence its violation was not thought to amount to an 'interference'. As a result, 
imprisonment most often amounted to an inherent limitation of the coverage of the right 
to respect for correspondence as recognised in art. 8.1; the coverage of this right was
38Ap. No. 2291/64, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 June 1967, 24 Coll. Dec., p. 34; Ap. No. 2375/64, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 7 Feb. 1967, 22 Coll. Dec., p. 47; Ap. No. 2749/66, Final Dec. Adm. Com. of 11 
July 1967, 24 Coll. Dec., p. 112; Ap. No. 3717/68, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1970, 31 Coll. Dec., 
p. 105; Ap. No. 4144/69, Dec. Adm. Com. 16 March 1970, 33 Coll. Dec., p. 30; Ap. No. 4133/69, 
Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 July 1970,36 Coll. Dec., p. 64; Ap. No. 4351/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 5 Oct. 
1970, 36 Coll. Dec., p. 86; Ap. No. 4445/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 Apr. 1970, 37 Coll. Dec., p. 
122.
39Ap. No. 1983/63, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Dec. 1965, YB VIII, p. 228,262; Ap. No. 3717/68, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1970, 31 Coll. Dec., p. 105; Ap. No. 5265/71, Dec. Adm. Com. of 18 Dec. 
1973 (unpublished). Digest of Strasbourg Case-Law. Council of Europe, Vol. 3. p. 196.
40Ap. No. 2291/64, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 June 1967, 24 Coll. Dec., p. 34; Ap. No. 2375/64, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 7 Feb. 1967, 22 Coll. Dec., p. 47; Ap. No. 2749/66, Final Dec. Adm. Com. of 11 
July 1967, 24 Coll. Dec., p. 112; Ap. No. 4144/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 March 1970, 33 Coll. 
Dec., p. 30; Ap. No. 4133/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 July 1970, 36 Coll. Dec., p. 64; Ap. No. 
4351/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 5 Oct. 1970, 36 Coll. Dec., p. 86; Ap. No. 4445/70, Dec. Adm. Com. 
of 1 Apr. 1970, 37 Coll. Dec., p. 122.
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thus made to coincide with the protected scope o f the right to personal freedom under 
art. 5 of the Convention41.
As has been mentioned already, the position of the Convention's organs with 
respect to the issue of 'inherent limitations' changed in the 1970s, when the Court took 
the view, which it still holds today, that the coverage of the right to respect for 
correspondence is only limited by its own conceptual boundaries, with no room for 
inherent limitations. This view was introduced in the context of the freedom to 
communicate, yet it is also applicable to the secrecy of telecommunications. As a result, 
imprisonment has no longer been considered to affect the scope of recognition of this 
right. Rather, deprivations of liberty which are lawful under art. 5 are in a functional 
relationship with art. 8 rights: the former may be a limit to the exercise of the latter, 
provided that art. 8.2 requirements are met42.
2 .2  The Exceptional N ature  o f the R estrictions Contained in A rt. 8. 2
The initial interpretation o f the role of art. 8.2 was based on two points. First, 
the Commission judged43 that the Contracting Parties had a right to impose the 
limitations contained in art. 8.2, so long, of course, as the conditions imposed in that 
provision were respected. The Contracting Parties were thus granted a right to limit the 
rights recognised in art. 8.1, that is they enjoyed a right which prevailed over the rights 
recognised in art. 8.1. On the basis o f these premises, art. 8.2 could no longer be held 
exceptional, since the possibility to interfere with art. 8.1 rights was a right itself and 
thus had to be the object of a wide and favourable interpretation. A significant 
consequence of this is the presumption of lawfulness that the Contracting Parties 
enjoyed in the exercise of their 'right to interference', since national authorities did not 
need to prove that limitations of art. 8 rights were lawful; their lawfulness was 
presumed. The burden of arguing to the contrary was relegated to the victims of such 
limitations, who were obliged to show not only that an art. 8 right was at stake -which 
included showing the absence o f inherent limitations- and had been restricted in its 
exercise, but also that this restriction had not complied with the conditions of art. 8.2 of
41 Art. 5.1: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (...)"
42See Colder v. U.K., judgment of 21st Feb. 1975, Series A, vol. 16, Par. 44-45, p. 21. For more 
recent cases, see, e.g., Chester v. U.K., Report Com. of 17 May 1990,68 D&R p. 65 at 79.
43Ap. No. 1628/62, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Dec. 1963, 12 Coll. Dec.» p. 68. Ap. No. 2413/65, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 16 Dec.1966,23 Coll Dec.* p. 9.
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the Convention44. Victims of art. 8 limitations thus bore the burden of reasoning (the 
Commission calls it the 'burden of proof) not only within the scope of art. 8.1 but also 
within the scope of art. 8.2.
Second, the Commission adopted a rather detached attitude with respect to the 
interpretation of art. 8.2, in the sense that it considered the interpretation of art. 8.2 to 
be for the most part a matter of national concern. Accordingly, the Contracting Parties 
were granted "a certain margin of appreciation in determining the limits that may be 
placed on the exercise of the rights in question"45. This, of course, did not amount to 
an absolute absence of control by the Convention's organs, yet the Convention’s 
organs showed great respect for that margin o f appreciation and restricted their control 
over it to a minimum46. As a consequence, the national authorities did not only enjoy 
the right to limit the exercise of the rights contained in art. 8.1; in addition to this, they 
enjoyed a significant margin in the interpretation of the very requirements that they had 
to fulfil when exercising their right. In other words, the Contracting Parties could, to a 
great extent, settle the scope of their right to limit art. 8.1 rights.
As a result of points one and two above, the protected scope of the rights 
recognised in art. 8.1 was, initially, minimised dramatically. In the 1970s, however, 
the Convention's organs replaced their original views on art. 8.2 by their complete 
opposites (which are still held today): first, the Contracting Parties are no longer 
thought to have a right to interfere with art. 8 rights. The only rights arising from art. 8 
are those recognised in its first paragraph. It follows that only art. 8.1 rights have to be 
interpreted favourably and that the possibility (regulated in art. 8.2) that restrictions be 
imposed on their exercise must, on the contrary, be the object of a narrow interpretation 
and an exceptional application47. In this context, the "presumption of lawfulness" now
44Ibid. Sec also Ap. No. 793/60, Dec. Adm. Com. of 21 Dec. 1960, 5 Coll. Dec., p. 3. Ap. No. 
1307/61. Dec. Adm. Com. of 4 Oct. 1962,9 ColL Dec., p. 56. Ap. No. 4004/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 
16 March 1970, 33 Coll. Dec., p. 21. Ap. No. 4623/70, Partial Dec. Adm. Com of 19 July 1971, 39 
Coll. Dec., p.65. Ap. No. 4622/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 22 March 1972, 40 Coll. Dec., p. 18, Ap. 
No. 4960/71, Dec. Adm. Com. of 19 July 1972, 42 Coll. Dec., p. 57; Ap. No. 12976/87, Dec. Adm. 
Com. of 9 Oct, 1991, 71 D&R p. 45 at 48.
45Ap. No. 1628/62, 12 Coll. Dec. p. 68; Ap. No. 2413/65, 23 Coll. Dec., p. 9. See also Ap. No. 
4623/70, 39 Coll. Dec. p. 23 and Ap. No. 4960/71, 42 Coll. Dec. p. 57.
46Ap. No. 1449/62, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 Jan.1962, 10 Coll. Dec., p. 1 at 3; Ap. No. 1329/62, 
Dec. Adm. Com. of 7 May 1962,9 Coll. Dec., p. 28 at 32; Ap, No 2648/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 
Feb. 68, 26 Coll. Dec., p. 31; Ap. No. 2699/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 Apr. 1968, 26 Coll. Dec., p. 
33 at 39; Ap. No. 2792/66, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Oct. 1966, 21 Coll. Dec., p. 48 at 50; Ap. No. 
2822/66, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1968, YB XI p. 406 at 410; Ap. No. 4284/69, Dec. Adm. Com. 
of 1 Feb. 71, 37 Coll. Dec., p. 74; Ap. No. 4396/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 Dec. 1970, 36 Coll. 
Dec., p. 88 at 89: Ap. No. 5132/71, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 July. 1972, 43 Coll. Dec., p. 57 at 61; 
Ap. No. 5486/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 July 1973, 44 Coll. Dec., p. 128 at 129.
47See the judgment to Klass and others v. Germany, Series A, vol. 28, Par. 42, p. 21; see also, e.g., 
Funke v. France, Cremieux v. France and Miailhe v. France, judgments of 25 Feb. 1993, Series A, 
vol. 256, Par. 55, p. 24, Par. 38, p. 62 and Par. 36, p. 89, respectively.
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affects the exercise of art. 8.1 rights, that is applicants no longer have to provide 
evidence that the proscribed interferences do not respect the Convention's 
requirements. They must only put forward what they believe is an interference with one 
of the rights contained in art. 848. Once the Convention's organs are satisfied that art.
8.1 was violated, the national authorities in question have to prove that such a violation 
was nonetheless justified under art. 8.249.
Second, the Convention's organs have accorded themselves a more important 
role in the interpretation of art. 8.2. Of course, the Contracting Parties still enjoy some 
'margin of appreciation' in the reading art. 8.2, yet this margin is less wide and less 
flexible than it used to be. Restrictions of the Convention's rights are more and more 
subject to the increasing number o f rules and interpretative standards set out by the 
Convention's organs and must submit to the control that the Convention's organs exert 
over the way such rules and standards are applied; moreover, this control seems ever 
more rigourous50. Thus, although both the Contracting Parties and the Convention’s 
organs still participate in the interpretation of art. 8.2, there has been a shift in roles: the 
latter have taken over the guiding role in the interpretative process.
Studying art. 8.2 and the particular rules and standards the Convention's organs 
have given for its interpretation will be amongst the objectives of chapter 5, Let me 
however jump ahead so that the extent to which art. 8.2 ensures the exceptional nature 
of the lawful restrictions on art. 8 rights can be best appreciated. According to the 
Convention's organs, art. 8.2 is to be interpreted on the basis of a principle of 
proportionality, which requires a case-by-case analysis of whether restrictions of the 
right to correspondence and the aim pursued by these restrictions are being kept in 
proportion. In principle, such a test of proportionality does not grant an advantageous 
position to either of the elements confronted, that is, both the right and the aim which 
are being balanced against each other depart from a position of equality so that neither 
the protection of the one nor the pursuance of the other stands as either the rule or the
48Thus, the Commission can declare an application inadmissible if it "cannot find any substantiation 
in support of [the applicant's] contention" that there has been an infringement upon his right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications (T.V. v. Finland, Ap. No. 21780/93, Dec. Adm. Com. of 2 March 
1994, 76-A D&R p. 140 at 155).
49The cases mentioned in the previous footnotes are clear examples of the new allocation of the burden 
of reasoning; see also, e.g., Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, Series A, vol. 290, Par. 55, 
p. 21.
50This point of view is shared by R.StJ. Macdonald, "The Margin of Appreciation", The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 
p. 83 at 84; "[I]t is apparent that the Court is endeavouring to develop a more rigourous application of 
its guidelines, with the result that there has probably been a narrowing of an originally expansive 
concept of the margin of appreciation". The issue of the margin of appreciation will also be the object 
of attention in chapter 5.
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exception. Nevertheless, the Convention's organs have tended to favour the position of 
the right to respect for correspondence and, as was noted above, have subjected 
restrictions to this right to a narrow interpretation and an exceptional application. A 
good, probably the best, indicator of this is that, as part of the proportionality test, the 
Convention's organs have imposed the requirement that restrictions prove 'necessary', 
that is, they have imposed the requirement that any restrictions must prove to be the 
least intrusive means to achieve the pursued aims. In other words, limitations on the 
right to respect for correspondence have been considered disproportionate with their 
aims, hence unlawful, if these aims could be equally achieved by other means which 
are less intrusive upon that right -and no more intrusive upon any other51. The 
requirement that restrictions to art. 8 rights be 'necessary' thus accounts for the 
exceptional nature of these restrictions.
2 .3  The Historical Background
The case law o f the Convention's organs on the structure of art. 8 and the 
exceptions in the context of lawful interferences with the exercise of art. 8.1 rights has 
suffered a radical shift. Initially, the two-level structure o f art. 8 was blurred in the 
context of imprisonment, since this was regarded as an 'inherent limitation' to the 
coverage of the provision; additionally, restrictions to the exercise of art. 8 rights were 
not regarded as exceptional. Since the 1970s, however, the Convention's organs have 
clearly held both to the two-level structure o f art. 8 and to the exceptional nature of 
restrictions to the exercise of the rights recognised in its paragraph 1, thus complying 
with a more liberal approach to fundamental rights as rights of defence against the 
State. This shift can be better understood if it is seen as part of a more general change in 
the policy of the Convention's organs concerning the role of the Convention and the 
position of the Member States.
The initial approach to these two issues was developed by the Commission in 
its Decisions of Admissibility. In fact, until the 1970s the Commission considered all 
applications concerning the right to respect for correspondence inadmissible, hence 
neither the Committee of Ministers nor the Court were given a chance to express their 
views on matters concerning this right. This period of self-granted freedom was used 
by the Commission to impose its own views, which were strongly influenced by the
51 Thus, the "prior ventilation restriction" -contained in some of the Standing Orders regulating the 
management of prisons in the United States- has been considered disproportionate since its aims could 
also be attained with a "simultaneous ventilation rule" (case of Silver and others, Op. Com. Par. 302, 
p. 78. See also Par. 314 and 340-341, pp. 80 and 84).
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idea that the powers of national authorities should be respected as much as possible. 
The Commission's prime concern was to guarantee wide scope of action to the 
Contracting Parties, by way of respecting their discretion and minimising the duties 
inflicted upon them by the Convention. This tendency inevitably resulted in the position 
of the national authorities vis-à-vis the holders of Convention rights becoming over 
strong. The case of the right to respect for correspondence is a telling example of this. 
Such a result was not necessarily intended by the Commission; it was, however, 
tolerated.
The present approach to the structure of art. 8 came as the result of a change in 
the general policy of the Commission. The origins o f the approach date back to the 
early 1970s, when a case involving the violation of the right to correspondence was, 
for the first time, admitted by the Commission and subsequently submitted to the 
Court. The case or, rather, the cases in question were the so-called "Vagrancy" cases52. 
The double circumstance of their admission and subsequent submission to the Court are 
evidence of a more open approach of the Commission towards the protection of the 
rights recognised in the Convention53. This is confirmed in the Opinion of the 
Commission in this case, where it denied that confinement for vagrancy entailed the 
deprivation of the right to respect for correspondence, that is, that it amounted to an 
inherent limitation of that right. For its part, the Court did not consider that art. 8 had 
been violated; yet, it solved the question of its violation within the framework of art.
8.2. Therefore, although neither the Commission nor the Court spent much time over 
the issues concerning art. 8, the "Vagrancy" cases are at the origin of the shift in 
doctrine concerning the article's structure54. Some years later, the Colder case gave the 
Commission and the Court an opportunity to consolidate this new approach and to 
develop its implications further. Since then, this new approach has been consistently 
followed by all the Convention's organs55.
52De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A, vol. 12.
53It has been remarked that "[a]u depart, en effet, la Commission a eu tendance à préférer porter les 
affaires devant le Comité des ministres, dont elle avait remarqué qu'il suivait pratiquement toujours 
l'avis qu'elle lui donnait. Sensible aux critiques que cette attitude lui valut, la Commission redressa 
cette situation en saisissant davantage la Cour européenne et moins systématiquement le Comité des 
ministres" (Jean-Louis Burban, Le Conseil de L'Europe. Presses Universitaires de France. Collection 
"Que sais-je?". 1985, p.73). An example of this change of attitude is the fact that, from the Vagrancy 
cases onwards, all the cases on the right to correspondence that have arrived at the Court have been 
submitted to it by the Commission -with the only exception of the Golder case, submitted by the 
Government of the United Kingdom.
54It is also significant that, in this case, individuals were for the first time allowed to be a party to the 
procedure at the Court, together with the Government involved and the Commission (Jean-Louis 
Burban, Le Conseil de L'Europe,.al 75).
55Golder v. U.K., Op. Com. of 1 June 1973, Series B, vol. 16 Par. 122, p. 61; judgment of 21 Feb. 
1975, Series A, vol. 12, Par. 44-45, p.21. Klass and others v. Germany, judgment of 6 Sep. 1978, 
Series A, vol. 28, Par. 42, p. 21. X v. U.K. Ap. No. 7215/75, Report by the Commission of 12 Oct. 
1978, 19 D&R, Par. 127, p. 73. Dudgeon v. U.K., Op. Com. of 13 March 1980, Series B Vol. 40
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Section 3: Germany
Introduction
Article 10:
"1. Privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications is inviolable.
2. Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a law. Where a restriction 
serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of 
the Federation or a Land the law may stipulate that the person affected shall not 
be informed of such restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced 
by a review of the case by bodies and subsidiary bodies appointed by 
parliament"56
Art. 10 of the German Basic Law is another clear example of a two-step 
approach to the structure of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. To begin 
with, this provision uncontroversially recognises the secrecy of telecommunications as 
a negative right of defence against the State, yet it is not at all clear whether this right 
also has a positive subjective dimension. The German Constitutional Court has not yet 
had a chance to decide on the issue; moreover, it has not yet given a clear answer to the 
more general question whether German fundamental rights have a positive subjective 
dimension at all. All this will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. At this point I 
would just like to stress that the two-level structure of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications need not (or not yet) be questioned on the grounds that this right 
has a positive subjective dimension.
In addition, art. 10 is divided into two paragraphs, the first one limits the 
coverage of art. 10 rights and the second one the scope of its protection. To be more 
precise, art. 10.1 recognises the right to the secrecy of the postal service, letters and 
telecommunications, whereas art. 10.2 sets the conditions under which this right may 
go unprotected, that is, it limits from outside the protected scope of this right.
Par. 97-98, p. 36; judgment of 22 Oct. 1981, Series A vol. 45, Par. 40-41, 42 et seq., pp. 18-19. 
Malone v. C/./C, Op. Com. of 17 Dec. 1982, Series B, vol. 67, Par. 115, pp. 46-47; judgment of 2 
Aug. 1984, Series A, vol. 82, Par. 64-65, pp. 30-31. Some of the clearest statements made by the 
Convention's organs confirming art. 8 as a liberal provision with a two-step structure, with all the 
implications analysed above, were made within the context of art. 10 (see the Handyside case v. U.K. 
Op. Com. of 33 Sep. 1975, Series B, vol. 22, Par. 137-138, p.43; Judgment of 7 Dec. 1976, Series 
A, vol. 24, Par. 43, p. 21. The Sunday Times case v. U.K. Op. Com. 18 May 1977, Series B, vol. 
28, par. 177, p. 60; Judgment of 27 Oct. 1978, Series A, vol. 30). The apparent parallelism in the 
structure of articles 8 and 10 render these statements relevant also for the former.
56The translation of this and other provisions of the German Basic Law in this thesis has been taken 
from the collection Constitutions of the Countries of the World, ed. by Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert
H. Flanz, Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York. Issued August 1994.
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The following paragraphs will analyse the extent to which this structure 
underlies the decisions of the German Constitutional Court on the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. This will involve a study of the way the Constitutional Court has 
approached, first, the structure of this right and, second, the issue of the exceptional 
nature of the limitations imposed on its protected scope on the basis of art. 10.2.
1. The Structure of the Right to the Secrecy of Telecommunications
Even though a two-step structure is apparent in the wording of art. 10, several 
commentators have not read this provision in such a way. A two-step structure has first 
of all been questioned by commentators who take the view that no distinction can be 
drawn between the scope of coverage and the scope of protection of a right, as was 
explained in the introduction to this chapter. Second, the structure of art. 10 has been 
the object of less radical attacks: it has often been argued57 58that the coverage of this 
provision is subject to certain 'inherent limitations' ('immanente Schranken'), that is to 
limitations which, even if they go beyond the mere conceptual boundaries of art. 10 
rights, do not act upon the protected scope of this right but upon its coverage. Such 
limitations have been identified, in particular, in the control over telecommunications 
which is implicit in and absolutely necessary for the normal functioning of 
telecommunication services (betriebsbedingte or dienstlich notwendige Schranken59). 
Such control has been interpreted as including, e.g„ taking notice of the details of the 
telecommunication, checking that the norms regulating telecommunications are duly 
respected or even opening closed letters which are to be sent back to the sender if the 
sender could not be identifiable otherwise59. In relation to the above instances of 
control, art. 10 right has simply been considered non existent.
Such views have not been accepted by the German Constitutional Court. To 
begin with, the Court has stated that all constitutional rights, in general, and the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications, in particular, are recognised in two steps, that is that 
the Basic Law distinguishes between their recognition and their protected scope60. 
Moreover, the Court has gone a step further to affirm that a two-step structure of 
fundamental rights implies that these may not be subject to 'inherent limitations', since 
in its view the coverage of fundamental rights is exclusively limited by their conceptual
57See, e.g., Maunz/Diirig, GG-Kommentar, Art. 10, Rdnr. 66; Badura, Kommentar zum Bonner 
Grundgesetz, Art. 10, Rdnr. 49; OLG Köln, (1970) NJW, p. 1857; BVewGE 32. 129 (1932), (1969) 
NJWt 1637; BVenvGE v. 15. 3. 1984, (1984) NJW., p. 2112.
58See Maunz/Diirig and Badura, Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Art. 10, Rdnr. 49.
59§ 61 PostO.
^ee BVerfGE 33, 1 at 10-11; 85,386 at 397.
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boundaries. Any limitation going beyond these conceptual boundaries can only be of a 
functional character, that is it can only be related to the exercise of rights and affect their 
scope of protection.
It ought however to be noted that in the context of telecommunications the Court 
has not yet confronted certain situations, generally referred to as 'inherent limitations' 
but which actually imply conceptual restrictions to the coverage of art. 10 rights. I am 
referring to instances o f control over circumstances surrounding an act of 
telecommunication61 when these circumstances are not secret. This is for example the 
case with the control that postal employees exercise over telecommunications when they 
take notice of the details of the communicating parties, in as far these details lie open to 
their view. Although the Court has not yet had to decide on any such instance of 
control, it seems safe to affirm that they do not fall under the coverage of art, 10 rights 
for the simple reason that this right covers the secrecy of telecommunications and that 
here no secrecy is involved.
At the theoretical level, the view that art. 10 rights have a two-level structure has 
been held by the Constitutional Court with clarity and determination. This position is 
also confirmed by the Court’s implicitly allocating the 'burden of reasoning’ in art. 10 
cases: the claimant is expected to argue that there has been an infringement upon the 
rights recognised in art. 10.1 whereas the state is expected to argue that this 
infringement was justified under art. 10.2. Nevertheless, the Court has not always been 
consistent in these theoretical views in finding the solution to concrete cases, since it 
has sometimes imposed 'inherent lim itations' to the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. The following paragraphs will be devoted to the analysis of the 
decisions where these inconsistencies occur. These decisions will be divided into two 
groups: attention will be focused, first, on cases where the imposition of 'inherent 
limitations’ to the secrecy of telecommunications is merely implicit in the reasoning of 
the Court and, second, on cases where 'inherent limitations' to this right have been 
imposed in explicit terms.
61 As will be seen in the next chapter, these surrounding circumstances are covered within the scope of 
art. 10 rights to the secrecy of the post and to the secrecy of telecommunications.
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1.1  An Im plicit 'In h eren t L im itation ': the C ondition of Im prisonm ent
The German Constitutional Court has plainly and systematically denied the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications to prisoners62. In fact, in most cases involving the 
opening and stoppage of letters sent by or addressed to prisoners, the Constitutional 
Court has not even considered that art. 10 of the Basic Law could be at stake. Much 
more startling is the fact that, in most such cases, a violation of art. 10 rights has not 
been claimed by the applicants. Both Court and applicants have preferred to focus their 
attention on other constitutional rights, namely the freedom to engage in 
telecommunications (protected as part of the freedom of speech -art. 5), the right to 
receive private telecommunications (protected as part of the right to the free 
development o f one's personality -art. 2). Even the right of prisoners to the secrecy of 
their telecommunications with their partners has been claimed in this context, although 
this right has been regarded as part of the privacy o f marriage, which the Court 
conceives as an aspect of the right to the development of one's personality (ait. 2).
It must be pointed out, however, that not all the telecommunications of 
prisoners have been placed beyond the coverage of art. 10. There is one exception to 
this rule (that is, one case in which imprisonment is not an 'inherent limitation' of art. 
10), namely, the case of telecommunications between prisoners and their lawyers, as 
long as the former are not convicted for crimes connected with terrorism, as listed in § 
129a of the German Criminal Code. The secrecy of such privileged communications is 
the object of statutory protection63; yet, the relevance of this case for present purposes 
lies not so much in the fact that such privileged communications are actually protected 
but in the fact that they have been considered to be within the coverage of art. 10 of the 
Basic Law64.
With respect to prisoners, the right to the secrecy of telecommunications thus 
only has a two-step structure in the case of telecommunications between prisoners and 
their lawyers. Ignoring this case, the Court regards the condition of lawful 
imprisonment so inherent a limitation to the coverage of art. 10 right that this right is 
generally not even thought to be at stake in this context.
62See BVerfGE 34,384 at 400 et seq.; 35,35 at 39 et seq.; 35,311 at 315 et seq; 42,234 at 236; 56, 
170 at 177. All these cases concern prisoners on remand (Untersuchungshaft) but they could very well 
concern also convicted prisoners.
63§ 148 of the Strafprozeßordnung (StPO) for prisoners on remand and § 29 of the Strafvollzugsgesetz 
(StVollzG) for written telecommunications of convicted prisoners. For a detailed analysis of this issue, 
see chapter 5 below.
64See BGHSt 36, 205 esp. 207.
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1 .2  'In h e ren t L im itations' Explicitly  A dm itted
On two occasions, the Constitutional Court has explicitly subjected art. 10 
rights to ’inherent limitations'. Even more than the implicit inherent limitations analysed 
above, the decisions to be analysed now bring to light the contradiction between theoiy 
and practice in the position of the Court on this issue. This contradiction appears so 
much more startling since, at the theoretical level, the existence of'inherent limitations’ 
to fundamental rights was rejected even in the very decisions where such limitations 
were actually applied. In order to make some sense of such inconsistencies, it is 
imperative to pay attention to the particular circumstances of the two cases under 
consideration.
In the first one of these cases, the correspondence of the applicant, a convicted 
prisoner, had been opened and censored on the mere basis of a norm which lacked legal 
force65. In the second case, the applicant had been accused of telephone harassment, 
something which had been made possible by the surveillance of the circumstances 
surrounding the calls received by the person who had complained of harassment; the 
surveillance had been carried out by the public telephone service (deutsche Bundespost) 
upon request o f the person harassed, but lacked any legal basis66. Despite their very 
different factual circumstances, the legal circumstances of these two cases are nearly 
identical. Both o f them concerned the kind of restrictions to the secrecy of 
telecommunications that tend to be regarded as ’inherent limitations', i.e. restrictions 
imposed either upon convicted prisoners or by the normal functioning of the public 
telecommunication service. Additionally, in both of these cases the Constitutional Court 
was confronted with restrictions which lacked any legal basis, since, at the time they 
were adopted, the corresponding law had not yet been enacted; in other words, in both 
cases the restrictive measures in question violated art. 10.2.1, which subjects them to a 
'reserve o f law' (Gesetzvorbehalt)67. Given these characteristics, the cases at stake 
admitted only two possible solutions: either the limitations in question were considered
65BVerfGE 33,1. The norm in question was Nr. 153 Abs. 1 of the Dienst- und VoUzugsordnung of 1 
Dec. 1961.
66BVerfGE 85,386.
67The missing legal provisions were subsequently enacted as, respectively, the Strafvollzugsgesetz 
(16th of March 1976) and § 30 of the Postverfassungsgesetz (8th of June 1989), developed by the 
TELEKOM-Datenschutzverordnung (24th of June 1991). It ought to be noted that the first law sets the 
basis for restrictions not only of the right of convicted prisoners to the secrecy of telecommunications, 
but of all their rights. Not surprisingly, before the enactment of this law, the Constitutional Court 
faced cases similar to the one under consideration (that is. to BVerfGE 33,1) but dealing with different 
rights of convicted prisoners, cases which were all dealt with in similar terms (see BVerfGE 40,276; 
41, 329; 42, 229).
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unconstitutional, i.e. against art. 10.2.1, or they were considered inherent to the 
coverage of art. 10 rights.
Neither of these two solutions was accepted by the Constitutional Court. On the 
one hand, the Court denied that the measures at stake could be considered instances of 
inherent limitations; moreover, as advanced above, the Court took this chance to 
explicitly reject the theory that fundamental rights can be subject to inherent limitations 
at all. On the other hand, the Court subsequently decided that art. 10.2.1 had not been 
violated. Its point of departure in this respect was that the requirement that restrictions 
on art. 10 rights have a legal basis can be dispensed with for the sake of protecting 
more valuable interests. It reasoned as follows: nothing in the German Basic Law 
suggests that the law-maker had a duty to enact the legislation in question immediately 
after the Basic Law was enacted; on the contrary, it continued, it is much more 
reasonable to conclude that the law-maker was accorded a certain amount of time to this 
end. In some cases, should the circumstances demand it, this lapse of time need not be 
considered expired. Nonetheless, the Court admitted that the temporal margin granted 
to the law-maker should not extend for ever and pointed out that it is the duty of the 
law-maker to enact the legislation in question as soon as possible68; in the case dealing 
with the secrecy of correspondence of convicted prisoners, the Court even gave the 
law-maker a short dead-line -the end of the running legislative period- to provide an 
adequate law69.
Thus far, however debatable these decisions might be, nothing in the reasoning 
of the Constitutional Court indicates that it imposed 'inherent limitation* to the coverage 
of art. 10. Its reasoning, however, went a step further still. The Court seems to have 
taken this step simply because it felt ill at ease about disregarding the wording of the 
Basic Law and needed to offer some dogmatic justification for its position. Guided by 
this feeling the Court continued to argue that, after all, the limitations in question were 
not at all to be judged according to art. 10.2 standards; for one thing: such limitations 
did not even amount to a violation of art. 10.1. The Constitutional Court thus admitted 
that the exercise of art. 10 had been interfered with and that this was unconstitutional on 
the basis of art. 10.2; yet, in order to justify that the interference in question should be 
upheld, it reasoned within the scope of coverage of a r t 10. In other words, the Court 
justified the interference by way of labelling it as 'inherent limitation'.
68B VerfGE 85,386 at 402.
69BVerfGE 33,1 at 14.
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Incidentally, note that this last step has been taken by the Court only in the two 
cases under study, but not in other cases (cases which concern articles other than art. 
10) where similar judgments have been made in the context of violations of a 'reserve 
of law'70. In all these other cases, the Court simply argued that, given certain 
circumstances, compliance with the 'reserve-of-law' requirement may be transitorily 
exempted. Hence, its reasoning remained bounded within the scope of protection o f the 
rights in question; the two-step structure of these rights thus remained untouched. This 
difference in treatment can be explained by the fact that, as was mentioned above, the 
two cases under consideration concerned restrictions that tend to be regarded as 
'inherent limitations', Le. restrictions to the secrecy of telecommunications imposed 
either upon convicted prisoners or by the normal functioning of the public 
telecommunication service. In these cases it thus seemed easy for the Court to rely on 
the doctrine of the 'inherent limitations' as a way to justify that lawless restrictions to 
the secrecy of telecommunications could be upheld. It is however regrettable that it did 
so. For the doctrine of 'inherent limitations' has not helped to justify the Court's 
decisions but has merely increased their lack of dogmatic rigour and has additionally 
raised the problems that such limitations entail.
One should, however, bear in mind that, as has been repeatedly noted, at the 
theoretical level the Constitutional Court has never defended the existence o f 'inherent 
limitations': on the contrary, it has openly rejected it. In practice it has made explicit use 
of inherent limitations not because it approves of them, but because, and only insofar 
as, these limitations appeared as a useful and dogmatically neat way to justify the 
constitutionality o f lawless restrictions on art. 10 rights, that is of restrictions that 
would be unconstitutional under art. 10.2. Not surprisingly, the Court has sought to 
minimise the impact of the admission o f 'inherent limitations'. In this way, it has held 
that lawless restrictions may not be imposed automatically; they are subject to all the 
other requirements that functional limitations of rights must fulfil (art. 19.2; principle of 
proportionality), the 'reserve of law' being the only exception. Moreover, in one of the 
two cases the Court ruled that the authorities that carry out the restriction bear the 
burden of reasoning (the Court calls it the 'burden of proving') that these requirements 
have been fulfilled71. Yet in the other case the Constitutional Court made the victims of 
a lawless limitation bear the burden of reasoning that the limitation in question could not 
be justified as being inherent, thereby complying with the rationale o f 'inherent 
limitations'72.
70See BVerfGE 33, 303 at 347-348; 41,251 at 267; 45.400 at 420; 48,29 at 38.
71See for all BVerfGE 33.1 at 13-14.
72See BVerfGE 85,386 at 402.
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We can now summarise the position of the Constitutional Court vis-à-vis the 
structure of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. The Court takes the view 
that fundamental rights in general and the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in 
particular have a two-level structure and theoretically rejects any sign of a single level 
structure, namely that there can be 'inherent limitations' to those rights. Nevertheless, 
in practice the Court has imposed 'inherent limitations' to the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications in two particular types of cases, namely in the context of lawful 
imprisonment and in the context o f restrictions to the secrecy of telecommunications 
imposed without a legal basis. This circumstance however has not altered the Court's 
theoretical views on the matter. In cases of lawless restrictions to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, the Court has relied on the 'inherent-limitation' doctrine for purely 
instrumental purposes, that is in order to justify its upholding of such lawless 
restrictions. In cases of imprisonment, the imposition of 'inherent limitations' is a 
consequence o f the thoughtless automatism with which surveillance of prisoners' 
telecommunications is justified. This is confirmed by the fact that when the Court has 
been made to consider the issue more closely it has decided against considering 
imprisonment an 'inherent limitation’: the Court has for example ruled that interference 
with prisoners' telecommunications must comply with the reserve-of-law requirement 
If here it has nevertheless applied the 'inherent-limitation' theory it has been for the 
instrumental reasons pointed out above.
Let me now go on to the second element of this analysis, namely to the issue 
whether infringements upon the right to the secrecy of telecommunications have been 
considered exceptional by the Constitutional Court.
2 . The Exceptional Nature of Restrictions Contained in Art. 10.2
As was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, a two-step structure of 
fundamental rights generally implies that restrictions to the protected scope of these 
rights must be exceptional. The requirements these restrictions must comply with must 
thus be subject to strict interpretation, so that fundamental rights can enjoy as wide a 
protected scope as possible. In the case of the secrecy of telecommunications, however, 
and despite the clarity of its two-step structure, the wording of art. 10 does not offer 
any indication as to the exceptional nature of restrictions to their exercise: art. 10.2, in 
fact, merely requires that restrictions to that right be made pursuant to a law. Grounds 
for their exceptional nature must thus be sought elsewhere.
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The Basic Law offers some basis to sustain the exceptional nature of limitations 
of fundamental rights, namely the two substantive limits such limitations are subject to:
[1] the rule contained in art. 19.2 of the Basic Law that restrictions on fundamental 
rights may not infringe their 'essential content' {Wesensgehaltgarantie) and [2] the 
-implicit- constitutional principle that such restrictions must be reasonable 
{Verhaltnismafiigkeitsprinzip). Both these substantive limits will be studied in detail in 
chapter 5. The following paragraphs will comment on them only in as far as it proves 
relevant to our present purposes. Let us deal with the first point first.
[1] Art. 19.2 of the Basic Law seems to take a step towards asserting the 
exceptional nature o f restrictions on fundamental rights by way o f setting an absolute 
limit to the restricting activity of the law-maker, so that restrictions can only be held 
constitutional in as far as they do not overstep such a limit. In order fully to appreciate 
the extent to which this area of absolute protection accounts for the exceptional nature 
of restrictions to rights, one should consider how this area of absolute protection is 
interpreted, in particular whether it is interpreted in more or less flexible terms.
In this context, it ought to be noted that the Constitutional Court has not taken it 
upon itself to develop a consistent doctrine on the essential content of individual 
fundamental rights. The Court has simply decided, on a case-by-case basis, whether or 
not a particular restriction amounted to a violation of the essential content of the right at 
stake and has avoided any more general statements. As will be explained in chapter 5, 
this rule used to find an exception in the general right of personality recognised in art.
2.1 when the Court used to divide its object into three spheres: a sphere of intimacy or 
total seclusion from society, a sphere of privacy wherein society was allowed certain 
participation and a sphere of personality which is developed within society (all this was 
explained in chapter 1); of these three, the sphere of intimacy used to be regarded as the 
essential content of the right of personality73. What matters at this point is that even this 
area of absolute protection used to be the object of strict interpretation, so that it was 
never considered to be at stake74. Even in all other instances, that is in instances where 
the essential content has been approached on a case-by-case basis, the Court has hardly 
ever considered that the essential content o f the right at issue has been infringed
73See, e.g., BVerfGE 6, 32 at 41; 6,389 at 433; 27, 1 at 6; 27, 344 at 350; 32, 373 at 379; 34, 238 
at 245; 35,35 at 39; 35,202 at 220. See also G. Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte'* (1985) 
EuGRZ% 321 at 327,
74See, e.g., BVerfGE 6. 389 at 433; 27, 1 at 7; 27, 344 at 351; 32, 373 at 379; 34, 238 at 245; 35, 
35 at 39; 35, 202 at 220.
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upon75. This is also so in the context of the secrecy of telecommunications. Moreover, 
in the context of this right the Court has never even thought it necessary to raise the 
issue of the violation of its essential content. It thus seems that the 'essential content’ of 
fundamental rights cannot be regarded as a basis upon which the exceptional nature of 
limitations to their exercise can be sustained.
[2] Let us now turn our attention to the principle of reasonableness. This 
principle consists of three conditions, namely that restrictions on fundamental rights be 
'suitable' (geeignet) to achieve their aim, 'necessary' (<erforderlich) to the achievement 
of that aim and 'proportionate' {verhaltnifimafiig im engeren Sinne) to the aim they want 
to achieve. The characteristics of these conditions will be carefully studied in chapter 5. 
Yet some o f these characteristics will be mentioned here, since they provide an 
indication o f the extent to which the principle of reasonableness is a basis for the 
exceptional nature of restrictions. In the following paragraphs it will be argued that the 
conditions of proportionality and of necessity offer such a basis.
The condition of 'suitability' taken by itself, does not imply that restrictions 
upon fundamental rights must be exceptional. A limitation is 'suitable' if  it is 
appropriate to achieve the aim that justifies it, so that 'suitability' is merely intended to 
avoid arbitrariness in the imposition of restrictions on rights. M oreover, the 
Constitutional Court tends to interpret this requirement in rather flexible terms, that is in 
terms which tend to favour the restricting task of the law-maker. It has for example 
ruled that in order to be suitable a limitation need not achieve its aim completely: it 
suffices that it achieves it partially, it does not even need to actually achieve it at all: it 
suffices that it can potentially achieve it; moreover, when judging on the suitability of 
limitations the Court accords much importance to the subjective point of view of the 
law-maker.
The condition of proportionality implies a certain sense of the exceptional nature 
of restrictions, though of a very limited scope. This condition aims at keeping a balance 
between the restriction o f a fundamental right and the interest that this restriction 
pursues. In this respect, it imposes three requirements upon the interest. First o f all 
proportionality controls the selection of this interest (and this is the only condition 
which does), that is, it decides whether a particular interest may justify a restriction to a 
particular fundamental righ t In particular it requires (1) that the interest in question be 
legitimate -that it be not unconstitutional- and (2) that it be of greater importance than *53
75G. Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 328 singles out only one case (BVerfGE 30,47 at
53) in which the Court admitted that the essential core of a right (the art. 2.2.2 right to personal 
freedom) had been infringed.
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the aspect of the right to which protection is denied. Subsequently, once the interest in 
question has been justified in this way, the condition of proportionality controls the 
extent to which this interest can justify a restriction, in particular it requires (3) that 
interest and restriction (aim and means) stay in proper proportion. O f the three 
requirements imposed by the condition of proportionality imposes, only the first one 
implies that restrictions on fundamental rights must be to some extent exceptional. The 
other two are to be decided by way of reaching a balance between the fundamental right 
in question and its limiting measure and, in principle, the limited right and its limiting 
measure relate as two independent conflicting interests, not as a rule relates to an 
exception. A rule-exception relationship can of course be established, yet this is not 
inherent in the balance itself but is simply an option of the authority (whether judicial or 
legal) which strikes it. The extent to which the condition of proportionality supports a 
finding of the exceptional nature of restrictions to fundamental rights greatly depends 
on the way it is actually applied.
Finally, the condition of 'necessity' is the one that most clearly implies the 
exceptional nature of restrictions on fundamental rights. On the basis of this condition, 
such restrictions may only be imposed in the absence of alternative measures to achieve 
the same end, measures which, being equally effective, are less intrusive upon the right 
in question. In other words, fundamental rights may only be restricted to the extent that 
is absolutely necessary to achieve the aim that justifies their restriction. This condition 
does not question however the selection of the aim itself. It must also be pointed out 
that the ex-ante judgment made by the law-maker on the basis o f the elements that were 
at its disposal is accorded much importance.
Both the condition of necessity and the condition of proportionality therefore 
offer some basis to sustain the exceptional nature of restrictions to fundamental rights. 
The extent to which this is so (particularly in the case of the condition o f 
proportionality) cannot fully be grasped however before a look is taken at how they are 
applied in practice in the context of art 10. The Constitutional Court has not developed 
a particular doctrine concerning the application of the principle of proportionality in this 
context. Such a doctrine exists however with respect to the right to privacy understood 
as secrecy, a right recognised within the scope of art. 2.1 and of which the secrecy of 
telecommunications is only a particular instance. As was explained in chapter 1, this 
doctrine has been favourable to the protection of privacy, hence to the exceptional 
nature of its restrictions, in the sense that in this context the principle of proportionality 
has been applied in particularly strict terms. It remains uncertain whether this doctrine 
will be applied in the context of art. 10. All one can say is that in the very few cases on
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this provision decided on proportionality grounds, the Court has upheld the restricting 
measure at stake, sometimes in very controversial terms.
To summarise, restrictions on the right to the secrecy of telecommunications can 
be considered exceptional in the sense that [1] they can only affect its non-essential 
scope -a scope, however, which has not been defined and which, in any case, would 
most likely be subject to strict interpretation; [2] they can only be imposed for the 
protection o f an interest which is legitimate and [3] to the extent that is absolutely 
necessary for the protection of this interest. Yet the particulars of the relationship 
between the secrecy of telecommunications and the interest with which it is confronted 
(that is, whether the interest in question is more important than the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications and the extent to which it is justified that this right should yield 
to the interest in question) remain outside a rule-exception rationale.
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Section 4: The United States
Introduction
Fourth Amendment
’The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized."
In the case of the United States a two-step structure does not seem to underlie 
the constitutional protection of the secrecy of telecommunications. The secrecy of 
telecommunications is recognised as part o f the fourth amendment, a provision which 
does not make any explicit distinction between the coverage of the right it recognises 
and the extent to which this right must be protected. Rather, the coverage is made to 
coincide with the scope of protection since "the right to be secure" recognised in the 
fourth amendment is -conceptually- defined not as a right against all searches and 
seizures, but as a right against those searches and seizures which are unreasonable. 
Since, as will be explained in chapter 5, unreasonable searches and seizures are those 
searches and seizures carried out against the protected scope of the fourth amendment 
right it seems that the fourth amendment identifies the concept of the right with its 
protected scope.
The purpose o f the following pages is to analyse whether and, if so, to what 
extent the Supreme Court has identified the coverage of the fourth amendment with its 
protected scope, thus respecting the literal wording of this provision. To this end I will 
first of all consider the issue of how the Court has interpreted the structure of the fourth 
amendment; following this I will look at the extent to which lawful interference with the 
amendment's rights have been considered exceptional by the Court. This latter point 
will include an analysis of the issue of the burden of proof. When analysing these two 
issues I will compare the property and the privacy interpretations of the amendment. 
This mode of analysis appears the most effective way of bringing out the extent to 
which the fourth amendment (and the right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
recognised therein) has been influenced by the interest in privacy. Recall however that, 
as was explained in chapter 2, a sharp distinction between a property and a privacy 
period in the history of the amendment cannot always be drawn, since for the most part 
the property interpretation was only gradually replaced by the privacy interpretation. 
Only with respect to certain issues did this replacement take place in an all-or-nothing
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manner, namely in the case of the so-called 'mere-evidence' rule and the 'non-physical- 
infringement' rule, the last vestiges o f the property reading of the amendment76.
The following analysis will bring out that: [1] in general, the Court has 
followed the most common trend in the constitutional recognition of rights, that is, it 
has drawn a line between coverage and protection and has interpreted lawful non- 
protection as exceptional; [2] since the time when privacy started to be regarded as the 
underlying interest of the fourth amendment the Court has imposed 'inherent 
limitations' on the coverage of this provision and [3] ever since this time the exceptional 
character of reasonable searches and seizures has no longer been consistently held; [4] 
only the interest in privacy has provided grounds for clear rules concerning the burden 
of reasoning.
1 . The S tru c tu re  o f th e  F o u rth  A m endm ent: C o v eraee  v e rsu s  
P ro tec tion
1.1 The Interest in the Protection of Private Property
As originally conceived by the Supreme Court, the fourth amendment had a 
two-level structure: the coverage of the fourth amendment right was limited by the 
concepts 'search' and 'seizure', whereas its scope o f protection embraced those 
searches and seizures considered unreasonable77. Note that the term 'search' and 
'seizure' clearly refer to positive actions, hence the right against searches and seizures 
clearly has a negative dimension. It is however not clear whether this right also has a 
positive dimension, that is, it is not clear whether the fourth amendment obliges the 
public power to set an adequate framework to enable the exercise of the right not to be 
subject to unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the property reading o f the 
amendment, the Supreme Court did not have to decide on this issue and the fourth 
amendment right was regarded as a purely negative right. It therefore seems that the
76See Schmerber v. California (384 US 757 (1966)) and Katz v. US (389 US 347 (1967)), 
respectively.
77See Boyd v. US, 116 US 626 (1886); Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43 (1906); Wibon v. US, 221 US 
361 (1911); Silverthorne v. US, 251 US 385 (1920); Go-Bart importing Co. v. US, 282 US 344 
(1931); US v. Lefkowitz, 235 US 452 (1932); Harris v. US, 331 US 145 (1947); Trupiano v. US, 334 
US 699 (1948); US v. Rabinowitz. 339 US 56 (1950); Abel v. US, 362 US 217 (1960); Elkins v. 
US, 364 US 206 (1960); Rios v. US, 364 US 253 at 261 (1960); Chapman v. US, 365 US 610 
(1961); H. Lanza v. NY, 370 US 139 (1962); Preston v. US, 376 US 364 (1964); Warden v. Hayden, 
387 US 294 (1967).
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two-level structure o f the fourth amendment was not put into question by the 
recognition of a positive right within its scope.
I will now analyse whether the interest in the protection o f private property 
imposed any 'inherent limitations' on the coverage of the fourth amendment, that is 
whether it conditioned this coverage from outside. The following paragraphs (points 
[A] and [B]) will argue that, under the property reading of the amendment, the Supreme 
Court did not admit any such inherent limitations.
[A] The Mere-Evidence Rule.
One o f the main manifestations o f the influence of property upon the 
interpretation of the fourth amendment was the so-called mere-evidence rule, according 
to which searches and seizures are unreasonable if undertaken in relation to private 
property legitimately held for the mere purpose of using it as evidence at trial. This rule 
and its background were commented on in chapter 2, yet the question must now be 
posed whether the mere-evidence rule was applied in a way that conditioned the 
coverage of the amendment or rather whether it conditioned its scope of protection. The 
Supreme Court was always clear in this respect: searches and seizures carried out 
against legitimate property, most often with 'mere-evidence' purposes, were considered 
covered, but not protected, by the fourth amendment, that is they were considered 
unreasonable searches and seizures78.
. j
[B] The Physical-Infringement Rule.
The property reading of the fourth amendment also gave rise to the so-called 
physical-infringement rule. On the basis of this rule, the fourth amendment was applied 
only to physical infringements upon private property79. This means that the absence of 
physical intrusion did not condition the unreasonableness of searches and seizures but 
implied that no search and seizure existed.
At first sight, the physical-infringement rule would seem to amount to an 
'inherent limitation' to the scope of the fourth amendment, that is to a limitation arising 
from outside the conceptual scope of the terms search and seizure. Yet a closer look 
shows that this is not so. The physical-infringement limitation to the coverage of the
1 % Silver thorne v. US, 251 US 385 (1920); Gouled v. US, 255 US 298 (1920); US v. Lejkowitz, 235 
US 452 (1932); Abel v. US, 362 US 217 (1960).
790nce again, it must be pointed out that the fourth amendment was never urged in defence of non- 
material property. Thus, within the framework of the amendment, the only threats to private property 
arose from *physical intrusion* (see chapter 2 above).
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fourth amendment does not arise from outside those concepts but, precisely, from the 
conceptual boundaries o f the terms 'search' and 'seizure', as drawn by the Supreme 
Court. Certainly, in drawing such boundaries the Court made use of the interest in the 
protection of property, yet property was not directly used as an external source of 
limitations of the range of the amendment. It was merely used to indirectly limit the 
scope of the fourth amendment, something which is perfectly justified. For in the end 
the interest lying behind a provision is meant to condition its interpretation and to help 
towards its understanding, something which does not amount to imposing 'inherent 
limitations' to its range.
On the basis of the above considerations one can conclude that on the basis of 
the interest in the protection of private property the fourth amendment was read as a 
provision with a two-step structure and allowed for no 'inherent limitations'. Let us 
now analyse the extent to which this approach was altered when privacy started to be 
conceived of as the underlying interest of the amendment.
1,2 The Interest in the Protection of Privacy
Under the privacy reading of the fourth amendment, the Court has not 
abandoned the main lines o f its approach to the structure of this provision: the coverage 
of the amendment is still defined on the basis of the terms 'search' and seizure' and is 
subsequently distinguished from its scope of protection, which is defined on the basis 
of the term 'unreasonableness'80; nor has the Court yet had a chance, at least to my 
knowledge, to rule whether the right recognised in the amendment also has a positive 
dimension. It is important however to analyse whether the interest in privacy has 
imposed 'inherent limitations' to the coverage o f the amendment. In the following 
paragraphs I will argue that the Supreme Court has admitted privacy-based 'inherent 
limitations'.
In this respect I would like first of all to call attention to the position that the 
interest in privacy occupies in the context of the fourth amendment. Note in particular 
that the Supreme Court often refers to privacy not only as the underlying interest of the 
amendment but also as its direct object, in other words the Court often approaches the 
fourth amendment as a provision which directly recognises privacy as a right. Being *482
807Vrry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); US v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977); Scott v. US, 436 US 128 
(1978); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128 (1978); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367 (1987); NY v. Burger,
482 US 691 (1987); California v. Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988); Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325 
(1990); Soldal v\ Cook County, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992) (pending publication).
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consistent with this approach, the Court has often argued81 that in the absence of an 
interest in privacy the coverage of the fourth amendment is not at stake, so that 
independently of whether a search and seizure has occurred the amendment does not 
apply. The absence o f privacy interests is thus regarded as an 'inherent limitation' to the 
right against searches and seizures.
The imposition of ’inherent lim itations’ to the coverage of the fourth 
amendment, therefore, results from the fact that the Court often refers to privacy as the 
direct object of the amendment. Although such direct references to privacy can be found 
in a considerable number of cases of most diverse sorts, at least two groups of cases 
can be singled out. These are [A] cases of searches and seizures o f items lying in open 
view and [B] cases of lawful imprisonment.
A] The Open-View Rule
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that no interest in privacy is at 
stake in cases of searches and seizures of 'effects' or even of personal features (such as 
one's voice or handwriting) which are normally exposed to the public, that is which are 
open to anybody's view. It has therefore been consistently affirmed that the fourth 
amendment does not protect against such searches and seizures. The consequences that 
this open-view rule has had upon the amendment differ depending on whether one 
speaks of searches or o f seizures: with respect to the former the rule acts as a limitation 
to the coverage of the amendment, whereas with respect to the latter it acts as a 
limitation to its protected scope. In other words, on the basis of the open-view rule the 
act of looking at objects as they lie in the open view has not been considered a search, 
whereas taking such objects has been considered a seizure, though a seizure which can 
reasonably be carried out without a warrant since no interest in privacy is involved82. 
As a result, the open-view rule poses no problems for the structure of the amendment in 
the context of seizures but only in the context of searches. The question then is whether 
the open-view rule limits the coverage of the amendment from within the conceptual 
boundaries of the term 'search' or whether it directly relies on the concept of privacy, 
that is whether it limits the coverage of the amendment as an 'inherent limitation'.
8li/.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1976); Wahlen. v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S.Ct. 2256 (1980); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 
US 765 (1983); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,9 (1968); Mancusi v. DeForte. 392 U.S. 364,368 (1968); 
Combs v. U.S., 408 U.S. 224. 227 (1972); California v. Ciraolo, 104 S.Ct. 1809 (1986); Dow 
Chemical Co. v. U.S., 106 S.Ct 1819 (1986); California v. Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988); 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 US 91 at 97 (1990).
82The way the open-view plays out in the context of seizures will be explained in chapter 5. There has 
been however at least one case in which the Court stated that taking something lying in open view 
does not amount to a seizure within the meaning of the amendment (Maryland v. Macon, 472 US 463 
(1985)).
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The position of the Court has never been very clear in this respect. In some 
cases it has reasoned in terms of 'inherent limitations'. It has affirmed that there is no 
'reasonable' or 'legitimate' expectation of privacy in an object lying in open view and 
that therefore the act of taking notice of these objects is not covered by the fourth 
amendment prohibition against searches83. However, in most cases the Court has 
preferred to argue from within the concept of 'search', that is it has affirmed that taking 
notice of something exposed to the public eye is an action alien to the act of 
searching84, provided that the object in question is simply observed in the position it is 
in, that is that it is not moved in order to discover some o f its hidden details85. It thus 
seems that for the most part the open-view rule has not been interpreted as an 'inherent 
limitation' to the coverage of the fourth amendment, although the position of the Court 
in this respect is not as clear as would be desirable.
B] The Condition of Lawful Imprisonment
The question whether the condition of lawful imprisonment stands as an 
'inherent limitation' to the coverage of the fourth amendment started to be posed only 
when the interest in privacy began to motivate the reading of this provision. This could 
not be otherwise; for the condition of imprisonment imposes severe restrictions to the 
right to privacy, whereas it does not have a direct effect upon property rights.
A prison inmate does not have a "legitimate expectation of privacy ... in his 
prison cell and, accordingly, the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable 
searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell"86. This sentence 
summarises the most recent position of the Supreme Court regarding prisoners' fourth 
amendment rights. It clearly conceives imprisonment as an 'inherent limitation' on the 
constitutional right against searches and seizures. The position of the Court with respect 
to searches and seizures is thus similar to the position sustained by the German 
Constitutional Court and -originally- by the organs of the European Convention on 
Human Rights with respect to the secrecy of telecommunications.
83t/S v. Dionisio, 410 US 1 (1973); US v. Mara, 410 US 19 (1973).
84See Ker v. California, 374 US 23 (1963); Harris v. US, 390 US 234 (1968); Walter v. US, 447 US 
649 (1980); Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 US 765 (1983); Maryland 
v, Macon, All US 463 (1985); Florida v. Riley, 488 US 445 (1989); Horton v. California, 496 US 
128 (1990). Some of these cases are, however, ambiguous. At times, in fact, after having stated that an 
'open-view* case involves no 'search', the Court has continued to reason on the mere basis of privacy 
(see, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas).
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 US 321 (1987).
86Hudson v. Palmer, 468 US 517 at 526 (1984).
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It is curious to observe the extent to which the doctrines of the Supreme Court 
and of the Convention's organs have evolved in opposite directions. As was explained 
in section 1 of this chapter, the Conventions' organs initially approached lawful 
imprisonment as an 'inherent limitation' to the right to correspondence and only started 
to consider imprisonment a limitation to the protected scope of this right in the 1970s. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court originally interpreted the condition of 
imprisonment as a factor which did not affect the coverage of the fourth amendment but 
its protected scope87. The Court, in fact, used to hold the general view that prisoners 
retain their rights, although these are subject to the restrictions imposed by the condition 
o f lawful imprisonment. "There must be mutual accommodation between institutional 
needs and objectives and the provisions o f the United States Constitution that are of 
general application"88. In the case o f the fourth amendment rights, the Court used to 
require that one balance the need for the particular search against the invasion of the 
personal rights that the search entails, a balance which concerned the scope of 
protection of the fourth amendment89. This position is no longer held. As was pointed 
out above, the present doctrine of the Supreme Court is to consider imprisonment an 
'inherent limitation' to the fourth amendment rights.
It is noteworthy however that in the field of telecommunications this latter 
position has always been implicitly held. Prisoners have always been considered 
deprived of the fourth amendment right to privacy in their telecommunications. The 
Court has never even considered the possibility that they could be holders of this right. 
Cases concerning the stoppage, opening and eventual censorship of prisoners' 
correspondence have been dealt with exclusively within the context of the first 
amendment right to freedom of speech; in other words, the only right considered at 
stake in such cases has been prisoners' freedom to engage in telecommunications either 
as senders or addressees, it has never been their right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. The Court, therefore, has systematically approved of the opening 
o f letters sent to or by prisoners. M oreover, as was the case in Germany, a 
constitutional claim as to the violation of the secrecy of telecommunications has never 
been raised in the context of imprisonment90. All this applies even in the context of 
prisoners' privileged communication with attorneys. In this latter case, letters may be 
opened in the presence o f their addressees to check their content, i.e. that they contain 
no contraband, but they may not be read; yet this latter prohibition is regarded as a
87See, e.g., Lanza v. NY (370 US 139 (1962); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 US 520 (1979), with respect to 
the fouith amendment rights of both prisoners and pretrial detainees.
88Wo//v. McDonnell, 418 US 539 at 555-556 (1974).
89fle// v. Wolfish, 441 US 520 (1979).
90See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 US 396 (1974); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 US 539 at 575-577 
(1974); Procunier v. Navarette Jr., 434 US 555 (1978).
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means to protect not the secrecy of such letters, but prisoners' freedom to communicate 
with their attorneys; that is, it is regarded as a means of reassuring that prisoners' 
telecommunications with their attorneys are not subject to censorship91.
To summarise, the Supreme Court has always interpreted the fourth amendment 
as a provision with a basic two-level structure. Yet when relying on a privacy 
interpretation it has imposed 'inherent limitations' to the coverage of this amendment. 
Strictly speaking, however, such 'inherent limitations' do not result from the 
replacement of property by privacy as the underlying interest of the fourth amendment; 
rather they result from the fact that, unlike property, privacy is regarded as the direct 
object of recognition of this provision and thus defines its coverage directly. Examples 
of privacy-based 'inherent limitations' can be found in a great number of cases, of 
which the most significant in the context of the secrecy of telecommunications are the 
cases of lawful imprisonment. Let us now proceed to analysing the extent to which the 
interpretation of the fourth amendment relies on the second comer-stone of a liberal, 
two-level structure of rights; that is, let us see the extent to which the Court has 
considered that lawful interferences with the fourth amendment are exceptional.
2 . The Exceptional Nature of Lawful Searches and Seizures
2.1 The Property Rationale
The initial, property-based approach of the Supreme Court to the fourth 
amendment influenced the assertion of the exceptional nature of lawful searches and 
seizures. A key element in this respect was the so-called 'mere-evidence rule'. Recall 
that under this rule searches and seizures were considered unreasonable if  they 
infringed upon an individual's rights of possession; accordingly, they were held 
reasonable if the state was entitled to the property of the 'effects' at issue, that is if it 
had a right of possession over these 'effects' (provided of course that the warrant 
requirement had been duly fulfilled). On the basis o f this distinction, the Court 
approached the fourth amendment as a provision which enshrined two parallel rights: 
first, a right against unreasonable searches and seizures and, second, a right, held by 
the public powers, to carry out reasonable searches and seizures92. Deciding on the
91 Wolf v. McDonnell 418 US 539 at 575-577 (1974).
92Weeks v. US, 232 US 383 at 392 (1914); Gouled v. US, 255 US 298 at p. 309 (1921); Agnello v. 
US, 269 US 20 at 30 (1925); Carroll v. US, 267 US 132 at 158 (1925); Marron v. US, 275 US 192 
at 199 (1927); Johnson v. US, 333 US 10 at 14 (1948); US v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 at 61-62 
(1950); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 US 381 (1961); Chapman v. US, 365 US 610 at 615 (1961); 
Preson v. US, 376 US 364 at 367 (1964); Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 at 62 (1967).
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reasonableness of searches and seizures was thus equal to deciding on whose rights 
were at stake -the affected individual's or the state's.
The above approach to the fourth amendment greatly influenced the issue under 
consideration. In particular, the two parallel rights just described had to enjoy, in 
principle, the presumption of their lawful exercise. This implies, first, that neither 
victims nor police officers could be consistently made to offer evidence o f the 
(un)reasonableness of a search and/or seizure, that is, that neither of them could be 
consistently made to bear the burden of reasoning. It is thus no coincidence that, while 
the property reading o f the amendment was dominant, the Court never held a clear 
position with respect to who had to reason that this provision had been or that it had not 
been violated.
Second, it would seem that, in principle, both of these rights should deserve 
favourable interpretation, so that lawful restrictions to the right against searches and 
seizures -lawful searches and seizures- could not be considered exceptional. The 
Supreme Court, however, did not follow such a line since it was favourable to 
according the right against searches and seizures the widest possible protection93. To 
this end, it treated lawful searches and seizures -that is the state's right to carry them 
out- as exceptional. This applied, in particular, to the warrant requirement, for which 
the Court imposed a condition of necessity: it developed the rule that the warrant 
requirement always had to be complied with unless it was not reasonably practicable, 
that is unless its being obtained would seriously endanger the aim to be achieved -i.e. 
the enforcement of law through the particular search and seizure at stake94.
2 .2  The Privacy R ationale
Since the interest in privacy started to eclipse the interest in property in the 
reading of the fourth amendment, the above interpretation underwent some changes. In 
fact, since the view that the State has a right to undertake reasonable searches and 
seizures stopped making sense, the doctrine that the amendment contains parallel rights 
has been gradually abandoned. Under its privacy reading individuals are therefore 
considered the only holders of fourth amendment rights. Hence, they enjoy the
^Byars v. US, 273 US 28 at 32 (1927). See also Boyd v. US, 116 US 616 at 635 (1886): Couled v. 
US, 255 US 298 (1920); Co-Bart Importing Co. v. US, 282 US 344 at 357 (1931); US v. Lefkowitz, 
235 US 452 at 464 (1932); Grau v. US, 287 US 344 at 357 (1931).
94Agnello v. US, 269 US 20 (1925); Marron v. US, 275 US 192 (1927); Carroll v. US, 267 US 132 
at 156 (1925); Co-Bart Importing Co. v. US, 282 US 344 at 358 (1931); Trupiano v. US, 334 US 
699 (1948); McDonald v. US, 335 US 451 (1948).
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presumption that these rights are lawfully exercised and, conversely, that the search and 
seizure complained of is unreasonable.
An immediate consequence of this is that under the privacy reading o f the 
amendment the Supreme Court has developed a consistent rule vis-à-vis the burden of 
reasoning. In particular, victims of a fourth amendment violation have only been made 
to argue that a search and seizure has occurred, whereas police officials must argue that 
this search and seizure was reasonable95.
Paradoxically, the presumption of lawful exercise o f the right against searches 
and seizures which derives from the privacy reading o f the amendment, has not 
encouraged the view that lawful searches and seizures be considered exceptional. 
Privacy, in fact, tended to soften the sharp edges of the original position in this respect. 
To begin with, as opposed to the case of property, privacy imposes no material limits to 
the reasonableness requirement96. Under the privacy rationale, searches and seizures 
are lawful provided that they comply with the formal requirements of reasonableness 
imposed by the amendment, even if they frustrate a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has sometimes exhibited a looser attitude towards 
the warrant requirement under the privacy rationale as opposed to the property 
rationale. Under the privacy rationale, the lawfulness o f warrantless searches and 
seizures is decided by way of striking a balance between the different interests at stake 
(i.e. privacy and law enforcement). In fact, the interest in privacy has been the 
controlling rationale whenever a balance has been struck to decide on the lawfulness of 
warrantless searches and seizures and this even at the time when property still 
dominated the reading of the fourth amendment. This point will be developed in full 
detail in chapter 5. However at this point one should note that a balance does not 
impose any kind of rule-exception relationship between the elements confronted, which 
rather relate as two independent conflicting interests. Whether or not such a rule is 
imposed is a question which lies in the hands of the authority (whether judicial or legal) 
striking the balance. In order that the exceptional nature of limiting measures can be 
assured also against this authority additional grounds are needed.
95See US v. Jeffers, 342 US 48 at 51; Rios v, US, 364 US 253 at 261 (1960); H. Lanza v. NY, 370 
US 139 at 145-146 (1962); Warden v. Hayden, 387 US 294 at 306-307 (1967); Chimel v. California, 
395 US 752 at 762 (1969); US v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 at 14 (1977); Payton v. NY, 445 US 573 
(1980); Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325 (1990); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 US 91 (1990). There have 
been some exceptions to this consistent jurisprudential line (see Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 US 381
(1961); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367 (1987)), which have remained isolated cases.
96Yet, in this context, see chapter 5 below.
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The exceptional nature of restrictions o f fourth amendment rights can for 
example be supported by a condition o f necessity, such as the rule that restrictions may 
only be imposed if they are the least intrusive means to achieve an end. Yet such a rule 
has not been developed by the Supreme Court. In the context of telecommunications, 
the Court has occasionally hinted at it97; it has, however, never applied it consistently. 
Also the doctrine, developed under the property rationale, that a search warrant must be 
obtained whenever possible stands as a condition of necessity and thus supports the 
exceptional nature of restrictions. Unfortunately, this doctrine has not been followed as 
consistently under the privacy rationale as under the property rationale: followed and 
applied in many a case98, it has also been explicitly rejected in many others99. It thus 
seems that under the privacy interpretation o f the fourth amendment the Court has 
emphasised the balancing technique as the central criterion to ascertain the lawfulness of 
searches and seizures, hence to ascertain the lawfulness of interferences with the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications. Nor is the balancing technique actually applied in 
a way which supports the exceptional nature of lawful interferences with the 
amendment The result is that the privacy interpretation of the amendment has provided 
no solid grounds to sustain the exceptional nature of such interferences.
Let me summarise the position of the Supreme Court vis-à-vis the exceptional 
nature of lawful interferences with the fourth amendment right. The Court's position 
has been strongly conditioned by the fact that under the property rationale the fourth 
amendment was thought to enshrine a right o f the State to carry out lawful searches and 
seizures. A consequence of this is that the Court could not set clear rules as to the 
burden of proof under the property interpretation of the amendment, it only could do so 
under its privacy interpretation. In fact, the Court has ruled that those who claim a 
fourth amendment violation bear the burden of arguing that their fourth amendment 
right has been infringed, whereas the authorities in question must argue that the 
infringement was lawful.
It would also have been natural for the Court to consider lawful searches and 
seizures exceptional to the extent that the fourth amendment does not accord the State a *9
97 Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78 at 90 (1987). The case dealt with prisoners’ right to correspondence as 
part of the first amendment right to free speech. In this context, the Court stated that prison authorities 
could not be made to bear the burden of finding the least intrusive means to achieve their end of 
keeping security in prisons; yet, it continued, if prisoners could point to a measure less encroaching 
and equally or even similarly effective, this could operate as an argument that the measure actually used 
does not satisfy the requirement of reasonableness -i.e. of proportionality.
9S Chapman v. US, 365 US 610 at 615 (1961); Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 (1969); US v. 
Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. NY, 442 US 319 (1979).
"US v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 at 63 (1950); Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 (1967); Maryland v. 
Buie, 494 US 325 (1990).
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right to carry them out. This however has not been the position taken by the Court. At 
the time when the interest in property guided the interpretation of the amendment (that is 
at the time when the Court affirmed that the State has a right to carry out lawful 
searches and seizures) the Court clearly approached lawful interferences as exceptional 
and even developed rules to sustain their exceptional nature (i.e. the rule that the 
warrant requirement must be obtained whenever possible). Then, as the Court started to 
interpret the amendment in privacy terms (that is as the State was no longer thought to 
have a right to carry out lawful searches and seizures) it stopped holding the exceptional 
nature of such lawful interferences. The reasons why the Court has not followed the 
implications of its own approach to the fourth amendment can be found in the 
ideological background of the property and the privacy interpretation of this provision, 
something which was explained in detail in chapter 2. The property interpretation of the 
fourth amendment belongs to an era characterised by the predominance of liberal 
thought and of strong individualistic feelings, that is to an era when the individual's 
rights were thought to deserve the widest protection possible. The passage to a privacy 
interpretation took place as individual-centred liberalism gave way to a realist, more 
sociological approach to law, so that privacy belongs to an era when the focus of 
attention shifted from the individual to social considerations, these including, e.g., the 
need for law enforcement.
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Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the idea that recognising the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications with a two-step structure entails considerable 
advantages for the protection of this right. We should have been able to perceive these 
advantages by comparing the two-step structure of this right with cases in which this 
structure is not respected. Let us now look at the main points of this comparison.
The right to the secrecy of telecommunications is literally recognised in a two- 
step manner both in art. 8 of the ECHR and in art. 10 of the German Basic Law. Also 
the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court as having a two-step structure, even though this is not at all 
apparent in its wording. Nevertheless, this structure is not always consistently 
respected. To begin with, the European Court and Commission of Human Rights have 
stated that art. 8 also recognises positive subjective rights, rights which have a single- 
level structure. In this context, however, the consequences which derive from a single- 
level structure are justified by the logic of positive subjective rights and are in any case 
outweighed by the mere fact of the recognition of these; moreover, in the case of art. 8 
of the ECHR such consequences have thus far been altogether avoided in practice.
More open to criticism is the fact that the two-step structure of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications is subjected to exceptions even when this appears as a 
negative right of defence against the State. This is presently the case in Germany and in 
the United States. The German Constitutional Court regards the condition of 
imprisonment on remand as an 'inherent limitation1, that is, as a non-conceptual 
limitation which affects the coverage of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, 
not its protected scope. In addition, it has admitted some 'conjunctural1 'inherent 
limitations' to this right with purely instrumental purposes, that is as a means to uphold 
restrictions which do not respect the requirement that they be based on a legal 
provision. The Supreme Court of the United States also has imposed 'inherent 
limitations' to the coverage of the fourth amendment. The imposition of such limitations 
is connected to the fact that privacy often defines the object of this provision, so that the 
coverage of the fourth amendment is often limited to cases where an interest in privacy 
is at stake. On the basis o f this general 'inherent limitation' the Court has excluded the 
condition of imprisonment from the scope o f application of the amendment, a 
circumstance which particularly affects the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. 
On the other hand, it is not clear whether the so-called open-view limitation to the
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coverage of the fourth amendment is the fruit of an 'inherent limitation', or whether it 
simply is the result of an interpretation of the term 'search* on the basis of privacy.
The fact that imprisonment tends to be regarded as a limitation inherent in the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications is regrettable, since it gives rise to the 
negative consequences for the protection of this right mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, yet it is not difficult to explain why this is generally the case. The crux of the 
explanation is that in general the systematic surveillance o f prisoners' 
telecommunications appears as a reasonable practice. In particular, it seems to 
withstand any test of its proportionality as a measure aimed at keeping order and 
security in prisons. For this reason, the particular circumstances of a case tend to be 
overlooked and the surveillance of prisoners' telecommunications automatically upheld. 
It is precisely this automatism that ultimately leads to considering surveillance as a 
limitation inherent in the coverage o f this right.
An example of how fine a line separates the automatic justification of a 
functional limit from the consideration of this limit as inherent can be found in the initial 
case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights on the condition of 
imprisonment. Initially, the position of the Commission fluctuated between a few cases 
where restrictions on prisoners' right to respect for correspondence were regarded as 
functional limitations, yet systematically justified, and other cases where imprisonment 
was thought to impose an inherent limitation on the coverage of the right. Admittedly, 
the actual result in both types of cases often coincides, yet their theoretical implications 
are significantly different and can also account for different practical consequences. To 
be more precise, only if the surveillance of telecommunications stands as a functional 
limitation does the possibility remain that, in a particular case, surveillance will prove 
unnecessary, unreasonable or out of proportion. Similarly, only if regarded as a 
functional limitation must surveillance comply with whichever other requirements are 
imposed upon such limitations, such as having to be in accordance with the law.
It ought to be recalled at this point that the German Constitutional Court has 
decided that the surveillance of telecommunications of convicted prisoners must be 
carried out in accordance with a law; thereby it has denied that the condition of 
convicted imprisonment is an inherent limitation. Further, the German Court has not 
always considered the condition o f imprisonment on remand an inherent limitation; in 
particular, it has judged that the secrecy of telecommunications between these prisoners 
and their lawyers is covered by art. 10 of the Basic Law. It thus seems that in the case 
of Germany the surveillance of prisoners' telecommunications is approached as an 
inherent limitation only in cases where it has already passed a first, abstract test as to its
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lawfulness. The problem is that» once this first test has been passed, the lawfulness of 
surveillance is automatically upheld, regardless o f case-by-case considerations, and it is 
because of this automatism that surveillance finally has appeared as an inherent 
limitation.
From this one could conclude that the automatic application of limitations 
without due regard to the particular circumstances o f every case might blur the 
borderline between the coverage and the protected scope of a right, in the sense that 
such limitations might tend to be regarded as inherent. In the context of the secrecy of 
telecommunications the risk of an automatic application o f restrictions is particularly 
high in the context o f lawful imprisonment. O f the three systems under consideration, 
this risk has only been avoided in the context o f the ECHR, where imprisonment is not 
-no longer- approached as an inherent limitation to the secrecy o f telecommunications. 
This circumstance is not purely coincidental. Rather, it is due to the fact that the ECHR 
recognises the freedom to engage in telecom munications and the secrecy of 
telecommunications as a single right: the right to respect for correspondence. For one 
thing, unlike in the case of the secrecy of telecommunications, restrictions to prisoners' 
freedom to engage in telecommunications are not always considered to be justified. 
Hence, such restrictions cannot be applied automatically, but only after due regard to 
the particular circumstances of every case. It should therefore not be surprising that the 
doctrine that imprisonment constitutes no inherent limitation to the right to respect for 
correspondence has been developed within the context o f the freedom to engage in 
telecommunications, even though it is also applicable in the context of the secrecy of 
telecommunications100.
It is noteworthy, in this respect, that also in Germany and the United States the 
two-level structure of the right to engage in telecommunications is respected even with 
respect to prisoners. Prisoners are holders of this right, even though its exercise can be 
-more or less exceptionally- restricted101. It is thus to be presumed that, were the 
freedom to engage in, and the secrecy of telecommunications recognised as a single 
right in these two systems, the result would be similar to the one reached in the ECHR,
100The doctrine was explicitly laid down in the judgment to the case of Golder v. U.K. (Par. 45, p. 21) 
and has since then been consistently followed (see Silver v. U.K. judgment, Par. 84, p. 32; Campbell 
and Fell v. U.K. judgment. Par. 110, p. 49; Malone v. U.K, judgment. Par. 64, p. 30; Schonenberger 
and Durmaz v. Switzerland judgment. Par. 24, p. 13; Kruslin v. France judgment, Par. 26, p. 20; 
Margareta and Roger Anderson v. Sweden judgment, Par. 73, p. 25; Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria 
judgment, Par. 43, p. 18; Cambell v. U.K. judgment, Par. 33, p. 16; Liidi v. Switzerland judgment. 
Par. 39, p. 19).
101For Germany, see arts 24 et seq. of the StVollzG; BVerfGE 34, 384; 42, 234. For the United 
States, see Procunier v. Navarette (434 US 555 (1978)) and Turner v. Safley (482 US 78 (1987)).
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that is the condition o f imprisonment would not constitute an inherent limitation to the 
secrecy of telecommunications.
Let me conclude with some comments on the exceptional nature of lawful 
infringement upon the secrecy of telecommunications. In the three systems under 
consideration, the lawfulness of restrictions to this right is ultimately measured on the 
basis of a balance, that is of a proportionality test. In principle, as has been made clear 
earlier in this chapter, the test of proportionality neither grants nor precludes a position 
of advantage to the right which is going to be limited, so that this is left in the hands of 
the Court at issue. Nevertheless, both in the ECHR and in Germany, the 
proportionality test is complemented by an additional requirement which holds the 
exceptional nature o f limitations, namely by the condition of necessity. On the basis of 
this requirement, limitations of rights are lawful only if they are the least intrusive 
means to achieve an aim, that is only if there is no alternative means to achieve the same 
end which imposes a lesser encroachment upon the right at issue (and which of course 
does not impose a bigger encroachment upon any other right). The requirement that a 
limiting measure be necessary does not control the choice of the aim which justifies a 
restriction of a right and thus cannot account for the exceptional nature of this aim; it 
does assure, however, that once the aim is chosen the restriction it imposes upon a right 
be exceptional. As has been mentioned, the necessity requirement has been adopted 
both by the Convention's organs and by the German Constitutional Court. It was also 
adopted by the Supreme Court o f the United States in the context of the fourth 
amendment when this provision was interpreted under a property rationale, yet at 
present the Supreme Court is not consistently applying this requirement. From the time 
that privacy was taken to underlie the interpretation of the fourth amendment, the 
exceptional nature of limitations of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications has 
remained totally in the hands of the Supreme Court, which is free to interpret such 
limitations in more or less generous terms according to the policy at issue.
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CHAPTER 4: THE OBJECT OF THE RIGHT TO THE SECRECY OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ITS COVERAGE
Introduction
The present chapter will deal with the coverage of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, that is, it will deal with the way the conceptual boundaries of the 
right are drawn in each of the three systems under consideration. One of my main 
concerns in this chapter will be to consider the extent to which the conceptual 
boundaries o f this right are in fact clearly defined. My contention is that a clear 
definition is crucial in the context of the right, so that whether or not it is at stake can be 
ascertained easily and is not a matter of much judicial speculation; to this end, I believe, 
it is also crucial that the definition of a right responds to a clear rationale which grants 
the right internal coherence, that is, I believe that the internal coherence of a right 
contributes significantly to the clarity o f its external boundaries. I contend that a clear 
definition of rights remains important even where there is some risk of the application 
of the right becoming somewhat rigid, hence relatively inflexible and perhaps not well 
adapted to cover new situations. For one thing, rights which are defined in clear, i.e. 
rigid, terms still allow that the areas which fall outside their coverage be covered by a 
different right, if need be, by a right newly created for the particular purpose; on the 
other hand, rights whose coverage is flexible because not clear cannot act as a distinct 
point of reference in the coverage of any area at all.
Having these considerations as a guide-line, this chapter will be primarily 
concerned with the extent to which the ECHR, Germany and the United States detach 
the coverage of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications from the right to privacy 
and the conceptual confusion which surrounds the definition of the right; it will also be 
concerned with the extent to which the recognition of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications responds to a clear rationale, i.e. with the level of internal 
coherence that this right enjoys in each of these three systems.
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Section 1: The European Convention on Human Rights
Introduction
Article 8:
"I. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.
II. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of his 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection o f health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others."
The first paragraph of art. 8 defines the scope o f  coverage o f the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications. This paragraph uses the expression "the right to respect 
for", which, together with its analogue in the second paragraph ("this right"), suggests 
that art. 8 caters for four different features (private life, family life, home and 
correspondence) of a single right, close in scope to the concept of privacy. Despite this, 
art. 8 has always been interpreted as a source o f  recognition of four different rights, 
whereas privacy has been conceived as the unifying rationale behind them. The present 
section will analyse "the right to respect fo r ... correspondence", since this is the right 
that covers the secrecy of telecommunication.
To be sure, the secrecy of telecommunication is also covered as part of the right 
to private life. Indeed, the expression ’private life’ can be taken as a synonym for 
'privacy', so that the right to private life covers all the areas which fall within the right 
to privacy. However, within the context of art. 8 the right to privacy or to private life 
occupies a 'subsidiary' ('fall-back') position, in the sense that it embraces all the areas 
of privacy which are thought to deserve recognition as rights but which are not 
specifically recognised. Since the secrecy o f telecommunications is specifically 
recognised within the art. 8 'right to respect for correspondence' no recourse to the 
right to private life need be made in my discussion of the secrecy of telecommunication 
below.
It is the purpose o f this section to study the scope of the coverage of "the right 
to respect for correspondence". The scope of the term "respect" will raise the issue of 
the negative and positive dimensions of the rights recognised in art. 8, that is the 
negative and positive obligations these rights impose upon the Contracting Parties. The
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discussion o f the scope o f the term "correspondence" will then bring up the non-literal 
reading that the Convention's organs have made o f this term and the problems this 
interpretation gives rise to. This section will then conclude with an analysis of the right 
to privacy as the underlying interest o f art. 8, with particular reference to the 
confrontation o f this provision with the freedom o f expression as recognised within art.
10.
i
I
1 .  "The Right to  Respect fo r ...!  j
I
Let us now start with the term "respect" and the way it conditions the scope o f |
the right to correspondence. Before entering this analysis, however, let me mention that |
the expression "the right to respect for" does not exclusively refer to the right to I
correspondence. Rather, it constitutes a general heading which defines the coverage o f I
ait. 8 as a whole and thus affects all the rights recognised in this article. As a result, the I
following arguments do not only apply to correspondence, but also to private life, I
family life and home. Equally, in the development o f these arguments, account must be '
taken not only o f the case-law on correspondence, but also o f the case-law on each of 1
these three other rights.
I
The scope o f the term 'respect' has already been dealt with in the previous |
chapter. The word 'respect', it was then argued, denotes in large part an idea o f I
'refraining from acting'1. Its use in art. 8.1 thus suggests that correspondence is I
recognised as a negative right, that is as a right to enjoy a negative or passive 1
permissiveness in the exercise of correspondence, in line with the most typically liberal 
tradition. As was also pointed out, this limitation in coverage seems confirmed in art. i
8.2 with the use of the term "interference", a term which suggests an idea of active |
behaviour against the exercise of rights2. In sum, the expression "respect for" suggests I
that art. 8 recognises a right to suffer no active hindrance when corresponding with 1
anybody.
i
It was also discussed in chapter 3 that the above interpretation has never been i
followed by the Convention's organs. I would now like to insist on this point and 
stress that, since their earliest cases on the subject, both the Commission and the Court
i
t
i
Respect: "4.c. To treat with consideration; to refrain from injuring or interfering with; to spare” (The ,
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, Vol. XIII, p. 733) !
interfere: ”4.a. (of things) To come into collision or opposition, so as to affect the course of; 4.b. (of
persons) To meddle with; to interpose and take part in something, esp. without having the right to do
so” (The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII, p. 1102) ,
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I
have interpreted the scope of the Convention's rights in general, and of the idea of 
'respect' in particular, in more flexible terms. To be more precise, they have stated that 
"the rights recognised by the Convention are not all 'negative'"3 but also have a 
positive dimension. Within the specific context of art. 8, in particular in cases dealing 
with the right to respect for private life or family life4, the Convention's organs have 
stated: "[I]n addition to [art. 8] primarily negative undertaking there may be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life"5, so that "the State 
... by failing to [act]... m ight... interfere with the respect due to private life without 
any positive new act of interference"6. Similar statements have been made within the 
context of the right to respect for correspondence: here the failure to provide prisoners 
with the means o f writing letters has been seen to amount to a violation of art. 87. »
The statement that the Convention's rights also are positive subjective rights is 
of major importance. With this the Convention's organs have gone beyond the 
premises o f the liberal conception o f fundamental rights, according to which these 
rights (and in this case the Convention's rights) are rights of defence against the State 
entailing negative claims against the State only. In the Court's view, this conception 
"may still have a certain philosophical value" but it "is in no way normative"8. 
Moreover, the Convention's organs have also gone beyond the conception of 
fundamental rights as objective values or principles o f the constitutional order; for 
according to this conception fundamental rights impose positive obligations upon the 
State, yet they do not allow for subjective claims o f the individual. The position o f the 
Convention’s organs relies on social theories o f fundamental rights, according to which
3Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium 
(languages case). Op. Com. of 24 June 1965, Series B, vol. 3-4; Judgment (merits) of 23 July 1968, 
Series A, vol. 6.
4Their ideas in this respect were mainly developed in three cases: Marchc v. Belgium (Op. Com. of 10 
Dec. 1977, Series B, vol. 29; judgment of 13 July 1979, Series A, vol. 31); Airey v. Ireland (Op. 
Com. of 8 March 1978, Series B, vol. 30; judgment of 9 Oct. 1979, Series A, vol. 32); Van 
Oosterwijck v. Belgium (Op. Com. of 1 March 1979, Series B, vol. 36; judgment of 6 Nov. 1980, 
Series A, vol. 40). The subsequent case-law plainly takes these ideas for granted: see, e.g., X and Y v. 
the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A, vol. 91, Par. 23, p. 11; Abdulaziz, Cabales and 
Balkadali v. U.K., judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A, vol. 94, Par. 67, p. 33; Rees v. U.K., 
judgment of 17 Oct. 1986, Series A, vol. 106, Par. 35, p. 14; Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment 
of 18 Dec. 1986, Series A, vol. 112, Par. 55, p. 25; W. v. U.K., judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A, 
vol. 121, Par. 60, p. 27; Gaskin v. U.K., judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, vol. 160, Par. 42, p. 17; 
Powell and Rayner v. U.K., judgment of 21 Feb. 1990, Series A, vol. 172, Par. 41, p. 18; Cossey v.
U.K,, judgment of 27 Nov. 1990, Series A, vol. 184, Par. 37, p. 15.
sMarckx v. Belgium judgment, Series A, vol. 31, Par. 31, p. 15; Airey v. Ireland judgment, Series A, 
vol. 32, Par. 32, p. 17.
6Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, Op. Com., Series B, vol. 36, Par. 45, p. 24.
7Colder v. U.K., Op. Com. of 1 June 1973, Series B, vol. 16, Par. 119, pp. 60-61. See also Ap. No. 
7291/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 18 Oct. 1985, 50 D&R, p. 5. This statement concerns the freedom to 
communicate but, as has been argued, the doctrine behind it also applies to the right to communicate 
secretly.
L^anguages case judgment, Series A, vol. 6 at p. 21.
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fundamental rights entail positive subjective claims against the State, not only in the 
context of social rights but also in the context o f traditional liberal rights of defence. 
Here the individual must be able to claim that the State actually develops the necessaiy 
pre-conditions so that rights can be exercised both against the State itself and against 
third parties, for otherwise the subjective dimension o f fundamental rights risks 
remaining more formal than real. In brief, the Convention's organs have found that, in 
spite o f being a traditional right o f  defence against the State, the right to respect for 
correspondence has both a negative and a positive dimension, hence that it imposes 
both negative and positive obligations upon the Contracting Parties9. Let us now 
explore the scope of each o f  these two dimensions.
1.1 The Coverage of the Negative Dimension of the Right to
Correspondence
As already stated, then, the rights recognised in art. 8, conceived as negative 
rights, require that the Contracting Parties refrain from any active interference with their 
exercise. Their scope is limited by the use o f the term 'interference'. Relevant questions 
thus are: what active infringements upon the right to correspondence amount to an 
'interference' for the purposes of art. 8 and what level o f infringement is needed in 
order for an 'interference' to have taken place?
The question o f what active infringements amount to an 'interference' arises in 
at least two groups o f cases. The first group involves cases where the responsibility of 
the disclosure of a piece o f communication lies with one o f the parties involved, either 
because the disclosure was actively made by one o f the parties communicating or 
simply because it was made with her consent. The second group concerns the act of 
taking notice o f the circumstances surrounding a piece o f telecommunication. O f all 
these three issues the organs o f the Convention have only addressed the second one: 
they have stated that the disclosure o f a piece o f  communication by one of the parties 
communicating is not an 'interference' according to art. 810.
It is the second question (what level o f infringement is needed in order for an 
'interference' to exist?) that has mainly occupied the organs of the Convention. To be 
precise, this question has only been raised in the context o f the freedom to correspond,
9For the sake of clarity, the Contracting Parties are already put forward here as the passive subjects of 
the art. 8 right to correspondence, although a comprehensive analysis of both active and passive 
subjects will take place in a different section.
10See, e.g., Ap. No. 3788/68, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 July 1970, 35 Coll. Dec., p. 56.
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yet the answer to it can very well be extended and applied to the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. The position of the Convention's organs on the issue has evolved  
overtime. Initially, they equated the term, 'interference' with "a total prohibition from 
communicating"11 and saw no interference in, e.g., discouraging someone from 
sending letters, restricting the number of letters per week someone may send, tearing a 
letter in two as long as it is still legible, or forbidding a particular means of 
communication as long as others are still available12. This initial interpretation is 
contained in the Commission's Decisions of Admissibility, which should not come as a 
surprise: as has previously been mentioned, the interpretation of art. 8 was initially 
controlled by the Com mission, something which tended to down play the 
responsibilities o f the Member States, so as to guarantee them as wide a scope o f  action 
as possible. Nor should it come as a surprise that this initial interpretation was reversed 
by the Court in the 1970s, when giving its opinions on art. 8. In one o f its first 
decisions on this provision, the Court held that "the right under Article 8 (1) to respect 
for correspondence envisages a free flow of such communications"13. Since then any 
censorship or other active limitation to this free flow  has been regarded as an 
interference; further, any active infringement upon the secrecy of correspondence, 
however partial, has been considered an interference, hence a violation of art. 8.1.
1.2 The Coverage of the Positive Dimension of the Rights of Art. 8:
States' Positive Obligations
The problem of limiting the coverage o f  the positive dimension of the art. 8 
rights is not so straightforward. This is because the recognition of this dimension is not 
explicit in art. 8 but is a result of the way the organs o f the Convention have interpreted 
this provision. In order to know a State's positive obligations arising from art. 8 one 
therefore must look at the case-law o f the Convention's organs. This is the purpose of 
the present heading.
The organs of the Convention have defined the positive dimension of the rights 
in art. 8 on the basis o f one criterion. States, have they affirmed, must adopt the 
required positive measures in order that the rights recognised in art. 8 can be effectively
nAp. No. 2749/66, Dec. Adm. Com. of 11 July 1967,24 Coll. Dec. p. 95.
R^espectively, Ap. No. 2122/64, Dec. Adm. Com. of 28 Sep. 1964, 15 Coll. Dec., p. 6; Ap. No. 
7180/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 7 Oct. 1976 (unpublished). Digest of Strasbourg Case-Law, Council of 
Europe, Vol. 3, p. 176; Ap. No. 2749/66, Final Dec. Adm. Com. 11 july 1967, 24 Coll. Dec. p. 98; 
Ap. No. 6870/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 May 1977, 10 D&R, p. 37.
13Silver and others v. U.K. (Op. Com. of 11 Oct. 1980, Series B, vol. 40, Par. 269-270) and 
Campbell and Fell v. U.K. (Op. Com. of 12 may 1982, Series B. vol. 65, Par. 142, p. 75).
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exercised, but only in as far as these measures fall within their juridical responsibility. 
On the basis o f  this criterion, the States' positive obligations can be defined as follows. 
First, States must provide an adequate legal framework for the exercise of the rights o f  
art. 8, which must make the protection o f their exercise adequately accessible to all14. 
Second, States must also (re-)establish the preconditions for the exercise of the right in 
question whenever this is or has been hindered by an action or non-action attributable to 
the States15. The Contracting Parties must thus remove all significant obstacles to the 
exercise of the right to correspondence for which they can be held responsible, so that, 
for example, they must pay the postage on prisoners' correspondence where the 
prisoners' lack o f  financial means is directly related to their situation o f  
imprisonment16. On the other hand, no obligation exists for the Contracting Parties 
positively to render possible the exercise o f rights whenever this has been hindered by 
reasons beyond their responsibility17. For example, States are under no obligation to 
provide with means to avoid "the risk of occasional miscarriage o f mail" which "the 
very nature [of the postal service] involves"18.
14See, e.g., Marcks v. Belgium judgment (Series A, vol. 31, Par. 31, p. 15); Airey v. Ireland 
judgment (Series A, vol. 32, Par. 33, p. 17); X and Y v. The Netherlands judgment (Series A, vol. 91, 
Par. 23, p. 11); Johnston and others v. Ireland judgment (Series A, vol. 112, Par. 56, pp. 25-26).
15Vnn Oosterwijck v. Belgium, Op. Com. of 1 March 1979, Series B, vol. 36, Par. 45, p. 24. See 
also, e.g., Ap. No. 13134/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Dec. 1990, 67 D&R p. 216 (the Commission 
ruled that the U.K. has a positive duty under the Convention to secure that all pupils, including pupils 
at private schools are not exposed to corporal punishment as an inhuman or degrading treatment 
contrary to art. 3 of the Conventin, and that this duty is an effect of compulsory education -ibid, at 
223).
16Ap. No. 9659/82, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 March 1985,41 D&R, p. 91. In the context of the right to 
respect for family life, States may not refuse permanence or admission to an alien if there is no other 
place where he can live together with his family (Abdulaziz, Cabales andBalkandali v. V.K„ judgment 
of 28 May 1983, Series A, vol. 94, pp. 33-34; see also Ap. No. 7816/77, Dec. Adm. Com. of 19 May 
1977,9 D&R p. 219, at 220; Ap. No. 9285/81, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 June 1982, 29 D&R p. 205, at 
209; Ap. No. 14112/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 Dec. 1988,59 D&R p. 267). Similarly, "it is part of 
a prisoner's right to respect for family life that prison authorities assist him in maintaining contact 
with his close family" (Ap. No. 13756/88, Dec. Adm. Com, of 12 March 1990, 65 D&R p. 265 at 
277; Ap. No. 15817/89, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 Oct. 1990, 66 D&R p. 251 at 255). However, in a 
recent decision the Commission has ruled that a State has no positive obligation to create a postal 
service of home delivery in areas where it does not exist, even if certain persons, for example the 
elderly, might have difficulties to go to the postal office to collect their mail (see Ap. No. 22964/93, 
Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Oct. 1994 (pending publication)).
17ln some cases, the responsibility for the passive hindrance the exercise of a right has been seen to lie 
with a different State (Ap. No. 7597/76, Dec. Adm. Com. of 2 May 1978,14 D&R, p. 122), or even 
with the applicants themselves (see, among others, Ap. No. 5416/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 30 May 
1974, 46 Coll Dec,, p. 92. Ap. No. 6577/74, Dec. Adm. Com. of 19 Dec. 1974, 1 D&R, Par. 92. 
Ap. No. 8317/78, Dec. Adm. Com. of 15 May 1980, 20 D&R, Par. 80, p. 90. Guzzardi v. Italy, Op. 
Com. of 7 Dec. 1978, Series B, vol. 35, Par. 87, p. 35; judgment of 6 Nov. 1980, Series A, vol. 39, 
Par. 109, p. 41). In some other cases, no responsibility has been found at all (see next footnote).
18Ap. No. 8383/78, Dec. Adm. Com. of 3 Oct. 1979, 17 D&R, p. 228. In the context of family life, 
see Ap. No. 11776/85, Dec. Adm. Com. of 4 March 1986, 46 D&R, p. 253: "[art, 8] respect for 
family life [does not]... impose on States a general obligation to provide for financial assistance to 
individuals in order to enable one of two parents to stay at home to take care of children").
150
The coverage of the positive dimension of the rights in art 8 is thus based on 
the criterion of responsibility, i.e. on the criterion of what is properly in the control of 
the State. However, in order to appreciate the scope o f these rights attention must be 
paid to their limits. The reason, as was discussed in the previous chapter, is that the 
positive dimension o f the rights in article 8 appears to have a single-level structure, so 
that it can be subjected to conceptual restrictions but not to restrictions o f a functional 
character. In other words, the exercise of the positive rights in article 8 can only be 
restricted as a matter o f definition o f their coverage and the scope of a State's positive 
obligations deriving from them must be assessed exclusively within the context of art. 
8.119. As a result, the description o f the coverage of the positive rights in article 8 must 
rely on considerations which in the context of rights with a two-level structure would 
describe the scope of protection.
At this point, one should bear in mind that the mere fact that individuals have a 
claim that the Contracting Parties positively guarantee the effectiveness o f the 
Convention's rights implies a significant broadening o f their rights -as well as a 
significant restriction of the Contracting Parties' scope o f political action. It is therefore 
to be expected that the Convention's organs seek to compensate for this restriction by 
way of binding States’ positive obligations within adequate limits. They have in fact 
accorded the Contracting Parties a wide 'margin of appreciation’ to set the scope of 
their own obligations20.
Of course, whether or not a State has acted within the scope o f its 'margin of 
appreciation' is ultimately decided by the organs o f the Convention. If the 'margin of 
appreciation* is not thought to be at stake, the Convention's organs also control 
whether or not the action o f a State respects the positive obligations that this has under 
the Convention. This control is exercised on the basis o f  the criterion o f responsibility, 
but not exclusively. In addition, the Convention's organs rely on criteria which 
coincide with those contained in art. 8.2, that is with the ones which control the 
imposition o f functional limits upon art 8 negative rights and which will be studied in 
detail in the next chapter21. The result is a strong parallelism between the functional
19In this respect, see Marchc v. Belgium judgment. Series A, vol. 31, Par. 31, p. 15; Airey v. Ireland 
judgment. Series A, vol. 32, Par. 32, p. 17; Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, Op. Com. Series B, vol. 
36, Par. 52. p. 26.
20Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. U.K., judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A, vol. 94, Par. 67, 
pp. 33-34; Johnston and others v. Ireland, judgment of 18th Dec. 1986, Series A, vol. 112, Par. 55, p. 
25; IV. v. U.K., judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A, vol. 121, Par. 60, p. 27; Gaskin v. U.K., 
judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, vol. 160, Par. 42, p. 17. See also, e.g., Ap. No. 10871/84, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 10 July 1986, 48 D&R p. 154 at 170; Ap. No. 13756/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 
March 1990, 65 D&R p. 265 at 278.
21Rees v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 106, Par. 37, p. 15; Gaskin v. UK. judgment. Series A, 
vol. 160, Par. 42, p. 17.
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limits of art. 8 negative rights and the conceptual limits o f art. 8 positive rights. This 
issue was discussed in the previous chapter* where it was noted that thanks to this 
parallelism the stronger implications o f the single-level structure o f art. 8 positive rights 
have thus far been avoided.
Let me now summarise how the Convention organs define the expression 
'respect for* correspondence, both in its negative and in its positive dimension. In its 
negative dimension this expression means 'refrain from active infringement' or, to be 
precise, 'refrain from any active infringement', however marginal the infringement 
might appear. Also note that disclosures o f  a piece o f telecommunication by one of the 
communicating parties has not been regarded as an infringement. In its positive 
dimension, the expression ’respect for’ has been interpreted to mean that the 
Contracting Parties must take positive measures (legislative and others) to enable the 
exercise o f the right. Yet the Contracting Parties are positively obliged to remove 
obstacles only when these can be regarded as their responsibility and in as far as these 
obstacles cannot be considered 'necessary in a democratic society' for attaining one o f 
the aims mentioned in art. 8.2. This then concludes my discussion of the scope of the 
expression 'respect for' used in art 8 and leads me on to an analysis of the term 
'correspondence', that is o f  the second term which limits the coverage of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications as recognised in art. 8.
2. ” Correspondence "
The term 'correspondence' is the second element limiting the coverage o f art. 8 
right to telecommunications. As with the word "respect", a sharp distinction must be 
made between the literal scope o f the term "correspondence" and the scope of that word 
as interpreted by the Convention's organs because, as in the case o f  the word "respect", 
the Convention’s organs enlarged the scope o f "correspondence" beyond its literal 
conceptual boundaries. Let us now enter the analysis o f the term 'correspondence', 
first, in its literal scope and, second, as interpreted by the Convention's organs.
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2.1 The Literal Scope of the Term 'Correspondence'
Taken literally, the term 'correspondence* does not cover all means o f  
telecommunication, but is limited only to letters22. In this concern the ECHR belongs to 
a more general trend in international law. In particular, it follows the steps o f  art. 12 of 
the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, by which it was inspired23, and o f  art. 17 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: these provisions only 
mention a right to correspondence24. A  literal interpretation o f the term 
'correspondence' is supported (more or less explicitly) by most commentators25, who 
at most grant that the term 'correspondence' also covers other means o f written 
telecommunication. Moreover, the limited character o f the scope o f the term 
'correspondence' is most often not even criticised by commentators, since, as some of 
them have pointed out26, the secrecy o f means o f  telecommunications other than 
correspondence are nonetheless covered under art. 8 as part of the right to respect for 
private life. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the right to private life plays 
a subsidiary role, in the sense that it covers areas o f privacy considered worthy of 
recognition as a right but which do not fall within the scope of a more specific right. 
Art. 8, therefore, embraces all types of telecommunication, independently of whether or 
not they are covered by the right to respect for correspondence.
Contrary to the most general doctrinal trend and in spite o f the above 
considerations, the Convention's organs have not respected the literal meaning of the 
term 'correspondence' when defining the scope o f the right to correspondence. Let us 
therefore focus our attention on the view they hold in this regard.
C^orrespondence: "6.a: Intercourse or communication by letters; 6.b: The letters that pass between 
correspondents" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. in, p. 966).
23J. Velu, "The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Respect for Private Life, the 
Home and the Communications" Privacy and Human Rights (Reports and Communications Presented 
at the 3rd. Colloque about the European Convention on Human Rights). Chapter one, pp. 12-95 (at 
14).
24"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, home or correspondence..." (art. 
12 of the U.D.H.R.); "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence..." (art. 17 I.C.C.P.R.). This trend seems so solidly rooted that the 
term 'correspondence* was never questioned during all the 'travaux préparatoires' on art. 8 of the ECHR 
(J. Velu, "The European Convention ..." at 15-18)
^For some explicit comments, see J.E.S. Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Article 8). Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2nd edition. 1987, pp. 210-235 (at 228); J. Velu, 
"The European Convention..." at 65; E. Garcia de Entérela, E  Unde, LI. Ortega, El Sistema Europeo 
de Protección de los Derechos Humanos. Ed. Civitas, 2nd. Ed. 1983, p. 105. See also the separate 
opinion of Sir G. Fitzmaurice to the Colder judgment (Series A, vol. 18, separate opinion of Sir G. 
Fitzmaurice, Par. 5, p. 33).
26Golder judgment. Series A, vol. 18, separate opinion of Sir G. Fitzmaurice, p. 33, footnote 2;
J.E.S. Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention ...; J. Velu, "The European Convention 
..." at 65.
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2.2 The Doctrine of the Organs of the Convention
The Convention's organs have not limited the scope o f  the right to 
correspondence contained in article 8 to the literal meaning of the term 
'correspondence'. Ever since facing the issue for the first time27, both the Commission 
and the Court have made an effort to enlarge the scope of the right to correspondence 
beyond the descriptive meaning of the term, so that it embraces all telecommunications. 
They have thus disregarded the literal wording o f the provision, together with the most 
general doctrinal position on the issue. On the other hand, "communications by person 
to person by word o f mouth" have been interpreted as being only part of the scope of 
the right to private life28. In sum, the Convention's organs have tended to understand 
by 'correspondence' the flow of any piece o f telecommunication from the sender to the 
addressee29. Even within these limits, the broadening o f the scope of the term 
'correspondence' beyond its descriptive definition is far from uncontroversial. It poses, 
first, the question o f whether such broadening was acceptable (may the organs of the 
Convention simply disregard the literal meaning o f the terms used in the Convention?) 
and, second, the question o f whether there was any need for such broadening, since the 
secrecy of telecommunications other than correspondence can always be considered 
covered by the right to private life, which is also recognised within art. 8. Both these 
questions will be addressed in the following paragraphs.
2.2.1 Was the Broadening of the Term 'Correspondence* Acceptable?
In chapter 1 1 argued that the term 'privacy' can be used at three different levels, 
namely at a descriptive, a moral and a legal level. The same analysis can be applied to 
'correspondence'. As was said with respect to privacy, it seems only logical that the 
descriptive definition o f a term lies at the basis o f its definition both as a moral and as a 
legal right. It was also shown, however, that this way o f proceeding is not always 
followed in practice, for the definition of a legal right sometimes goes beyond the 
descriptive definition o f  the term which lies at its basis. Such a way o f proceeding can
27Klass and others v. Germany, Op. Com. of 9 March 1977, Series B, vol. 26; judgment of 6 Sep. 
1978, Series A, vol. 24.
28McVeigh and others v. U.K., Report of the Commission of 18 March 1981, 25 D&R, Par. 226- 
227, p. 50.
29As the Commission has ocassionally pointed out, "the right to respect for correspondence does not 
apply to documents which have already reached the addressee and are kept by him" (Ap. No. 9614/81, 
Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Oct. 1983, 34 D&R p. 119; Ap. No. 21962/93, Dec. Adm. Com. of 11 Jan. 
1994, 76-AD*/? p. 157).
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give rise to a considerable degree o f confusion, as was argued in chapter 1. However, 
as was also noted in that chapter, the re-definition of ordinary language for using it in a 
technical legal sense is, in the end, a perfectly legitimate practice -one could simply 
affirm that thereby the same word is used to refer to a different concept. Moreover, the 
inconveniences that such re-definitions entail can be minimised. In particular, a great 
deal of confusion can be avoided if  the right in question is defined with a certain degree 
of internal coherence and in rather clear terms. In the following paragraphs I will argue 
that the re-definition of the term 'correspondence' can be considered internally coherent 
and reasonably clear.
[A] Internal Coherence
The re-definition o f 'correspondence' can be considered coherent. Coherence, 
justified on the basis of objective technical reasons, implies that the secrecy o f closed- 
channel telecommunications be recognised as a single right and that the freedom to 
engage in all telecommunications be recognised as a single right. Why this is so will be 
explained in the following paragraphs.
Let me first of all refer to the case o f  the secrecy o f telecommunications. 
Communications carried out through open channels (whether they are 
telecommunications or person-to-person communications) have very different features 
from telecommunications carried out through closed channels. The key-point is secrecy 
or, to be more precise, secrecy in as far as it is objectively guaranteed. Secrecy is an 
inherent feature of closed-channel telecommunications. Open-channel communications, 
on the contrary, do not rely on the objective guarantee o f  their secrecy; they entail the 
risk that uninvited members o f the audience may see or hear a piece of communication 
and even record it. This difference implies that interfering with open-channel 
communications simply is in breach o f a (more or less legitimate, more or less justified) 
subjective expectation o f  secrecy, whereas interfering with open-channel 
telecommunications additionally violates the secrecy which qualifies those particular 
means of communicating.
Although the above distinction applies for the most part to the right to the 
secrecy of correspondence, it would of course also be coherent to draw it in the context 
of the freedom to correspond; yet, in this context it makes more sense to draw the 
dividing line between all telecommunications, on the one hand, and face-to-face 
communications, on the other hand, so as to make the former the object o f a single 
right. The reason is that, in order to engage in telecommunications, one must make use 
of some technical devices (these including pen and paper), whereas face-to-face 
communications require nothing of the sort. The freedom to engage in
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telecommunications thus requires that legal attention be paid to the means by which they 
are carried out.
Having clarified what coherence implies in the context of the recognition of the 
right to telecommunications, let us now examine whether the Convention's organs were 
reasoning consistently with these implications in their re-definition of the term 
'correspondence1. The Convention's organs have stated that "correspondence in a 
broader sense"30 embraces not only letters, but also, e.g., telegrams* 31 and telephone 
conversations32 all o f  which are modes o f  closed-channel telecommunications. 
Moreover, they have stated that the right to correspondence does not cover the secrecy 
of telecommunications vis-à-vis telecommunication partners, for the simple reason that 
here no secrecy is involved: the confidentiality existing between the parties in a piece of 
telecommunication can only eventually be covered as part of the right to private life33. 
Nevertheless, on at least one occasion34, the Commission has taken the view that 
correspondence embraces all types o f  telecom m unications, even forms o f  
telecommunications carried out through open channels, such as radio-communication. 
Yet I would like to stress that such a view has been taken in the context of the right to 
engage in 'correspondence'. In short, the term 'correspondence' has so far been 
interpreted to mean closed-channel telecommunications in the context o f the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications and open-channel telecommunications in the context of 
the freedom to engage in telecommunications. According to the above considerations, 
therefore, the re-definition o f this term can be regarded as internally coherent.
[B] Clarity
Thus, when the Convention's organs have dealt with the scope of the term 
'correspondence', they have drawn a distinction between the the right to the secrecy of 
correspondence and the freedom to correspond. This distinction seems to introduce an 
element of complexity in the re-definition o f  correspondence, thus preventing a 
straightforward understanding of this term as used within the context of art. 8. 
Complexity does not imply 'unclarity', however. The re-definition o f correspondence 
is perfectly clear with respect to the secrecy o f correspondence, on the one hand, and 
with respect to the freedom to correspond, on the other. Thus, the re-definition o f
WjClass and others v. Germany, Op. Com. Series B, vol. 26, Par. 62, p. 37.
31 Ap. No. 6870/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 May 1977, 10 D&R, p. 37.
&Klass and others v. Germany, Op. Com. Series B, vol. 26, Par. 62, p. 37; judgment Series A, vol. 
24, Par. 41, p. 21. Afalone v. U.K., judgment of 2 Aug. 1984, Series A, vol. 82, Par. 64, p. 30. 
Schenk v. Switzerland, judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A, vol. 140, Par. 52, p. 31.
33Ap. No. 14838/89, Dec. Adm. Com. of 5 March. 1991,69 D&R. p. 286.
34Ap. No. 8962/80, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 May 1982,28 D&R, p. 112 at 124.
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correspondence should not be considered unclear because it is based on a plausible 
distinction between the secrecy and the freedom o f correspondence.
2.2.2 Was the Broadening of the Term 'Correspondence' Needed?
The broadening o f the scope o f  'correspondence' can still be subject to further 
criticism. In particular, one could object that, however legitimate, such a broadening 
implies no change in the scope o f  art. 8, since secrecy of telecommunications is 
nevertheless covered under the heading of the right o f private life, which is part of art. 
8. No actual advantage seems to compensate for the terminological confusion that such 
a broadened definition creates35.1  will argue, however, that some actual advantages do 
derive from the reading the Convention's organs have made of 'correspondence' within 
the context o f art. 8. These advantages are, at least, the following:
First, including the secrecy of closed-channel telecommunication and the 
freedom to engage in all telecommunications under the heading of'correspondence' has 
permitted the development of a coherent jurisprudence in each of these two fields. This, 
of course, is highly desirable, since the protection o f the secrecy of closed-channel 
telecommunication, on the one hand, and o f  the freedom to engage in all 
telecommunications, on the other hand, gives rise to similar problems, as was argued 
above. A coherent jurisprudence would have been more difficult to achieve if different 
modes o f telecommunication had been treated as part o f different rights, even if 
recognised in the same article. Second, a coherent jurisprudence in turn helps to 
coordinate the ECHR and the national Constitutions o f the Contracting Parties, since 
the latter have a tendency to include all forms o f telecommunication within a single 
right36. In this way, the doctrine o f the Convention’s organs on the subject can be more 
easily followed by the Contracting Parties. Finally, it should be noted that extending the 
scope of 'correspondence' to embrace other forms of telecommunication helps to avoid 
the uncertainties that their coverage under the heading o f a subsidiary right to privacy or 
to 'private life' would have implied.
For these reasons it seems wise to have included telecommunications within the 
right to correspondence, even if  they could also have been covered by art. 8 under the
35This, as for the rest, has been the solution sometimes adopted by the Convention's organs. See, e.g., 
Ap. No. 10828/84, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Oct. 1988, 57 D&R, p. 5 at 28: "The Commission leaves 
open the question whether bank statements may be regarded as 'correspondence'..., given that in any 
event they fall within the domain of private life".
36See the Constitutions of Denmark (art. 72), Germany (art. 10), Italy (art. 15), the Netherlands (art. 
13), Portugal (art. 34), Spain (art. 18.3), Sweden (an. 6) and Turkey (art. 22).
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right to private life  and even if  this required a re-definition of the term 
'correspondence1. Paradoxically, the fact that the right to telecommunications is in any 
case covered by art. 8 turns out to be of benefit when justifying the jurisprudential 
broadening o f the scope o f 'correspondence'. Due to this circumstance, the issue is 
avoided of whether the Court is allowed to enlarge the literal scope o f a provision so as 
to create a new right, since the Convention’s organs merely re-allocated under different 
conceptual headings rights which were already recognised.
3 .  Art. 8 and, the Right to Privacy
3.1 Respect for Correspondence and Private Life
The main features of the coverage o f the right to the secrecy o f  
telecommunications can now be summarised as follows: first, the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications has both a positive and a negative dimension, that is it imposes 
both positive and negative obligations upon the Contracting Parties; second, the 
coverage o f this right embraces all closed-channel telecommunications and, so far, only 
closed-channel telecommunications37; third, the secrecy o f telecommunications is 
entirely recognised within the right to respect for correspondence, not within the right 
to respect for private life. Taking account o f  these three features, the coverage o f this 
right appears defined in generous terms (first feature) but in terms which, at the same 
time, are internally coherent (second feature) and clear (second/third feature).
The third one o f these features deserves further attention, however. In 
particular, it ought to be noted that in a number of cases dealing with the secrecy o f  
telecommunications the Convention's organs, mostly the Commission, have started to 
refer both to the right to correspondence and to the right to private life38. The fact that 
private life is referred to together with correspondence indicates that it does not occupy 
a 'subsidiary' or 'fall-back' position; rather it seems to be regarded as a right which 
embraces all the others listed in art. 8, that is to say it seems to be regarded as a
37Questions such as whether this right covers only closed letters or also, e.g., postcards, whether it 
coves only letters or also other acts of postal sending or whether it covers correspondence sent through 
channels different to the post have not yet been settled by the Convention's organs.
38See Ap. No. 10439/83, 10440/83,10441/83. 10512/83 and 10513/83, Dec. Adm. Com. of 10 May 
1985, 43 D m , p. 34; Ap. No. 10628/83, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 Oct. 1985, 44 D m , p. 175; Ap. 
No. 10862/84, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 March 1986, 46 D&R, p.123; Ap, No. 11811/85, Dec. Adm. 
Com. of 8 March 1988, 55 D&R, p. 196; Krustin v. France, judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A, 
vol. 176, Par. 26, p. 20; Ap. No. 13274/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Sep. 1990, 66 D&R p. 164; Ap. 
No. 12327/86, Report of the Com. of 9 May 1989, 67 D&R p. 123; Ap, No. 14838/89, Dec. Adm. 
Com. of 5 March 1991, 69 D&R p. 286.
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synonym for the all-embracing right to privacy. It would thus seem that by way of 
referring to private life the Convention's organs have started to push privacy to the 
foreground o f art. 839.
As has been argued, making privacy the direct source of recognition o f art. 8 
rights can only prove to be to the disadvantage of these rights, since it subjects the 
scope of art. 8 rights to the uncertainties inherent in the concept of privacy. So far, this 
danger has not materialised as far as the secrecy o f telecommunications is concerned. 
The reason is that in this context the right to correspondence has remained the central 
point o f reference, even if  cited jointly with the right to private life. Private life -hence 
privacy- has merely been mentioned as a way o f reinforcing the position o f  the 
claimants, maybe even to stress the importance o f privacy as the interest underlying art. 
8 rights, but not to undermine the fact that the secrecy o f  telecommunications is the 
object o f recognition and protection as a independent right. TTie role o f privacy as the 
'underlying interest' in the context o f  art. 8 will be the main focus of attention for the 
rest o f this section.
3.2 Respect for Correspondence and Freedom of Speech
The analysis of the coverage of the right to telecommunications in article 8 
would not be complete without a comment on the scope of the expression "respect for 
correspondence", taken as a whole. In particular, it ought to be noted that this 
expression covers the freedom to engage in telecommunications as well as the secrecy 
of telecommunications, that is that the freedom and the secrecy of telecommunications 
are approached as two different aspects o f a single right.
That the freedom and the secrecy of telecommunications are recognised jointly 
was pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, where I also noted that a feature 
distinguishes the ECHR from the Constitutions of Germany and the United States, 
where the freedom to engage in telecommunications is protected as part of a different 
constitutional right. This feature o f the ECHR has up to now been taken for granted in 
my discussion o f the case-law o f the Convention's organs. It is however an aspect of
390n one occasion, the Committee of Ministers even made an explicit reference to privacy as the direct 
source of coverage of all telecommunications within art. 8 ("Recommendation No. R(85)10 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States concerning the practical application of the European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in respect of letters rogatory for the interception 
of telecommunications” adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28th June 1985, Council of 
Europe. Publication Section (Legal Affaires). Strasbourg, 1986, esp. Par. 17, p. 13; Par. 22, pp. 13- 
14). This, however, has remained an isolated case.
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the right to correspondence which raises important issues in the context of the coverage 
of this right and, more generally, in the context o f the coverage o f art. 8 as a whole. It 
is now time to address these issues.
There is a danger that the inclusion of the freedom to engage in 
telecommunications within the right to respect for correspondence undermines privacy 
as the interest underlying art. 8 rights and that, as a consequence, this provision loses 
its internal coherence and the clarity of its external limits. In particular, there is the 
danger of blurring the borderline between art. 8 and art. 10. For art. 10 recognises the 
right to free speech, a right with which art. 8 freedom to engage in telecommunications 
has many common traits. The tension between these two articles is underlined by the 
fact that the borderline between them lies in the privacy-publicity distinction; in other 
words, whereas privacy underlies art. 8, the idea o f publicity underlies art. 10 freedom 
of expression40: freedom of expression concerns the divulgence of facts or ideas 
purportedly addressed to an unidentified number of people or to a non-restricted or 
non-selected group o f  persons41.
The internal coherence of the right to respect for correspondence, in particular, 
and of art. 8, in general, ought to be maintained. In order to make this possible and to 
avoid confusion with art. 10, the scope o f  art. 8 must be limited to the freedom to 
engage in telecommunications in so far as the recognition of this freedom is justified by 
the interest in privacy. One should thus take into account the point that privacy supports 
the recognition of the freedom to engage in acts of telecommunication only if they are 
intended to be private or if they can reasonably be expected to be private. As long as 
these qualifications are borne in mind, privacy can still be taken as the point o f  
reference for the coverage of art. 8.
In the context o f the freedom to engage in telecommunications, one can assume 
that the term 'privacy' is not used as a synonym for 'seclusion' (after all, a piece o f 
telecommunication is an instance o f  the contact that a person has with the outside 
world) but as a synonym for 'secrecy*. Secrecy thus constitute the common rationale o f
40The free-speech claimant "is still part of the open society and fights his battle in the market place of 
ideas; [whereas the privacy claimant] is part of the closed society and fights to withhold his allegiance 
and perhaps even his identity and association" (R.G. Dixon, "The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional 
Charter for an Expanded Law on Privacy?" The Right of Privacy. A Symposium, New York 1971, p. 
8).
41Such a distinction appears in the Italian Constitution, one of the few ones within the Council of 
Europe where freedom and secrecy of telecommunications are recognised as complementary aspects of a 
single right: "La libertà e la segretezza della corrispondenza e di ogni altra forma di comunicazione sono 
inviolabili" (art. 13). See also art. 41 of the Constitution of Malta and art. 22 of the Constitution of 
Turkey.
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the secrecy o f  and the freedom to engage in telecommunications. In spite o f  this, 
however, these two different rights do not have the same scope: as was noted above, 
the former covers telecommunications the secrecy of which is objectively guaranteed on 
technical grounds, whereas the latter covers both closed-channel and open-channel 
telecommunications. What I would now like to note is that in order for art. 8 to keep its 
internal coherence the right to engage in telecommunications cannot embrace just any 
open-channel telecommunications. If internal coherence is to be achieved, then the 
definition o f this right must be qualified on the basis o f  a criterion which bespeaks the 
interest in the protection o f  privacy. For example, it would be coherent to affirm that 
art. 8 only covers the right to engage in telecommunication which are carried out with 
the intention or the expectation o f keeping its content private (i.e. secret); it could even 
be required that this expectation be somewhat justified. Unfortunately, the 
Convention's organs have not yet given an indication as to the criteria which define the 
right to engage in telecommunications. The risk therefore exists that this right appears 
to embrace all kinds of telecommunications, whether or not they are intended to be 
private.
N evertheless, and although a definition o f  'private open-channel 
telecommunications' has not yet been provided, the Convention's organs have so far 
respected the internal coherence of art. 8, that is they have managed to keep art. 8 under 
the controlling rationale of privacy. A good indication o f this is that they have 
sometimes referred to open-channel telecommunications as part of the right to private 
life42. This however has not prevented 'hard cases' on the borderline between arts. 8 
and 10 from arising. Such 'hard cases' arise in the context of the freedom to use means 
of telecommunication which are intended to publicise the content of the communication. 
A good example involves 'public' letters, i.e. letters which are ultimately intended for 
publication; another example is the case of radio-communications, provided that they 
are intended to be public. Does art. 8 cover the right to use such 'public' means of 
telecommunication?
The freedom to write 'public* letters has been dealt with by the Convention's 
organs. Their case-law on the issue shows an evolution towards a broader 
interpretation of the scope of art. 8. In their earliest jurisprudence on this issue, they 
judged that the freedom to write such letters was covered only by art. 1043;
42Ap. No. 8962/80, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 May 1982, 28 D&R, p. 112 at 124.
43Art. 8, for example, was not thought to protect the right to contact a publisher (e.g., Ap. No. 
5442/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 20 Dec. 1971, 1 D&R p. 41).
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subsequently they judged that it was covered both by arts. 8 and 1044, which is the 
current view. Although the coverage o f public letters by both art. 8 and 10 can be 
considered settled doctrine, the Convention's organs have not been clear as to how in 
particular these two articles relate and apply: in some cases, art. 8 has been considered 
"lex specialis", the application of which excludes the need to examine a complaint with 
respect to art. 1045, whereas in other cases complaints have been examined within the 
scope of art. 1046.
On the other hand, the Convention's organs have not yet had to decide on any 
case dealing with radio-communications intended to be public. It is however worth 
noting that they have judged on the freedom to engage in private radio-communications 
(i.e. radio-communications intended to be kept secret) not only with reference to art. 8 
but also with reference to art. 1047. In this way, they have enlarged the scope o f art. 10 
and made it cover private communications, which is just another way of blurring the 
borderline between this article and art. 8.
In sum, we can affirm that, generally speaking, and in spite of the fact that art. 
8 covers the freedom to engage in open-channel telecommunications, the organs of the 
Convention have so far respected the fundamental division between the scope o f art. 8 
and the scope of art. 10. The interest in the protection o f privacy thus outlines the 
boundaries of the scope of art. 8 and the privacy/publicity distinction makes the 
borderline between arts. 8 and 10. This distinction confirms and reinforces the clear 
definition o f the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications: the right is defined by the 
conceptual boundaries o f the terms 'respect' and 'correspondence', to which the organs 
of the Convention give a clear definition and, at least in principle, it does not overlap 
with the coverage o f  the freedom o f speech. Nevertheless, the recognition of the 
freedom to engage in open-channel telecommunications has given rise to border-line 
cases, which the organs o f the Convention have not been able to solve on the basis o f  
the above distinction. This could lead to a blurring o f the borderline between art. 8 and 
art. 10. It would therefore be desirable that a clear distinction between the scope o f  
these two rights operated with very great weight in the solution o f border-line cases.
44Silver and others v. U.K., Op. Com. of 11 Oct. 1980, Scries B, vol. 40, Par. 272, p. 72; Ap. No.
8317/78, 3 EHRR 161. Par. 107
45Ap. No. 8317/78, 3 EHRR 161, Par. 107.
46Ap. No. 8231/78, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Oct. 1983, 49 D&R, Par. 52, p.15.
47Ap. No. 8962/80, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 May 1982, 28 D&R, p. 112.
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Section 2: Germany
Introduction
Article 10:
"1. Privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications is inviolable.
2. Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a law. Where a restriction 
serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of 
the Federation or a Land the law may stipulate that the person affected shall not 
be informed of such restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced 
by a review of the case by bodies and subsidiary bodies appointed by 
parliament.'’
The secrecy of telecommunications is recognised as an independent right in art. 
10 of the German Basic Law. This provision is exclusively dedicated to the recognition 
of this right, thus differing from the analogous provisions in the ECHR and in the 
Constitution o f the United States. To be sure, the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is considered by the Constitutional Court to be an aspect of 
privacy, which is recognised as a right within art. 2.1 o f the Basic Law, yet it is an 
aspect of privacy which art. 10 recognises as a specific right, and which therefore no 
longer falls within the scope of art. 2.1. This is not to say, however, that privacy has 
no role to play in the context of the secrecy of telecommunications, for privacy remains 
in any case for the Constitutional Court the interest behind the protection of this right. 
Further, as was explained in chapter 1, art. 2.1 covers areas not clearly covered under 
art. 10 (supplementäres Freiheitsrecht) and areas that art. 10 covers but for which if 
offers no protection (subsidiäres Freiheitsrecht). Nevertheless, in as far as covered by 
art. 10, the secrecy of telecommunications stands as an independent right.
Art. 10 o f the German Constitution recognises three different rights, the right to 
the secrecy o f correspondence (although translated as 'privacy' the German term used 
by the Basic Law is 'geheimnis\ which translates into 'secrecy'), the right to the 
secrecy of communications by post and the right to the secrecy o f other forms of 
telecommunications. In particular, it states that the secrecy of all these types of 
communication is inviolable. These three rights give form to an all-embracing right to 
the secrecy o f telecommunications. It will be the purpose o f the following pages to 
explore the conceptual boundaries o f this right. Attention will first focus on the scope 
of the terms 'correspondence', 'post', 'telecommunications' and 'secrecy' as used in 
art. 10. Subsequently, I w ill try to shed some light upon the scope o f the term 
'inviolability' as used with reference to the secrecy o f telecommunications.
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1. "Post1
The secrecy o f  communications by post as recognised in art. 10 could be 
considered as a kind o f lex specialis with respect to the other two rights covered by this 
provision, so that the area covered by the secrecy o f 'correspondence' and the secrecy 
of 'telecommunications' are those left uncovered by the secrecy o f telecommunications 
by post. This area can be described as follows: the secrecy o f communications by post 
starts to apply from the moment when the object to be sent is accepted for carriage by 
the postal service to the moment when it is delivered by the postal service to the 
addressee. In other words, the secrecy of communications by post applies during the 
time when the postal service is in control o f the object of the sending48.
During this period of time, the right covers the secrecy not only of letters but of 
anything else sent by post; even the secrecy o f postal checks, although in any case 
covered by the secrecy o f bank, has been considered to be included within this right to 
the extent that they are means of communication between people by post49. In addition, 
art. 10 secrecy of communications by post does not only guarantee the secrecy o f the 
content of a postal sending but also of all other circumstances concerning every 
particular use of the postal service. Amongst these circumstances there is, for example, 
the very fact o f that use, the time and place where the communication took place, the 
kind of the postal service chosen, as well as the persons identified as the sender and the 
addressee50.
2. "Correspondence1
Art. 10 of the Basic Law recognises an independent right to the secrecy o f  
correspondence, i.e. a right to the secrecy o f  letters. The scope o f this right overlaps 
with the scope of the one studied above during the time in which a letter is in the hands 
o f the postal service. Thus, the secrecy o f telecommunications by letter stands as an 
independent right only before letters are accepted by the postal service and after they
48See on this point the BVerwGE 79,110 at 115.
49"Postscheckgeheimnis", regulated in § 6 PostG. In this context, see Badura, Kommentar zum Bonner 
Grundgesetz, Art. 10, Par. 34, p. 19. As the author points out, the same cannot be said, e.g., of 
accounts opened in the bank attached to the postal service -Tostspaikassengeheimnis", § 6 PostG.
50See BVerfGE 6,299 et seq.; 67,157 at 172.
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have been delivered by it, as well as when a letter is sent by some means other than the 
postal service51.
In the context of this right, the term 'correspondence' can be interpreted as any 
communication from person to person carried out in writing as a substitute for oral 
com m unication52. This implies, first, that this right covers letters, telegrams or 
postcards, but not other act of sending such as parcels, newspapers, books, etc.; 
second, that it only covers the correspondence between some concrete sender and 
addressee, not correspondence in which either of the two is not personally identifiable.
For the secrecy o f a letter to be covered by art. 10, it must be surrounded by a 
certain objective expectation of "secrecy", that is, letters must be closed so as to provide 
secrecy. In this sense, contrary to the right to the secrecy of communications by post, 
the right under examination covers the content o f letters, but not other circumstances 
involved in their transportation, such as, the name and address of the sender and the 
addressee. Moreover, this right covers the content of letters only when these have been 
properly closed, hence not when their content lies open to public view, as in the case of 
postcards, or when they have been wrapped in such a way that their content can still be 
seen without effort. Borderline cases are of course bound to arise in which it is difficult 
to decide whether the content of a letter is easily visible. Such cases should be solved 
with regard not only to the objective adequacy o f the wrapping to guarantee secrecy but 
also to the subjective expectation o f  the sender or, to be more precise, having regard to 
what the wrapping can objectively say about the subjective expectations o f  the 
sender53.
3. "Telecommunications "
Finally, art. 10 recognises a right to the secrecy o f telecommunications. The 
coverage o f this right goes from the most traditional means of telecommunications, 
namely telecommunications by phone and telegraph to new means o f long-distance 
communication the secrecy of which might appear as worthy of protection, such as 
telefax, telex , electronic mail, etc. This right covers the secrecy o f  all 
telecommunications independently o f whether or not they are carried out by the post. In
51See Badura, Kommentar zum Bonner CG, Art. 10, Par. 28, p. 17.
52Badura, Kommentar... Par. 29, p. 17; Maunz-Dürig-Herzog, Grundgesetzeskommentar, Art. 10, p.
13.
53See, e.g., BGH (ZR), Urteil v. 20. 2. 1990, (1991) JZ 67 at 68. This position is sustained by 
Maunz-Dürig-Herzog, Grundgesetzeskommentar p. 14; Badura, Kommentar... Par. 29, p. 17.
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this respect, the question arises whether public telecommunication networks must be 
considered part o f the postal service. It has been noted54 that if they must, then the right 
under consideration remains rather narrow in scope, since most forms o f  
telecommunications take place within the framework of such networks. The discussion 
whether or not this is the case is, however, rather futile, since both rights are 
guaranteed in art. 10; moreover, they are guaranteed in similar terms, for as was the 
case with the secrecy o f the post, the secrecy o f telecommunications also covers not 
only the content but all other circumstances o f every particular communication55.
4 .  "Secrecy"
Art. 10 of the Basic Law recognises a right to the 'secrecy' of the post, 
correspondence and telecommunications. This element o f the definition of the art. 10 
right raises two issues: first, it must be decided which party in an act o f  
telecommunication is entitled to secrecy; second, the scope o f the term 'secrecy' as used 
in art. 10 must be defined.
4.1 Which Party has a Right to the Secrecy of an Act of
Telecommunication?
Which party in an act of telecommunication has a right to its secrecy? Is it only 
the sender, only the addressee, or is it both o f them? If both of them, does each party 
have a right to secrecy in a different phase o f the telecommunication process or do they 
both enjoy a simultaneous right to secrecy? O f course, these questions do not arise in 
the context of every means of telecommunication. It is, in fact, rather artificial to pose 
them in a context in which every piece o f  telecommunication contains a dialogue 
between the parties involved, as in the case o f telephone conversations, so that each 
party can be regarded as both the sender and the addressee. The above questions are 
relevant only in the context o f pieces of telecommunication in which the sender and the 
addressee can be individualised and separated. This is the case with telecommunications 
carried out by letter and through the post and o f all other types of telecommunications in 
which the parties involved do not hold a simultaneous reciprocal intercourse, such as 
telefaxes or electronic mail.
54See Maunz-Diirig-Herzog, Grundgesetzeskommentar p. 17.
55See BVerfGE 67.157 at 172; 85, 386 at 396.
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Nothing is specified in art. 10 o f the Basic Law as to which party to an act of 
telecommunication has a right to its secrecy. Ordinary law* on the other hand, gives 
certain indications in this respect. To begin with, according to the general view56, the 
criminal protection of the secrecy o f telecommunications (§ 202 Strafgesetzbuch) is 
accorded to the sender until the moment when the act o f telecommunication reaches the 
addressee, at which point protection is accorded to the addressee. This distribution of 
rights appears to have been confirmed by the Postordnung (PostO), which grants the 
sender o f a postal sending full control over it until the moment when it is delivered -the 
sender is entitled to have the postal sending returned upon petition any time before 
delivery (§44 .1 .1; 44.3 PostO). According to ordinary law, therefore, the questions 
formulated above could be answered as follows: until the moment when a piece of 
telecommunication reaches the addressee, only the sender has a right to the secrecy of 
this piece of telecommunication; from this moment onwards, the addressee becomes the 
only holder o f the right to secrecy.
Nevertheless, the conclusions reached at the statutory level cannot be 
automatically followed in the context of a constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. For one thing, the scope o f  a fundamental right cannot be defined 
by the scope o f one of the rights that individuals have vis-à-vis the postal system as 
users of the postal service; nor can it be defined by ordinary law but only by the 
Constitution. We thus have to tum to the Basic Law for hints on the issue o f which 
party to an act of telecommunication has a right to its secrecy. Now, art. 10 may give 
no indication as to which party has a right to the secrecy of an act o f  
telecommunication, yet this is one o f  the issues that can be solved by way of an appeal 
to the interest behind the recognition o f a right to the secrecy of telecommunications, 
that is, by an appeal to the interest in the protection of privacy. The relevant question 
therefore is which party has a privacy interest in an act o f telecommunication? It seems 
to me that the answer can only be that both parties to an act o f telecommunication have a 
privacy interest in keeping it secret, hence that an interference with the secrecy o f an act 
of telecommunication breaches the privacy interests o f  both the sender and the 
addressee, independently o f the particular moment in which the interference in question 
takes place. On this basis we can conclude that both parties to an act of 
telecommunication have a right to its secrecy57.
56See e.g. Dreher/Tröndle StGB 44. Aufl. § 202 Par. 7 and § 205 Par. 3; Schönkel/Schröder/Lenckner 
StGB 23. Aufl. § 202 Par. 8 and § 205 Par. 4; LK/Träger StGB 10. Aufl. § 202 Par. 24 and § 205 
Par. 4 (references in BGH (ZR), Urteil v. 20.2.1990, (1991) JZ 67 at 69).
57BGH (ZR), Urteil v. 20.2. 1990, (1991) JZ 67 at 68.
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4.2 The Definition of 'Secrecy' in the Context of Art. 10
As used in the context o f art. 10, the term 'secrecy' can be defined as the 
secrecy of an act o f telecommunication which is inherent in the act of communicating. 
This definition can be gleaned from some o f  the details of the definition of this coverage 
which have been explained above. Note for example that the particular circumstances 
surrounding an act o f  telecommunication are covered by the rights to the secrecy of the 
post and to the secrecy o f  other forms of telecommunication, but not in the context o f  
the right to the secrecy o f letters. Similarly, the content o f an open postal sending is part 
of the right to the secrecy o f the post, whereas the content of open letters is not covered 
within the right to the secrecy of letters. The reason is precisely that both the right to the 
secrecy of the post and the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications cover means o f  
telecommunication entrusted to services that can guarantee the secrecy o f their 
surrounding circumstances as well as the secrecy of the content o f  an open sending, 
which is not the case in the context o f the secrecy o f letters.
The fact that the term 'secrecy' defines the scope o f art. 10 in the terms 
specified above helps to solve some issues concerning the definition of the coverage o f  
art. 10. First, due to the definition of 'secrecy' the art. 10 right does not cover the 
secrecy of the circumstances surrounding a piece o f telecommunication vis-à-vis the 
particular employee to whom it is entrusted in as far as such circumstances lie open to 
his view, that is in as far as they are not secret to him. As far as this employee is 
concerned, art. 10 does not even cover the secrecy of the content o f  an act o f  postal 
sending using material which is not properly closed, that is, it does not cover the 
secrecy o f an open postal sending58. On the other hand, if  the surrounding 
circumstances of a piece of telecommunication remain secret, then they are covered by 
the art. 10 right even if  knowing them is essential in order that the telecommunication in 
question can be carried out; even in this latter case, finding out the details of an act o f  
telecommunication which do not lie in open view amounts to an infringement upon the 
right to the secrecy o f  telecommunication, hence it is only constitutional if it fulfils 
certain conditions which will be explained in the next chapter, among which art. 10.2.1 
of the Basic Law stipulates that they must be authorised by law (see § 5.1-2 Postgesetr, 
§ 14a ( 1 ) Fernmeldeanlagegesetz).
Secondly, the definition o f  'secrecy' implies that art. 10 does not cover the 
content o f telecommunications concerning communication partners or vis-à-vis a third 
person who has access to the conversation from a regular extension telephone se t Yet
58See BVerwGE 32, 129 at 130; 76,152 at 154.
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neither a party nor such a third listener may divulge the content o f a piece of  
telecommunication in question, since this goes against the right to privacy recognised in 
art. 2.1 and, eventually, against the more specific right to one's own voice also 
recognised within this provision. On the other hand, the circumstances that surround a 
piece o f telecommunications are covered by art. 10 also vis-à-vis communication 
partners. As a matter o f  fact, the secrecy o f these circumstances vis-à-vis 
communications partners has recently been reinforced by the European Commission in 
its "Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive concerning the 
protection o f personal data and privacy in the context o f  digital telecommunication 
networks, in particular the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and digital 
mobile networks"59. In this proposal (arts. 7 and 8), the Commission gives the 
subscriber of a telecommunication service the possibility both to have itemised bills and 
to effectuate a calling-line identification, yet it also makes it a duty for Member States to 
ensure that the privacy o f  the subscribers affected by such bills or calling-line 
identification devices will be preserved.
Finally, the way the term 'secrecy' is approached and the fact that this term 
defines the coverage of art. 10 sheds light upon the question of whether this provision 
embraces only closed-channel or also open-channel telecommunications, i.c. whether it 
only covers means of telecommunication the secrecy o f which is guaranteed on a 
technical basis or whether it also covers other means the secrecy of which lies in no 
more solid a basis than the expectations or hopes o f the parties involved. The German 
Constitutional Court has not yet had to judge on this issue, yet the way the term 
'secrecy' is interpreted within art. 10 suggests that the scope o f this provision is limited 
to closed-channel telecommunications. This is also the desirable solution. For, as I 
argued in section 1, the definition o f the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications can 
only be coherent if this right covers only telecommunications carried out through 
closed-channels, i.e. if the coverage o f this right is limited to telecommunications the 
secrecy o f which is guaranteed on a technical basis.
Admittedly, some common rationale could be found for the recognition o f the 
secrecy of both closed-channel and open-channel telecommunications as a single right, 
the problem is that in order to embrace these two types o f  telecommunications such a 
rationale must be rather lax, which means that it cannot have much strength as a point 
of reference for the definition o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications (the only 
instance o f such a rationale I can think o f is a 'reasonable expectation o f secrecy' where 
the term 'reasonable' is interpreted in subjective or social terms). Recognising the
59COM(94) 128 final - COD 288, Brussels. 13 June 1994.
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secrecy of open-channel telecommunications as part o f the same right as the secrecy o f  
closed-channel telecommunications would thus be to the detriment of the coverage o f  
the latter, since its otherwise rather clear boundaries would then be subject to ill- 
definition. This is not to say that the secrecy o f open-channel telecommunications ought 
not to be recognised as a right; this is only to say that the secrecy of open-channel 
telecommunications ought to be recognised within a different right to the rationale o f  
which it is closer, such as the right to privacy recognised in art. 2.1 o f the Basic Law.
The way the term 'secrecy' defines the coverage o f art. 10 proves important in 
the face of the development of the new means o f telecommunications. Let me give two 
examples. The first example is the so-called electronic mail (E-mail), that is the "system 
of message transfers sent between computer terminals via telephone lines"60. The 
provider o f this electronic telecommunication can have access to the content o f  
messages sent and keep a copy o f  them in case o f system failure. The question 
therefore arises whether the existence o f this possibility puts E-mail communications 
outside the coverage o f  art. 10 o f the Basic Law. This question has to be given a 
negative answer, because messages transmitted through E-mail do not lie in open view  
for the providers o f  the service. Having access to those messages thus amounts to an 
interference with art. 10 rights and may only be considered in accordance with the 
Basic Law to the extent that it is explicitly allowed in a legal text. Let me also note that 
E-mail services are provided by private parties, hence the secrecy o f this means o f  
telecommunication is not directly covered as a right under art. 10 o f the Basic Law. 
This issue will be developed in chapter 7.
The second example concerns conversations by portable telephones. 
Conversations carried out from a portable telephone are partially transmitted via radio 
waves. One can therefore conclude that they partially fall outside the coverage o f art. 10 
of the Basic Law, hence that the secrecy of part o f portable telephone conversations can 
only be protected within the right to privacy recognised in art. 2.1. This conclusion is 
particularly serious. For one thing, portable telephones have nowadays as much 
importance as traditional wire telephones have. In addition, parties to a portable 
telephone conversation are not usually aware o f  these implications, hence they have the 
same confidence in its secrecy as do the parties in a telephone conversation completely 
carried out via wire; nor does someone speaking through a wire phone always know 
that at the other side o f the line there is a portable phone. Before reaching a definite 
conclusion on the coverage of the secrecy o f  portable telephone conversations, I would
60R.W. Kastenmeier, D. Leavy, D. Beier, "Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective" 
(1989) Wise. L. Rev. 715 at 726, note 75.
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like to pay closer attention to the technical characteristics of these conversations; in 
particular, I would like to distinguish among three different portable telephone 
technologies, each of which implies a different level o f 'openness*.
A first type of portable telephones are cordless telephones, which consist o f "a 
handset and a base unit wired to a landline and a household/business electrical 
current"61. The level of 'openness' o f  this means o f telecommunication is very high. 
The reason is that from the handset to the base unit, a cordless telephone conversation 
is transmitted by AM or FM radio signals, which means that during this lapse a 
conversation can be intercepted from any radio set. Second, there are also cellular 
telephones. "When a caller dials a number on a cellular telephone, a transceiver sends 
signals over the air on a radio frequency to a cell site. From there, the signal travels 
over phone lines or a microwave to a computerised mobile telephone switching 
office"62. The cellular technology has some advantages over traditional 'cordless 
telephones': first, it makes portable phones available in areas distant from a telephone 
wire, typically in cars; second, cellular telephone conversations are more difficult to 
intercept than cordless telephones conversations: they can only be intercepted with a 
scanner particularly designed or adapted to this purpose. Finally, portable telephones 
can also be microwave telephones, which work through "extremely high frequency 
radio waves transmitted point-to-point on line-of-sight paths between terrestrial 
antennas, usually via satellite"63. These portable telephone conversations are most 
difficult to intercept: interception can only be carried out with the help of specialised and 
expensive equipment, which normally only satellite dish owners or intelligence 
agencies possess. In spite of these advantages, cellular phones appear to be taking over 
the market because they have a much higher channel capacity and allow the use of much 
more subscribers in an area.
In sum, portable telephone conversations are always partially carried out via 
radio waves, yet the extent to which these radio waves are accessible to the public 
varies with each mode of portable telephone. Cordless telephone conversations are 
accessible from any ordinary radio set; cellular and microwave conversations, on the 
other hand, are designed with the purpose of excluding uninvited ears, to the extent that 
they can only be intercepted with devices specifically and fundamentally designed for 
this purpose. Thus cordless telephone conversations appear to be open-channel, hence 
uncovered by art. 10 of the Basic Law, whereas cellular and microwave conversations 
are closed-channel and covered by this provision.
61Kastenmeier and others, "Communications privacy..." at 724, note 56.
62Ibid. at 723, note 50.
63Ibid. at 722.
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I would now like to draw attention to one fact: the German Ministry for Post 
and Telecommunications recently liberalised the sale and possession o f receivers for 
special frequencies o f  radio frequencies, these including the scanners which allow the 
interception o f portable telephone conversations64. In this legal context, it seems that 
the only sure mechanisms to avoid interception is the use o f digitalised types of cellular 
telephones (the so-called D1-D2 network). In this type, the transmission from the 
telephone to the cell site is digitalised and the conversation codified; the difficulties 
involved in the de-codification of a message make this mode of telecommunication truly 
'secret', i.e. closed-channel, hence covered by art. 10 o f the Basic Law.
What about the other types o f cellular and microwave portable telephone 
communications, then? Have they become open-channel by virtue o f the decision o f a 
German Minister to liberalise the sale o f special frequency receivers? Can a closed- 
channel modality o f telecommunication be transformed into the open-channel variety 
merely by making intercepting devices available to all? To answer this question with a 
simple 'yes' would be unsatisfactory, because this answer amounts to taking 
uncritically the is for the ought, in the realist fashion. A critical position instead ought to 
be adopted. I would for example consider it reasonable to classify telecommunications 
either as open or as closed channel depending on whether they can be intercepted with 
devices that can primarily be used for other legitimate purpose (as is the case with 
ordinary radio receivers), on the one hand, or whether they can only be intercepted with 
devices specifically or mainly designed for that purpose, on the other. In this latter 
case, one must conclude that the availability o f intercepting devices does not make 
closed-channel telecommunications stop being such. The coverage o f a constitutional 
provision cannot be defined by the legal regulation on the availability o f technical 
devices aimed at the violation o f this very constitutional provision. Rather, norms 
making intercepting devices available must be regarded as interferences with art. 10 o f  
the Basic Law.
The ideas developed in the above paragraphs as to how the term 'secrecy' 
defines the coverage o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications have recently 
found some support in the amended proposal of the European Commission for the 
Directive for the protection of privacy in digital telecommunication networks referred to 
above. This proposal limits the scope o f  this directive to closed-channel 
telecommunications; with respect to the open-channel part of some otherwise closed-
64Decision of 30 June 1992, 75. Jahresbericht des Landesbeauftragten für den Datenschutz, Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen, March 1993, pp. 13-14.
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channel telecommunications, the proposal makes it a duty for telecommunication 
organisations to inform the subscribers of the risk of interceptions and to offer them 
encryption facilities (see arts. 2 .2 ,2 .5  and 4).
4 .  " Invio lab ility11
Art. 10 recognises a right to the "inviolability'* o f  the "secrecy" of the post, o f 
letters and of telecommunications. Although the addressees o f the art. 10 right will be 
studied in chapter 7, let me make the point now that this right is directly addressed only 
to public authorities. To be more precise, it is addressed to all public authorities, 
whether or not these are in some way connected to the postal service itself. On the other 
hand, it is not directly addressed to private individuals, even if they run a 
telecommunication service. The inviolability of art. 10 rights, therefore, only results in 
the imposition o f duties upon public authorities. Let us now see what these duties are.
4.1 The State's Negative Obligations
As traditional rights o f defence against the State, art. 10 rights impose negative 
obligations upon public authorities. In this context, authorities may not obtain, whether 
directly or indirectly, any information about aspects o f telecommunications which, 
according to the above considerations, are covered by art. 10. As explained above, 
postal officers entrusted with some act of telecommunication do not infringe art. 10 
when they take notice of information concerning this piece o f telecommunication in as 
far as such information lies open to their view. On the other hand, in as far as such 
information does not lie in open view, taking notice of it encroaches upon the secrecy 
of telecommunications; yet this encroachment can be justified if the information taken 
notice o f is necessary to carry out the piece of telecommunication in question -provided 
of course that this is duly authorised by law, as will be explained in the next chapter 
(see § 5.1-2 PostG; § 14a (1) FAG). In addition, postal employees may not disclose to 
a third party any information about a communication obtained as part o f their duties on 
the job, whether the third party be private or a public authority to whom the information 
in question was not addressed (on this issue, see § 5.1 PostG).
Touching on a different point, the Constitutional Court has stated that 
infringements upon the secrecy o f telecommunications amount to violations o f  the 
rights of art. 10 even if these infringements have been consented to by one or even all 
of the parties involved. With respect to such infringements, the Court has posed the
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question of whether they are justified, that is whether the consented violations of the 
secrecy o f telecommunications touch upon the protected scope o f  art. 10 rights, an 
issue which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. On the other hand, the Court 
has considered that disclosing the content o f  an act of telecommunication by one of the 
parties involved does not amount to a violation o f the secrecy o f telecommunications. 
Nevertheless, show ing one's letters or taping and reproducing one's oral 
telecommunications might violate different rights of the other party involved in the 
communication, such as her rights to privacy, to intellectual property or to her own 
voice65.
4.2 The State's Positive Obligations
Art. 10 also imposes positive obligations upon the State. It is, in fact, 
uncontroversial that the State must provide for an adequate legal framework and adopt 
whichever immediate measures might be needed to protect the secrecy o f  
telecommunications against third parties; it must also develop the necessary procedural 
means to ensure the protection o f this right against the State itself66. Moreover, this 
double duty of the German State has been confirmed at the European level by the draft 
of the European Commission on the secrecy o f telecommunications (arts. 12 and 16). 
However, the existence o f these positive obligations is uncontroversial only in as far as 
the objective dimension of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is concerned, 
that is only in as far as this right is regarded as an 'institutional guarantee'67. The 
question that arises now is whether such positive obligations are also implicit in the 
subjective dimension of this right, that is whether the State's positive obligations in the 
context of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications can be the object of subjective 
claims.
The Constitutional Court has not yet faced this question. Moreover, it has not 
yet adopted a clear position with respect to the more general issue o f whether the State's 
positive obligations arising from fundamental rights can be the object of subjective 
claims on the basis o f  these rights. In this respect, the Court has only stated in more or 
less clear terms that the right to human dignity (art. 1.1) and the right to one's life and 
physical integrity (art. 2.2.1) taken together grant the individual a positive subjective
65This latter right has been included within art. 2.1*s right to personality in BVerfGE 34,238.
66See Mau nz - Diiri g- Herzog, Grundgesetzeskommentar, pp. 14,16 et seq.
67See BVerfGE 75,40.
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claim to having the minimum conditions for her existence guaranteed by the State68. 
Beyond this, all that can be said is that the Court has not precluded a potential future 
finding that fundamental rights can have a positive subjective dimension. This is so at 
the three levels where such a positive subjective dimension o f rights can exist. In other 
words, the Court has not stopped o ff the possibility that the State can be obliged, first, 
to provide an adequate legal framework for the protection of an individual’s 
fundamental rights against third parties, second, to develop an organisational and 
procedural apparatus which enables the actual protection o f  an individual's fundamental 
rights against the State itself69 and, third, even to provide for the exercise o f social 
rights in the narrow sense70. It is therefore likely that fundamental rights in Germany 
will in the future enshrine positive subjective claims against the State71. This however 
cannot yet be said to be the case.
With this I conclude my analysis o f the coverage o f the fundamental right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications as recognised in the German Basic Law. On the basis of 
this analysis we can affirm that in Germany the right is defined in rather clear terms. 
This is to be celebrated, even if  it implies that the secrecy of certain modes of  
telecommunication (i.e. open-channel modes) are left out o f the coverage o f this right. 
Besides, the secrecy of open-channel telecommunications is recognised as an aspect of  
the right to privacy recognised in art. 2.1 of the Basic Law. It is to be regretted only 
that the Constitutional Court has not ruled that the right to the secrecy o f 
telecommunications also has a subjective positive dimension, hence that it imposes 
subjective positive obligations upon the State. One can only hope that recognising this 
dimension of fundamental rights will be a future line in the evolution of the case-law of 
the Court.
68See BVerfGE 1, 97 at 104 et seq; 40, 121 at 133 (R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Nomos 
Veriagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1985, at 398).
69See R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte at 413-415 and 434, respectively.
70In this context, all the Court has stated is that holders of fundamental rights can claim access to 
means which are intended to enable the exercise of these rights in as far as such means have already 
been created by the State ("derivativen Teilhaberechte) (BVerfGE 33, 303 -Numerus-clausus case- and 
35, 79 -High-school organisation case), which in the end is just a variation of a negative right of the 
individual that the State does not prevent his access to means which facilitate the exercise of 
fundamental rights (see e.g. Ossenbuhl, "Die Interpretation der Grundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts", (1976) NJW, 2100 at 2104). Yet the Court has not precluded the possible 
existence of an additional subjective right that the State creates the necessary conditions for the exercise 
of fundamental rights ("orgmdre" Teilhaberechte) (BVerfGE 33,330).
71The way to this evolution is also being paved by the 'Federal Adminstrative Court’ 
CBundesverwaltungsgericht’ -BVerwG). It for example granted the individual a positive subjective right 
to the existential minimum before the Constitutional Court did and in much clearer terms (see Alexy, 
Theorie der Grundrechte at 398); in addition, the BVerwG has consistently stated that the fundamental 
right to found schools (art. 7.4 of the Basic Law) implies a claim to Lhe public finance of such schools 
(BVerwGE 23, 347; 27, 360) (see M. Hund, "Schutzpflichten statt Teilhaberechte?" Festschrift fur 
Wolfgang Zeidler, Band 2 p. 1445 at 1446 and 1450 et seq., Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York 
(1987)).
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Section 3: The United States
Introduction
Fourth Amendment
"The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized."
As was explained in the previous chapter, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
fourth amendment as recognising a right with a two-step structure: it recognises a right 
against searches and seizures, but only offers protection against those searches and 
seizures which are 'unreasonable'. In dealing with the coverage o f the fourth 
amendment, therefore, attention must primarily be focused on the terms 'search' and 
'seizure'.
The terms 'search' and 'seizure' define the coverage o f the fourth amendment 
right. This circumstance deserves at least two comments. First o f all, let me recall a 
remark I made when dealing with the structure o f the fourth amendment in chapter 3. 
As was then pointed out, the terms 'search' and 'seizure' indicate that the fourth 
amendment recognises a negative right, yet the question whether this provision also 
imposes positive obligations upon public bodies has, to my knowledge, not yet been 
addressed by the Supreme Court. Second, note that the fact that the terms 'search' and 
'seizure' define the scope of the fourth amendment right implies that this right is 
recognised in a manner contrary to most rights. By this I mean that, unlike most 
provisions recognising a right, the fourth amendment does not emphasise the behaviour 
that the holders o f the right it recognises may adopt (right to be secure), but on the 
behaviour that the addressees of this right may not adopt {right against searches and 
seizures)72. In other words, rather than describing the right itself the fourth amendment 
describes what constitutes interference with that right In this respect, this provision is a 
product of its history, since it was adopted not in order to guarantee security in general 
but in order to put an end to the practice o f  issuing general warrants for searches and 
seizure. This in fact explains why the "right against searches and seizures" appears at 
the foreground o f the amendment, whereas the "right to be secure" (in one's person,
72This becomes clear when comparing the fourth amendment with arts. 1-17 of the GG and, within the 
American framework, with the first, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments.
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house, papers and effects) hardly has any relevance; the latter seems included only as 
an introduction to the former, in an attempt to make the fourth amendment comply with 
the most general approach to constitutional rights taken in the U.S. Constitution.
The above characteristic of the wording of the amendment has had some 
practical consequences. Jurists' minds seem in general to be so shaped that they 
approach rights in an 'affirmative' manner, that is as rights to do something. The fact 
that in the case o f the fourth amendment a right thus recognised might be missing or 
might not be significant enough to account for the intricacies of the coverage of the 
fourth amendment has often created uneasiness. This is why courts, in particular the 
Supreme Court, have willingly undertaken either to reaffirm the importance of the 
fourth amendment 'right to security* or simply to find a more significant 'right to' as its 
object. The former was the tendency under the property reading of the amendment. 
This was surely conditioned by the fact that security in one's papers, objects and home 
are rights where an interest in property can easily be identified. The latter, on the 
contrary, has been the tendency under the amendment's privacy reading, in which 
context the interest in privacy has often been brought to the foreground and been 
spoken of as if it were the right directly recognised by the fourth amendment73. This 
alternative is now preferred probably because the literal wording of the amendment, 
even if it includes a 'right to security in one's person', does not stand strongly enough 
for privacy interests; additionally, mentioning privacy as the right recognised in the 
amendment initially helped the Court to stress its reaction against the property reading 
of the amendment and the rigidly formalistic type of judicial adjudication attached to 
it74.
All these considerations already give a first idea of how the interest in property 
and the interest in privacy have conditioned the coverage of the fourth amendment. In 
the following paragraphs I will attempt a more detailed analysis of this issue. This 
analysis will show that property acted as a rather narrow but very clear rationale for 
defining this coverage, whereas privacy has been acting in the opposite way, that is it 
has provided the fourth amendment with a scope of coverage which is as wide as it is
73See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 347 (1967); G. M. Leasing Corporation v. US, 429 US 338 
(1977); Wahlen v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977); US v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977); Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 US 128 (1978); Payton v. NY, 445 US 573 (1980); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 US 868 (1987); 
California v. Greenwood, 486 US 35; Florida v. Riley, 488 US 445 (19989); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 
US 91 (1990); Michigan Dep. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990).
74Privacy is cited as the object of the fourth amendment since, and especially when, it starts to slowly 
outweigh the importance of property behind the amendment. See, e.g., US v. Lejkowitz, 235 US 452 
(1932), Zap v. US, 328 US 624 (1946), Harris v. US, 331 US 145 (1947); Trupiano v. US, 334 US 
699 (1948), McDonald et al v. US, 335 US 451 (1948).
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ill-defined. In the context of both rationales, particular attention will be paid to the 
coverage of the secrecy of telecommunications under the fourth amendment.
1 . Searches and  Seizures u n d e r a  P rivate-P roperty  R ationale
1 .2  The F ou rth  Am endm ent
Interpreted in property terms, the fourth amendment was regarded as a 
provision guaranteeing a right to security in one’s house, papers and effects, i.e. a right 
to security in one’s -legitimate- property rights. Accordingly, the terms 'search' and 
'seizure' as used in the amendment were interpreted as synonyms for interferences with 
material property. In this context both searches and seizures independently amounted to 
an interference, yet attention primarily focused on seizures since they were regarded as 
a more significant threat to private property rather than searches. Thus far we have been 
dealing with the general guide-lines concerning the coverage of the fourth amendment. 
More particular statements in this respect were only made in borderline or otherwise 
dubious cases. Under the private-property rationale, such cases were the following:
[A] A first such case was Boyd v. U.S75. This case and how it influenced the 
property reading of the fourth amendment were analysed at length in chapter 2. At this 
stage one should only note that the Boyd case enlarged the scope of coverage of the 
fourth amendment beyond the common understanding of the terms ’search’ and 
'seizure'. In particular, the Supreme Court declared that the 'compulsory production' of 
one's private papers or of any private property in general is tantamount to a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of the amendment, even if no real seizure as commonly understood 
had actually taken place.
[B] If the case o f Boyd raised the issue of the forcible production of private 
property, the case o f Perlman v. CAS76 raised the issue of their voluntary production. 
In this respect, the Supreme Court took the view that the voluntary exposition and/or 
production of papers or personal effects did not amount to a search and/or a seizure. 
The Court thus confirmed what had been indicated in Boyd v. US, that is that only a 
forcible production of private property can be considered to be a search and seizure for 
the purpose of the amendment. 156
15Boyd v. U.S., 116 US 616 at 622 (1886).
16Perlman v. V.S., 247 US 7 (1917).
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This case also gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to judge on the issue of 
consented searches and seizures for the first time. Based on the view that the exposition 
and production of private property must be forcible, the Court reasoned that the 
concepts of search and seizure as used in the fourth amendment enshrine an idea of 
compulsion, be this physical or moral (i.e. threats). From this it concluded that 
searches and seizures carried out with the consent of the person affected thereby were 
not 'searches and seizures' for the purpose of the amendment, hence that the fourth 
amendment did not cover any right to security against them. The legal meaning of the 
words 'search' and 'seizure' was thus restricted with respect to their descriptive 
meaning. This restriction, however, would not be followed by the Court in later 
cases77. The Supreme Court soon took the view that rather than remaining outside the 
scope of the fourth amendment searches and seizures voluntarily permitted were not to 
be considered 'unreasonable'. Consent, therefore, started to be interpreted as an 
exception to the warrant requirement or, moreover, as a waiver to the protection of the 
fourth amendment.
[C] During the property reading of the fourth amendment, the scope of searches 
and seizures was still subject to a third restriction, a restriction which would remain as a 
leading feature of the property interpretation of the fourth amendment. I am referring to 
the so-called 'physical-infringement limitation' introduced in the case of Olmstead v. 
t/S78 and according to which the terms 'search' and 'seizure' only embraced physical 
interference with private property. This limitation was explained in chapters 2 and 3.
To summarise, on the basis of the interest in the protection of property the 
coverage of the fourth amendment appeared well defined. The fourth amendment was 
thought to recognise a right to security in one's home, papers and effects against 
forcible searches and seizures carried out by means o f physical infringement upon 
private property and this included the forcible production of private papers. A 
consequence of this interpretation of the fourth amendment was the exclusion of the 
secrecy of wire telecommunications from its coverage, as will now be explained.
1.2 The Case of Telecommunications
When looking at the coverage of the secrecy of telecommunications under the 
fourth amendment we have to depart from a distinction between written and wire
77The doctrine of Perlman was mainly followed in U.S. v. MitchelU 322 US 65 (1944) and also finds 
support in recent decisions of the Court (see Florida v. Terrance Bostick, 115 L Ed 2d 389 (1991)).
78Olmstead et al. v. US, 277 US 438, part, at 464-465 (1928).
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telecommunications. Written telecommunications (i.e. letters) fell under the heading 
'papers' or more broadly under the heading 'effects', hence they were regarded as 
instances of private property; similarly the stoppage and/or opening of this type of 
telecommunications were regarded as a seizure and/or search within the meaning of the 
amendment, since they had to be carried out by means of physical infringement upon 
private property. Their secrecy was thus covered by the amendment79. This was not the 
case for wire telecommunications, for here no private property is at stake and in 
principle interference with the secrecy o f wire telecommunications need not involve 
physical infringem ent upon rights o f possession. The secrecy of w ire 
telecommunication was therefore not covered by the fourth amendment, unless of 
course this secrecy had been breached by means of a 'physical infringement' upon 
private property, i.e. by trespass80.
Although heavily criticised on policy grounds81, the doctrine settled in the 
Olmstead decision survived for nearly forty years. During this time the secrecy of wire 
telecommunications did not remain completely unprotected, however, for soon 
Congress made it the object of statutory recognition and protection in Section 605 of the 
Communication A ct of 193482. Yet, for its recognition and protection as a 
constitutional right the property reading o f the fourth.amendment had to be definitely 
abandoned for the privacy one. It is to this that we shall now turn.
2 . Searches and Seizures tinder a Privacy Rationale
2.1 The Fourth Amendment
During the second third of this century, the approach of the Supreme Court to 
the fourth amendment evolved in the sense that privacy was accorded increasing 
importance as the underlying interest of the amendment, until the point (in the 1970s) 
when it completely replaced private property. The substitution o f privacy for property 
has had important consequences upon the coverage of the amendment. First, the 
amendment has no longer been conceived in absolute material terms. This implies that
79See Ex parte Jackson, 96 US 727 (1877).
80On Lee v. US, 343 US 747 (1952), Silverman v. US, 365 US 505 (1961); Lanza v. AT, 370 US 
139 (1962). In Silverman v. US the Court saw trespass in the insertion of an electronic listening 
device ('spike mike’) through a wall from the moment that it made contact with private premises, in 
particular the heating duct.
81 Perhaps the most significant criticisms were made by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion (see 
Olmstead, 277 US 438 at 470 et seq. (1928)).
8248 Stat. 1064, U.S.C.
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now a material interference is neither necessary nor sufficient for the amendment to be 
infringed, since interferences with a person’s privacy can also adopt non-material 
forms. As a result, the Court has turned away from much o f its preceding case-law on 
the coverage of the amendment, in particular it has abandoned the 'compulsory- 
production* enlargement and the 'physical-infringement' reduction of its scope. 
Second, a privacy interpretation implies that searches are regarded more dangerous than 
seizures for the purposes of the amendment and started to be perceived as its main 
focus of attention83. Third, persons have slowly replaced material objects as the main 
point of reference for the amendment84, from which a number of consequences 
followed, for example, taking physical evidence from persons85 or stopping them for 
the purposes of investigation have been regarded as seizures86 *.
The substitution of privacy for property has had a yet more important 
consequence, however. It appears that privacy has enlarged the coverage of the fourth 
amendment beyond the strict limits that a property-based, material interpretation had 
imposed upon it. It ought immediately to be added however that, as a counterpart, 
privacy has also exposed the amendment to a great deal of ill-definition. The reason is 
that privacy, which is a broad but rather ill-defined concept, has been regarded as the 
direct object of recognition of the fourth amendment, so that the coverage of this 
provision is now defined on the basis o f the scope of the 'right to privacy'. Indeed, as 
the Supreme Court started to interpret the fourth amendment in privacy terms, privacy 
started to be referred to as the direct object of this provision, the result being that the 
'right to privacy' took the place of the 'right to security' as the direct object of the 
amendment. Above I suggested some reasons why the Supreme Court might have 
brought privacy to the foreground; I would now like to look at the consequences that 
bringing privacy to the foreground has implied. To begin with, direct references to 
privacy have altered the two-level structure of the amendment by way of imposing 
'inherent limitations' upon its coverage, something that was analysed in the previous 
chapter. In addition, direct references to privacy have also affected the coverage o f the
83This is best appreciated in connection with the protected scope of the amendment, since the 
lawfulness of seizures has been made dependent on the lawfulness of searches. Particularly significant 
in this respect is the plain-view doctrine with respect to seizures (see chapter 3 above and chapter 5 
below).
84See explicit statements in this respect in e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); Sibron v. NY, 329 US 40 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979); 
Alabama v. White, 496 US 325 (1990); Michigan Dep. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990).
85See US v. Dionisio, 410 US 1 (1973); US v. Mara, 410 US 19 (1973).
860n this subject, see generally the Annotation by John F. Wagner Jr, J.D., "Law Enforcement
Officer’s Authority, under Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, to Stop and Briefly Detain, and 
to Conduct limited Protective Search of or frisk', for Investigative Purposes, Person Suspected of 
Criminal Activity -Supreme Court Cases", United. States Supreme Court Reports, 104 L Ed 2d 1046 et 
seq. (1991).
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amendment. The conceptual boundaries o f the right to privacy now define the scope of 
the fourth amendment, which entails the obvious risk that this provision will suffer 
from the same ill definition as the right to privacy. Let me now dwell on these latter 
consequences.
From the case-law of the Supreme Court one can glean that in the context of the 
fourth amendment, privacy is understood in terms of seclusion and secrecy, which 
would appear as a step towards giving this provision a rather clear definition. On the 
other hand, however, the Court has qualified the concept of privacy as used in the 
context of the fourth amendment in a way that creates strong uncertainty: the Court 
conceives of privacy as an individual's expectation of privacy. Expectations of privacy 
are subjective. Indeed, the Court initially relied on the expression 'expectation of 
privacy' to define the coverage of the right to privacy recognised in the fourth 
amendment in purely subjective terms: the Court affirmed that the fourth amendment 
recognises a right to privacy in what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public"87. Soon, however, the Court introduced objective 
standards into the definition of the fourth amendment right to privacy, so that a 
subjective expectation of privacy was necessary, but no longer sufficient for this right 
to be at stake. The Court thus ruled that the fourth amendment right to privacy embraces 
only expectations o f privacy which can be considered 'justifiable'88, 'legitimate'89 or 
're a so n ab le '90. F or example, the Court has dism issed as ’illegitimate' or 
’unreasonable' the expectation of privacy that a car passenger might have in the car 
where she is sitting91 or an expectation of privacy in areas or items lying in open view, 
an issue which was studied in detail in the previous chapter.
The coverage of the amendment is thus subject to the indeterminacy of the terms 
'justifiable', 'legitimate' or 'reasonable', particularly to the indeterminacy of the term 
'reasonable', which the Court prefers over the other two. To make things worse, the 
Supreme Court interprets the words ’justifiable', 'legitimate' and 'reasonable' in a way 
which only intensifies their indeterminacy, since it relies on social standards: an 
expectation of privacy has been deemed 'justifiable' or 'reasonable' only if society is 
ready to accept it as such. Let me give some examples: the Court has stated that the
&1Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351-352 (1967)
**Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 at 353; U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-749 (1971).
89t/.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7,11 (1976); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 100 S.Ct. 2256 (1980); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 US 765 (1983).
90Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 9 (1968); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Combs v. 
U.S., 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972); California v. Ciraolo, 104 S.Ct. 1809 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. 
U.S., 106 S.Ct 1819 (1986); California v. Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988); Florida v. Riley, 488 US 
445 (1989); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 US 91 at 97 (1990).
9^Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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fourth amendment does not cover the expectation of privacy that an individual may have 
in the garbage he has left for recollection outside the curtilage of his home, since this 
expectation is not accepted as reasonable by society92; on the contrary, it has 
considered that society does accept as reasonable the expectation of privacy of a 
houseguest in his host's home, hence that the fourth amendment applies in this case93.
The introduction of social standards into the definition of privacy is regrettable. 
On its basis privacy becomes even more imprecise, since it is left at the mercy of 
oscillations in social standards, or at the mercy o f oscillations in the judicial 
interpretation of social standards. An example of this is the question of whether 
somebody who is legitimately on the premises has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in them, hence whether she has standing against searches and seizures carried out in 
them; this question has sometimes been given an affirmative, sometimes a negative 
answer94. Moreover, the introduction of social standards into the definition of the right 
to privacy makes the scope of this right not only imprecise, but also necessarily 
narrower, for thereby its definition is laid in the hands of the major enemy of privacy,
i.e. society. As a result, the weight that the right to privacy is accorded when balanced 
against any other interest is seriously undermined, since it is measured by those who 
are most interested in keeping its weight low.
The Supreme Court thus undermines the relative importance of the right to 
privacy rather systematically. This confirms the idea advanced in chapter 1 that the right 
to privacy seems to be regarded by the Court as suspicious, since its protection is 
thought to respond to purely individualistic interests: the protection of privacy is sought 
by individuals in order that they can develop their own personality away from the gaze 
of society and public power. Thus conceived, the protection of privacy clashes with the 
protection of other interests which are thought to be more orientated toward the 
common good, be this social or political. This clash becomes more evident if one thinks 
that on the basis of the right to privacy individuals aim at concealing information from 
the public realm, independently of whether this information might turn out to be useful 
for the well-being of society and/or of the State. This individualistic approach to
92California v. Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988). Whether or not society accepts such an expectation of 
privacy as reasonable is however debatable (see Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion to the Greenwood 
case, ibid, at 51-52). On the issue of garbage searches, see, e.g., Gordon J. McDonald, "Stray Katz, is 
Shredded Trash Private?" 79 Cornell L. Rev. 452 (1994). Here the author distinguishes the Supreme 
Court's approach to garbage searches under the property and under the privacy reading of the fourth 
amendment
^Minnesota v. Olson, 495 US 91 at 97 (1990).
94See, for example, Jones v. US, 362 US 257 (1960) or Minnesota v. Olson, 495 US 91 (1990) for 
an affirmative answer and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128 (1978), US v. Salvucci, 448 US 83 (1980) or 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 US 98 (1980) for a negative one.
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privacy seems to prevail in the United States. Indeed, it seems to be in order to correct 
this 'antisocial' or even 'undemocratic' inclinations of the right to privacy that the 
definition of the right to privacy is left here in the hands o f society, which both 
undermines the importance of this right and contributes to making its boundaries ill 
defined.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has taken yet another step towards minimising 
the importance of the right to privacy. The Supreme Court does not take society to be 
the source of a prescription of what expectations of privacy ought to be taken as 
reasonable, but merely to describe what expectations of privacy actually are reasonable 
given the present circumstances. Only in situations in which privacy actually exists is 
an expectation of privacy reasonable; in situations where privacy has not been fully 
preserved, on the other hand, it is unreasonable to have expectations of privacy. By 
adopting this understanding, the Court undermines the role of the right even further not 
only is its scope defined by its major enemy; in addition, it is not invoked as a value, 
but called upon in a descriptive fashion to cover situations the privacy of which is 
actually respected by society and the State. In short, in accordance with the American 
realist tradition, the Supreme Court takes the is for the ought and grants the right to 
privacy a descriptive rather than a prescriptive role.
Moreover, the Court takes the is for the ought in a manner that suggests that it 
conceives of the right to privacy in all-or-nothing terms. If an individual renounces a 
sphere of his privacy in the context of his social relations (if he openly declares his 
sexual tendencies by participating in gay demonstrations, for example), even if he 
renounces a sphere o f his privacy only in his relations with a selected part of society 
(for example by way of going to gay clubs), then the Court assumes that he has 
altogether renounced his right to privacy in this sphere, hence that he cannot reasonably 
expect any privacy even from the State in the context in question. In brief, the Court 
assumes that a person renounces his right to privacy where he does not take adequate 
measures to protect his privacy from every prying eye. This all-or-nothing approach to 
the right to privacy stands in contradiction to a conception of privacy as a prerequisite 
for participation and for the exercise of constitutional rights95. For many constitutional 
rights (free speech, freedom of association, freedom of meeting) have by their nature to
95Indeed, it has been criticised by commentators who defend a more participatory vision of this right. 
See for example J J. Tomkovicz, "Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of 
the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province", 36 The Hastings L. J. 645 at 681 (1985); S.E. Sundby, 
""Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?" 94 
Col L Rev. 1751 at 1798 (1994). Compare the Supreme Court's all-or-nothing definition of the right 
to privacy with the 'graded' definition of this right made by the German Constitutional Court, which as 
has been mentioned regards privacy as a condition for participation. In particular, see BVerfGE 90,255 
esp. at 261 et seq.
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be exercised in the public light, that is, their exercise requires that an individual 
renounces a sphere of his privacy vis-à-vis society; yet in order that they can be 
exercised freely, an individual must be able to preserve this sphere of his privacy vis-à- 
vis the State. The State, that is, may not take note of whether and how an individual 
exercises his constitutional rights. The problem with the Supreme Court's doctrine of 
the right to privacy, however, is precisely that privacy is not approached as a condition 
for participation. The result is a very narrow definition o f the right to privacy. When 
looking at the right to the secrecy of telecommunications we will come across some of 
the negative consequences of the Supreme Court’s descriptive and absolute conception 
of the right to privacy.
2.2  The Case of Telecommunications
The position of the Supreme Court with respect to telecommunications 
underwent a radical change as its understanding moved from one characterised by 
property to one characterised by privacy. This could not be otherwise, since the issue 
of telecommunications stands as the landmark of a broader issue which conditioned the 
general passage in Supreme Court reasoning from property to privacy, i.e. whether 
there can be searches and seizures without physical infringement upon private property 
(the ’physical-infringement’ limitation). As a matter of fact, the 'physical-infringement1 
limitation had been introduced by the Court in a case (Olmstead v. US) dealing with 
wire telecommunications as an easy formula to justify that the secrecy of these could 
not be embraced by the amendment under its property reading. The property period in 
the history of the fourth amendment only came to a definite end when the Supreme 
Court abandoned the physical-infringement rule96 and a formal reading of the object of 
the amendment replaced its previous material reading, so that the concepts 'search' and 
'seizure' were no longer defined as physical intrusion into private property. Wire­
tapping and eavesdropping appeared as the most notable examples of non-physical 
searches and seizures.
In Katz v. t/597 the Court for the first time explicitly stated that there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone conversation, hence that for the 
purposes of the fourth amendment wire-tapping was a 'search' and the acquisition of
96The mere-evidence rule had been recently abandoned. See Schmerber v. California, 38 US 757 (1966) 
and Warden v. Hayden, 387 US 294 (1967).
97Katz v. US, 389 US 347 at 355 (1967).
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information therewith a 'seizure'98. Telecommunications thus came to join written 
letters within the coverage of the fourth amendment. It ought not to be forgotten 
however that thereby the boundaries o f the secrecy of telecommunications as a 
constitutional right have been exposed to the problems arising from the ill-definition of 
the coverage of the fourth amendment; to be more precise, the constitutional right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications is only recognised in so far as an expectation of privacy 
is involved which society is ready to regard as reasonable.
The Supreme Court has not had many opportunities to make decisions on the 
coverage of the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications. It is however 
worthy of note that on these few occasions the Supreme Court has not subjected the 
secrecy of telecommunications to the same degree of ill-definition as privacy. It is clear 
that in the context of telecommunications privacy is understood only as 'secrecy', so 
that the fourth amendment only covers the secrecy of telecommunications (that is it only 
covers the privacy of telecommunications which is inherent in their secrecy), or more 
precisely it only covers expectations of secrecy which society considers reasonable. 
What matters most is the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the condition o f 
reasonableness in this context. Thus far the Supreme Court seems to adhere to the idea 
that there is a reasonable expectation of secrecy only where secrecy is intrinsic to the act 
of communicating, thus translating the social standards that qualify the reasonableness 
of an expectation of privacy into an objective standard. According to the Court, for 
example, the fourth amendment does not apply vis-à-vis communication partners99. 
Similarly, it only covers the secrecy of first-class mail, i.e. the secrecy of letters and 
sealed packages subject to letter postage and thus closed to postal inspection100.
"Shortly before, in Berger v. NY (388 US 41 at 59 (1967)), the Court had implicitly considered 
eavesdropping within the scope of coverage of the amendment, independently of whether it had been 
carried out by way of physical intrusion. In fact, the Court examined whether die New York's statutory 
authorisation of eavesdropping (NY Code Crim Proc § 813-a) contravened the fourth amendment, thus 
accepting without arguing that eavesdropping is a kind of search and seizure.
"This doctrine had been developed with reference to Section 605 of the Communication Act of 1934 
(see Rathburn v. US, 355 US 107 at 110-111 (1957)). This idea can also be applied to written 
telecommunications: divulgence of their content by one party might violate some rights of the other 
party -such as his rights to privacy, intellectual property, honour- but not his right to the secrecy of 
telecommunication.
100US v. van Leeuwen, 397 US 249 (1970); US v. Ramsey, 431 US 606 (1977). This definition of 
the coverage of the right to the secrecy of letters is confirmed at the statutory level: Title 39 USC § 
3623(d) only recognises a right to secrecy to first-class mail of domestic origins. It is worthy of note 
that the coverage of the secrecy of written telecommunications under the fourth amendment was already 
so drawn by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Jackson (96 US 727 (1877)), that is, in the earliest case of 
the Supreme Court on this issue. Here the Court drew a line "between what is intended to be kept free 
from inspection, such as tetters and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to 
inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and other printed matter, purposely left in a 
condition to be examined" (ibid, at 733). It thus seems that in this early case the Court interpreted the 
fourth amenement as a provision aimed at the protection of privacy and defined privacy in terms of 
what is intended to be kept free from inspection by means which objectively guarantee freedom from 
inspection.
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Moreover, on the basis of this objective standard the Supreme Court has introduced a 
very im portant lim itation to the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications: it has ruled that the secrecy of the circumstances surrounding an 
act of telecommunication is not intrinsic in the act of communicating101, given that "pen 
registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies for the purpose 
of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law"102. 
Here we have an example of a descriptive definition o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications on the basis o f an all-or-nothing view of what expectations of 
secrecy society can consider reasonable. Since the circumstances surrounding an act of 
telecommunication are never totally secret, it is unreasonable to expect any secrecy in 
them with respect to anyone, independently of whether or not these circumstances 
ought to and actually could remain secret, at least to a certain extent and with respect to 
certain people103.
It thus appears that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications recognised in 
the fourth amendment has thus far escaped ill-definition. If the objective criterion hinted 
at by the Court continued to apply consistently (i.e. that this right exists in as far as 
there is an expectation of secrecy which is reasonable on objective or even technical 
grounds), then the Court would also have a more narrow margin of action to portray its 
mistrust of privacy in the context of telecommunications. This doctrine ought therefore 
to be celebrated as a positive step in the attitude of the Court towards 
telecommunications, perhaps even as a positive step in its more general attitude towards 
privacy. Yet it ought not to be celebrated without reservations: given that constitutional 
cases on the secrecy of telecommunications have thus far not been many, this doctrine 
cannot be considered in any sense consolidated yet. Now, this remark calls attention to 
a circumstance that contributes to the rather clear definition of the constitutional right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications. I am thinking of the existence of a well-defined 
statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications. This statutory right influences its 
corresponding constitutional right in at least three different ways. First, the existence of
101This is confirmed in Title 18 of the U.S.C., which only condemns the surveillance of the content 
of telecommunications, while it allows the surveillance of the circumstances surrounding an act of 
telecommunication, by means for example of a *pen register1. On the other hand. Title 50, Chapter 36 
of the U.S.C. contains a statutory exception to this rule for the case of foreign intelligence surveillance 
telecommunications. According to § 1801, this Chapter protects the 'content1 of telecommunications, 
this including "any information concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or the 
existence, substance, purport or meaning of that communication".
^  Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 at 742 (1979)
103Ibid. at 743 et seq.; see also US v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 US 953 
(1979) (mail covers, i.e. the recording by postal employees of the outsides of first-class envelops and 
sometimes the insides of lower-class mail addressed to a given person, falls outside the coverage of the 
fourth amendment). For this limitation of the coverage of the fourth amendment, see J. Applegate &  
A. Grossman, 'Ten Registers after Smith v. Maryland1', 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev., 753 et seq.
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a well-defined statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications reduces litigation 
concerning this right altogether andt in particular, it reduces the number of cases on the 
coverage of this right that arrive before the Supreme Court. Second, cases on the 
secrecy of telecommunications are hardly ever solved on a constitutional basis, since 
the Supreme Court avoids constitutional issues whenever possible and prefers to solve 
cases on statutory grounds ("if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one 
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or 
general law, the Court will decide only the latter"104). Finally, even when dealing with 
the secrecy of telecommunications from a constitutional point of view, the Court tends 
to reason on the basis of patterns provided by statutes, given that statutes regulate this 
right in much clearer terms.
In sum, it is certainly positive for the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications that it be clearly defined on objective grounds. With this it does not 
only escape ill-definition but also gives the Supreme Court fewer opportunities to 
portray its mistrust of privacy in the context of telecommunications. One ought 
however to be cautious when celebrating this doctrine because it is not consolidated at 
the constitutional level; moreover, it finds strong support in the existence o f a well- 
defined statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications. It would even seem that to 
some extent the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications depends upon 
its corresponding statutory right and that a change in the latter could provoke a change 
in the doctrine concerning the former. All in all, therefore, it is difficult to predict what 
can be the future line o f evolution o f the Court's doctrine. One can only hope that the 
Court will maintain its present definition o f the right to the secrecy o f 
telecommunications on purely constitutional grounds and that it will not occasionally 
fall back on vaguer sociological criteria to define the coverage of this right where they 
seem convenient. Given the general case-law of the Supreme Court on the fourth 
amendment, this latter danger unfortunately cannot be excluded.
One last question still remains unsolved unfortunately, namely, whether open- 
channel telecommunications are covered under the fourth amendment right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications. As in the cases of the ECHR and Germany, the answer 
to this question depends on whether or not the term 'secrecy' is interpreted in purely 
objectives terms, that is, it depends on whether or not secrecy (or, to be more precise, 
an expectation of secrecy that society considers reasonable) is thought to exist only 
where it is guaranteed on some objective technical grounds. Although this question has
^Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (Justice Brandeis concurring), 297 US 288, 346 (1936) 
(quotation from Martin Shapiro & Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, at 69).
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not yet been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, we have seen that so far the 
Court has only been applying the fourth amendment to situations where secrecy is 
inherent in the communication itself. This suggests that if the Court had a chance to 
decide on open-channel telecommunications, then it probably would not admit them 
within the coverage of the amendment -assuming of course that it does not alter its 
present doctrine. As was argued in the context o f the ECHR and Germany, this is the 
desirable solution.
As in the context of Germany, the fact that the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications only covers closed-channel telecommunications is of particular 
importance at a time when new modes of telecommunications are being developed. TTie 
reason is that not all of these new modes clearly fall within the category of closed- 
channel telecommunications. This is notably the case of portable telephone 
conversations, which are partially carried out via radio waves. The question therefore 
arises whether the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications covers 
portable telephone conversations. As was noted in the context of Germany, the answer 
to this question varies according to the kind of portable telephone technology at issue, 
for not all portable telephone conversations are equally easy to intercept. The easiest 
ones in the range are conversations carried out from a cordless telephone, for they are 
partially transmitted through AM or FM radio waves, hence they can easily be 
intercepted from any radio set. Then come cellular telephone conversations, which are 
partially transmitted via a radio frequency which can be intercepted by scanners 
designed or significantly modified for this purpose. Finally, microwave telephone 
conversations are transmitted through radio waves via satellite; the interception of these 
conversations requires complex technology which is only available for satellite dish 
owners and foreign intelligence agencies.
Which ones of the above modes of portable telephone telecommunications can 
be considered closed-channel, hence covered by the fourth amendment's right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications? When dealing with Germany I defended the idea that 
telecommunications can only be considered closed-channel to the extent that their 
interception is possible only by means specifically and fundamentally devised for this 
purpose105. On the basis of this criterion, I concluded that cordless telephone 
conversations are open-channel, whereas both cellular and microwave telephone 
conversations are closed-channel. The same considerations and conclusions apply in 
the context o f the United States. As in the context of Germany, the secrecy of the two
105In the context of the United States, this idea has been developed by Samuel Rosenstein, "The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and Satellite Descramblers: Towards Preventing 
Statutory Obsolescence" 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1451 (1992).
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latter modes of telecommunications must therefore be regarded as covered by the fourth 
amendment’s right to the secrecy of telecommunications, whereas the secrecy of the 
former falls outside the coverage o f this provision. This solution has also been adopted 
by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, which in 1986 amended Title 18 of the 
United States Code. This Act will be explained in detail in chapter 5; let me however 
advance the proposition that it limits the coverage of the statutory right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications it recognises to closed-channel telecommunications only and 
explicitly leaves out open-channel telecommunications.
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Conclusions
The three systems under consideration recognise a fundamental right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications, yet the terms in which the right is recognised differ in 
each of them. I would now like to draw attention to some points that constitute, I 
believe, the most significant differences in the coverage of the secrecy of 
telecommunication in these three systems. These differences will show that this right 
finds more favourable recognition in the ECHR and the German Basic law than in the 
Constitution of the United States. It will also become clear that the position of disfavour 
that the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications enjoys in the United 
States is mostly the result of a combination of two circumstances: first, here this right is 
recognised as part of the right to privacy and this is rather ill-defined; second, the right 
to privacy (hence also the right to the secrecy of telecommunications) is regarded as an 
individualistic interest worthy of limited recognition and protection.
First of all, the recognition o f the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in 
the ECHR has one clear advantage over the recognition of this right in Germany and in 
the United States. In the former system the secrecy of telecommunications as a 
subjective right has not only a negative but also a positive dimension. Art. 8 of the 
ECHR entails both negative and positive obligations for the Contracting Parties, so that 
on its basis, individuals can claim not only that the Contracting Parties refrain from 
interfering with its exercise but also that they provide adequate means to render its 
exercise possible. The advantages that this positive subjective dimension entails for the 
protection of the secrecy of telecommunications are obvious, yet this dimension has not 
been adopted either in Germany or in the United States, where the secrecy of 
telecommunications is recognised only as a negative right. In principle, neither the 
German Constitutional Court nor the Supreme Court of the United States seems to 
preclude the idea of recognising a positive subjective aspect to fundamental rights. 
Nevertheless, in order that they consider applying this idea to the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, and given the important commitments, even financial 
commitments, that positive subjective obligations imply for the public power, the right 
must be considered of particular importance. This is the case in Germany, where the 
right to privacy is regarded as a fundamental key to a constitutional democracy; 
moreover, here the recognition of a positive subjective dimension of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications could eventually be urged by the organs of the 
Convention, if some case on the subject should be brought before them. This is not, on 
the other hand, true of the United States, where the Supreme Court regards the right to
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privacy as antisocial and undemocratic and tries to minimise the importance that it is 
granted.
Second, the recognition of the right to the secrecy of telecommunication in 
Germany also has an advantage over its recognition in the other two systems. In 
Germany it covers the secrecy of the circumstances surrounding an act of 
telecommunication in as far as this is under the control of a telecommunication system 
(that is, in the context of the right to the secrecy of the postal system and the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications). The European Court and Commission of Human 
Rights have not yet had to express their opinion on this matter, whereas the Supreme 
Court of the United States has decided to disregard the importance of protecting these 
surrounding circumstances by way of adopting a 'realist' attitude toward their secrecy: 
on the grounds that telecommunication companies can easily have access to them, the 
Court argues that they cannot in truth be regarded as 'secret', hence that they are not 
covered by the fourth amendment. The circumstances surrounding an act of 
telecommunication have thus been excluded from the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications
Finally, in one important respect the recognition of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications in the ECHR and Germany is more favourable to the right than is 
the way it has been recognised in the United States. This concerns the relation existing 
between the secrecy of telecommunications as a fundamental right and privacy as the 
interest lying behind it. Both in the ECHR and in Germany, the secrecy of 
telecommunications is given independent recognition as an independent right. As a 
result, the right can be and is defined in clear terms, because its boundaries have been 
cut out of the shaky scope of the all-embracing right to privacy. Of course, saying that 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is independent from the right to privacy 
is not to say that privacy has no role to play in this context. Privacy, remains the 
interest behind the recognition of the right, thus it stands as a central interpretative 
criterion of particular importance in border-line cases; additionally, the right to privacy 
offers coverage to areas which do not -or do not clearly- fall within the scope of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications, thus compensating for the eventual rigidity 
that might arise from the clear definition of the right. For example, as an interpretative 
criterion, privacy helps to maintain a coherent rationale for art. 8 of the ECHR and 
imposes a certain interpretation of the right to respect for correspondence (i.e. that this 
right covers the freedom to engage only in open-channel telecommunications intended 
to be held in secret), whereas in Germany it leads to the conclusion that both parties to 
an act of telecommunication have a right to its secrecy. As a subsidiary right, privacy 
plays a role in the crucial question of whether the right to the secrecy of
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telecommunications also covers open-channel modes o f telecommunication. Open- 
channel telecommunications should not be covered by the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications if this is to keep its internal coherence, yet that does not mean that 
they will remain unprotected. As long as they are intended to remain private, open- 
channel telecommunications are covered by the subsidiary right to privacy.
In the United States, the relationship between the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications and the right to privacy is not the one depicted above. Here the 
recognition of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in the Federal Constitution 
is a by-product of the rise of privacy as the interest underlying the fourth amendment 
right against searches and seizures. The coverage of this right therefore depends on the 
concept of privacy, that is, the definition of the right to privacy decides the extent to 
which the terms 'search' and 'seizure' must be read to embrace interferences with the 
secrecy of telecommunications. Therefore, the coverage of the secrecy of 
telecommunications is subject to the ill-definition which characterises the scope of the 
right to privacy. The ill-definition of the right to privacy has been reinforced by the 
Supreme Court, which has furthermore interpreted the scope of this right in restrictive 
terms. At the source of their position there is the idea that privacy is a suspect interest 
because it protects individual preferences for secrecy and seclusion at the expense of the 
common good, which tends to require publicity. In order to compensate for the 
antisocial character of privacy, the Court has defined the right to privacy on the basis of 
sociological and 'realist' patterns. It has defined the right to privacy as an expectation of 
privacy that society (i.e. the greatest enemy of privacy) is willing to accept as 
'reasonable' or 'legitimate', and has stated that this can only be the case if total privacy 
is already implied in the situation in question.
Nevertheless, the coverage of the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications has thus far escaped ill definition. In fact, in the context of 
telecommunications, the expression 'reasonable' or 'legitimate' expectation of privacy 
(here 'reasonable' or 'legitimate' expectation of secrecy) has so far been interpreted in 
purely objective terms, so that an expectation of secrecy is considered 'reasonable' or 
'legitimate' by society where secrecy is inherent in the act of communicating. As long 
as this rationale is respected, the right to the secrecy of telecommunications can keep its 
internal coherence, which makes it easy to identify, hence to protect. Positive though 
this doctrine is, however, cases on the subject have so far been few, if compared to the 
number of cases there have been on searches and seizures. It therefore remains to be 
seen whether the purely objective definition of the fourth amendment right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications will be followed consistently, or whether the Court will 
fall back upon its more general and better established practice of defining the fourth
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amendment right on sociological grounds, if it finds a reason for doing so. The 
existence of a well-defined statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications might 
help the Court to maintain a clear definition of this right at a constitutional level, yet the 
Court should also avoid the risk of making a constitutional right depend upon statutes. 
In short, in the United States the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications so far appears to be well defined. However, this position is not a 
consolidated 'doctrine' and, given the Court's more general and better established 
doctrine on the fourth amendment, it is difficult to predict whether it will be held 
consistently, at least, whether it will be held without the Court's relying upon the 
statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
As a final remark, I would like to note that unfortunately the question of the 
coverage of open-channel telecommunications has not yet been faced straightforwardly 
in any of these three systems, at least not at the constitutional level. A clear answer to 
this issue, however, is rather urgent, given the growth of modalities of 
telecommunication which are transmitted through open channels, such as cordless 
telephones. My opinion is that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications ought to 
be well-defined on the bases of a clear rationale and that this implies that, to the extent 
that they are open-channel, the secrecy of all these new systems should remain outside 
the coverage of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
Indeed, the definition of an independent right to the secrecy of closed-channel 
telecommunications relies on a clear rationale or point of reference, i.e. the right covers 
telecommunications the secrecy o f which is guaranteed on technical grounds. On the 
other hand, the definition of a right to the secrecy of open-channel telecommunications 
must rely on a much vaguer rationale, such as the existence of a more or less reasonable 
expectation of secrecy in an act of telecommunication. A common recognition of these 
two rights would have to rely on this latter rationale as a common point of reference, 
something which would clearly be in detriment to the coverage of the secrecy of 
telecommunications carried out through closed channels. The situation would be worse 
in cases where the reasonableness of an expectation of secrecy is measured in 'realist' 
terms, that is, on the basis of things as they are, as is the case in the United States. This 
situation can be avoided if the secrecy of open-channel telecommunications is 
recognised as an independent right or, in the absence of such a right, if it is recognised 
as part of the right to privacy. Only in this way can the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications conserve its clear, effective definition, while the secrecy of open- 
channel telecommunications can be covered in the same terms as it would be under an 
all-embracing right to the secrecy of telecommunications. It is reassuring that both the 
U.S. Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 and the draft of the European
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Commission for the Directive for the protection of privacy in digital telecommunications 
have adopted this point of view.
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CHAPTER 5: THE OBJECT OF THE RIGHT TO THE SECRECY OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE PROTECTED SCOPE
Introduction
In chapter 4, I analysed the coverage of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications as defined in the ECHR and the Constitutions of Germany and the 
United States. In the present chapter, I will look at the sphere within the coverage of 
this right that each of these three systems is willing to protect; in other words, I will 
look at the way the ECHR and the Constitutions of Germany and the United States 
define the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. As was 
explained in chapter 3, the protected scope of a right is generally defined from outside, 
that is, it is defined by reference to the sphere within the coverage of a right that may go 
unprotected; it was also explained in chapter 3 that this definition is the result of having 
struck a balance between the right in question and other conflicting constitutional 
principles. These ideas will be illustrated in the present chapter. We will see that art. 8 
of the ECHR, art. 10 of the German Basic Law and the fourth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States do not define the area within the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications that may not be infringed upon; rather, they define the area of this 
right that may be lawfully interfered with (to be more precise, they define the conditions 
under which interferences are lawful). We will also see that the definition of this area of 
non-protection is done on the basis of the balancing technique as the basic criterion.
In this chapter, I will also try to add to my contention that the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications is better off where it is defined in clear terms and where 
privacy is regarded as a condition for participation, hence where the protection of 
privacy is regarded as a pillar of the constitutional democratic system. Indeed, it will 
appear in this chapter that conceiving of privacy as a purely individualistic interest 
lowers the relative weight that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is given 
when balanced against other interests. In addition, I will try to show that the relative 
position of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is made even weaker where 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is recognised as an aspect of the right to 
privacy, where this right is recognised, that is, as an aspect of a right whose conceptual 
boundaries are highly ill-defined.
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Section 1: The European Convention on Human Rights
Introduction
Article 8:
"I. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.
II. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of his 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others."
The protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications within the 
ECHR is defined in paragraph 2 o f art. 8. According to this provision, art. 8 only 
protects against interferences with the right to correspondence which are not "in 
accordance with the law" or which are not "necessary in a democratic society" for the 
pursuance of some of the interests mentioned in this article. The following pages will 
analyse the scope of these two expressions.
As a preliminary to this analysis some comments are in order. First of all, note 
that paragraph 2 refers to all the rights recognised in paragraph 1 without distinction. 
Thus, the following arguments apply not only to the right to correspondence, but also 
to the rights to private life, family life and home; similarly, these arguments will be 
developed on the basis not only of the case-law on correspondence, but also of the 
case-law on each of these three other rights.
Second, the use of the conjunction "and" indicates that the expressions "in 
accordance with the law" and "necessary in a democratic society" do not impose 
alternative requirements, but requirements which must be fulfilled independently. As a 
consequence, an interference is unlawful from the moment that it does not comply with 
either of the two, so that once one o f the requirements has not been fulfilled then an 
examination o f the other one is often considered redundant and avoided. The 
Convention's organs have always preferred to analyse the requirement of legality first, 
thus following the order art. 8 proposes. This preference can be justified on the 
grounds that the fulfilment of the requirement of legality is easier to check than the 
fulfilment of the necessity requirement. This explains why the Convention's organs 
generally face this latter requirement only when the issue cannot be avoided, that is they
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study the "necessity" of an interference only when this has already proven to be 
"lawful"1.
Finally, note that the requirements of art. 8.2 only apply in as far as the holders 
of the rights recognised in art. 8.1 have not waived the exercise of these rights in the 
particular case at issue; in other words, the requirement of legality and the requirement 
of necessity must only be fulfilled by interferences with art. 8.1 rights which have not 
been explicitly or implicitly consented to by the victim of such interferences2. Consent 
thus appears as a limit to the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications.
1. "In Accordance with the Law"
As well as other provisions of the Convention3, art. 8 requires that interferences 
with the rights it recognises be in accordance with the law. Yet no indication is given as 
to how the word "law" ("loi" in the French version of the Convention) must be 
interpreted. Neither did the Convention's organs initially feel compelled to give a 
systematic interpretation of this word. In the earliest cases on art. 8 hardly any attention 
is paid to the requirement of legality at all4; subsequently, both the Commission5 and 
the Court6 started to check whether that requirement had been fulfilled, yet without 
entering into the question of the scope of the requirement itself.
A comprehensive and systematic interpretation of the requirement of legality 
was only accomplished in the Court's judgment in the Sunday Times case7. This case
its opinion to Silver and others v. U.K. (Series B, vol. 51) the Commission, eager to clarify its 
position, studied the "necessity" of the interferences in question, even though these had previously been 
found unlawful (see Par. 299-300, 310-311, 320-321, 345-346, 361-362; pp. 78, 79-80, 81, 85, 88 
resp.). After this case, and despite the criticism of some dissenting opinion (see the dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Pcttiti to the Malone case judgment) the avoidance of that stage can be considered a settled trend. 
2See, e.g., Ap. No. 13134/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Dec. 1990, 67 D&R p. 216 at 223-224.
3 See articles 2 (1), 5 (10), 9 (2), 10 (2) and 11 (2).
4See, e.g., Ap. No. 793/60, Dec. Adm. Com. of 21 Dec. 1960, 5 Coll. Dec. p. 3; Ap. No. 1628/62, 
Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Dec. 1963, 12 Coll Dec. p. 68; Ap. No. 2516/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 23 
May 1966, 20 Coll Dec. p. 39; Ap. No. 2413/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 Dec. 1966, 23 Coll Dec. 
p. 9; Ap. No. 3717/68, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1970,31 Coll Dec. p. 105.
5Ap. No. 5459/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 23 March 1972, 40 Coll Dec. p. 78; Ap. No. 4960/71. Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 19 July 1972,42 CoU. Dec. p. 57; Ap. No. 5852/72. Final Dec. Adm. Com. of 8 July 
1974, 46 Coll Dec. p. 145; Ap. No. 7736/76, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 May 1977,9 D&R p. 207; Ap. 
No. 8065/77, Dec. Adm. Com. of 3 May 1978, 14 D&R p. 247-248; Ap. No. 7308/75, Dec. Adm. 
Com. of 12 Oct. 1978, 16 D&R p. 33-34.
6Golder v. U.K.. judgment of 21 Feb. 1975, Series A, vol. 18; Klass and others v. Germany, judgment of 6 Sep. 1978, Series A, vol. 28.
^The Sunday Times v. U.K. Op. Com. of 18 May 1977, Series B, vol. 28, par. 177, p. 60; Judgment 
of 27 Oct. 1978, Series A, vol. 30.
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deals with art. 10 of the Convention, yet articles 8 and 10 have similar structures and 
their respective paragraphs 2 are drafted in similar terms8; in particular, they both 
contain a requirement of legality. On account of these similarities, the Convention's 
organs have applied the doctrine developed in the Sunday Times case to the art. 8 
requirement of legality9.1 will now proceed to analyse this requirement. My discussion 
will first focus on the diverse features of the requirement of legality, namely on its 
substantial and on its formal features; second, on the basis of those features, I will 
consider which norms fall within the scope of the term ’law " as used in art. 8.
1.1 Features of the Requirement of Legality
A first question concerning the requirement of legality is whether this 
requirement is merely formal or whether it also has substantial content. "In a formal 
sense the term covers any act performed in accordance with the procedure for legislative 
action laid down by the constitution of the State in question. In the substantial sense it 
covers any act by the public authorities laying down general, permanent and binding 
rules of law"10. The preparatory work on the Convention does not throw any light 
upon this issue. Yet the provisions o f the Convention followed the draft of the United 
Nations International Covenants very closely and, according to the United Nations 
Secretariat’s commentary on the draft, these Covenants use the term "law" in a 
substantial sense11. This seems to indicate that art. 8 imposes a requirement of legality 
understood in a substantial sense.
The Convention's organs did not initially share this point of view. As was 
observed above, they did not initially pay much attention to the requirement of legality 
and when they did this requirement was considered fulfilled with the mere existence of
8Art. 10.2: 'The exercise of these freedoms ... may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safely, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others...".
9In the context of the right to correspondence, the leading cases on this issue are Silver and others v.
U.K. (Op. Com of 11 Oct. 1980, Series B, voi. 51; judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A, voi. 61) 
and Malone v. U.K. (Op. Com. of 17 Dec. 1982, Series B, voi. 67; judgment of 28 June 1984, Series 
A, voi. 80). The Convention's organs were aware that, in the English version of the Convention, each 
provision expresses the requirement of legality differently -art. 8.2 demands that interferences be "in 
accordance with the law", whereas art. 10.2 demands that they be "prescribed by law". Yet, the 
symmetry between both of the paragraphs 2 led them to rely on the French version, where the same 
literal expression -"prevue par la loi"- is used (see Sunday Times case judgment. Par. 48, p. 30; Silver 
and others case judgment. Par. 85, pp. 32-33).
10Jacques Velu, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Respect for Private 
Life, the Home and Communications" Privacy and Human Rights -Reports and communications 
presented on the 3rd colloquy about the E.CJJJÌ. Ed. by A.H. Robertson, 1970, p. 12 at 70.
11 Ibidem.
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a legal basis for an interference12. This position is no longer held, however. At a 
certain stage, the Court explicitly stated that the art. $ requirement of legality is not 
merely formal but also requires that the laws which justify an interference have certain 
standard of quality13. Let us now see what the features of this standard of quality are.
1.1.1 "In Accordance with the Law" as a Substantial Requirement.
[A] Foreseeability
"A norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be ab le ... to foresee, to a 
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action 
may entail"14.
Foreseeability is at the centre of the substantial aspect of the requirement of 
legality. As the above quotation indicates, it is not required that 'laws' be foreseeable 
with absolute certainty, but only with "sufficient precision", "to a degree reasonable in 
the circumstances'\ a question which, o f course, is to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis. In other words, 'laws' need not enable individuals to foresee with absolute 
accuracy when their right to respect for correspondence is likely to be lawfully 
interfered with, so that they can adapt their conduct accordingly. Rather, 'laws' must 
only give adequate indications as to when public authorities may undertake such 
interferences15. Moreover, 'laws' can be considered foreseeable even if they confer a 
certain margin of discretion upon the authorities which must apply them; all they must 
do is be precise as to the margin of discretion accorded and provide sufficient guidance 
as to how the discretion they confer must be exercised16.
12"It is beyond doubt that the interference was 'in accordance with the law', that is Rules 33 (2) and 34 
(8) of the Prison Rules 1964" (Golder v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 18, Par. 45. p. 21); 'This 
requirement is fulfilled in the present case since the 'interference* results from Acts passed by 
Parliament" (Klass and others v. Germany judgment. Series A, vol. 28, Par. 43, p. 22).
13Silver and others v. U.K., Op. Com. Series B, vol. 61, Par. 282, p. 74; Malone v. U.K., Op. Com. 
Series B, vol. 67, Par. 121, p. 48, judgment. Series A, vol. 82, Par. 67, p. 32; Kruslin v. France, 
judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A, vol. 176, Par. 27, p. 20; Margareta and Roger Andersson v. 
Sweden, judgment of 25 Feb. 1992, Series A, vol. 226, Par. 75, p. 25; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 
judgment of 24 Sep. 1992. Series A, vol. 244 Par. 88, p. 27.
14Silver and others v. U.K., Op. Com. Series B, vol. 51, Par. 282, p. 74. See also Malone v. U.K., 
Op. Com. Series B, vol. 67, Par. 121, p. 48.
15Malone v. U.K. judgement. Series A, vol. 82, Par. 67, p. 32, Kruslin v. France judgment. Series A, 
vol. 176, Par. 35, p. 24.
16Silver and others v. U.K judgment. Series A, vol. 61, Par. 88, p. 33; Margareta and Roger 
Andersson v. Sweden judgement. Series A, vol. 226, Par. 75, p. 25; Herczegfalvy v. Austria judgment. 
Series A, vol. 244, Par. 89-91, p. 27; Ap. No. 13800/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 july 1991, 71 D&R 
94 at 107-108.
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[B] The Existence of Adequate Safeguards Against Abuse
'The phrase 'in accordance with the la w '.... implies .... that there must be a 
measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph l" 17.
This statement of the Court is extremely misleading, in that it could lead to the 
conclusion that lawful interferences with correspondence must be based on laws which 
also provide for adequate safeguards against abuses, whereas this is not at all the case. 
Indeed, providing for adequate safeguards has never been regarded as a material feature 
of "law" under art. 8. The Court has even affirmed that such "safeguards [need not] be 
enshrined in the very text which authorises the imposition of restrictions"18. The 
existence of such safeguards is the object of the right to an effective remedy against 
Convention wrongs, a right recognised in art. 13 and which will be addressed in 
chapter 6. In addition, providing for adequate safeguards can be regarded as part of the 
positive obligations that art. 8.1 imposes on the Member States, an issue studied in the 
previous chapter in order to comply with a rt 8.1, Member States must ensure that their 
legal systems, taken as a whole, provide for adequate guarantees against interferences 
with correspondence. In sum, a broader look at the case-law of the Convention organs 
shows that the States are under the obligation to provide for adequate safeguards 
against violations of the Convention rights, yet that providing for adequate safeguards 
is not considered a feature of the requirement of legality under art. 8.2, so that laws 
which do not contain such safeguards may still be 'laws' in the sense of art. 8.2, hence 
the interference based on such laws may still be 'lawful'.
Equally misleading is the insistence of the organs of the Convention that 
limiting laws must provide for "a measure o f protection ... against arbitrary 
interferences" by public authorities with the right they limit19. For, in spite of what this 
might seem to indicate, the organs of the Convention have always regarded such a 
measure as a requirement of the rule of law. To be more precise, they have always 
referred to such a measure when dealing with limiting laws which confer a discretion 
upon a public authority, as a way to say that, in order to comply with art. 8.2, such 
laws must indicate the scope of the discretion they confer. In other words, in using the 
expression 'measure of legal protection' the organs of the Convention only want to
17Malone v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 82, Par. 67, p.32.
Silver and others v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 61, Par. 90, p. 34,
19See, e.g., Herczegfalvy v. Austria, judgment of 24 Sep. 1992, Series A, vol, 244, Par. 89, p. 27; 
Funke v. France, Crimieux v. France and Miailhe v. France, judgments of 25 Feb. 1993, Series A, 
vol. 256, Par. 56-57, p. 25, Par. 39-40, pp. 62-63, Par. 38-39, p. 90, respectively; Ap. No. 13800/88, 
Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 July 1991, 71 D&R p. 94 at 107.
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remind us (unfortunately not in a very clear way) that the definition of the protected 
scope of art. 8 rights must primarily be 'legal', that is, that it must primarily be carried 
out by laws.
1.1.2 "In Accordance with the Law11 as a Formal ReQuirement: the Accessibility of the 
Law
"The law must be adequately accessible, the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given 
case"20.
As a formal requirement, 'legality' imposes the requirement that laws be 
adequately accessible. A law is accessible if it is published, yet publication is not the 
only way of conforming with this requirement. In the case o f Silver and others, the 
Court affirmed that certain unpublished restrictions imposed on prisoners' rights to 
correspondence were "in accordance with the law", insofar as prisoners had been 
informed in good time of their existence and content through an explanatory notice21. 
Law is therefore accessible (hence that it is 'law* under art. 8) if it has been made 
known, by whatever means.
To summarise, a law is 'law' under art. 8, hence it can allow interferences with 
art. 8 rights, if it is foreseeable with sufficient precision and adequately accessible. 
These are necessary requirements. The question that arises now is whether these 
requirements are also sufficient, that is whether every norm can authorise an 
interference with a r t  8 rights provided that it is foreseeable and accessible, or whether 
the requirement of legality additionally imposes the requirement that such interferences 
be only authorised by certain particular types of norms. It is the view of the organs of 
the Convention that foreseeability and accessibility are not sufficient requirements and 
that only certain norms fall within the scope of the term 'law' as used in art. 8.2. Let us 
now look at what these norms are.
Sunday Times v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 130, Par. 49, p. 31. 
21 Silver and others v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 61, Par. 94, p. 36.
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1.2 Scope of the Term 'Law* under Article 8 (2)
[A] International Law
"[T]he interference in question must have some basis in domestic law"22.
As this statement shows, the word "law" only embraces "domestic law". 
International laws are thus excluded, unless, of course, they have been incorporated 
into the domestic law of a Member State and then comply with the substantial and 
formal features of the requirement of legality. Compliance with the requirement of 
legality can be difficult for international norms, even if incorporated into domestic law, 
because they tend to be too general and abstract to be considered 'foreseeable* under 
art. 8.2. Nonetheless, whether or not they can be considered ’laws', provisions of 
international law are not irrelevant under art. 8 in that they may contribute to setting an 
adequate framework for the decision whether an interference is "necessary in a 
democratic society"; for "a restriction which violates a State's international obligation is 
n o t... necessary in a democratic society"23.
The provisions of EEC law deserve separate attention, since EEC law is not 
international, but supranational law, hence it is "law" under art. 8.2. Again, the 
requirement of legality must be fulfilled in its diverse features and, again, the main 
difficulty arises from the foreseeability of the law. From this point of view, self­
executing provisions can be considered 'law' taken by themselves, whereas other 
provisions are only 'law' in combination with the provisions by which they are 
complemented and executed24.
[B] Unwritten Law
"The Court observes that the word 'law' in the expression 'prescribed by law' 
covers not only statute but also unwritten law"25.
Unwritten law is 'law' under art. 8. This statement applies primarily to common 
law. In this respect, there has always been absolute agreement among the organs of the 
Convention and the applicants and governments involved. As the Court affirmed, the
22Silver and others v. U.K. judgment, Series A, vol. 61, Par. 86, p. 33.
23P. J. Duffy, "The Protection of Privacy, Family Life and Other Rights under Art. 8 of the 
E.C.H.R." (1982) (2) Yearbook of European Law, p. 191 at 206.
24See Ap. No. 6871/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 3 March 78,12 D&R (1978), p. 14 at 18-19.
25Sunday Times v, U.K. judgment, Series A, vol. 61, Par. 47, p. 30. See also Malone v. V.K., Op. 
Com. Series B, vol. 67, Par. 124, p. 49, judgment Par. 66, p. 31; Chappel v. U.K., judgment of 30 
March 1989, Series A, vol. 152. Par. 52, p. 22.
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opposite interpretation "would clearly be contrary to the intention of the drafters of the 
Convention", for it would strike at the very roots of the legal system of States which 
are Party to the Convention26, In the context of continental legal systems case-law is 
also considered 'law', yet it is not 'law' independently taken but only in so far as it 
helps the interpretation of rules having the force of law. In other words, in order to 
judge on the foreseeability of the legal rule at the basis of limitations on art. 8 rights, 
account must be taken not only of this legal rule itself but also of the case-law 
developed in its regard27.
Needless to say, in order to be considered 'law', both common law and 
continental case-law must be duly accessible and foreseeable. The difficulty, as usual, 
lies in the requirement of foreseeability. Only settled jurisprudential trends can be 
considered predictable and can thus be at the basis o f an interference with the right to 
respect for correspondence. Hence the possibility is precluded of restricting this right 
on the basis of rules newly created by the judiciary.
[C] Written Rules Lacking the Force of Law
"It was common ground between Government, Commission and applicants that 
a basis for the interferences was to be found ... not in the Orders and Instructions 
which lacked the force of law"28.
Rules lacking the force of law are not "law" under art. 8. This means that, taken 
independently, they do not offer sufficient basis to justify an interference with the right 
to respect for correspondence. The only question is whether, and if so to what extent, 
non-legal rules that have as their source legal rules may regulate interferences with this 
right. The Convention's organs have accepted that laws leave some discretion to 
administrative authorities, since laws cannot cover every eventuality, hence they cannot 
make every interference sufficiently foreseeable29. Moreover, the Convention's organs 
have considered that conferring such discretion is even desirable, lest laws become too 
rigid to keep pace with changing circumstances30. They have only required that laws
26Sunday Times v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 130, Par. 47, p. 30.
27See Kruslin v. France judgment, Series A, vol. 176, Par. 29, pp. 21-22 and the case-law cited 
therein.
28Silver and others v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 61, Par. 86, p. 33.
29Silver and others v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 61, Par. 88, p, 33.
30See Sunday Times v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 130, Par. 49, p. 31; Olsson v. Sweden, 
judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A, vol. 130, Par. 62, p. 31; Eriksson v. Sweden, judgment of 22 
June 1989, Series A, vol. 156, Par. 60, p. 25.
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which confer a discretion indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of the discretion and 
the way it must be exercised31.
[D] Administrative Practice
The conclusions reached above with respect to rules lacking the force of law can 
also be applied to administrative practice. This is obvious when administrative practice 
has been couched in systematic rules. Yet* even when this is not the case, there seems 
to be no reason why administrative practice should not be a legitimate basis for 
interferences with art. 8 rights, provided that it acts as a complement to a legal rule and 
that it fulfils the requirement of legality in its formal and substantial features, i.e. that it 
is foreseeable and accessible.
At first sight, it would seem that the organs of the Convention do not share this 
viewpoint: the Commission has affirmed that M,law' (...) plainly does not include mere 
statements of administrative practice"32. Yet, statements such as this prove misleading 
if read out of context. For, whenever an administrative practice has been in question, 
the organs of the Convention have analysed whether this practice fulfils the 
requirements of foreseeability and accessibility necessary to be considered "law" under 
art. 8. The Convention's organs were thus open to the idea of counting administrative 
practice as law, providing that it complied with these requirements. This has never been 
the case, however. In the cases dealt with by the Convention's organs, an 
administrative practice was either not accessible (it consisted of secret measures33) or 
not adequately foreseeable (it did not have "binding effects" upon administrative 
authorities, hence it was impossible to predict whether it would be applied to particular 
cases34).
This then concludes the analysis of the first requirement that art. 8 imposes 
upon restrictions to the right to respect for correspondence and leads to the analysis of 
the second one, i.e., the requirement that restrictions be "necessary in a democratic 
society" for the protection of certain interests mentioned in art. 8.2. Before proceeding, 
however, let me briefly summarise the content of the above analysis. We have seen 
that, as interpreted by the organs of the Convention, the requirement "in accordance 
with the law" imposes clear and well-defined limitations to restrictions of the right to
31 Silver and others v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 61, Par. 88, p. 33; Margareta and Roger 
Anders son v. Sweden judgement. Series A, vol. 226, Par. 75, p. 25.
32Malone v. U.K., Op. Com., Series B, vol. 67, Par. 124, p. 49. See also Leander v. Sweden, 
judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A, vol. 116, Par. 51, p. 23.
33Leander v. Sweden, judgment. Series A, vol. 116, Par. 51, p. 23.
34Malone v. U.K., Op. Com. Series B, vol. 67, Par. 124, p. 49.
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respect for correspondence. It requires that these restrictions be adequately foreseeable 
and accessible. In addition, this requirement demands that such restrictions be 
contained in domestic written norms which have the force of law or in norms of 
common law (in common-law countries); yet in order to judge whether the 
requirements of foreseeability and accessibility have been fulfilled these norms must be 
read together with norms which lack the force of law, administrative practice and case- 
law which might eventually complement and interpret them.
2 . "Necessary in a Democratic Society (in the Interest of ...V
According to art. 8.2, restrictions to the right to respect for correspondence 
must be "necessary in a democratic society" for the pursuance of some particular 
interests. This requirement implies that a balance must be struck between a particular 
restriction and the interests this restriction pursues. This balance is structured in two 
phases. In the first phase, every measure limiting the right to correspondence must be 
one that is pursuing an aim important enough to justify a limitation on this right. In the 
second phase, once a limiting measure has been thus justified, the concrete terms in 
which this limiting measure is imposed must be balanced against the aim in question in 
the particular case at issue, that is, using the terminology of art. 8.2, limiting measures 
must prove that, in a democratic society, they are necessary for the pursuance of that 
aim.
These two phases will now be analysed in turn. Before let me recall only that 
the requirement that limitations be "necessary in a democratic society" must be 
respected not only by concrete m easures which interfere with the right to 
correspondence, but also by the 'law' which is (must be) at the basis of such concrete 
measures. In other words, the second requirement o f art. 8.2 applies "both to the 
domestic legislator and to the bodies, judicial amongst other, that are called upon to 
interpret and apply the laws in force"35.
2.1 The First Phase: the Pursuance of Some Particular Interests
Every measure limiting the right to respect for correspondence must pursue 
some interest which is considered important enough to justify a limitation on this right. 
In principle, it would seem that art. 8.2 does not leave much flexibility in this first
^  Hardy side v. U.K., judgment of 7 Dec. 1975, Series A, vol. 24, Par. 48, p. 22.
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phase of the balancing process» since it explicitly settles the interests which can 
legitimately justify an interference. Nevertheless» the aims listed in this provision are 
conceived in such general terms and have such strong ideological» sociological and 
political connotations that they still allow for a wide scope of flexibility in then- 
application. Moreover» the generality of these aims is such that it seems fairly easy to 
justify any measure as having been adopted in the pursuance of one of them. As a 
matter of fact» the Convention's organs have never decided that an interference with the 
right to respect for correspondence was unlawful just because it did not pursue any of 
the listed aims; rather» they have always decided on the basis of whether or not the 
interference in question could be considered "necessary in a democratic society" in 
order to attain one of these aims. The aims listed in art. 8.2 thus appear hardly to play a 
relevant role when deciding on the legitimacy of interferences with the right to respect 
for correspondence.
2.2 The Second Phase: "Necessary in a Democratic Society"
Once a limitation of the right to correspondence is justified as being in 
pursuance of one of the interests listed in art. 8.2» it must additionally be proved that it 
is "necessary in a democratic society" for the pursuance of the aim in question. In order 
for it to be proved» a fair balance must be struck between the limiting measure and the 
aim this measure pursues in the particular case at issue. In striking this balance, the 
Convention's organs rely on the following criteria: [1] limiting measures must be 
proportionate; [2] limiting measures must also be necessary; in addition [3], a 
dissenting opinion to a Court judgement has suggested that limiting measures should 
also prove to be adequate to reach the aim they pursue. I will now look at these three 
issues36.
[1] Proportionality
According to the Court, the expression "democratic society" enshrines a 
principle of proportionality: the expression "democratic society" does not merely have a 
formal content, that is it does not merely stand for the majority rule, but it also implies 
substantial notions such as "pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness"37. In this
36In my discussion I will sometimes refer to the Handy side case, a case which concerns the freedom of 
expression recognised in art. 10 (Handyside v. U.K., judgment of 7 Dec. 1975, Series A, vol. 24). The 
reason is that it is in this case where the Court first made a systematic analysis of the expression 
“necessary in a democratic society" and that the result of this analysis is applicable in the context of 
art. 8 because, as in the case of the expression "in accordance with the law", the expression "necessary 
in a democratic society" is identical in articles 8 and 10.
37PJ. Duffy, *The Protection of Privacy at 208-209.
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substantial sense, the Court sustains, a "democratic society" imposes a requirement of 
proportionality upon interferences with art. 8 rights: restrictions of a person's interest in 
the protection of her right to correspondence are in accordance with the Convention 
only if they are proportionate to the aim they pursue, i.e. with the aim that justifies the 
limitation in question38.
[2] Necessity
In addition to being proportionate, a 'fair balance' requires that limitations of the 
right to respect for correspondence must also be "necessary". As interpreted by the 
Convention's organs, this requirement o f necessity stems from a combination of the 
term "necessity" explicitly used in art. 8.2 and the expression "democratic society". In 
the Court's view, it is implicit in a "democratic society" that a restricting measure 
cannot be upheld if the aim it pursues can be equally reached by other means which are 
less intrusive upon the rights involved39. In other words, the Court has considered that 
it is part of a fair balance that the level o f infringement upon the right to respect for 
correspondence be the lowest possible, that is, that this right only be subject to the level 
of infringement which is absolutely necessary, i.e. indispensable to achieve a particular 
aim40.
[3] Adequacy
In his dissenting opinion to the Handyside case. Justice Mosler suggested that, 
"in a democratic society", a restricting measure ought to be considered "necessary" only 
if, independently taken, it proves adequate to achieve the aim it pursues. The adequacy 
of a measure, Justice Mosler continued, should not be decided on the basis of its actual 
success in achieving its aim; rather, account ought to be taken o f whether or not "from 
an objective point of view, the measures ... could never have achieved their aim 
without being accompanied by other measures"41.
38With respect to the right to family life, see Moustaquim v. Belgium (judgment of 18 Feb. 1991, 
Series A, vol. 193, Par. 41-46, pp. 18-20) and Beldjoudi v. France, judgment of 26 March 1992, Series 
A, vol. 234, Par. 74*79, pp. 27-28. For cases dealing with the right to correspondence, see Silver and 
others v. U.K.; Margareta and Roger Anders son v. Sweden, Series A, ol. 226, Par. 95-97, p. 31; 
Pfeifer and Plank! v. Austria, judgment of 25 Feb. 1992, Series A, vol. 227, Par. 47, p. 19; Campbell 
v. U.K., judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A, vol. 233, Par. 52, p. 21.
39As an example, the "prior ventilation restriction", contained in some of the Standing Orders 
regulating the management of prisons in the United States, was considered disproportionate since its 
aims could also be attained with a "simultaneous ventilation rule" (Silver and others v. U.K., Op. 
Com. Series B, vol. 51, Par. 302, p. 78; see also Par. 314 and 340-341, pp. 80 and 84).
40Note however that in the judgment to Handyside v. U.K. (Series A, vol. 24, Par. 48, p. 22) the 
Court had referred to "necessity" in much looser terms. The term "necessity" was then considered 
stricter than expressions such as "admissible", "ordinary" (ait. 4.3), "useful" (art. 1.1 of Protocol No. 
1), "reasonable" (art. 5.3 and 6.1) or "desirable"; yet it was also considered more flexible than 
expressions such as "indispensable", "absolutely necessary" (art. 2.2) or "strictly necessary" (art. 6.1).
41Handyside v. U.K., judgment, Series A, vol. 24, separate opinion of the Judge Mosler, Par. 2, p. 
33.
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The majority of the Court has never expressed its opinion on whether a 
restricting measure must be 'adequate* if it is to be regarded as the result of a 'fair 
balance'; yet the application of a requirement o f 'adequacy' is hardly avoidable, not 
because it is part of a 'fair balance' (in the next section I will argue that in truth it is not) 
but because it is inherent in the idea that limiting measures may not be imposed 
arbitrarily. In addition, the suggestions of Justice Mosler would bring a harmonisation 
of the definition of the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
in the ECHR and Germany: in Germany, 'adequacy' is, together with necessity and 
proportionality, one of the requirements enshrined in the so-called principle of 
reasonableness, a principle which can be considered the equivalent of the principle of 
the 'fair balance' applied by the Convention’s organs.
Thus far we have considered the terms in which the Convention's organs strike 
a balance between limitations to the right to respect for correspondence and their aims. 
It has been pointed out42 that the Court more and more often refers to the requirement 
that lawful interferences with a right must not infringe upon the 'very essence' of the 
right in question. The question has been raised of whether the non encroachment upon 
the 'very essence' of a right constitutes an additional requirement for lawful 
interferences with rights or whether it merely amounts to the requirement of 
proportionality which interferences must fulfil in the context of a fair balance. In my 
opinion, this latter is the correct answer, that is, I believe that a limiting measure 
respects the 'essence' of rights in so far as it is proportionate to the aim it pursues and it 
violates the 'very essence' o f a right in so far as it is out of proportion with this aim. 
The reasons why I sustain this position will be developed in depth in Section 2 of this 
chapter.
When an applicant complains that one of his rights has been violated, the organs 
of the Convention must judge whether or not the limitation of this right is the result of a 
'fair balance' having been struck, i.e. whether or not the limitation was proportionate 
and necessary. Nevertheless, State authorities are thought to be in a better position to 
judge on the proportionality and the necessity of certain restrictions and have therefore 
been granted a certain 'margin of appreciation'43. The expression 'margin of 
appreciation' is widely used by the organs of the Convention to refer to an area of
42Marc-Andr6 Eissen, "The Principle of Proportionality", The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, p. 125 at 144.
43See the judgments to Hctndyside v. U.K., Series A, vol. 24, Par. 48-49, p. 22-23; Klass and others 
v. Germany, Series A, vol. 28, Par. 65, p. 26; Silver and others v. U.K., Series A, vol. 61, Par. 97 
(b), pp. 37-38. See also the cases of Funke. Crimieux and Miailhe v. France, judgment of 25 Feb. 
1993, Series A, vol. 256, Par. 55, 38 and 36, respectively.
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discretion granted to the Contracting Parties within which they can make a final 
decision on the proportionality and the necessity of a restriction44; conversely, this 
expression also defines the scope o f supervisory power that the organs o f the 
Convention retain. The doctrine of the 'margin of appreciation' has been developed by 
the organs of the Convention with a view to keeping a balance between the sovereignty 
of the Contracting Parties and their obligations under the Convention; in other words, 
the ’margin of appreciation' aims at balancing the need for a Contracting Party to act in 
accordance with what is demanded by its specific political, economic and social 
context, on the one hand, with the need for the Convention's organs to develop a set of 
principles which can be applied across the entire Convention, on the other45. It follows 
from the very nature of the margin of appreciation that it cannot be defined in the 
abstract. Whether or not a Contracting Party acted within the limits of this margin, 
hence whether or not its action is subject to revision by the Convention's organs, is 
something to be decided in every individual case. One can however note some general 
tendencies in the case-law of the organs of the Convention, among which the tendency 
to make the margin of appreciation widest in the context of economic rights and most 
narrow in the context of aspects o f  privacy, such as the secrecy of 
telecommunications46.
Thus, when the Convention's organs receive a person's complaint that his right 
to respect for correspondence has been violated, they follow this logical sequence: first, 
they analyse whether or not the restriction of this right remains within the 'margin of 
appreciation1 of the Contracting Parties; second, to the extent that this is not the case 
they continue to analyse whether or not this right has been limited on the basis of a fair 
balance, i.e. whether or not the limitation is proportionate and necessary. These 
questions can only be decided on the basis of the particular circumstances of every 
individual case. Nevertheless, certain restrictions have always been discarded by the 
Convention's organs as being intrinsically out of balance -a case in point is prohibitions 
that are blanket and general, that is, prohibitions which leave no room for possible
44Attention has been drawn to the (regrettable) fact that the Convention's organs often use the 
expression 'margin of appreciation* in an ambivalent way: they use it both to refer to the extent to 
which a restriction is non-reviewable and also to refer to the extent to which the way in which a 
restriction has been imposed is justifiable (see R.St J. Macdonald, 'The Margin of Appreciation", The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston- 
London, 1993, p. 83 at 84-85). Yet, the expression 'margin of appreciation' only has an independent 
meaning of its own in the former case; in the latter, it is simply a way to refer to the scope of non­
protection of a right and to the fact that whether or not this scope is at stake must ultimately be decided 
by the Convention's organs.
45R.StJ. Macdonald, "The Margin of Appreciation", at 83.
^Macdonald, "The Margin of Appreciation" at 108,123.
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adjustments to the particularities of a case47. Some other general rules can also be 
induced from the case-law of the Convention's organs. For example, they have ruled 
that victims of telecommunication surveillance need not be informed thereof in as far as 
this would endanger the efficacy o f the measure of surveillance and that this does not 
fail to be proportionate and necessary48. Another example is the professional 
correspondence between a prisoner and her law yer prisoners' correspondence with 
lawyers are considered to be o f a privileged nature and, in principle, should be 
unhindered or, at least, it should only be hindered upon more weighty reasons than any 
other correspondence49. Also in the context of imprisonment, stopping or censoring 
private letters on the basis that they "hold the [prison] authorities up to contempt" has 
been considered as lacking proportionality50.
With this I finish my analysis of the protected scope of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications in the ECHR. These last considerations have come to confirm 
the first impressions noted when studying the expression "in accordance with the law", 
that is that art. 8 of the ECHR as interpreted by the organs of the Convention subjects 
restrictions to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications to strict and rather well- 
defined limits. Restrictions of this right are lawful only if they have been consented to 
by their victims or, alternatively, provided that they fulfil the following requirements: 
[1] they must be based on a domestic rule which must have the force of law or be 
common-law (even if it can be complemented by case-law and/or non-legal rules) and 
which must be duly foreseeable and accessible; [2] they must pursue one of the 
interests mentioned in art. 8.2 and [3] they must be the result of the striking of a fair 
balance between the limitation of this right and the interest that its limitation pursues. 
The 'fair balance* requirement implies that restrictions must be both proportionate to 
their aim and absolutely necessary to achieve their aim. National authorities enjoy a 
certain margin of appreciation to impose the limitations they consider proportionate and
47Silver and others v. U.K.% Op. Com. Series B, vol. 51, Par. 323-333, 348, 357, 363, 374, 387, pp. 
82-83, 85, 87. 88, 90, 92.
^Klass and others v. Germany, judgment. Series A, vol. 28, Par. 58. Ap. No. 10439/83, 10440/83, 
10441/83, 10512/83 and 10513/83, Dec. Adm. Com. of 10 May 1985, 43 D&R, 34 at 116; Ap. No. 
10628/83, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 Oct. 1985, 44 D&R 175 at 194; Ap. No. 13564/88, Dec. Adm. 
Com. of 8 June 1990,65 D&R 210 at 219.
49This doctrine was set in the context of the so-called 'simultaneous ventilation rule' existing in the
U.K. (rule that a prisoner’s outgoing letters have to be shown at the same lime to the prison Governor 
or the Secretary of State, in accordance with Standing Order 5B 34(j) which regulates prison 
management). According to the Convention's organs, this rule may be necessary in a democratic 
society for the prevention of disorder in prisons, yet it may not apply to prisoners' correspondence with 
lawyers. See Campbell v. U.K. judgment. Series A, vol. 233, Par. 52, p. 21; Chester v. U.K., Report 
Com. of 17 May 1990, 68 D&R p. 65 at 78-79; see also Ap. No. 12976/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 
Oct. 1991,71 D&R p. 45.
50An example could be the rule that it is disproportionate to stop or censor private letters (Silver and 
others v. U.K. judgement, Series A, vol. 61, Par. 64 and 99, pp. 26 and 38; Pfeifer and Plankl v. 
Austria, judgment. Series A, vol. 227, Par. 47, p. 19).
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necessary free from the supervisory power of the Convention's organs, yet the 
Convention's organs are interpreting the margin of appreciation granted to national 
authorities in more and more narrow terms, particularly in the context of rights relating 
to privacy, such as the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. This clear and broad 
definition of the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is 
coherent with the clarity and broadness of the definition of the coverage of this right, as 
we studied in the previous chapter.
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Section 2: Germany
Introduction
Article 10:
"1. Privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications is inviolable.
2. Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a law. Where a restriction 
serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of 
the Federation or a Land the law may stipulate that the person affected shall not 
be informed of such restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced 
by a review of the case by bodies and subsidiary bodies appointed by 
parliament."
Art. 10.2.1 requires that restrictions to the protection of the right to 
communicate secretly be ordered pursuant to a law, that is, it imposes a 'legislative 
reservation o f power* (Gesetzvorbehalt)51 upon restrictions to the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications. Standing by itself, this provision appears rather poor in content: 
all it requires is that limitations to the secrecy of telecommunications respect the 
principle of democracy and the rule of law attached to it. In order to grasp how 
significantly the protected scope o f this right is limited by the Basic Law, art. 10 must 
be read together with paragraphs 1 and 2 of art. 1952 and with the principle of 
reasonableness (Grundsatz der Verhaltnismafiigkeit) which the Constitutional Court 
considers implicit in the Basic Law.
Art. 19.1 qualifies the legislative reservation of power as imposed in art. 
10.2.1; it requires, in particular, that restrictions be made pursuant to laws which must 
be general and which must explicitly name the basic right they limit (in our case the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications) indicating the provision where this right is 
recognised (in our case art. 10). For their part, art. 19.2 and the principle of 
reasonableness set substantive limits to the restrictions of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications; they require, respectively, that restrictions of this right do not 
encroach upon its essential content and that they be reasonable in the pursuance of a 
legitimate end.
511 have taken the translation of Gesetzvorbehalt into the English 'legislative reservation of power* 
from Christian Starck, "Constitutional definitions and protection of rights and freedoms" in Rights, 
Institutions and Impact of International Law according to the German Basic Law (Ch. Starck ed.), p, 
25, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1987.
52"(1) In so far as a basic right may, under this Basic Law, be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such a 
law must apply generally and not solely to an individual case. Furthermore, such a law must name the 
basic right, indicating the Article concerned.
(2) In no case may the essential content of a basic right be encroached upon"
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This section will be dedicated to the analysis of the conditions that the Basic 
Law imposes upon lawful restrictions to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. 
This will include an analysis of the legislative reservation of power, both as a formal 
and as substantive requirement, and of the limits such restrictions are subject to, i.e. the 
essential content and the principle of reasonableness.
1. The Legislative Reservation of Power
1.1 The Legislative Reservation o f Power as a Formal Requirement
The right to communicate secretly "may be restricted only pursuant to a law" 
(art. 10.2.1 GG). The imposition o f a legislative reservation of power in the limitation 
of fundamental rights responds to the idea that such limitations should be controlled by 
the principle of democracy. In fact, the law-maker is here called upon to play a quasi­
constitutional role: he is called upon to complete the regulation of the object o f a 
constitutional right, for the restriction and regulation of rights are but different aspects 
of a single activity53. Given the importance o f this role, in this context the term "law" 
(iGesetz) is used in a technical sense. This means that "law" only refers to acts which 
have been enacted according to the procedures that are specifically provided for the 
enactment of formal laws. Such procedures require that laws be enacted by the 
representative organs directly elected by the people. This is so both at the federal level 
and at the level of the Länder. At the former, formal laws are enacted by the federal 
Parliament54; at the latter, they are enacted by the legislative Chambers of the Länder55. 
The only exception to this technical conception of law is pre-constitutional law: 
according to the Constitutional Court, pre-constitutional restrictions to fundamental 
rights need not be couched in formal laws in order to be lawful56.
In order to comply with art. 10.2.1, formal laws must regulate restrictions to 
art. 10 rights to such an extent that it can be foreseen which concrete limiting measures 
may be taken by the administrative power. Limiting laws must thus be precise57, to the
53See BGHSt 29,244 at 249.
54Ait$. 76,77,78 and 82 of the GG.
55See Sigurd Hendrichs, "Art. 19", Grundgesetzkommentar, Hrg. von Ingo von Münch, 2. Auflage 
München 1981, Band I, p. 690.
56See BVerfGE 9,63 at 70; 9, 73 at 76; 9. 213 at 221-222; 15, 226 at 231; 22,114 at 122; 28, 21; 
34, 293 at 303.
57Limiting laws, however, may use general or indeterminate teims in so far as their meaning has 
somehow become clear, be this in the practice, in the case-law or by way of their interpretation in
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extent that they may not accord the administration any discretion to regulate the 
circumstances in which rights ought to be limited. Needless to say, art. 10.2.1 only 
requires that it be foreseeable whether a limitation may be imposed by the 
administration, not whether and when a limitation is actually going to be imposed58.
The requirem ent that restrictions o f the right to the secrecy o f 
telecommunications be made pursuant to a law has not always been respected by the 
Constitutional Court. As was explained in chapter 3, the Court has twice dispensed 
with the application of this requirement. On two occasions, in fact, the Court has 
upheld the constitutionality of a restriction on the secrecy of telecommunications not 
made by means of a law on the grounds that the law-maker enjoys a certain margin of 
time to enact the required limiting law and that, under certain circumstances, this margin 
of time need not be considered to have expired. In chapter 3 these two decisions were 
commented on and criticised on the basis that, in order to justify the constitutionality of 
lawless limitations on the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, the Court had 
considered that such limitations were ’inherent' to this right At this point let me simply 
add that the very idea that art. 10.2.1 may transitorily not be applied is open to 
criticism, for it is a matter of course that constitutional provisions must always be 
respected. This point becomes still more emphatic since art. 10.2.1 is phrased in 
unconditional terms and nothing indicates that it should not have started to apply 
together with the rest of the Basic Law. In any event, at the time the two cases at stake 
were raised enough time had elapsed since the enactment of the Basic Law. Both the 
restrictions in question were therefore unconstitutional and should have been declared 
thus by the Constitutional Court, eventually with a warning to the law-maker to quickly 
enact legislation in the fields at issue.
1.2 The Legislative Reservation o f Pow er as a Substantive 
Requirement
[A] "In so far as a basic right may, under this Basic Law, be restricted by or 
pusuant to a law, the law shall apply generally and not merely to one case" (art.
19.1.1).
The requirement that laws restricting fundamental rights be general stems from 
the principle of equality (art. 3 of the Basic Law), yet it carries the rationale of this
conformity with the Constitution (see A. Bleckmann, Stoatsrechi II. Allgemeine Grundrechtslehren, 
1985, p. 276).
58A. Bleckmann, Staatsrecht II, ibid.
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principle even further. On the basis of art. 19.1.1, the addressees of restricting laws 
must be indeterminate, that is, impossible to individuate, even if otherwise the law in 
question would not be considered to be against the principle of equality. This applies as 
much to the rules as to the exceptions contained in such laws: these must not only be 
general in their scope; they may contain neither particular exceptions nor particular 
privileges. This requirement is not necessarily incompatible with a law having a narrow 
scope of application59. Laws enacted to be applied in a certain context or under certain 
circumstances can be considered general if, despite their particular scope, the 
addressees of their rules and exceptions cannot be individuated60. On the other hand, 
laws phrased in general terms do not comply with the requirement of generality if, in 
practice, they only apply to certain, identifiable addressees61.
[B] ’Furthermore, the law shall specify the basic right and relevant Article" (art.
19.1.2).
According to this provision, the protected scope of fundamental rights may only 
be limited by law in explicit and clear terms. This provision aims at introducing some 
clarity as well as a warning element into the process of restricting fundamental rights. 
Thereby the law-maker is allowed to restrict a fundamental right in as far as he 
explicitly says he will do so in the law in question and clearly mentions the particular 
fundamental right and the article where it is recognised; in this way individuals are 
enabled to foresee whether and in which circumstances their rights may be lawfully 
interfered with62.
Art. 19.1.2 has been the object of rather narrow interpretation by the 
Constitutional Court. To begin with, this provision only applies in cases where the law­
maker is explicitly authorised to 'restrict* a right (the distinction between authorisations 
to 'restrict', to 'regulate* and to 'determine the content o f  a right will be addressed 
below). In addition, art. 19.1.2 does not apply to pre-constitutional law, nor does it 
apply to post-constitutional laws insofar as these merely reproduce pre-constitutional
590n this issue, the Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutionality of the so-called 'measure-
laws' (Maßnahmegesetze), that is, laws enacted as a way to pursue a very particular, well-defined aim 
(see, e.g., BVerfGE 15,126 at 146; 25,371 at 396; 36,383 at 400; 42,263 at 292-293; 70,35 at 66- 
67; see also Bleckmann, Staatsrecht II at 277 et seq.). 
öOßVerfGE 10,234 at 241; 24,33 at 52.
61BVerfGE 13,225 at 229; 24,33 at 52. In practice, it proves difficult to ascertain when a law is to be 
considered general and when it is not. Due to these difficulties, art. 3 is sometimes preferred to art. 
19.1.1 as a much better defined, more reliable guarantee against abuses in the limitation of rights (see
K. Hesse, Gnmdzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 16., ergänzte Auflage,
C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg 1982, p. 133). For further comments on art. 19.1.2, see S. 
Hendrichs, "Art. 19" at 691-693; A. Bleckmann, Staatsrecht II. at 277 et seq.
62See K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts at 133. See also BVerfGE 85,386 at 403 et seq.
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law still effective63. The scope of this requirement is thus reduced to post-constitutional 
laws which restrict the exercise of fundamental rights beyond the limitations that valid 
pre-constitutional laws impose upon them. Art. 19.1.2 has thus been interpreted as a 
formal burden on restrictions of rights which have been imposed anew after the 
enactment of the Basic Law64.
2 . Substantive Lim its, to Restrictions on Fundam ental R ights
The requirements with which restrictions on fundamental rights must comply 
cannot merely be formal in nature. Substantive 'limits to the limits' (Schranken- 
Schranken) also prove necessary, lest rights be deprived of protection to such an extent 
that their recognition becomes a mere form of words. The existence of substantive 
limits is thus the logical counterpart to the possibility of lawful limitations to the 
exercise of fundamental rights. The Basic Law contains two: first, art. 19.2 explicitly 
rules that the 'essential content' (Wesensgehalt) of rights may never be encroached 
upon; second, there is general agreement that the Basic Law implicitly imposes 
compliance with the 'principle of reasonableness* (Grundsatz der Verhaltnismafiigkeit). 
In the following pages I will analyse how these two limits define the protected scope of 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
2.1 The Guarantee of the Essential Content65
"In no case may the essential content of a basic right be encroached upon" (art.
19.2).
With this provision, the Basic Law imposes an explicit limit to the possibility of 
limiting fundamental rights, that is it draws a line which such limitations, in order to be
63See BVerfGE 2,121 at 122; 5, 13 at 16; 8, 214 at 329; 15, 288 at 293; 16,194 at 199; 28, 36 at 
46 et seq; 35, 185 at 189.
64See S. Hendrichs, "Art. 19" at 694- 695; A. Bleckmann, Staatsrecht 11 at 280; Pieroth/Schlink, 
Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II, Heidelberg 1988, p. 79.
650n the issue of the essential content of rights, see Herbert Krüger, "Der Wesensgehalt der 
Grundrechte i.S. des Art. 19 GG" (1955) DÖV, p. 597; Gunter Dürig, "Der Grundrechtssatz von der 
Menschenwürde" 81 AÖR 1956, p. 117,136 et seq.; G. Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte", 
(1985) EuGRZ, p. 321; Pieroth/Schlink, Grundrechte at 76 et seq.; Ludwig Schneider, Der Schutz des 
Wesensgehalt von Grundrechte nach Art. 19 Abs. 2 GGt Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin 1983; Peter 
Häberle, Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Artikel 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz, Müller Juristische Verlag, 
Heidelberg 1983; Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 
1985, pp. 267 et seq.; Manzer Stelzer, Das Wesensgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz der 
Verhältnismäßigkeitt Springer-Verlag, Wien - New York, 1991.
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considered lawful* may not overstep. It is however not clear what the expression 
'essential content of rights' exactly stands for. This question has been, and still is* the 
object of much doctrinal debate and the Constitutional Court has not provided a clear 
answer to it. This is the reason why, before looking at the essential content of the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications, I will first deal with the issues that the definition 
of the expression 'essential content' generally brings up and with the position that the 
Constitutional Court has adopted in their respect
[11 In order to define the expression 'essential content of a right', two 
conceptual choices must be made. The first one concerns the words 'essential content'; 
the second one concerns the way in which the term 'right' is used in this context. The 
implications of these two options will be analysed, respectively, in (A) and (B); in (C) I 
will comment on the position of the Supreme Court with respect to these options.
(A) The expression 'essential content' can be interpreted either in absolute or in 
relative terms66. Interpreted in absolute terms, this expression refers to the area within 
the coverage o f a given fundamental right which enshrines the basic substance, the 
most fundamental features of a right; it is therefore an area which may in no case be 
encroached upon lest the right in question becomes conceptually unrecognisable67. 
Interpreted in relative terms, on the other hand, the expression 'essential content’ refers 
to that part of the coverage of a fundamental right encroachment upon which is not 
justified on balance; the protection of a relative essential content therefore ensures that 
restrictions of fundamental rights never be unreasonable, hence it does not preclude the 
possibility that, eventually, a restrictive measure can be considered 'reasonable1 even if 
it encroaches upon the whole coverage of a right
The absolute interpretation of the essential content is usually preferred to the 
relative one, a preference which is generally justified on the basis of two arguments68. 
The first argument relies on the literal wording of art. 19.2; in particular the provision
S^ee, e.g., Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 323; Stelzer,Da.r Wesensgehaltsargument 
... at 49 et seq. Further comments on the grounds and implications of each of these alternatives can be 
found in L. Schneider, Der Schutz des Wesensgehalt... at 159 et seq.
67H. Krüger, e.g., speaks of the "Stoff' of a fundamental right as that aspect of its object without 
which this right can no longer accomplish its aim ("Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte..." at 601). In a 
more sophisticated absolute conception, G. Düng defines the essential content as the sphere of a 
fundamental right encroachment upon which amounts to an encroachment upon an. 1.1 right to human 
dignity {"Würde des Menschen"), which Dürig considers the basis of the whole system of protection of 
fundamental rights ("Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde" at 136 et seq.). Also the 
Constitutional Coun has sometimes related the protection of the essential content to the protection of 
art. 1.1 right to human dignity (see, e.g., BVerfGE 27, 344 at 351; 34, 238 at 245; 35, 35 at 39; 80. 
367 at 245).
68See in this respect Stelzer, Das Wesensgehaltsargument... at 100-101.
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that the essential content of fundamental rights may "in no case" be encroached upon is 
often interpreted in the sense that the essential content cannot be made a relative 
concept. The second argument claims that» in the ensemble of the Basic Law, the 
explicit protection of the essential content of rights can only make sense if this essential 
content is conceived in absolute terms; a relative interpretation of this expression would 
make the art. 19.2 provision completely redundant, given that the guarantee that 
restrictions of fundamental rights be not unreasonable is already provided, precisely, by 
the principle o f reasonableness.
However, neither of the above two arguments offers definite grounds as to why 
the absolute interpretation o f the essential content ought to be preferred to the relative 
one. To begin with, the first argument is completely ill-founded. It relies on a mistaken 
assumption, namely, that the expression 'in no case' helps to define the expression 
'essential content', whereas according to art. 19.2 the former expression only applies 
once the latter has already been defined. Indeed, the expression ’in no case' merely 
emphasises that, however defined, the essential content of rights must be respected 
without exception, that is, that it must be respected in every particular case and in the 
context of every right. Emphasising that the essential content of rights must always be 
respected might appear superfluous, yet it makes sense if a rt 19.2 is read in connection 
with art. 19.1; in particular, the words 'in no case' make it clear that the coverage of 
art. 19.2 is not subject to the same restrictions as the coverage of art. 19.169. Let me 
develop this point
As was mentioned above, art. 19.1 imposes certain substantive requirements 
upon laws restricting fundamental rights, i.e. that they must be general and must name 
both the fundamental right in question and the constitutional provision where it is 
recognised. I would now like to comment on the scope of the application of this 
provision. In particular, I would like to point out that art. 19.1 only applies in so far as 
a fundamental right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law (Gesetzvorbehalt)70. This 
definition of the boundaries of art. 19.1 leaves three groups of rights outside its range. 
These groups are, first, rights the exercise of which may be 'regulated' -not 
'restricted'- by the law-maker; second, rights of which the law-maker may 'determine' 
the 'content and limits'; third, rights which the law-maker is not explicitly authorised to
69Also on this issue, see L. Schneider, Der Schutz des Wesensgehalt... at 60-61.
70This legislative reservation of power can be general (einfacher Gesetzvorbehalt), as in the case of 
arts. 2.2.3; 5.2; 8.2; 10.1; 16.1.2 or 17(a) of the GG, but it can also be limited to the protection of 
some particular interests (qualifizierter Gesetzvorbehalt), as in the case of arts. 5.2; 9.2; 10.2.2; 11.2 or 
13.3 of the GG.
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restrict at all71. On the grounds that, in the end, regulation simply is a modality of 
restriction, the Constitutional Court has broadened the range of art. 19.1 so that this 
also covers the rights included within the first of these three groups72; yet even this 
broadening has only been partial: according to the Court, laws which regulate the 
exercise of a right must be general (art. 19.1.1)73 but they need not name the right it 
regulates (art. 19.1.2)74. In sum, art. 19.1.1 applies to fundamental rights which may 
be either restricted or regulated by or pursuant to a law, whereas art. 19.1.2 only 
applies to fundamental rights the exercise of which may be restricted by or pursuant to a 
law.
All the above considerations do not apply in the context of art. 19.2. As 
opposed to art. 19.1, the scope art. 19.2 is defined in very general terms, so that one 
can presume that this provision covers not only the rights subject to a legislative 
reservation of power but also to the three groups of rights described above75. That this 
is so is emphasised precisely by the words 'in no case' which introduce this provision: 
these words underline the generality of art. 19.2 and at the same time stress the 
difference between the scope of this provision and that of the preceding paragraph.
Let me now discuss the second argument raised by defenders of an absolute 
essential content, i.e the argument that a relative essential content adds nothing new to 
the principle of reasonableness. The explicit protection of a relative essential content
71 Arts. 4.3 and 12.1.2 belong to the first group, art. 14.1 to the second group and arts. 3; 4; 5.3; 6; 8;
16.1.2 and 17 to the third group.
72This broadening cannot embrace either the second or the third group. To begin with, the act of 
"determining" the "content and limits" of a right differs greatly from a mere ’restriction' of their 
exercise, for it amounts to a delimitation of its coverage, that is to a definition of the conceptual scope 
of the right in question, a ’creative' activity which is not embraced by art. 19.1 (BVerfGE 20, 351 at 
356; 21,92 at 93; 24.367 at 396). As for rights recognised without a legislative reservation of power, 
the exercise of these rights are also subject to restrictions (vorbehaltlose aber nicht schrankenlose 
Grundrechte -see BVerfGE 20,150 at 157; 69,1 at 58-59; 80,137 at 161; 83,130 at 142), yet only to 
those restrictions that the Basic Law itself imposes and which mainly derive from the need to solve 
conflicts between different constitutional rights and values (verfassungsimmanente Schranken -see, e.g., 
BVerfGE 28,243 at 260 et seq.; 69, 1 at 58 et seq.). The law-maker is merely called to identify and 
apply such restrictions, a task which remains outside the logic of art. 19.1 (BVerfGE 6, 32 at 41; 35, 
35 at 39; 83,130 at 142). As for the rest, note that the present implicit limitations differ from those 
discussed in chapter 3 in that they apply to the scope of protection, not to the coverage of rights.
73See, e.g., BVerfGE, 12,45 at 53; 28,243 at 259; 32,40 at 45; 48,127 at 163; 61, 82 at 113.
74BVerfGE 64,72; 80, at 154; 83,386 at 404.
750n this issue, see, e.g., BVerfGE 28, 243 at 261; 31,58 at 68; 34, 238 at 245; 48,127 at 163; 69, 
1 at 58. The only controversial issue is whether art. 19.2 applies in the context of art. 14,1, which 
leaves the determination of the content and limits of the right to property and inheritance in the hands 
of the law-maker. The Constitutional Court has decided for the protection of the essential content of 
these rights. To this end it has identified the object of these rights in the ensemble of civil laws and 
principles which regulated them before the enactment of the Basic Law, that is, it has identified the 
object of art. 14.1 in the status quo of civil institutions of property and inheritance (i.e. in the right to 
property as an Institutsgaranrie, in the Weimar sense of the term) before the enactment of the Basic 
Law (BVerfGE 26, 215 at 222; 31, 229 at 239; 58, 300 at 348. See L. Schneider, Der Schütz des 
Wesensgehalt... at 65 et seq.).
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may be regarded redundant -even authors who conceive the essential content as relative 
have no difficulties in admitting as much as this76; yet this argument constitutes no 
definite grounds to reject the relative interpretation. Note that the criticism that art. 19.2 
is redundant can equally be raised if the essential content of rights is regarded as an 
absolute concept. The idea that fundamental rights must always be protected in their 
most essential features can be regarded as an implicit constitutional principle: it is 
implicit in the very fact that the Basic Law recognises certain rights which are 
considered binding upon all public powers, including the legislative (art. 1.3)77. This is 
not to say that art. 19.2 ought not to have been included within the Basic Law. 
Provisions with a mere declaratory meaning can still be relevant, particularly in as far as 
they can draw attention to a rule or principle which might otherwise have been 
overlooked. This precisely is the task of a rt 19.2, a task that it can perform even if it is 
interpreted in relative terms. Indeed, the explicit protection o f a relative essential content 
confirms and consolidates the principle of reasonableness, a principle, it ought to be 
recalled, that is not explicitly recognised in the Basic Law78.
The relative interpretation of the essential content is defended by some 
commentators79 on the simple grounds that the constitutionality of restrictions of 
fundamental rights can only be measured in terms of their reasonableness. For what 
else could an absolute definition of the essential content imply?. It could certainly not 
imply that restrictions of fundamental rights are constitutional if they are unreasonable; 
nor could it imply that they are ««constitutional if they they are not unreasonable, 
unless one wants to rely on a deeper, metaphysical understanding of the concept 
'essential content'. If one does not want to rely on such an understanding, then the so- 
called absolute essential content of rights can only amount to that part of the coverage of 
rights of which the restrictions are unreasonable. It is however not precluded that there 
can be a part within the coverage of rights of which the restrictions always are or tend 
to be unreasonable. As a matter of fact, this is very likely to be the case. For one thing, 
the more a principle has been restricted when balanced against others, the more resistant 
this principle becomes in future balances80. It is therefore likely that there is a last sub­
76See K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts at 134; P. Häberle, "Grundrechte und 
parlamentarische Gesetzgebung im Verfassungsstaat - das Beispiel des deutschen Grundgesetzes" 114 
AÖR 361 at 389 (1989).
77Let me however qualify this by saying that, as will be explained below, the redundant character of 
art. 19.2 is exclusively connected to the objective interpretation of the essential content of fundamental 
rights. In other words, art. 19.2 appears to be redundant only in as far as it is thought to protect the 
essential content of fundamental rights conceived as institutional guarantees and not as subjective rights 
of the individual.
78See K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts at 134.
79See K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts at 133 et seq.; R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 
269 et seq.
80See R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 271.
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sphere within the coverage of rights which will be regarded as so important that it is not 
reasonable to leave it unprotected for the sake of any opposing principle.
On theoretical grounds, this interpretation of the essential content seems 
convincing to me. In addition, it has the practical advantage that, while being essentially 
relative, it succeeds also in embracing and reconciling the absolute interpretation. 
Moreover, it avoids the shortcomings of each of these two interpretations: on the one 
hand, the essential content does not appear as a metaphysical, ungraspable concept the 
definition of which (and with it the definition of the protected scope of rights) lies in the 
hands of the law-maker; on the other hand, the definition of the essential content is not 
merely subordinated to the achievement of some policy goal (something which is 
sometimes regarded as the greatest danger of the relative interpretation of the essential 
content), but is the result of striking a balance where the importance of the different 
principles at stake must be confronted and where some stable, absolute-like conclusions 
can be attained.
(B) A second controversy surrounds the definition o f the essential content of 
rights: it is not clear in which way the term 'rights' is used in this context. Both a 
subjective and an objective interpretation have been put forward81. The first one 
sustains that art. 19.2 protects the essential content of fundamental rights in as far as 
they are subjective claims; this implies that the essential content must be protected in 
each and every individual case where the right in question is at stake, so that either a 
fair balance (relative essential content) or the conceptual identification of every right 
(absolute essential content) must be ensured in every such case. The second alternative 
sustains that art. 19.2 protects the essential content only within the context of rights as 
institutional guarantees; this implies that either a fair balance (relative essential content) 
or the conceptual identification of a right (absolute essential content) must not be 
ensured in every individual case but only in as far as they are recognised as objective 
guarantees of the constitutional order82.
Note that in order that a right can be protected at a subjective level it is a 
precondition that it is protected as an institutional guarantee. The protection o f the 
essential content o f fundamental rights as institutional guarantees goes hand in hand
81The different positions concerning the term 'right' as used in this context are clearly illustrated in L. 
Schneider, Der Schütz des Wesensgehalt... at 77 et seq.
82Probably the most significant construction of an objective approach to the essential content of rights 
can be found in P. Haberle, Der Wesensgehalt... Note however that, as was discussed in chapter 3, 
Haberle denies that rights have a two-step structure, hence that there can be a distinction between 
coverage and protected scope. This means that Haberle's position as to the essential content of rights 
really applies to what he regards as the coverage of fundamental rights taken as a whole.
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with their constitutional recognition as rights with binding effects upon all the public 
powers83, to the extent that the provision of art. 19.2 can be considered redundant in as 
far as the objective dimension of fundamental rights is concerned84. For this reason, 
the subjective approach to the essential content of rights cannot imply that this is not 
protected at the objective level; rather, it relies on the presumption that this is already the 
case. The question, therefore, cannot be whether the essential content of rights is an 
objective or a subjective concept, but rather whether, in addition to being an objective 
concept, it must also be regarded as a subjective one85.
Subjective theories o f the essential content are supported by most 
commentators. They first of all argue on the basis of the words 'in no case' used in art. 
19.2; yet, as pointed out when discussing the absolute interpretation of this provision, 
this argument seems misguided. A second and more substantial argument made by 
these commentators is that fundamental rights are primarily subjective rights o f the 
individual86. Taken by themselves, it is argued, objective theories do not show much 
concern for rights as individual claims; this is particularly true since objective theories 
tend to measure the violation of the essential content of a right in purely quantitative 
terms, that is on the basis of the number of holders of a right who can still exercise it87. 
Only a subjective interpretation of the essential content can make sure that fundamental 
rights actually accomplish their prime aim of protecting the individual.
The argument that the individual is the centre of attention of fundamental rights 
is fully convincing and seems to point to the subjective interpretation of the essential 
content. Note however that the essential content can only be interpreted in subjective 
terms if it is thought to be a relative concept. For one thing, in the context of an 
absolute interpretation of this expression a subjective theory simply cannot account for 
the way things are. In particular, it does not account for the fact that under certain 
circumstances single individuals may be completely deprived of the possibility of 
exercising a right (deprivation o f personal freedom in life imprisonment is the most 
typical example) and yet there is general agreement that this does not amount to a
83Recall that the idea that fundamental rights have a hard core of absolute protection against the law­
maker first arose in the Weimar era in the context of the so-called "Institutsgarantien" and 
"Institutionsgarantien", which, although not equal to the actual concept of rights as institutional 
guarantees ("Institutionelle Gewahrleistungen”) can be regarded as the closest precedent of this concept 
(see the introduction to chapter 3).
84In this sense, see Stelzer, Das Wesensgehaltsargument... at 80.
85L. Schneider, Der Schütz des Wesensgehalt... at 87 et seq.; see also R. Alexy, Theorie der 
Crundrechte, at 447.
86See Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Gnindrechte" at 324; R. Alexy, Theorie der Crundrechte, at 268.
87See L Schneider, Der Schütz des Wesensgehalt ... at 82 and 84; see Stelzer, Das 
Wesensgehaltsargument... at 54.
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violation of the essential content of the right in question88. This incoherence can only 
be avoided if the subjective essential content is defined in relative terms.
O f course, the above incoherence does not arise if the essential content is 
interpreted in objective terms. Moreover, not every objective interpretation can be 
accused of disregarding the individual as the centre of protection of fundamental rights. 
Indeed, the protection of the individual can be the ultimate target o f objective 
interpretations of the essential content where this is not defined in purely quantitative 
terms but on the basis of some substantive criteria89. In particular, one can take the 
view that it belongs to the essential content of a right as an institutional guarantee 
(whether defined in absolute or in relative terms) that this essential content be respected 
in every individual case as far as this proves possible. This objective approach to the 
essential content of rights is, I believe, a valid alternative to the relative-subjective 
approach referred to above, since it avoids both the criticisms raised against objective 
theories and the incoherence of absolute-subjective theories. As a matter o f fact, both 
the relative-subjective approach and the objective approach here proposed lead to very 
similar conceptions of the essential content of rights; this is particularly so if also within 
the objective approach the essential content is conceived as a relative concept, an 
interpretation which, for the reasons given above, is to be preferred.
(C) The above pages should have illustrated the doctrinal debate which 
surrounds the definition of the essential content of fundamental rights and should have 
destilled the essential points at issue; I also hope to have explained clearly and 
convincingly my position with respect to these issues. I will now turn to the position of 
the Constitutional Court in this discussion. In the context of the relative/absolute 
debate, the Court was initially inclined to favour a relative definition of the essential 
content90, yet it soon changed position and adopted an absolute definition in very 
explicit and resolute terms91. In the context of the objective/subjective debate, the Court 
has expressed its preference for the subjective interpretation o f the essential content92. 
In sum, the Court interprets the essential content of fundamental rights in absolute 
subjective terms, an interpretation which was criticised above. However, the Court has 
not been able to sustain its absolute subjective interpretation of the essential content in 
every instance; this is something which should not come as a surprise, because, as
88See L. Schneider, Der Schutz des Wesensgehalt... at 81.
89As for the justification of an objective essential content upon substantive criteria, see Stelzer,£>ar 
Wesensgehaltsargument... at 54,63 et seq.
^VerfG judgement of June 11,1968, (1968) NJW, pp. 1035 at 1039.
91 See, e.g., BVerfGE 6, 32 at 41; 10, 302; 27, 1 at 6; 27,344 at 351; 32, 373 at 378; 34, 238 at 245; 
35, 35 at 39; 52, 131 at 175; 61, 82 at 113; 80, 367 at 373.
^See Herben, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 326; R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 268.
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pointed out above, this interpretation often proves totally unfeasible. For there are 
rights of which individual deprivations can only take place in an absolute and definitive 
manner (such as the right to life) or situations (such as imprisonment or state of 
emergency) in which it seems uncontroversial that individuals may be completely 
deprived of certain rights. In such cases, the essential content of the rights concerned 
can only receive absolute protection if it is defined in objective terms, that is, with a 
view to keeping the right recognisable as an institutional guarantee. These 
circumstances have led the Court to sustain an eclectic position and to choose between 
the subjective and the objective interpretation of the essential content on the basis of the 
particular characteristics of the right at stake, always with a preference for the subjective 
one93. In other words, the Constitutional Court conceives the essential content as an 
absolute concept which must be protected in the context of subjective rights in as far as 
this proves possible.
The position of the Constitutional Court has two theoretical flaws. First of all, 
the Court conceives the essential content of rights in absolute terms, yet the idea that it 
must be respected in every possible individual case is defended on the grounds that the 
essential content is primarily subjective. As has been reasoned above, a subjective 
interpretation of the essential content can only be sustained if this is also interpreted in 
relative terms, whilst an absolute interpretation can only be sustained if the essential 
content is primarily defined with respect to rights as institutional guarantees. A 
combination of an absolute and a subjective interpretation does not hold theoretically, 
nor can it be actually applied in practice. The second flaw concerns the idea that the 
essential content of rights must be regarded as a subjective concept whenever this is 
possible and as an objective one only when this is not the case. This eclectic position 
theoretically can find support in an objective interpretation of the essential content such 
as the one suggested above, i.e. that the essential content of a right as an institution 
requires that this essential content be protected in every possible individual case. The 
problem is, however, that the Court defends its eclectic position within the context of a 
subjective approach to the essential content of rights, that is within a context in which 
there is no solid theoretical background for an eclectic position; as a matter of fact, this 
eclectic position is merely defended as an easy way to patch up the deficiencies of its 
absolute-subjective approach to the essential content.
On account of these weaknesses, it should not come as a surprise that the 
Court's theoretical position has not been consistently followed in practice. As a matter
93See BVerfGE 2, 266 at 285; 10, 302; 22, 180 at 219; 31, 58 at 69; 45. 187 at 270-271. See also 
Pieroth/Schiink, Grundrechte at 77-78; G. Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 326.
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of fact, the Court applies the essential content in terms which correspond more to a 
relative than to an absolute interpretation of this concept; in addition, the essential 
content tends to be protected in the context o f rights as institutions, rather than in the 
context of rights as subjective claims of the individual. Let me explain what I mean by 
this.
First, the essential content of rights may be theoretically defined as an absolute 
concept, yet in order that it is precise to say that rights enjoy absolute protection within 
a certain area of their coverage the Court ought to have defined this area or, at least, it 
ought to have given certain indications as to its boundaries. With one single exception, 
the Court has never undertaken any such thing. The exception concerns art. 2.1 general 
right of personality at the time when the Court still divided up its object into three 
spheres, a sphere of intimacy or seclusion of an individual from society CIntimsphäre), 
a sphere of privacy wherefrom society was not completely excluded (Geheimnisphäre) 
and a sphere of one's personality which is developed in society. At that time, the Court 
used to identify the essential content of the right of personality in the sphere of intimacy 
or seclusion (Intimssphäre)94. As was explained in chapter 1, this theory of the three 
spheres is no longer maintained. Beyond this case, the Constitutional Court has been 
approaching the essential content of rights on a case-by-case basis: it has been deciding 
in every particular case, on the basis of the particular circumstances, whether or not the 
essential content of a right has been infringed upon, without drawing more general 
conclusions as to the scope of the absolute protection of a right95. The practical attitude 
of the Court towards the essential content of particular rights thus seems closer to a 
relative than to an absolute conception of this concept.
Second, it would seem that the Court accords more importance to the objective 
aspect of fundamental rights than it is willing to admit. This should become clearer if 
we note that the role played by the essential content in the solution of individual cases 
(subjective essential content) has been reduced to a minimum, in the sense that the 
Court has hardly ever considered that the essential content of a right was actually 
infringed. This was first of all the case in the context of art. 2.1 general right of 
personality at the time when its essential content was actually defined by the Court. The 
Court defined the essential content of this right as the intimate sphere of individuals 
(Intimshpäre) and consistently insisted that this sphere deserves absolute protection; yet 
this area was interpreted in very narrow terms, to the extent that in no individual case
94BVerfGE 6, 32 at 41; 6, 389 at 433; 27, 1 at 6; 27, 344 at 350; 32, 373 at 379; 34, 238 at 245; 35, 
35 at 39; 35,202 at 220 (cases referred to by G. Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 327).
95See, e.g., BVerfGE 22, 180 at 220; 27, 344 at 352; 30, 47 at 53; 61, 82 at 113. Also on this point, 
see G. Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 327.
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did the Court think that it was actually at stake96. Even in all other cases, that is in cases 
where the essential content is actually being dealt with in relative terms, the Court 
generally reaches the conclusion that the essential content has not been violated97. In 
sum, the essential content of rights has hardly played any role in the context of 
fundamental rights as subjective claims of the individual. All the weight of individual 
decisions concerning the protected scope of fundamental rights has been laid upon the 
principle of reasonableness, which therefore stands as the central point of reference for 
the definition of the protected scope of fundamental rights98.
[2] It is now time to turn our attention to the rights recognised in art. 10, i.e. the 
rights to the secrecy of the post, letters and telecommunications. The three of them, 
however, appear as good examples o f rights the essential content of which can only be 
defined by reference to their institutional dimensions; for there are situations, in 
particular, imprisonment, in which individuals are completely deprived of the secrecy 
of all their post, letters and telecommunications, hence where there is no possibility that 
the essential content of these rights be respected in individual cases. This circumstance 
seems to have been grasped by the Constitutional Court, for this has never approached 
the question of whether or not the essential content of art. 10 rights had been infringed 
upon. Decisions on the legitimacy of individual restrictions have thus never been taken 
with reference to whether or not their essential content was at stake; the Court has 
plainly overlooked this issue and focused exclusively on the principle of 
reasonableness.
96See, e.g., BVerfGE 6, 389 at 433; 27, 1 at 7; 27, 344 at 351; 32, 373 at 379; 34, 238 at 245; 35, 
35 at 39; 35, 202 at 220.
97G. Herbert ("Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte” at 328) points to a single case (BVerfGE 30,47 at 
53) where the Court concluded that the essential content of a right (art. 2.2.2 right to personal freedom) 
hau been violated, whereas Stelzer (Das Wesensgehaltsargument... at 53) points to yet another such 
case (BVerfGE 22,180, also in the context of art. 2.2.2).
98See G. Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 327; M. Stelzer.Aw Wesensgehaltsargument 
... at 52..
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2.2 The Principle of Reasonableness"
Though not explicit in the Constitution, 'reasonableness' is ^controversially 
regarded as a second constitutional 'limit to the limits' of fundamental rights, that is, as 
a second element in the definition of their protected scope. 'Reasonableness' would 
appear to play a secondary role with respect to the essential content in the definition of 
the protected scope of rights, in the sense that it only applies within the sphere of rights 
which is not defined as essential. For the reasons given above, however, the principle 
of reasonableness has proven to be much more central to the definition of the protected 
scope of rights than the guarantee of their essential content. Once again, in the analysis 
of this issue I will first concentrate on the definition o f 'reasonableness' and, second, 
on the way the principle that restrictions of rights must be reasonable applies in the 
context of art. 10 rights to the secrecy of telecommunications.
[1] The German Constitutional Court has readily adopted 'reasonableness' as a 
point of reference in the definition o f  the protected scope of fundamental rights. 
Reasons for this can be found in the German legal context. In Germany, the principle 
of reasonableness has long been applied in the fields of administrative and criminal law, 
where it has appeared as a means to prevent arbitrariness in the action o f the public 
power, moreover, in these contexts the application of this principle has been considered 
a requirement of the Constitutional State. Relying on this background, it was an easy 
task for the Constitutional Court to enlarge the range of this principle so that it could 
apply it in the solution of conflicts involving fundamental rights* 100, or even to regard it 
as a constitutional principle of the Constitutional State (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) or as part 
of the essence of fundamental rights101. At present, it is in the context of constitutional 
conflicts where the principle of reasonableness plays its most characteristic role.
The principle of reasonableness is a fruit of the idea that principles (in our case 
fundamental rights) are commands to optimalise, that is that in a particular legal and
"On the principle of proportionality, see E. Grabitz, "Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts*' 98 AÖR 568, (1973); B. Schiink, Abwägung im 
Verfassungsrecht, Berlin 1976; H. Schneider, Die Güterabwägung des Bundesverfassungsgericht bei 
Grundrechtskonflikten. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1979; B. Schiink, Treiheit durch 
Eingriffsabwehr - Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion" (1984) EuGRZ, p. 457 et seq.; 
Pieroth/Schlink, Grundrechte at 72 et seq; A. Bleckmann, Staatsrecht II at 295 et seq.; Manzer Stelzer, 
Das Wesensgehaltsargument...
100See, e.g., BVerfGE 1,167 at 178; 2,1 at 79; 2, 121 at 123; 2, 266 at 280; 6. 389 at 439; 7, 377 
at 402 et seq.
101BVerfGE 38, 348 at 368 and 65,1 at 44, respectively.
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factual context principles must be enforced to the greatest extent possible102. This idea 
that principles must be optimalised controls even the selection of the conflicting 
principles, in our case the selection of the aims which may justify a restriction of 
fundamental rights, which could be regarded as a phase preceding the application of the 
principle of reasonableness itself103. Let us for a moment concentrate on this phase.
The selection of the principles (these including fundamental rights) which may 
restrict fundamental rights implies that a balance must be struck between the importance 
of the restriction in question and the aim that this restriction pursues104. The 
Constitution stands as a more or less direct point of reference for this balance. It stands 
as a direct point of reference when it provides the rules on which basis this balance 
must be struck. It, for examples, demands that aims contrary to the constitutional order 
must be discarded as illegitimate. Similarly, the Basic Law conditions the limitation of 
certain rights to the pursuance of particular aims, something it sometimes does 
explicitly105, sometimes only implicitly; this latter is the case with the rights recognised 
without legislative reservation of power, that is of the rights which only find their limits 
in the Basic Law itself, hence which may only be restricted in order to protect some 
outbalancing constitutional right or value. Most often, however, the Basic Law only 
appears as an indirect constitutional basis for limitations, that is it does not relate the
102R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 75; 100 et seq. This idea is generally expressed by reference 
to the so-called 'principle of practical concordance' -praktische Konkordant- (see K. Hesse, Grundzüge 
des Verfassungsrechts at 127).
l°3Note that this previous step could be avoided and that the balance here proposed could alternatively 
be struck as part of the principle of reasonableness itself -in particular as part of the condition of 
proportionality (in this sense, see e.g. Stelzer^ ar Wesensgehaltsargument... at 99). The decision for 
either solution does not have practical consequences (See Schiink, "Freiheit durch.." at 459 et seq.; 
Herbert, "Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte" at 329; Bleckmann, Staatsrecht IL at 300), yet I find it 
clearer to separate the selection of the aim which may justify a restriction, on the one hand, and the 
decision on the proportionality between this restriction and the aim it pursues, on the other.
104In this respect, E. Grabitz ("Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit..." at 600 et seq.) has suggested 
that in its case-law the Constitutional Court implicitly classifies rights into four groups. Within a first 
group there are rights (those recognised without a legislative reservation of power -with the exception 
of art. 12.1.1- and the art. 2.2.2 right to personal freedom) which may be limited only to give force to 
some outbalancing constitutional right or interest ('legislatorische Konkretisierungskompetent). The 
second group includes rights (the art. 12.1.1 objective rules concerning the choice of profession; the 
art. 2.2.1 right to physical integrity; the art. 2.1 right of privacy, this including more concrete 
manifestations such as the inviolability of domicile and the secrecy of telecommunications) which may 
be limited for the sake of some general interest defined by the law-maker, provided that it outbalances 
the importance of the limited right ("positiv gebundene legislatorische Qualifikationskompetent). The 
third group includes rights (the art. 12.1.1 subjective conditions concerning the choice of profession 
and the art. 14 right to property) which may be limited to attain some interest defined by the law­
maker, as long as this interest is legitimate, that is, as long as it does not go against the public interest 
or the constitutional order Çnegativ gebundene legislatorische Qualifikationskompetent). Finally, the 
fourth group includes rights (the art. 2.1 freedom of enterprise -'Wirtschfisfreitheit- and the art. 12.1 
rules concerning the practice of trades, occupations and professions) which may be limited as a policy 
option, as long as this reasonably aims at the general good, that is, as long as the limitation is not 
arbitrary ('willkürfreie legislatorische Qualifikationskompetent).
105Qualifizierter Gesetzvorbehaln arts. 5.2, 9.2,10.2,11.2,13.2.
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limitation of rights to particular aims, but merely authorises the law-maker to carry out 
these limitations. In these cases, limitations may only be imposed for the pursuance of 
aims which need not be of a constitutional character, yet which on balance must prove 
to outweigh the importance of the right to which protection is denied.
Once it has been shown that the pursuance o f a particular aim justifies the 
restriction of a right, this restriction must pass the triple test imposed by the principle of 
reasonableness. As conceived by the Constitutional Court, this principle requires that 
restrictions on constitutional rights be suitable (geeignet), necessary (erforderlich) and 
proportionate (verhältnismäßig irrt engeren Sinne, proportional or nicht übermäßig) in 
the pursuance o f their aims. Again, this triple test is based on the idea of the 
optimalisation o f principles: the condition of proportionality seeks a factual 
optimalisation of the protection granted to fundamental rights, whereas the conditions 
of suitability and necessity seek the optimalisation of this protection at the theoretical 
level106. Let us now look at each of the elements of this test.
(a) The limitation of a right is suitable if it can achieve the goal which justifies 
it107. The Constitutional Court has qualified this definition in several ways. First of all 
it has ruled that in order to be suitable a limitation must only be able to carry out a 
partial achievement of its goal108. Second, the suitability of a limitation to achieve its 
aim is independent of the actual achievement of the aim; in other words, the suitability 
of a limitation is measured in the abstract. This means that limitations are not considered 
unconstitutional on the mere grounds that their claimed aims have not yet been 
accomplished; instead, attention is focused on whether these aims can actually be 
accomplished at all109. Third, in order to decide on the suitability of a limitation, the 
Constitutional Court places itself in the position of the law-maker. The crucial question 
it asks is whether the limiting measure at stake reasonably appeared as suitable to the 
the law-maker, on the basis of the elements of judgment this could dispose of at the 
tim e110. Of course, the ex-ante judgement of the law-maker acts as the point of 
reference in as far as the suitability of a particular measure has not been proven in 
practice. A limiting measure which actually proves unsuitable to reach its aim must be
106R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 100 et seq.
107See BVerfGE 33, 171 at 187; 67, 157 at 173. This condition of suitability is more "suitable" a 
means to prevent arbitrariness than to seek proportionality in the restriction on rights. Not 
surprisingly, some authors have not included it together with necessity and proportionality amongst the 
conditions of proportionality (see, e.g., von Krauss, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in seiner 
Bedeutung für die Notwendigkeit des Mittels im Verwaltungsrecht t Hamburg 1955; Lerche, Übermaß 
und Verfassungsrecht. Zur Bindung des Gesetzgebers an die Grundsätze der Verhältnismäßigkeit und der 
Erforderlichkeiu 1961 -ref. from B. Schiink. Abwägung... at 143).
108BVerfGE 16,147 at 183.
109BVerfGE 67,157 at 175.
110BVerfGE25,1 at 12; 30,250 at 263.
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held unconstitutional, whatever the ex-ante judgement of the law-maker. However, and 
this is the fourth qualification to be made, the Court has also taken the part of the law­
maker in this context It has stated that limitations on a right are suitable as long as the 
possibility is not excluded that they can actually achieve their aim*11. In other words, 
according to the Court limitations on fundamental rights enjoy a kind of 'presumption 
of suitability'.
(b) A limitation is necessary if its aim cannot be reached through alternative 
means which, being equally effective, imply a lesser encroachment upon the right in 
question* 112. The condition of necessity accords the law-maker a certain margin of 
freedom to choose the means to reach the aim it pursues. To begin with, the law-maker 
can choose among all the restricting measures which equally limit a fundamental right. 
Additionally, the Constitutional Court decides whether a limiting measure is necessary 
on the basis of a negative judgment, that is, it decides whether alternative, less intrusive 
limiting measures are not as effective as the one at issue. Moreover, as was the case 
with the condition of suitability, the Constitutional Court accords great importance to 
the ex-ante judgment of the law-maker in this context; yet, as in that case, a measure 
that actually proves unnecessary must be considered unconstitutional, whichever the 
ex-ante judgment of the law-maker113.
(c) A limitation is proportionate if it does not go beyond what is needed to 
achieve the aim it pursues114. The condition of proportionality is thus meant to strike a 
balance between the limitation of a right (means) and the right or value which justifies 
its limitation (aim). Striking this balance implies the active involvement of both aim and 
means. Under the condition of proportionality, therefore, both the aim and the means of 
limitation are conceived as variables in an 'inter-conditioning' relationship115. As in the 
case of the condition of necessity, a judgment on the proportionality of a measure 
implies a negative proof. The Court, in fact, does not require that means and aim be in 
an adequate relationship. The Court is satisfied that a limitation is proportionate when it 
is shown that the relationship between means and aim is not inadequate116.
11 ^ VerfGE 67,157 at 175. On this issue, see E. Grabitz, "Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit..." 
at 573.
112BVerfGE 19, 330 at 337 et seq.; 25, 1 at 17 et seq.; 30, 292 at 316; 67,157 at 176.
113BVerfGE 17, 269 at 279; 21, 261 at 270 et seq.
114BVerfGE 22, 180 at 218 et seq.; 30, 292 at 316; 48, 396 at 402; 67, 157 at 178.
115See E. Grabitz, 'Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit..." at 575.
116See BVerfGE 7, 377 at 407; 16, 194 at 202; 17, 108 at 117; 25, 236 at 247; 27, 211 at 219; 27, 
344 at 352; 28, 66 at 88; 28, 264 at 280; 48, 396 at 402; 67, 157 at 178.
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This triple test of reasonableness confronts limitations of constitutional rights 
with the aims they pursue in three different ways. The condition of suitability, to begin 
with, establishes an absolute means-aim relationship: given a certain aim, measures are 
either suitable or unsuitable to reach it. The condition of necessity also establishes such 
an absolute relationship, yet, it confronts a limiting measure not only with the aim it 
pursues but also with other alternative means which can lead to the same end. Finally, 
the condition o f proportionality describes a relative means-aim relationship, in the sense 
that aim and means inter-condition each other117.
[2] Let us now turn our attention to the way the principle of reasonableness 
defines the protected scope of art. 10 rights; that is, we must now first of all ascertain 
which aims may justify a restriction o f these rights and, second, how the 
reasonableness test has been applied in this context.
Art. 10 subjects restrictions to the secrecy of telecommunications to a legislative 
reservation of power and, for the most part, does not impose a requirement that such 
restrictions be subordinated to the pursuit o f any particular aim. To the extent that this is 
the case, the secrecy of telecommunications may be limited in order to protect some 
general interest defined by the law-maker, provided that the importance of this interest 
proves to outweigh the importance of the interest in the protection of art. 10 rights. In 
the context of law enforcement, for example, this condition is not fulfilled by the 
interest in the prosecution of just any crime, but only by the interest in the prosecution 
of crimes considered particularly serious118.
To some extent, however, the legitimacy of restrictions on the secrecy of 
telecommunications is subordinated to the pursuit of some concrete aim. To be more 
precise, restrictions on this right may include a provision that "the person affected shall 
not be informed of any such restriction" and that "recourse to the courts shall be 
replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies appointed by 
Parliament", but only if they aim at "the protection of the free democratic basic order or 
the existence or security of the Federation or a Land' (art. 10.2.2). Such a provision, 
however, mostly affects the art. 19.4 right to judicial recourse and only affects art. 10
117See E. Grabitz, "Der Grandsatz der VerhaltnismâÛigkeii ..." at 571; here the absolute and relative 
means-aim relationships are referred to as 'quantitative' and 'qualitative', respectively. In this author's 
view (pp. 581 et seq.), the suitability and necessity requirements are Vules' ÇEntscheidungsregelri), 
whereas the requirement of proportionality is a 'principle' Çoffenes Prinzip'), since it merely offers 
indications as to the way decisions ought to be taken (for the distinction between rules and principles, 
see Alexy Theorie der Gnmdrechte, at 71 et seq.).
1 l8B VerfGE 34,238 at 249. Although this decision concerns a case of unlawful recording of a person- 
to-person conversation, its conclusions also apply in the context of telecommunication surveillance.
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right to the secrecy of telecommunications in as far as the existence of this right requires 
that remedies be provided against its violation. On account of this, art. 10.2.2 will be 
commented on at length in chapter 6.
As for the application of the test of reasonableness to art 10, the case-law of the 
Constitutional Court on the issue is not rich enough to let us draw general conclusions. 
It can only be said that in all cases where the Court has applied the principle of 
reasonableness it has upheld the constitutionality of the restriction in question as applied 
in the particular case and, more broadly, as regulated by law. The short number of 
cases on art. 10 decided by the Court, the fact that in most of these cases the Court has 
confirmed the constitutionality of the legal restriction in question, but above all the fact 
that the law-maker is in charge of defining the protected scope of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications within the limits analysed above, all these circumstances make u 
necessary to look at the various legal restrictions of the constitutional right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications. Indeed, a glance at these restrictions is a necessary step 
in the study of the protected scope of this right.
3 , Legal Restrictions on the Protected Scope o f Article.JO
[1] A first restriction on the exercise of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is laid down by the Basic Law itself in art. 18, which reads as 
follows:
Article! 8:
"Those who abuse their ... privacy of correspondence, posts and 
telecommunications (Article 10)... in order to undermine the free democratic 
basic order, shall forfeit [this] basic right. Such forfeiture and its extent shall be 
determined by the Federal Constitutional Court"
However, art. 18 does not allow a restriction of the protected scope of the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications, but the forfeiture of this right: it allows the 
Constitutional Court to deprive a holder of this right in any case of abuse. In other 
words, art. 18 does not limit the protected scope o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications but the possibility of being a holder of this right. Be that as it may, 
this constitutional provision has not yet been applied in the context of art. 10. A 
sufficient check that the right to the secrecy of telecommunication is not abused for
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undemocratic purposes is rather carried out on a statutory basis119. This basis is 
provided for by the statutes to which reference will now be made.
[2] As far as statutory restrictions to the secrecy of telecommunications are 
concerned, let me first refer to those imposed by the postal and telecommunication 
services as part of their normal functioning. Such restrictions, which can be referred to 
as 'structural', can be imposed both on the secrecy o f the post and on the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications but not on the right to the right to the secrecy of letters, 
since this right covers the lapse of time in which letters are not in the hands of the postal 
service. § 5.2 o f the la w  of the Postal Service' (Postgesetz -PostG) permits structural 
restrictions on the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of the post with respect to 
both the content and the surrounding circumstances of an act of postal sending. For its 
part, § 14a (1) o f the *Law on Telecommunications' (Fernmeldeanlagengesetz -FAG) 
authorises structural restrictions on the right to the secrecy of other kinds of 
telecommunication, yet it only permits such restrictions to be imposed upon the content 
of them. No legal provision authorises restrictions of the secrecy of the circumstances 
surrounding an act of telecommunication, hence according to art. 10.2.1 o f the Basic 
Law such restrictions may not be imposed.
Note however that no legal authorisation is needed in order that 
telecommunication employees take notice of the circumstances surrounding an act of 
telecommunication entrusted to them or even of the very content of the act of 
telecommunication in as far as those circumstances or that content lie open to their 
view. The reason is that, as explained in chapter 4, such cases do not fall under the 
coverage of art. 10 right, because this right only covers the secrecy which is inherent in 
telecommunications. Legal authorisation is needed only in the context of situations in 
which secrecy exists but must be broken for the sake of the normal functioning of the 
post or telecommunication services (a most typical example is the authorisation given to 
postal authorities to open a closed object sent in the post which is to be returned to the 
sender if the sender cannot be identified from details on the cover -§ 61.3.2 
Postordnung -PostO). In addition, recall that the Constitutional Court has ruled that, 
temporarily at least, restrictions on the right to the secrecy of telecommunications need 
not fulfil the requirement of legality. There is therefore a good chance that the Court 
will uphold the constitutionality o f  structural restrictions imposed upon the 
circumstances surrounding an act of telecommunication even if such restrictions lack 
any legal basis.
119See Schuppert, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, Band 1 "Art. 
10”, Par. 32, p. 42, Luchterhand 1984.
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As part of the structural restrictions that may be imposed upon the secrecy of 
telecommunications, post and telecommunication services may prevent the illegal use of 
these services. On this basis, postal communications can be checked by custom officers 
in order to prevent the misuse o f telecommunications (§ 6.7 ZollG). They can also be 
checked by postal authorities if they seek to prosecute a crime committed using the 
postal service, i.e. a crime which could not have been committed, at least not in the 
same way, without the use of the postal service (§5.3.1 PostG)120. Similarly, postal 
authorities may check the post of someone against whom the postal service might have 
a judicial or non-judicial claim related to the use of the postal service (e.g. because the 
postal rules concerning the packing of goods or the payment of fees were violated) (§
5.3.2 PostG).
In the context of other means of telecommunication, structural restrictions for 
the prevention of the illegal use of telecommunication services are allowed by §§ 7 and 
8 of the 'Order Concerning Data Protection in the German TELEKOM' (TELEKOM- 
Datenschutzverordnung -TDSV). The problem is however that the TDSV is not a 
formal 'law' in the sense of art. 10.2.1, nor is it clearly grounded on a formal law. 
Some basis for it could be found in § 30 of the Postverfassungsgesetz (PostVerfG), yet 
this provision does not explicitly authorise a limitation on the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, hence it does not fulfil the requirements imposed by art. 10.2.1 
and art. 19.1 of the Basic Law for the limitation of this right. Let me however recall that 
the Constitutional Court in certain circumstances authorises the termporary suspension 
of the requirement of legality normally imposed upon restrictions on the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications; moreover, this authorisation has been confirmed in a 
case concerning precisely the controls imposed by telecommunication authorities as part 
of the normal functioning of a telecommunication service and, in particular, within the 
context of a regulation aimed at preventing telephone harassment121.
[3] Statutory restrictions are also imposed on the telecommunications of 
prisoners. On this point, prisoners on remand must be distinguished from prisoners 
who have already been sentenced. We will refer to them in turn.
According to § 119.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure {Strafprozefiordnung 
-StPO), the rights of prisoners on remand may be subject to restrictions in as far as they 
prove necessary to the aims of their imprisonment or to order in the institution. This
120See Schuppert, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Par. 69, p. 42.
121BVerfGE 85, 386.
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provision does not cite any particular fundamental right, hence it would seem to go 
against the constitutional provision that limiting laws must cite the right they limit and 
the constitutional article where it is recognised (art. 19.1.2 of the Basic Law); yet the 
Constitutional Court has ruled that art. 19.1.2 of the Basic Law does not apply in this 
context for, though enacted in 1965, § 119.3 StPO merely reproduces pre­
constitutional law. § 119.3 StPO thus provides the legal basis for the restriction of all 
fundamental rights o f prisoners on remand, hence also for the restriction o f their right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications122.
§ 119.3 finds an exception in § 148 StPO. This provision protects the verbal 
and written communication of these prisoners with their lawyers, unless the former are 
accused of having committed a crime listed in § 129a o f the Criminal Code 
{Strafgesetzbuch -StGB), that is a crime connected with terrorism and covers both the 
freedom to engage in such com m unications and the secrecy of such 
communications123. This latter may only be violated in order to ascertain whether or 
not the communication in question is in a given situation actually being held with the 
prisoner's lawyer. In any case, written and other types of postal communications must 
first be submitted to a judge to be opened; if the parties have not clearly agreed to this, 
the letter or parcel in question may be sent back (§ 148.2).
In the case of convicted prisoners, laws only authorise the surveillance of 
written telecommunications and only in as far as this proves necessary to the 
functioning, security or order in prison (§ 29.3 Strafvollzugsgesetz -StVollzG). 
German law however does not allow the surveillance of written communications of 
prisoners to the Ombudsman, to the European Commission of Human Rights (§ 29.11 
StVollzG) or to their lawyers; in the last mentioned there is, again, an exception for a 
case where the prisoner has been convicted of the commission of a crime listed in § 
129a (§ 29.1 StVollzG).
[4] An important group of restrictions on the secrecy of telecommunications is 
regulated in §§ 94 -111 of the StPO, which permit the surveillance of written and other 
kinds of telecommunications for the purpose of obtaining evidence within the context of 
a criminal investigation process (§ 94 StPO)124.
122See BVerfGE 35,35; 42, 234.
123See BHGSt 33,347 at 349; see also BHGSt 36. 205.
124Because they aim at obtaining criminal evidence, these restrictions can be clasified among the so- 
called "authentic criminal law restrictions of fundamental rights" ("echte strafprozessuale 
Grundrechtseingriffe") (see Knut Amelung, "Zur dogmatischen Einordnung strafprozessualer 
Grundrechtseingriffe" (1987) JZ 737 at 739).
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According to § 99 of the StPO, written telecommunications -letters, telegrams, 
telegraphs and any other act of sending by post- may be intercepted for the investigation 
of any crime if addressed to or sent by the person accused of its commission. The 
surveillance of other modalities of telecommunication, on the other hand, is authorised 
in § 100a only in cases where there are solid grounds for the suspicion that certain 
criminal acts of particular gravity have been committed, as long as it would be futile or 
there would be a serious impediment to the carrying out of the investigation or to the 
finding out of the whereabouts o f the person charged with the commission of the crime 
in question by any other means.
As originally drafted, the wording of § 100a only allowed for the "recording of 
telecommunications in a magnetophone", on which basis this provision could not serve 
as a basis for the surveillance o f non-oral telecommunications. At present, § 100a 
allows for the "registration o f [any] telecommunications"125. This change in the 
wording of § 100a was doubtless needed on account of the development of new forms 
of telecommunication, notably through computer networks. Yet this provision does not 
deal with all the possibilities of computer surveillance. To begin with, § 100a 
disregards the fact that today computer telecommunications often take place in a 
codified form, for it does not explicitly authorise the deciphering and evaluation of the 
data collected through surveillance126. Unless decoding an intercepted message is 
interpreted as implicitly authorised with the interception, this act constitutes an 
infringement on the secrecy of telecommunications which is not authorised on legal 
grounds, hence it is an act which cannot be carried out in accordance with the Basic 
Law. It is however rather likely that the Constitutional Court will allow that the 
legislative reservation of power be temporarily dispensed with in this case, as it has 
done on different occasions. In addition, note that § 100a only applies in the context of 
art. 10 of the Basic Law to justify the surveillance of telecommunications, that is it only 
applies in as far as there is a transmission of information between two parties. It 
therefore does not authorise public authorities to regulate individual computer work, to 
copy computer stored data or the like127. These circumstances are covered by the right 
to privacy recognised within art. 2.1 of the Basic Law, a right restrictions to which are 
not subject to a legislative reservation of power.
§ 100a authorises surveillance of telecommunications if there is a suspicion, 
based on articulable facts, that a person has committed or attempted to commit (if the
125This new wording of § 100a was introduced by an. 4.17 of the Poststrukturgesetz (PostStruktG) of 
the 8th June 1989 (BGBl IS. 1026).
126W. Bär, "Die Überwachung..." at 583.
127Ibid. p. 582.
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attempt is punishable) one of the crimes that this provision proscribes (from high 
treason to some drug-related offences). No particular degree of suspicion is required; in 
fact, courts have interpreted this requirement rather flexibly128. The addressee o f a 
measure of surveillance may be the person charged with the commission of just one of 
these crimes or a third person with whom he is reasonably believed to communicate or 
whose telecommunication connexion he is reasonably believed to use (§ 100a). An 
exception to this rule is a lawyer's conversations with his client. The basis for this 
exception is § 148.1 StPO, which guarantees free oral communication between lawyers 
and their clients. This provision has been interpreted as saying that lawyers cannot have 
their oral communications with their clients intercepted on the grounds of the 
investigation of crimes of which these latter are suspected. Rather, a lawyer's oral 
telecommunications can only be intercepted if he (i.e. the lawyer in question) is 
suspected of the planning or commission of one of the listed criminal acts129. Some 
commentators even claim that a suspect's conversations with other attorneys, clergy or 
doctors, that is with people who may refuse to testify on the basis of the confidential 
character of the conversations (§ 53 StPO), also ought to be considered exempted from 
interception130.
Both the interception of the post and the surveillance of other modalities of 
telecommunication must be ordered by a judge. Exceptionally, should no delay seem 
advisable, they may also be ordered by a public prosecutor, yet this order expires after 
three days unless confirmed by a judge (§§ 100.1-2 and lOOb.l respectively). An 
intercepted act of postal sending may only be opened with the permission of the judge 
who ordered or confirmed the interception (§ 100.4,2); indeed, it is this judge who 
must open the object that has been intercepted, unless she decides to authorise a public 
prosecutor to do it in order to avoid delay which might endanger the prosecution (§ 
100.3.1-2). A judicial order of telecommunication surveillance must specify the name 
and address of the person against whom it is addressed, together with the kind, scope 
and duration of the measure; the duration may not be longer than three months and may 
only be renovated for another period o f three months (§ 100b.2). As soon as the 
conditions under which surveillance was ordered stop existing, the measure must be 
immediately brought to an end (§ 100b.4). Similarly, the information thereby collected 
must be destroyed as soon as it proves no longer relevant (§ 100b.6). The persons 
affected by any of the above measures (interception of the post or surveillance of 
telecommunications) must be informed thereof as soon as doing so ceases to be a
128T. Weigend, "Using the Result of Audio-Surveillance as Penal Evidence in the Federal Republic of 
Germany" 24 Stanford J. Int'l L, 21 at 40 (1987).
129See BGHSt 33, 347.
130T. Weigend, "Using the Result...", note 102 and accompanying text.
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danger to the success of the investigation in question, to public security, to a person's 
life or physical integrity or to the ability of an undercover agent to continue operating 
effectively (§ 101).
[5] Special attention deserves to be given to the law "restricting the secrecy of 
the mail, post and telecommunications (law supplementing Art. 10 of the Basic Law)" 
(Gesetz zu Artikel JO Grundgesetz), usually referred to as G 10131. This law was 
introduced to develop art. 10.2.2 of the Basic Law, on which basis the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications can be subject to rather significant restrictions when 
these are needed for the protection of national security and the democratic system. In 
particular, art. 10.2.2 allows that, in the context of telecommunication surveillance 
carried out for these purposes, those who suspect that they are being victims of 
surveillance can be denied access to the judiciary and must raise their claims in front of 
a non-judiciary independent body created ad hoc. This circumstance will be explained 
in detail in the next chapter. For the moment I will concentrate on the way G 10 defines 
the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications and, in particular, 
on how this definition differs from the one made by the StPO.
G 10 regulates the surveillance and registration of telecommunications of any 
kind132 provided that someone is suspected of planning, committing, or having already 
committed one of certain crimes against the security of the state or of the democratic 
system, crimes which are exhaustively listed in art. 1 § 2 G 10. The main 
characteristics of G 10 surveillance are the following:
1. As in the case of § 100a StPO, surveillance can only be ordered when 
carrying out the investigation by any other means appears to be impossible or 
significantly more difficult. Similarly, a measure of surveillance may only be imposed 
upon the person suspected of the commission of the crime in question or a third person 
with whom he is reasonably believed to communicate or whose telecommunication 
connexion he is reasonably believed to use.
2. Surveillance can only be ordered upon petition. This may be made by the 
federal office for constitutional protection, by Land authorities for constitutional
131Gesetzzur Beschränkung des Brief- Post- und Femmeldegeheimnisses v. 13.8.1968. Note that art. 
2 of this law introduced §§ 100a and 100b into the StPO, to which reference has been made above.
132In its original version, art. 1 § 2 G 10 authorised that written telecommunications could be read and 
oral telecommunications overheard, hence its applicability to forms of telecommunication such as 
Satellite telecommunication or telecommunication through computer networks was doubtful. As § 
100a StPO, art. 1 § 2 G 10 was amended by the PostStruktG (art. 4.16), which thus enlarged the scope 
of the G 10 to all means of telecommunication.
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protection, by the service of counter-intelligence (if the activity being investigated 
affects the German Federal Armed Forces) or by the federal service of information (if 
the activity being investigated affects this service). Petitions must specify in writing the 
kind, scope and duration of the requested surveillance and offer grounds for such 
requests; they must also show that, the investigation of the case in question would be 
impossible or considerably more difficult through any other means (art. 1 § 4; § 2.2.1).
3. The order of surveillance must be issued by a minister whom the Prime 
Minister has entrusted with this task or, if petition is made by Land authorities for 
constitutional protection, by the competent highest authority of that Land (art. 1 § 5 
(1)). Federal and other authorities for constitutional protection of the corresponding 
Land must keep one another informed of the measures of surveillance adopted (art. 1 § 
5 (4)).
4. The person affected by a measure of surveillance under this law must be 
informed thereof as soon as it has been adopted, unless notification proves to be of 
danger for the success of the investigation in question; in this latter case, notification is 
required as soon as this danger disappears; yet if this condition is not fulfilled five years 
after the adoption of a measure, notification is no longer required (art. 1 § 5 (5)). Until 
notification has been made, the person affected by a measure of surveillance under this 
law has no recourse to the judiciary, but only to a Commission created ad hoc (art. 1 §§ 
5 (5) and 9). This latter point will be developed in detail in the next chapter.
Finally, G 10 also authorises the random interception of telecommunications 
with a view to gathering the information necessary for German authorities to guarantee 
national security against foreign armed attacks (art. 1 § 3.1). This is so-called 'strategic 
surveillance'. Strategic surveillance does not concern any person in particular. The 
persons whose telecommunications are intercepted are selected at random on 
geographical grounds, or because they engage in telecommunications with a suspicious 
office or address. Since the identity of the persons actually subject to 'strategic 
surveillance' is irrelevant, such persons need not be informed that their 
telecommunications are being intercepted; conversely, if the identity of these persons be 
known, it may not be used in any way. In order that their identity can be used, the 
persons in question must be suspected of planning, being committing or having 
committed one of the crimes listed in a r t  1 § 2; in other words, the requirements must 
be met that justify a personal surveillance under art. 1 § 3.2 of the G 10.
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The effect of strategic surveillance appears particularly sweeping133. It allows 
that whole series of telecommunications be surveyed on the grounds that they might 
eventually give some useful hints for the protection of national security. The protection 
of national security thus appears as an asset in the hands of the public power to subject 
whole sectors of the German population to surveillance of their telecommunications 
without ever informing them thereof. In spite of its sweeping effects, one might agree 
that strategic surveillance is an important tool, arguably even a necessary one, to 
guarantee external national security. One might also agree that the protection of national 
security justifies relatively serious restrictions o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. Nonetheless, on account precisely of its sweeping effects, 
strategic surveillance must be subject to a particularly strict application of the principle 
of reasonableness, so that the interference with the secrecy of telecommunications 
carried out on its basis be reduced to a minimum. For example, permanent surveillance 
of every piece o f telecommunication linking Germany with potential political enemies 
might be of great help to the identification of plans for possible armed attacks upon 
Germany, yet such permanent surveillance must be considered unacceptable because 
out of proportion with its aim134. Particularly important is that information gained 
through strategic surveillance not be used against private individuals, unless the 
conditions for personal prosecution imposed by the G 10 are fulfilled. Equally 
important is that personal information gained through strategic surveillance be 
destroyed as soon as it is no longer needed.
[6] Let me now mention the restrictions on the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications imposed by § 12 FAG, According to this provision, a judge and, 
in a danger of delay, also an Attorney (''Staatsan\valtschaft'')y can in criminal 
proceedings require that information about pieces of telecommunication addressed to 
the accused, or about pieces of telecommunication which seem likely to come from the 
accused or to be directed to her, be brought to the judge or attorney, provided that 
information about these pieces of telecommunication appears to be relevant for the 
investigation.
The scope of the application of § 12 FAG differs from that of the two previous 
sets of provisions in at least four different ways. First, as opposed to § 100a StPO and 
to art. 1 § 2 G 10, but similarly to § 99 StPO, § 12 FAG authorises judges to obtain
133Indeed, it has been criticised on these grounds. See G. Frankenberg, "Die Freiheit und die 
Verhältnisse. Anmerkungen zu den Beschlüssen des BVerfG zur Kunstfreiheit ("Anachronistischer 
Zug") und zur "strategischen Überwachung" gemäß § 3 G 10", 17 Kritische Justiz 437 at 440 et seq.
(1984).
134BVerfGE 67, 157 at 174.
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information on telecommunication in the context of any criminal procedure, that is in 
the context of the investigation of any crime at all. Second, § 12 FAG does not 
authorise judges to obtain information concerning future pieces of telecommunication; 
but information concerning pieces of telecommunication which have taken place. Third, 
in relation to this temporal definition o f the scope of application of § 12 FAG, this 
provision only authorises judges to obtain the information about telecommunications 
which is automatically registered as part of the normal functioning o f the 
telecommunication company in question. Finally, the literal wording of § 12 FAG 
suggests that it only allows the collection of information concerning the circumstances 
surrounding a piece of telecommunication ("Auskunft iiber Femmeldeverkehr"); yet 
some commentators argue135 that § 12 FAG can be interpreted in the sense that it 
embraces the acquisition of information about the content of telecommunications in as 
far as this information is automatically registered as part of the normal functioning of 
telecommunication companies (i.e. on the basis of § 14a (1) FAG).
Until recently, § 12 FAG had hardly had any grounds for application, for until 
recently, information on telecommunications was automatically registered only in the 
context of the mobile telephone network, whereas information concerning conventional 
telephone conversations could only be registered with the help of surveillance devices 
explicitly installed for this purpose136. § 12 FAG has only developed its potential as a 
basis for telecommunication surveillance with the introduction of digital 
telecommunication. The reason is that the circumstances surrounding every piece of 
digital telecommunication (i.e. the number dialed, the duration of the communication 
and the date when it took place) are automatically registered and may be kept by 
telecommunication companies for 80 days (§§ 6.2.2 (l) ; 6.3 TDSV). § 12 FAG thus 
permits the drawing up of an accurate picture of all digital telecommunications engaged 
in and received on a certain line during a period of nearly three months, this including 
not only telephone but all other telecommunications attached to a computer network. 
The importance o f § 12 FAG as a limitation of the protected scope of the secrecy o f 
telecommunication will become most significant with the enlargement of the digital 
network, which in fact is meant to replace the traditional telephone system and to be the 
source of all telecommunications.
135See W. Bär, "Zugriff au Femmeldedaten der Bundespost TELEKOM oder Dritter - Strafprozessuale 
Eingriffsmöglichkeiten in den Datenverkehr" (1993) Computer und Recht (CR) 634 at 636-637, note 
16.
l36See S. Walz, "Datenschutz und Telekommunikation (II) - Konsequenzen des Poststrukiurgeseiz", 
(1990) CR 138 at 140.
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§ 12 FAG has thus become a powerful tool for investigation. Moreover, its 
importance is strengthened by the fact that it allows the collection of information for the 
investigation of any crime at all, a circumstance which has often been criticised137. In 
principle, however, I do not find this an unreasonable limitation of the protected scope 
of art. 10. It should not be forgotten that finding out these circumstances does not entail 
as significant an invasion of privacy as uncovering the content of a piece of 
telecommunication, hence it seems reasonable that the former limitation of ait. 10 be 
allowed in cases where the latter is not. Problems might only arise in the context of 
digital telecommunications the content of which is also automatically registered. Such 
problems can however be easily avoided if, because o f its sweeping effects, § 12 FAG 
is interpreted in narrow terms, that is, if it is interpreted as a provision which allows the 
collection o f information concerning the surrounding circumstances of digital 
telecommunications but not the content of such telecommunications, even if this should 
be automatically registered. This interpretation seems demanded by the European 
Commission in its recent "Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive concerning the protection of personal data and privacy in the context of digital 
telecommunication networks, in particular the Integrated Services Digital Network 
(ISDN) and digital mobile netw orks"138. Art. 5 of this proposal allows 
telecommunication services to process data concerning the subscriber and surrounding 
the acts of telecommunication she has used only for the purpose of billing and up to the 
end of the statutory period during which the bill may be challenged, which as was 
mentioned above in Germany is 80 days. According to art. 6 of this proposal, these 
data must in any case be erased as soon as they are no longer necessary to provide the 
service required (art. 6).
[7] Finally, let me end by bringing up a different kind of limitation which may 
be imposed on the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications,
i.e. the possibility that the holder of this fundamental right renounces its exercise. It 
seems uncontroversial that the protection to the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications can freely be waived in individual cases139. This opens the 
possibility that the lawfulness of telecommunication surveillance may be based upon the 
consent given thereto. The question that arises now is who may consent to a measure of 
surveillance? To be more precise, is a measure of surveillance lawful if it is consented
137See S. Walz, "Datenshutz und Telekommunikation..." at 140.
138COM(94) 128 final - COD 288, Brussels, 13 June 1994.
139See Pappermann, "Art. 10" in Ingo von Münch (ed.), GGKommentar, München 1981, p. 433 at 
434; Badura, "Art. 10" in Kommentar zum Bonner GG, p. 16; Maunz-Dürig-Herzog, "Art. 10" in 
GGKommentar, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München 1993, Band I, p. 21; W. Bär, 
"Überwachung des Gemmeldeverkehrs - Strafprozessuale Eingriffmöglichkeiten in den Datenverkehr"
(1993) CR 578 at 585. See also BVerfGE 85, 386 at 398.
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to by only one of the parties taking part in the piece of telecommunication surveyed or 
is the consent of all the parties involved therein needed?
In order to answer this question two different considerations must be kept in 
mind. On the one hand, the right to the secrecy of telecommunications (at least to the 
secrecy of the content of telecommunications) does not apply vis-à-vis communication 
partners because this right only covers the secrecy o f telecommunications, secrecy 
which does not exist between communication parties (see chapter 4). On this basis, a 
party to an act o f telecommunication may disclose the content or the circumstances of 
telecommunications she has engaged in140. By doing so, she might violate some other 
fundamental right of the person affected (provided of course that disclosure is carried 
out by the public power), such as the rights to privacy or to one's own word 
recognised within art. 2.1 of the Basic Law; she might even be committing a crime (§ 
201 StGB). Yet disclosure does not amount to an infringement upon the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications.
This is so as far as disclosure of the secrecy o f a piece of telecommunication is 
concerned. On the other hand, the case of consent to an interference cannot be solved 
on the above premises. For there is an important difference between the act of 
disclosing the secrecy of a piece of telecommunication and the act of consenting to a 
third party's interfering with that secrecy. This difference becomes clear if we depart 
from a basic idea: the exercise of a fundamental right can only be waived by the holder 
of this right, hence every individual can only consent to interferences with her own 
fundamental rights. In every instance o f telecommunication each of the parties taking 
part therein is the holder of an independent right to the secrecy of telecommunications. 
Each party can therefore consent to interferences with her right, yet she may not 
consent to the interference with the right of the other party. The conclusion therefore is 
that in order that no violation of a r t 10 be involved surveillance must be consented to 
by all the parties to an act of telecommunication.
The Constitutional Court has been confronted with the question of consented 
surveillance in a case concerning the secrecy of the circumstances surrounding 
telephone conversations141. The reasoning of the Court and the conclusion it reached 
coincide with the considerations that have just been made above: in order that the 
lawfulness of telecommunication surveillance can be based on consent, the consent 
must be given by all the parties involved in the piece of telecommunication surveyed. It
140BVerfGE 85,386 at 399.
141IbicL
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is inherent in the reasoning of the Court that this conclusion is not restricted to the 
circumstances surrounding telephone conversations but that it can be applied both to the 
circumstances and to the content of every modality of telecommunication142.
Conclusion
The protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in 
Germany is defined in rather clear terms. This is mostly due to the fact that its definition 
is ultimately left in the hands of the law-maker and that the legal regulation of the 
protected scope is rather precise. In addition to being clearly regulated, restrictions of 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications are subject to strict limits. They are 
constitutionally required to fulfil both a formal and a substantial condition. Formally, 
the law-maker must make it explicit that a particular law intends to limit the protected 
scope of the right to the secrecy o f telecommunication. Substantially, the law-maker 
may only impose limitations upon the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications which comply with the so-called 'principle of reasonableness' 
(Grundsatz der Verhàltnismafiigkeit). In order to comply with this principle, limitations 
must pursue a legitimate aim, they must be suitable and necessary for attaining that aim 
and they must not be out of proportion with the aim they pursue.
All the restrictions listed above would seem to be pursuing a legitimate aim. 
They also seem suitable to attaining this aim (they all certainly seem suitable to attaining 
it at least partially) and, we can also accept, they seem necessary to attaining the aim. 
Yet some of them have such sweeping effects that they might create problems of 
proportionality unless they are interpreted and applied in restrictive terms. This is 
particularly the case with two provisions, namely with art. 1 § 3 of the G 10 and with § 
12 FAG. The former can subject whole sectors of the German population to the 
'strategic surveillance1 of their telecommunications for the sake of the protection of 
national security. The latter allows the collection of information concerning 
telecommunications which have taken place for its use in any criminal prosecution, in 
as far as this information is automatically registered by telecommunication companies. 
In order that these two provisions allow for restrictions which respect the principle of 
reasonableness, they must be subject to particularly strict interpretation and their effects 
must be minimised. Heavier criticism is deserved by the G 10 in as far as it precludes 
the possibility that victims of a measure of surveillance carried out under the G 10 can
142Fears that only one party's consent might be valid in the context of computer telecommunications 
are therefore unjustified (see W. Bär, "Überwachung...", at 585 et seq.)
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have recourse to the judiciary against such measures before they have been officially 
informed of their existence. This criticism will be developed in detail in chapter 6.
I would also like to recall a particularly regrettable doctrine of the Constitutional 
Court, i.e. that the law-maker has a certain margin of time to authorise the limitation of 
a right, hence that limitations of a right may temporarily not be in accordance with the 
law. This doctrine, which is plainly unconstitutional, has sometimes been applied in the 
context of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. Moreover, the danger that it 
be applied for longer and longer periods is particularly great with respect to the 
restrictions imposed as part of the normal functioning of telecommunication services 
(what I have called 'structural restrictions’), since not all such restrictions are yet 
authorised by law. This is notably the case for structural restrictions to the secrecy of 
the circumstances surrounding a piece of non-written telecommunication. Similarly, 
structural restrictions for the prevention of the illegal use of telecommunication services 
are only authorised by §§ 7 and 8 of the TDSV, which are not legal provisions.
Beyond these criticisms, the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications seems defined in terms which are rather clear and rather 
reasonable, as corresponds to the clear definition of its coverage.
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Section 3: The United States
1 . The Scone o f  Protection o f the Fourth Amendment
Fourth Amendment
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized."
The fourth amendment recognises a right against all searches and seizures, yet it 
offers protection only against some of them. It is the purpose of this section to ascertain 
which searches and seizures are banned by the fourth amendment, thus defining the 
boundaries of the protected scope of this provision. It will be seen that the protected 
scope of the fourth amendment is strongly influenced by considerations as to the level 
of protection which privacy ought to be granted. Indeed, the definition of the scope of 
privacy which is worthy of protection will appear as the main criteria in the definition of 
the scope of protection of the fourth amendment. It will also come to light that the level 
of protection that privacy deserves is decided on policy grounds. All of this will prove 
to be to the detriment of the protected scope of the fourth amendment, the definition of 
which will appear as shaky and subject to policy restrictions. Let us however proceed 
step by step and look at the protected scope of the fourth amendment with some order.
The basic points of reference in the definition of the protected scope of the 
fourth amendment are provided by the amendment itself. According to its wording, 
lawful searches and searches must comply with two requirements. First, they must be 
reasonable; second, they can only be backed by warrants issued upon probable cause 
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized. Let me first comment on this latter requirement.
Warrants which back searches and seizures must fulfil two conditions, which 
are a direct product of the history of the fourth amendment: as explained in chapter 2, 
this provision was enacted as a reaction against the practice of issuing general search 
warrants and aimed at preventing arbitrariness in the issuing of warrants and at making 
the scope of these as well defined as possible. The first condition aims to control the 
lawfulness of searches and seizures at their origins and states that search warrants can 
only be issued upon 'probable-cause'. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 'probable 
cause' requires that before a search warrant is issued there must be evidence which
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would lead a prudent and cautious man to believe that an offence has been or is being 
committed, that the items sought are to be found in the place or on the person searched 
and that those items will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction of some 
person143. The second condition, on the other hand, aims to control the lawfulness of 
searches and seizures while they are being carried out, for indeed "a search which is 
reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable 
intensity and scope"144. The condition is that lawful warrants particularly describe the 
object of the searches and seizures they authorise; in particular, warrants must specify 
the places, persons and items to be searched for and seized, so that only those thus 
specified can be the object of a lawful search and seizure145.
The requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable is much looser in 
scope, hence much more difficult to define, than the warrant requirement. It is not 
merely one among the cumulative requirements of constitutionality that the fourth 
amendment imposes upon searches and seizures. Rather, 'reasonableness1 has been 
taken by the Court as the only requirement of the kind that this amendment really 
imposes or, more precisely, as the requirement which comprehends all others. Searches 
and seizures are constitutional if they are reasonable, yet, in order to be thus, they must 
fulfil certain conditions, in particular they must not be backed by an invalid warrant. 
The provision that searches and seizures must not be invalidly warranted is the only 
criterion of reasonableness provided by the fourth amendment. This, however, is 
clearly insufficient: taken by itself the criterion implies that every warrantless search and 
seizure is reasonable per se; the requirement of 'reasonableness' must entail more than a 
bare provision that searches and seizures be 'not invalidly warranted'. It has been the 
task of the Supreme Court to define the scope of this requirement.
As a first observation in this respect, note that 'reasonableness' has not been 
read to imply any kind of 'less-intrusive-means rule'. Unlike the German Constitutional 
Court and the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has discarded the application o f any such rule: "the reasonableness of any 
particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence
143See Grau v. US, 287 US 124 at 128 (1932); Go-Bart importing Co. et al. v. US, 282 US 344 at 
355 (1931). The above guide-lines have also been induced from cases in which probable cause is 
demanded from warrantless searches and seizures (see footnotes 156,158 below).
l44Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 at 19 (1968).
145See Marron v. US, 275 US 192 at 196-197 (1927); Cooiidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 at 
471 (1971), where the seizure of items under terms not described in a valid warrant is deemed lawful 
only if covered by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. See also Marcus v. Search 
Warrant. 367 US 717 at 724 (1961); Stanford v. Texas, 379 US 476 at 480 (1965); Roaden v. 
Kentucky, 413 US 496 at 502 (1973); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. 436 US 307 at 311 (1978); Lo-Ji 
Sales, Inc. v. NY, 442 US 319 at 322, 325 (1979). where the Court has disapproved general or open- 
ended warrants.
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of alternative 'less intrusive’ means"146. Beyond this point, the question of the scope 
of the reasonableness requirement will be faced in the following paragraphs. In 
particular, I will focus upon two issues: fust, whether the 'reasonableness' requirement 
has any substantive content; second, whether the issuance of a valid search warrant, not 
only the validity of such a warrant when issued, is a condition on the reasonableness of 
a search and seizure.
1.1 Are Valid W arran ts Sufficient?; [a] 'Reasonableness* as a
Substantive Requirement
Let me start by noting that the warrant requirement does not have substantive 
content. The warrant requirement only demands that search warrants comply v. ith 
certain formalities, that is, it protects the right to privacy merely by way of imposing 
formal or procedural requirements upon restrictions o f the right. Admittedly, the* 
issuance and scope of a valid warrant must be based on some substantive 
considerations concerning, in particular, the existence of probable cause. Yet, strictly 
speaking, probable cause does not impose substantive restrictions upon the content of 
warrants; the restrictions it imposes are merely functional, that is, they are related to the 
factual circumstances of a case. Once this is clear, I would like to point out that, under 
the privacy reading of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the 
requirement of reasonableness to mean the imposition of any other requirement than the 
warrant requirement upon searches and seizures. If probable cause exists and a warrant 
is duly issued on these grounds, then a restriction of the right to privacy through search 
and seizure is lawful. As a result, under the privacy reading of the fourth amendment, 
searches and seizures are not subject to any kind of substantive requirements.
With this position the Supreme Court seems to assume that the right to privacy 
can always be subordinated to the interest in law enforcement, independently of the 
importance that privacy and law enforcement respectively have in a particular case. All 
the Court requires is that an interest in law enforcement is really at stake, that the 
violation of privacy helps to make law enforcement effective (probable cause) and that 
both these points be decided by courts (search warrant). Reasonableness is not thought 
to require that the aim of law enforcement be of any particular degree of importance in 
order to justify infringement upon privacy interests; nor is it thought to require that 
limitations of privacy be necessary to attain their aim (as noted above, the violation of *543
146See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 US 640 at 647 (1983); cifr. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367 at 374 
(1987). See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 US 433 ai 447 (1973); US v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US
543 at 557 (1976).
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privacy need not pass the test of being the least intrusive means to an end) or that they 
be proportionate to the aim they pursue. Instead, the protection of privacy is simply 
subordinated to law enforcement and its limitation is considered reasonable provided 
that a court confirms that it is a suitable means to attain this aim. This restrictive 
approach to privacy confirms an idea that I have developed in previous chapters: in the 
United States the right to privacy is regarded as suspect, because it safeguards purely 
individualistic interests which often go against more general interests of society, 
interests which for this reason are considered more valuable than privacy. When these 
two kinds of interests clash against each other, then the Supreme Court assumes that it 
is reasonable that privacy be automatically sacrificed to the common good, without any 
further considerations. Such a clash between privacy interests and the common good is 
notably present in the context of law enforcement.
The low importance that the right to privacy is thought to deserve contrasts with 
the importance the Supreme Court used io accord to the protection of private property 
when this dominated the interpretation of the fourth amendment. Indeed, recall that the 
fourth amendment offered private property absolute protection, so that legitimate private 
property could under no circumstances be searched. This explains that, when the fourth 
amendment was regarded as a means for the protection of private property, the purely 
formal warrant requirement could not suffice to account for the reasonableness of 
searches and seizures, it could by no means grant private property the absolute 
protection against searches and seizures that it was thought to deserve. Some additional 
substantive requirement, indeed some absolute substantive requirement, was thus 
needed and this was found in the so-called 'mere-evidence rule'. Indeed, as explained 
in chapter 2, the 'mere-evidence rule' defined what could be considered the 'essential 
content' of the provision, since it defmed a sub-area within the coverage of the fourth 
amendment infringement of which was always considered unconstitutional.
The abandonment of the 'mere-evidence rule' signified the abandonment of the 
property reading of the fourth amendment and the definite prevalence of the privacy 
reading. Since then, no other substantive requirement, whether or not absolute, has 
come to replace the 'mere-evidence rule'. In fact, in the case of Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily the Court stated that "[u]nder existing law valid warrants may be issued to search 
any property... at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, 
or evidence of a crime will be found"147. Nevertheless, in this very case the Court left 
the door open for the eventual imposition of a substantive requirement of 
'reasonableness* by saying that "[t]his is not to ... assert that searches, however or
147Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 US 547 at 554 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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whenever executed, may never be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on 
probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be 
seized"148. It thus seems that the Court has not discarded the idea that, eventually, 
searches and seizures might be made to comply with material requirements of 
reasonableness under a privacy rationale149. Unfortunately, this idea has not yet been 
developed.
1 .2  [b] T he Issuance o f a  W arran t as a  Condition of 'Reasonableness*
1.2.1 The Issuance of a Warrant as a Rule
The fourth amendment does not literally require that search warrants be issued. 
It only requires that, should a search and seizure be based on a warrant, this latter must 
comply with certain conditions (warrants must be based on probable cause, they must 
describe the target of the search and seizure, etc). As was explained in chapter 2, the 
amendment came as a reaction against general search warrants, not against warrantless 
searches and seizures150. Nevertheless, in the end, these two circumstances can give 
rise to a similar evil, namely too wide discretion for law-enforcing officers. This evil 
becomes more evident in a society where, like in present American society, law- 
enforcing agents have a great deal of factual and legal power over ordinary citizens, 
hence where law-enforcing agents are in a position from which they can and do 
endanger the exercise of civil rights to an extent unknown to the drafters of the fourth 
am endm ent151. Taking these considerations into account, the Supreme Court has 
always considered the issuance o f a warrant as a part, a very important part indeed, of 
the requirement of reasonableness. The Court is of the opinion that, on balance, the 
interest behind the avoidance of a search warrant -more efficient law enforcement and 
the like- is outweighed by "the desirability o f having magistrates rather than police 
officers determine when searches and seizures are permissible and what limitations 
should be placed upon such activities"; for only magistrates "possess the detachment
148Ibid. at 559-560.
149In this context, it has been suggested that searches and seizures of "the most private matters" -one’s 
own thoughts and their physical embodiment in the form of communications to oneself- should be 
considered unreasonable when carried out upon third parties, unless supported by probable cause not 
only that the object of the search or seizure is linked to the commission of a crime but, additionally, 
that the owner of the object of the search is also involved in the crime in question (C.M. Bradley, 
"Constitutional Protection for Private Papers" 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev., 461 (1981)).
150The particular circumstances and the legal background which justified the wording of the fourth 
amendment have been analysed by Akhil Reed Amar, "Forth Amendment First Principles" 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 757 (1994).
151 See Carol S. Steiker, "Second Thoughts About First Principles", 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820 at 830 et 
seq. (1994).
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and neutrality with which the constitutional rights of the suspect must be viewed"152. 
In other words, the Court has thought it advisable that neutral and independent 
magistrates judge on the constitutionality o f searches and seizures not only ex post, that 
is, not only once a search and seizure has already occurred, but also before they have 
been carried out. Without a judicial warrant, such a prior decision is left in the hands of 
law enforcing officers, with the obvious risk of abuse.
The warrant requirement is not unconditionally regarded as a requirement of 
reasonableness, however. There are cases where, on balance, the Court has thought it 
advisable to avoid the procedure of issuing a search warrant. To be sure, the Court has 
always asserted that, as a rule, search warrants must be issued, yet it has admitted that 
under certain exceptional circumstances the needs of law-enforcement outweigh 
interests in the issuance of a search warrant. In this context, it does not suffice to show 
that a warrantless search and seizure has been properly carried out or that it was backed 
by probable cause, hence that a warrant would have been obtained if it had been applied 
for153. The purpose of the warrant requirement is that there be a prior independent 
judgment on the constitutionality of a search and seizure and that this not be replaced by 
the opinion of police officers, even if  ex post their opinion turns out correct. A 
warrantless search and seizure can be deemed reasonable only under exceptional 
circumstances154.
The decision that a particular search and seizure need not be warranted results in 
the loss of the central criterion with which to measure the reasonableness of a search 
and seizure. This loss has become more significant since the fourth amendment started 
to be read exclusively in privacy terms, for this implied the abandonment of the 'mere- 
evidence rule' as a substantive condition of reasonableness which complemented the 
warrant requirement. Thus, the Court has had to set alternative conditions of 
reasonableness for the cases where the warrant requirement does not apply. In
l52Trupiano et al. v. US, 334 US 699 at 705 (1948). See also, e.g., Agnello et al. v. US, 269 US 20 
at 32*33 (1925); Taylor v. US, 286 US 1 at 6; Johnson v. US, 333 US 10 at 13-15 (1948); Chapman 
v. US, 365 US 610 at 615 (1961); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 at 110-115 (1964); Berger v. NY, 
388 US 41 at 54- 60 (1967); Katz v. US, 389 US 347 at 354-357 (1967); Payton v. NY, 445 US 573 
at 588 (1980).
{5iAgnello et al. v. US, 269 US 20 at 33 (1925); Taylor v. US, 286 US 1 at 6; Johnson v. US, 333 
US 10 at 13-15; Trupiano et al. v. US, 334 US 699 at 705 (1948); Rios v. US, 364 US 253 at 262 
(1960); Chapman v. US, 365 US 610 at 615 (1961); Katz v. US, 389 US 347 at 354-357 (1967); US 
v. US District Court, 407 US 297 at 317 (1972); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 at 759 (1979); 
Payton v. NY, 445 US 573 at 588 (1980). As will be seen below, such considerations help to sustain 
the constitutionality of a warrantless search and seizure once its warrant ¡ess character has been justified. 
They are substitutes for the warrant requirement when this is not needed, but offer no grounds for doing 
without a warrant.
154As commented on in chapter 3, the attitude of the Supreme Court with respect to the 
‘exceptionality1 of such circumstances has become less and less strict as privacy became a more and 
more important interest in the context of the amendment.
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particular, it has stated that ’'the notions which underlie the warrant procedure and the 
requirement of probable cause remain fully relevant in this context [of warrantless 
searches and seizures]"155. It would therefore seem that, in principle, warrantless 
searches and seizures must be based on probable cause156 and that their object must be 
particularly described, so that warrantless searches and seizures can also be controlled 
both at their origins and while they are being carried out.
However, these two requirements do not apply in the context of warrantless 
searches and seizures in the same terms as in the context of warranted searches and 
seizures. This is true, first of all, of the requirement that the object of searches and 
seizures be precisely defined, because this requirement is, for obvious reasons, 
impossible to fulfil in the absence of the explicit prior authorisation of a search. In its 
stead, the Court has had to content itself with an equivalent demand, namely that the 
scope of a warrantless search and the seizure arising therefrom be strictly tied to and 
justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible157. The same is 
also true of the probable cause requirement. Probable cause is not an absolute 
requirement; it is not a requirement compliance with which can only be measured in 
absolute, all-or-nothing terms which are the same in every situation. Rather, 
compliance with this requirement appears as a matter of degree. It is only too normal 
that certain searches and seizures are thought to require a higher degree of probable 
cause than others in order to be considered reasonable. The degree of probable cause 
required can vary according to the level of intrusion of a search, to the importance of 
the crime it aims at investigating, even to the imminence of the crime it is aimed to 
prevent. These circumstances must certainly be taken into account before issuing a 
search warrant upon probable cause; yet they become even more important in the 
context of the evaluation of the reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures. 
For one thing, the reasons that suggest that a warrant be dispensed with often also 
suggest that probable cause be required only to a lesser degree.
The Supreme Court has admitted that certain searches and seizures need not be 
subject to strict probable cause. It has ruled, for example, that the presence of "special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make [not only] the warrant [but
155 Jerry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 at 20 (1968).
156See Carroll et al. v. US, 267 US 132 (1925); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 US 381 at 383 (1961); 
Wong Sun v. US, 371 US 471 at 479 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 US 89 at 96-97 (1964); Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 US 294 at 307 (1967); Terry v. Ohio. 392 US 1 at 21 (1968).
157Agnello et al, v. US, 269 US 20 at 30-31 (1925); Go-Bart Importing Co, et al, v. US, 282 US 
344 at 356-358 (1931); US v. Di Re, 332 US 581 at 586-587 (1948); Kremen v. US (Per Curiam), 
353 US 346 at 347-348 (1957); Preston v. US, 376 US 364 at 367-368 (1964); Warden v. Hayden, 
387 US 294 at 310 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 at 19 (1968); Sibron v NY and Peters v. NY, 392 
US 40 at 66 (1968); Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 at 762 (1969).
253
also the] probable cause requirements impracticable"158; similarly, it has ruled that 
searches and seizures which may be warrantless because they only marginally intrude 
upon fourth amendment interests may also be carried out without probable cause159. 
However, the Supreme Court does not like to regard probable cause as a relative 
requirement which can be complied with by degrees. Rather, it regards probable cause 
as an absolute requirement which imposes equal standards upon all searches and 
seizures, be these warrantless or warrant based. The differences between these two 
approaches are more a matter of style than a matter of substance: the Supreme Court 
never speaks of lessening the level of application of the probable cause requirement; 
instead, the Court speaks of excepting the application of probable cause, often replacing 
it by a different, less stringent requirement One such requirement is, for example, that 
searches and seizures must rely upon the 'reasonable suspicion' that an offence had 
been, was being or was about to be committed160.
1.2.2 The Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Throughout its case-law on the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has 
drawn a list of exceptions to the warrant requirement. At first sight, this list would 
appear to be exhaustive. Indeed, the Court has required that the authorities seeking to 
do without a search warrant show that a particular case fall under one of the exceptions 
categorised as such within the Court's list161. Yet the Court has not been completely 
closed to accepting new grounds for exceptions to the warrant requirement. To begin 
with, it has never precluded the possibility that new circumstances can be included in 
the list of exceptions. There have been, in fact, late additions to that list (the 'good- 
faith' and the 'inventory-search' exceptions, for example). Thus whenever the 
circumstances of a case do not fall within a pre-established exception to the warrant 
requirement, the public authorities can always try to convince the Supreme Court that
158Atew Jersey v. TM.O., 469 US 325 at 351 (1985) (disciplinary searches and seizures of students by 
school officials); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 US 868 at 873 (1987) (searches and seizures carried out 
within the state probation system); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 US 656 (1989) (application 
of the US Custom Service drug testing program to employees who apply for positions involving 
illegal drugs or requiring the carrying of firearms); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn, 489 US 602
(1989) (employee drug testing); Michigan State Police v. Stiz, 496 US 444 (1990) (searches in 
sobriety check points).
159As will be seen below, this is generically the case of the stop-and-frisk, the consent and all the 
administrative-search exceptions.
160The Supreme Court understands 'reasonable suspicion* as the "likelihood of facts justifying the 
search" (Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 US 868 at 877 (1987)). For sound criticisms of the absolute, 
unflexible understanding of the probable cause requirement by the Supreme Court, see A.R. Amar, 
"Forth Amendment First Principles" at 782 et seq.
161 Jones v. US, 357 US 493 at 499; US v. Jeffers, 342 US 48 at 51; Rios v. US, 364 US 253 at 261 
(1960); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 at 455,474 (1971).
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*these circumstances stand for a new exception worth establishing. Furthermore, the 
Court has admitted a so-called 'exceptional-circumstances exception1, thus providing a 
rather flexible fail-back argument for public authorities which seek to do without the 
warrant requirement.
In the following paragraphs I will analyse the list of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. To this end I will divide these exceptions into two main groups. To the 
first group [1] belong exceptions the rationale of which lies in the existence of 
compelling circumstances which demand that no time is wasted in obtaining a warrant. 
To the second group [2] belong exceptions to the warrant requirement justified by the 
fact that invasion of privacy implied by some particular types of searches and seizures 
will be slight. Note that belonging to one of the following categorised exceptions does 
not automatically dispense with the warrant requirement. In order that th:s is so, the 
rationale that justifies a particular exception must be present in the particular 
circumstances of an individual case, something which has to be proven by the public 
authorities who argue that a warrantless search and seizure be nonetheless declared 
reasonable162.
[1] Exceptions Justified by the Existence of Compelling Circumstances
The Supreme Court has ruled that the warrant requirement can be dispensed 
with in the presence of exceptional circumstances which prove so compelling that no 
delay in obtaining a warrant is advisable. The Court has not followed a clear line when 
interpreting the exceptionality rationale. Initially, when this rationale was introduced, 
the Court read it in the sense that the warrant requirement can only be dispensed with 
when a warrant is not "reasonably practicable"163. Shortly after having been 
established, however, this doctrine was explicitly overruled by the doctrine that the 
reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure under the exceptional circumstance 
exception must be decided on all its facts, and not merely on the criterion whether a 
warrant would have been practicable164. This latter doctrine granted law-enforcing 
agents a much greater discretion to decide on the issuance of a warrant. Yet even this 
doctrine has not been consistently followed by the Court. Whilst the Court has adhered
m Jones v. US, 357 US 493 at 499; US v. Jeffers, 342 US 48 at 51; Rios v. US, 364 US 253 at 261 
(1960); Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 at 762 (1969); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 at 
455, 474 (1971); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 at 761 (1979); Payton v. NY, 445 US 573 at 586- 
587(1980).
163See Trupiano v. US, 334 US 699 at 705-706 (1948).
164 US v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 at 62 (1950),
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to it in many cases165, it has rejected it in many others in favour of the 'reasonably- 
practicable' rule166, a position to which it seems to have grown more inclined. It is 
significant, in this respect, that in a recent Annotation on the arrest exception, the 
'reasonably-practicable' rule has simply been taken for granted167.
As examples of compelling circumstances accepted by the Court we can cite, for 
example, the cases of hot pursuit and of investigative stops or stops and frisks168. 
These exceptions allow the police to stop a person if they believe that criminal activity 
might be afoot and to carry a patdown search of the person for weapons if they believe 
the person may be armed and presently dangerous169. Under such compelling 
circumstances the police need not even rely on probable cause that the person is 
involved in criminal activity; 'reasonable suspicion' is considered sufficient. Other 
instances of the compelling-circumstance exception are the so-called 'automobile 
exception' and the 'incident-to-arrest exception1. These two instances require more 
detailed explanations.
[a] The Automobile Exception
Warrantless searches and seizures of vehicles that are constantly movable are 
reasonable when any delay to obtain a warrant can allow the vehicle to escape and the 
object of the search and seizure to be destroyed170 *. The automobile exception thus 
appears as an emergency measure to avoid the destruction of the object of the search
165See Harris v. US, 331 US 145 at 150 (1947); Abel v. US, 362 US 217 at 236-239 (1960); Ker v. 
California, 374 US 23 at 42 (1963); U.S. v. Caruso, 358 F2d 184,185-186, ceit. denied 385 US 862 
(1966); Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 at 62 (1967); US v. Edwards, 415 US 800 at 805 (1974); US 
v. Chadwick et aL, 433 US 1 at 9 (1977).
166See Chapman v. US, 365 US 610 at 615 (1961); Preston v. US, 376 US 364 at 367 (1964); 
Stoner v, California, 376 US 483 at 487 (1964); Warden v. Hayden, 387 US 294 at 299 (1967); Katz 
v. US, 389 US at 357-358 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 at 19 (1968); Chimel v. California, 395 
US 752 at 762-763 (1969); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 at 460-462 (1971); Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 US 753 at 761 (1979).
167Tim A. Thomas, J.D., "Constitutionality of Searching Premises Without Warrant as Incident to 
Valid Arrest" -Annotation, United States Supreme Court Reports, 108 LEd 2d 987 at 990 (1992).
168See Warden v. Hayden, 387 US 294 (1967) andTVrry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968), respectively. For 
an analysis of and further cases on the stop-and-frisk exception, see the Annotation by John F. Wagner 
Jr, J.D., "Law Enforcement Officers Authority, Under Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, to 
Stop and Briefly Detain, and to Conduct Limited Protective Search of or Trisk', for Investigative 
Purposes, Person Suspected of Criminal Activity -Supreme Court cases", United States Supreme Court 
Reports, 104 L Ed 2d 1046 et seq. (1991).
169The seizure of incriminatory evidence other than weapons, such as contraband, is lawful only if a 
lawful patdown search lays the object in question in plain view for the police officer carrying out the 
search (see Michingan v. Long, 463 US 1032; Minnesota v. Dickerson, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993) 
(pending publication)). The open-view exception will be explained below.
170See Carroll et al v. US, 267 US 132 (1925); Preston v. US, 376 US 364 (1964); Cooper v.
California, 386 US 58 (1967); Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 (1969); Chamber v. Maroney, 399 
US 42 (1970); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971); US v. Chadwick et al, 433 US 1 
(1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 at 761 (1979); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 US 1 (1980); 
Robbins v. California, 453 US 420 (1981), New York v. Belton, 453 US 454 (1981).
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and seizure. Accordingly, it has only been upheld to the extent that obtaining a warrant 
would have significantly endangered the search and seizure of the automobile in 
question, due to its mobility. Thus, e.g., the automobile exception may justify the 
warrantless seizure of closed pieces of luggage, containers or even of sealed letters 
found inside a searched car and probably related to a crime, but not their opening 
without a search warrant171.
[b] The Incident-to-Arrest Exception.
A person lawfully arrested and the place where the arrest is made may be 
lawfully searched without a warrant172. This exception to the warrant requirement, the 
one most frequently applied, is supported by a double rationale. First, it aims to protect 
the arresting agent; second it aims to prevent an escape from custody of the person 
arrested and to avoid the concealment or destruction of items connected with the crime 
in question during the delay needed to obtain a warrant. On the basis of this double 
rationale, the arrest exception imposes two conditions of lawfulness upon searches and 
seizures. First, searches and seizures must be carried out within the 'area of immediate 
control' o f the person arrested. Such searches and seizures are always allowed. The 
arresting agents are not required to establish that weapons or destructible evidence may 
be involved173; their potential existence is always presumed and considered dangerous 
enough to justify a warrant exception. The Court, however, has not given clear 
indications on the scope of this area174.
17 ^ ee US v. Chadwick et at., 433 US 1 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 at 761 (1979); 
Robbins v. California, 453 US 420 (1981). To the contrary, however, see the more recent opinion of 
the Court in California v. Acevedo, 114LEd2d619(1991).
m Weeks v. U.S., 232 US 383 (1914); Carroll v. U.S., 267 US 132 (1924); Agnello et al v. US, 
269 US 20 (1925); Matron v. U.S., 275 US 192 (1927); Co-Bart Importing Co. v. US, 282 US 344 
(1931); US v. Lefkowitz et al. 385 US 452 (1932); Harris v. US, 331 US 145 (1947); Trupiano v. 
US, 334 US 699 (1948); US v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 (1950); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 US 381 
(1961); US v. Jeffers, 342 US 48 (19 ); Preston v. US, 376 US 364 (1964); Beck v. Ohio, 379 US 
89 (1964); James v. Louisiana, 382 US 36 (1965); Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 (1969); US v. Edwards, 415 US 800 
(1974); US v. Chadwick et al., 433 US 1 (1977); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 US 31 (1979); 
Robbins v. California, 453 US 420 (1981); New York v. Belton, 453 US 454 (1981); Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 US 367 (1987); Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325 (1990).
1737Vrry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 at 26-27 (1968); US v. Robinson, 414 US 218 at 235 (1973); US v. 
Chadwick et al. 433 US 1 at 15 (1977).
174The position of the Court is in fact subject to significant fluctuations, fluctuations which run 
parallel to those concerning the argument of whether warrants must be issued whenever reasonably 
practicable or whether account must be taken of all the circumstances of the case, to which reference 
has been made above. In particular, under the 'reasonably-practicable' rule, the 'area of immediate 
control' has been deemed much more restricted than under the 'account-of-al 1-circumstances' rule. In fact, 
this latter rule has justified actual general exploratory searches of the premises where an arrest was 
made, even though these searches have not been openly described thus (see, e.g., Harris v. US, 331 US 
145 at 151 (1947)).
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Second, searches and seizures must be 'incident to arrest1. This expression has 
been defined by the Court as 'contemporaneous to arrest' and interpreted in rather strict 
terms175. However, the Burger Court expanded this expression to cover the situation 
of custody which might follow an arrest, so that searches and seizures carried out while 
the arrestee is in custody have since been considered 'incident to arrest'176. The Court 
has also faced the question whether the 'incident-to-arrest' condition precludes the 
seizure of items related to a crime different to the one that justified the original arrest. 
The lawfulness of such seizures has been judged on the basis of the so-called open- 
view exception177, which will be commented on below.
The lawfulness of warrantless searches and seizures incident to arrest still 
depends on a third condition, i.e, the lawfulness of the arrest itself. In order to be 
lawful, an arrest must fulfil one of two alternative conditions: either it is based on a 
valid arrest warrant, or it must be based on probable cause, judged by the arresting 
agents, that the person arrested has committed or is committing an offence178. 
Therefore, the arrest exception does not always amount to substituting an arrest warrant 
for a search warrant: often the lawfulness of searches and seizures incident to arrest will 
be justified on the grounds that the arresting officer had probable cause to carry out the 
arrest
[2] Exceptions Justified as a Lesser Invasion of Privacy
In several instances, the Supreme Court has looked at the level of invasion of 
privacy that a particular search and seizure entails in order to decide whether the search 
and seizure in question must be based on a warrant. The definition of privacy and, 
more particularly, of the right to privacy, thus acts as one o f the central criteria in the 
definition of the protected scope of the the fourth amendment right against searches and 
seizures.
175See, e.g., Stoner v. California. 376 US 483 at 486 (1964); Preston v. US, 376 US 364 at 367-368 
(1964); Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 at 770-771 (1966); US v. Chadwick et al., 433 US 1 at 
14(1977).
176See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 389 Us 58 at 61-62 (1967); Harris v. US, 390 US 234 at 236 
(1968); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 US 433 at 447-448 (1973); US v. Edwards, 415 US 800 at 807-808 
(1974); US v. Chadwick et al, 433 US 1 at 14-15 (1977); New York v. Belton, 453 US 454 (1981); 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367 at 372 (1987). However, custodial interrogation is considered too 
long and intrusive to be lawful if not pursuant to an arrest based on probable cause (Dunaway v. NY, 
442 US 200 (1979)).
177See US v. Edwards, 415 US 800 at 806 (1974), and cases cited therein.
178W7/joh v. Schnettler, 365 US 381 (1961). For the definition of probable cause, see text 
accompanying footnote 143 above.
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[a] The Administrative-Seanch-and-Seizure Exception
Although the fourth amendment draws no distinction between criminal and 
other kinds of searches and seizures, the Supreme Court holds that this provision 
primarily protects against criminal searches and seizures. The Court sustains the 
position that it is these searches and seizures that primarily endanger individual privacy, 
hence that the basic requirements of reasonableness it imposes are primarily intended to 
control searches and seizures aimed at obtaining fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of 
crime. Administrative searches and seizures, on the other hand, are less intrusive upon 
privacy than their criminal equivalents; they therefore need not be so heavily penalised, 
which according to the Court means that the warrant requirement and even the 
probable-cause requirement can be dispensed with in this context. In order to be 
reasonable under the fourth amendment, administrative searches and seizures only need 
comply with the particular administrative rules upon which they are based.
Certain searches and seizures have been explicitly included within the 
administrative exception. Amongst these, there are, e.g., searches relating to closely 
regulated industry179, searches at road inspection points180, work-related searches181 
and inventory searches182. Border searches183 can also be added to this list, although 
more than administrative they could be called 'political' searches, grounded on the 
"recognised right of the sovereign to control ... who and what may enter the 
country"184.
[b] The Open-View Case
The open-view rule was analysed in chapter 3. There it was explained that this 
rule defines the scope of coverage of the fourth amendment with respect to searches, 
whilst it defines the protected scope of this provision with respect to seizures. Items 
lying in open view cannot be considered the object of a real 'search' (the act of taking 
notice of such items is not a search strictly speaking), whilst they can perfectly well be *371
179Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US 523 at 538 (1967); Colonnade Corp. v. US, 397 US 72 
(1970); US v. Biswell, 406 US 311 (1972); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 US 307 at 312-313 (1978); 
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 US 594 at 598-599 (1981); NY v. Burger, 482 US 691 (1987). The 
alternative conditions of reasonableness imposed on these searches are specified in NY v. Burger, at 
702-703.
^Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979). 
l&iO'Connor v. Ortega, 480 US 709 (1987).
^ 2South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364 at 370 (1976); US v. Chadwick el al., 433 US 1 at 10, 
note 5 (1977); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 US 640 at 643 (1983); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367 at
371 (1987); Florida v. Wells, 495 US 1 (1990). For an analysis of this exception, see J.F. Wagner Jr., 
J.D.’s Annotation "Supreme Court’s Views as to Constitutionality of Inventory Searches", United 
States Supreme Court Reports, 109 L Ed 2d 776 et seq. (1992)
m Almeida-Sanchez v. US, 413 US 266, 272-273 (1973); US v. BrignonUPonce, 422 US 873, 880- 
881 (1975); US v. Ramsey, 431 US 606 (1977).
184U5 v. Ramsey, 431 US 606 (1977).
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the object of a seizure. I would now like to add that, according to the doctrine of the 
Supreme Court, the seizure of items lying in open view is not subject to a warrant 
requirement, for the simple reason that there is no right to privacy in such items. To put 
it differently, by way of laying an item in open view, the Court reasons, someone is 
waiving his right to privacy upon the item in question. Since no interest in privacy is 
involved, then seizures can be warrantless. This is the case when this object is in a 
public place, or when it is in a private place to which the police had lawful access, be it 
on the basis of a warrant or within the scope of one of the admitted exceptions to it185. 
However, the Supreme Court has not excepted the application of the probable cause 
requirement in open-view cases; in order that the warrantless seizure of an item lying in 
open view be lawful, the police must have probable cause to believe that the object was 
associated with criminal activity186.
[c] The Consent Exception
Holders of the right to the protection of privacy can renounce the protection of 
this right. On this basis, the Supreme Court has ruled that warrantless searches and 
seizures are not unreasonable if made pursuant to a valid act of consent187. As was 
explained in chapter 4, although sometimes regarded as a limitation on the coverage of 
the fourth amendment, consent is most commonly considered a limitation on the 
protected scope of this provision. In other words, by way of consenting to a search and 
seizure an individual does not give up being the holder of the fourth amendment right; 
rather, he merely gives up enjoying the protection of this right in a particular case.
Since consent amounts to a waiver of the fourth amendment right, consented 
searches and seizures can be carried out with neither a warrant nor probable cause. 
This, of course, presumes that consent has been validly given. In order to be valid, 
consent must, first of all, be voluntarily given. There is no real consent if the apparent 
act of consent comes as a result of the use of force or coercion: this is, for example, the
185See, e.g., Harris v. US, 331 US 145 at 151 (1947); Alderman v. US, 394 US 165 (1969); Chime! 
v. California, 395 US 752 (1969); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 US 433 (1973); US v. Edwards, 415 US 
800 at 806 (1974); GM. Leasing Corp. v. US, 429 US 338 at 354 (1977); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
US 499 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385 (1978); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979); Jo- 
Li Sales, Inc. v. NY, 442 US 319 (1979); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 at 764, note 13 (1979); 
Payton v. NY, 445 US 573 at 586-587 (1980); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 US 1 (1980); Washington 
v. Chrisman, 455 US 1 (1982); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 US 765 (1983); Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 
325 at 330 (1990); Horton v. California, 496 US 128 (1990).
186Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 at 465 (1971); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 US 321 (1987); 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325 at 330 (1990); Horton v. California, 496 US 128 (1990).
187See Zap v. US, 328 US 624 (1946); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 US 543 (1968); Frazier v. 
Cupp, 394 US 731 (1969); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 US 218 (1973); US v. Matlock, 415 US 
164 (1974); US v. Watson, 423 US 411 (1976); US v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977); US v. 
Mendenhall, 446 US 544 (1980); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 US 1 (1982); Florida v. Royer, 460 
US 491 (1983); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 US 177 (1990); Florida v. Jimeno, 114 L Ed 2d 297 
(1991).
position in the case of consent given under arrest or after the police have affirmed that 
they possess a valid search warrant188. The burden of proving that free and voluntary 
consent existed lies with the law-enforcing agents seeking to justify a search and a 
seizure189. Second, a search and a seizure must be consented to by the person who, as 
a result of it, is accused of a crime. It can only be consented to by a third person if that 
person possesses common authority with the accused over the property to be searched, 
or if, at the time of the search, the police reasonably believed that person to have that 
authority190. The police's 'objectively reasonable belief is also taken as a criterion to 
measure the scope of consent validly given191. Both these cases, however, should 
rather be regarded as examples of the good-faith exception to the application of the so- 
called exclusionary rule, an issue which will be examined in chapter 6192.
1.3 Privacy in the Balance
As was observed above, under its privacy reading the fourth amendment is not 
thought to impose a substantive requirement of reasonableness upon searches and 
seizures, i.e. upon restrictions o f the interest in the protection of privacy. Rather, the 
protection of privacy is always and automatically subordinated to the interest in law 
enforcement and reasonableness is only thought to impose formal requirements upon 
restrictions of privacy, i.e. the requirement that restrictions be carried out on the basis 
of a warrant validly issued. We have also seen that even these formal requirements can 
under certain circumstances be dispensed with. I would now like to point out that, in 
this latter context, considerations as to the level of infringement upon privacy interests 
do enter and condition whether or not a particular invasion of privacy can be carried out 
without a valid warrant. In other words, the level of invasion of privacy does not 
condition whether or not a search or a seizure can be carried out at all, but it does 
condition whether or not a search or a seizure can be carried out without a valid 
warrant.
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 US 543 (1968); Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. NY, 442 US 319 (1979); 
Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491 (1983).
189The police, on the other hand, need not show that the person affected by a search and seizure knew 
that refusing consent to it was possible, although this showing may help to prove the voluntariness of 
the consent (see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 US 543 (1968); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 
218 (1973); Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491 (1983)).
190Frazier v. Cupp, 394 US 731 (1969); US v. Matlock, 415 US 164 (1974); Illinois v. Rodriguez. 
497 US 177 (1990). See also Chapman v. US, 365 US 610 (1961) (a landlord has no authority to 
consent to the search of a tenant's premises) and Stoner v. California, 376 US 483 (1964) (the police 
could not have reasonably believed that a hotel clerk had authority to consent to the search of a 
customer's room).
191 Florida v. Jimeno, 114 L Ed 2d 297 (1991).
192In a search of a motor vehicle, the Court has decided that each of its occupants has authority to 
consent (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218 (1973); Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491 (1983)).
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The influence that privacy has upon the application o f the warrant requirement 
can primarily be felt in the existence of warrant exceptions based upon the rationale that 
privacy be hardly infringed upon. Yet the influence of privacy is also present in 
exceptions based on the existence of compelling circumstances: the argument that there 
is only a marginal infringement of privacy interests underlies the automobile exception, 
the arrest exception as well as the exception in the case of stops and frisks, to the extent 
that one could speak of exceptions grounded doubly on the existence of compelling 
circumstances and of a minimal invasion of privacy193. In sum, considerations as to the 
extent to which an interest in privacy is at stake in each particular case and as to the 
protection that this interest ought to be granted control decisions whether searches and 
seizures can be carried out without a warrant.
Taking account of the circumstances of a case is thus crucial to decide on the 
application of the warrant requirement, so crucial that the Supreme Court itself has 
considered a "demand for specificity ... the central teaching of this Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence"194. Laying so much importance upon this 'demand for 
specificity* entails one danger, however. It entails the danger that the Court might 
forget, as it often does, that the reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure 
should be decided with account taken o f all the circumstances of the case, yes, but as a 
result of a balance between principles (the right to privacy, on the one hand, against the 
State's duty to guarantee security through effective law enforcement, on the other). 
Instead, the Court often adopts what has been called a "fact style of adjudication"195 
and makes the applicability of the warrant requirement a matter of policy preference. As 
was to be expected given the general attitude of the Court toward privacy, privacy is 
most often subordinated to the interest in law enforcement. Moreover, the decision on 
the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure is likely to be influenced, more or 
less explicitly, by ex post considerations as to the result of this search or seizure, i.e. as 
to its success. If a warrantless invasion of privacy resulted in the apprehension of a 
criminal or in the obtention of evidence o f crime to be used at trial, then it is likely that 
the invasion of privacy will be upheld on policy grounds. This policy approach to the 
question of the warrant requirement is therefore very restricted toward the scope of
193See, respectively, Cardwell v. Lewis (471 US 583 (1974)), U.S. v. Robinson (414 US 21® (1973)) 
and Pennsylvania v. Mimms (98 SCt. 330 (1977)) (references taken from M. Shapiro & Rocco J. 
Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, 5th ed., New York - London, 1979, pp. 625-627).
1947>rry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 at 21, note 18 (1968).
195R.B. Dworkin, "Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: the Limits of Lawyering", 48 
Indiana L. J. 329 (1973). For more general criticism of this style of adjudication, see H. Wechsler, 
'Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959); H.H. Wellington, 
"Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication", 83 The 
YateLJ. 221 (1973).
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protection of the fourth amendment and, in addition, subjects the definition of its 
protected scope to great uncertainty.
Incidentally, 1 would like to note that the present stress on casuistic 
considerations is typical of the interpretation of privacy as the interest behind the right 
against searches and seizures. At the time when the protection of property was the 
underlying interest of the fourth amendment, case-by-case considerations had less 
weight than they do now. At that time, the style of judicial adjudication in fashion 
consisted o f a highly mechanical application of legal rules and principles, something 
well suited to the protection of the right to property. For that right is rather well defined 
in the abstract and ascertaining whether or not it has been violated can often be a rather 
automatic operation. In any case, since private property was thought to deserve 
absolute protection against searches and seizures, the bulk o f case-by-case 
considerations had to be limited to cases where no interest in private property was 
thought to be at stake, hence in cases the solution of which was controlled by the 
interest in the protection of privacy.
Thus, case-by-case considerations have always been under the control of the 
concept of privacy as the interest protected by the fourth amendment, even when the 
property interpretation of the fourth amendment still prevailed196. Indeed, the ill- 
defined character of privacy makes it particularly suitable for a casuistic accommodation 
of policy needs and explains why the 'demand of specificity' in the context o f the 
fourth amendment grew hand in hand with the evolution from a property to a privacy 
reading of this provision. However, this is not to say that private property does not 
contribute to the definition of the protected scope of the fourth amendment through 
balance. It does contribute to its definition, yet it does so only indirectly, in as far as it 
helps to define the extent to which an expectation of privacy ought to be protected by 
the amendment: according to the Court, an expectation of privacy is more worthy of 
protection if it regards one's own private property than if it regards somebody else's 
property197 or commercial premises198. In these latter cases, the position of privacy in 
the balance is, therefore, weaker199.
I96See, during the property period. Lefkowitz v. US, 285 US 452 (1932); Harris v. US, 331 US 145 
(1947); Trupiano v. US, 334 US 699 (1948); McDonald v. US, 335 US 451 (1948); Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949).
197In Rakas v. Illinois (439 US 128 (1978)) the Court emphatically denied that there was any 
expectation of privacy related lo somebody else's property (see also Payton v. NY, 445 US 573
(1980)). This position was overruled in Minnesota v. Olson (495 US 91 (1990)), where the Court 
accepted that one could have some expectation of privacy in somebody else's property. 
m Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc. 436 US 307 (1978); NY v. Burger, 482 US 691 (1987).
1 "Moreover, in a recent case the Court has affirmed that the fourth amendment protects property 
intersts even where privacy is not implicated (Soldal v. Cook County, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992) 
(pending publication)). The case concerned the removal of a trailer home from the place where it was
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The above considerations should have given us a rather accurate idea o f the 
terms in which the Supreme Court draws the protected scope of the fourth amendment 
right against searches and seizures. With these considerations in mind, let us now see 
how the definition of the protected scope of this right applies in the context of the fourth 
amendment right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
2 .  The Protecled_ Scone o f the  Secrecy, o f Telecom m unications
2.1 The Protected Scope Defined in the Case-Law of the Supreme
Court on the Fourth Amendment
As is known, since the case o f Katz v. i/S200, the fourth amendment is thought 
to cover and protect a constitutional right to the secrecy o f wire telecommunications 
and, more generally, of all types of oral communications with respect to which there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy as secrecy (see chapter 4). The protected scope of 
this constitutional right is drawn on the basis of the criteria which generally determine 
the protected scope of the fourth amendment. In order to be lawful, the interception of 
telecommunications must be reasonable. Generally speaking, the condition of 
reasonableness requires that surveillance be based on a warrant issued by an 
independent judge upon probable cause and particularly describing the object to be 
seized or tapped. Probable cause presents no peculiarities in the interception of wire 
communications, whereas the particular-description requirement does. According to the 
Supreme Court, this requires that the conversations to be recorded and, in the case of 
wire-tapping, the telephone line to be tapped, be particularly described. In this respect, 
naming the person or persons whose communications are to be overheard or recorded 
is not sufficient. 'This does no more than identify the person whose constitutionally 
protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly describing' the communications, 
conversations, or discussions to be seized"201. Moreover, identifying those persons is 
not even necessary. The Court has considered that "it is not a constitutional requirement 
that all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations be 
named"202.
located without ever entering it. In spite of this circumstance, however, this case could also have been 
solved by reference to the right to privacy: in my view, the very fact that a trailer home is seized and 
driven away amounts to a privacy wrong, even in the absence of trespass.
200Katz v. US, 389 US 347 (1967).
20lBerger v. NY, 388 US 41 at 59 (1967).
202US v. Donovan, 429 US 413 (1977).
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Under certain circumstances, the warrant requirement for surveillance can be 
dispensed with. In principle, it can be dispensed with in the same cases and under the 
same conditions as other searches and seizures, yet the characteristics of some of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement make them inapplicable in the context of 
telecommunications. Thus exceptions based on the existence of exigent circumstances, 
such as the automobile or the arrest exceptions, can justify the seizure but not the 
opening of sealed letters. Other exigent circumstances can arguably justify warrantless 
electronic surveillance, although this possibility is rather limited, since such 
surveillance cannot be carried out without the carrying out of certain formalities203. The 
administrative search, the consent and the open-view exceptions are the ones which 
best apply in this latter context204.
'Ordinary administrative divulgence' has explicitly been regarded by th^ 
Supreme Court as an exception to the warrant and even to the probable cause 
requirement in the context of wire telecommunications205 and also finds grounds for 
application in the context of written telecommunications (as will be seen below, this 
exception is explicitly admitted at the statutory level). This comes across as a case of 
non-coverage rather than as a case of non-protection, however, at least to the extent that 
the 'ordinary administrative divulgence* exception refers to situations where, in order 
for a telecommunication to take place, secrecy cannot exist; for, as was explained in 
chapter 4, the fourth amendment only covers telecommunications in as far as their 
secrecy is concerned. The Court has also explicitly accepted the 'consent' exception to 
both the warrant and the probable-cause requirements206. It has even made it clear that 
consent only need be given by one of the parties to the communication, a position 
which complements the fact that the secrecy of wire telecommunications is not
203Katz v. US, 389 US 347 at 357-358 (1967).
204In Katz v. US, 389 US 347 at 357-358 (1967) the Court thought that the consent exception could 
not apply to wire-tapping. The precedent of Section 605 shows, however, that there is no reason for 
that exclusion.
205See US v. NY Telephone Co., 434 US 159 (1977). Protection against the ordinary administrative 
divulgence entailed in wire communication had already been denied in Section 605 of the 
Communication Act of 1934, which forbade persons receiving or transmitting interstate or foreign wire 
communication from divulging or publishing their content or mere existence to persons external to the 
communication "except through authorised channels of transmission or reception" and "to a person 
employed or authorised to forward such communication to its destination, or to proper accounting or 
distributing officers of the various communicating centres over which the communication may be 
passed".
206Most examples of the consent exception can be found in the context of eavesdropping {US v. 
Caceres, 440 US 741 (1979); US v. White, 401 US 745 (1970)). With reference to wire 
communications, see Ratfùturn v. US, 355 US 107 at 110-111 (1957), produced within the context of 
the Communication Act of 1934. Within the context of this Act, the Court had developed the doctrine 
that consent must refer to the intercepting activity in its full scope and that, in the case of interceptions 
followed by divulgence, the interception and the divulgence had to be specifically and independently 
consented to (see Weiss v. US, 308 US 321 at 330 (1939)). This doctrine can still be considered 
applicable.
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guaranteed vis-à-vis the other parties taking part in it. As for the open-view exception» 
there is no doubt about its suitability to be applied in the context of wire-tapping or 
eavesdropping. Here, it justifies the overhearing and later use of conversations not 
originally described as part of the object of the search but which appear with probable 
cause related to a crime. In the context of telecommunications, the Supreme Court has 
even admitted yet another exception to the warrant requirement for telecommunication 
surveillance. In its Katz decision, the Court explicitly stated that surveillance carried out 
in the context of foreign intelligence for the purpose of preserving national security 
does not require judicial warrant207, a possibility that was later regulated by statute.
In sum, the protected scope o f the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications basically coincides with the protected scope of the more general 
right against searches and seizures, hence the comments that were made above with 
respect to this latter right are valid also in this context. The interest in law enforcement 
is always regarded as sufficient ground for restricting the constitutional right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications. This is true regardless of any casuistic considerations 
concerning the importance of the interest in privacy inherent in telecommunications, on 
the one hand, and of the interest in law enforcement, on the other. Moreover, 
restrictions need be neither necessary nor proportionate to their aim in order to be 
considered reasonable. The only requirement imposed upon telecommunication 
surveillance is purely formal: a measure of surveillance is constitutional as long as it is 
backed by a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause that there is an interest in law 
enforcement and that the measure of surveillance in question is suitable to satisfy this 
interest. Exceptionally, however, if the interest in law enforcement appears to be 
significantly stronger than the interest in privacy inherent in telecommunications, then 
even this formal requirement may be dispensed with. Furthermore, ex post 
considerations as to the actual success of a warrantless measure of surveillance might 
play some implicit role in the decision whether a warrant was at all needed.
At this point, I would like to look at the statutory regulation of the restrictions of 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. When dealing with this statutory 
regulation, it may seem that one is dealing with a definition of the protected scope of the 
constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications, in the way that German 
statutes define the protected scope of this right as recognised in the German Basic Law. 
Yet, there is a crucial difference between Germany and the United States in this regard. 
The difference is that the fourth amendment does not contain a legislative reservation of 201
201Katz v. US. 389 US 347 at 358, note 23; see also Justice White's concurring opinion, ibidem at 
363-364.
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power for the definition of the protected scope of this right. That is, in the United States 
the law-maker is not accorded the last word in the definition of the protected scope of 
this right; rather, this is left in the hands of courts and, above all, in the hands of the 
Supreme Court. The case-law of the Supreme Court on the scope of protection of the 
constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications thus stands over and above 
any statutory definition of this scope.
In spite of this, it is important to look at the statutory regulation of this right, 
because statutes turn out to play some role, an important role indeed, in the definition of 
the protected scope of this right at the constitutional level. Indeed, it is not unusual for 
the Court to follow statutory indications when defining this scope. This is only natural. 
For one thing, the Court prefers to solve cases on the secrecy of telecommunications on 
a statutory rather than on constitutional grounds because, as has been pointed out on 
other occasions, it has the policy of avoiding constitutional issues as far as it can. 
Moreover, even when a constitutional case of this right does arise the Court tends to 
introduce patterns of reasoning provided by statutes; for, as we will see below, statutes 
define the protected scope of the right in terms which are more clear and complete. 
Indeed, since the Court has jurisdiction over both constitutional and the statutory 
issues, it need not draw a clear line between these two levels and can combine them 
both at w ill208. The result is that pure constitutional cases on the secrecy of 
telecommunications are few. In practical terms, therefore, the statutory definition of the 
protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications provides valuable 
information for the understanding of what is likely to be the protected scope of this 
right at the constitutional level. Note however that this is more the result of practical 
coincidence than the result o f a theoretical identification of the statutory and the 
constitutional right. In theory, these two rights are regarded as two different ones even 
by the Supreme Court209. Keeping these reservations in mind, I will now look at the 
statutory limitations to the scope of the protection of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications.
208Examp!es of the complementary role played by the U.S.C. can be found in Alderman v. US, 394 
US 165 (1969); US v. Kahn, 415 US 143 (1974); US v. Donovan, 429 US 413 (1977); Scott v. US, 
436 US 128 (1978).
209See US v. Donovan, 429 US 413 (1977); Dalia v. US, 441 US 238 (1979).
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2 .2  The Influence of the U.S.C. upon the Protected Scope of the
Constitutional Right to the Secrecy of Telecommunications
The United States Code (U.S.C.) authorises both the opening of first class mail 
(the only mail covered under the fourth amendment) and the surveillance of wire and 
electronic telecommunications. According to Title 39, section 3623 (d) of the U.S.C., 
first class mail may be opened "under authority of a search warrant authorised by law 
or by an officer or employee of the Postal Service for the sole purpose of determining 
an address at which the letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the authorisation of the 
addressee". Thus this bare provision of § 3623(d) does not develop the fourth 
amendment, but simply overlaps with it, in as far as that they both imposes a warrant 
requirement upon restrictions to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications and they 
both admit a 'consent' exception and an ‘ordinary administrative divulgence* exception 
to the warrant requirement
The U.S.C. is more detailed when it regulates the possible interception of wire 
and electronic telecommunications both in the context of ordinary law enforcement and 
in the context of foreign intelligence investigations carried out for the protection of 
national security. It is to the regulation of these interceptions that we shall now turn.
2.2.1 Ordinary Law-Enforcement Surveillance
Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the USC (Sections §§ 2510-2520) regulates the 
interception of interstate or foreign telecommunications or telecommunications which 
affect interstate or foreign commerce (§ 2510 (1)). Chapter 119 embraces both wire and 
electronic telecommunications. Enacted in 1968 by Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act (Omnibus Act), Chapter 119 of Title 18 initially regulated 
the interception of wire telecommunications. In 1986, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act broadened the scope o f Chapter 119 so that it would also embrace the 
interception o f electronic telecommunications, as well as the interception of wireless 
telephone conversations.
The way Chapter 119 defines the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is very similar to the way the Supreme Court defines the protected 
scope of this right on the basis of the fourth amendment. To begin with, the warrant 
requirement is the central condition to be fulfilled by a lawful interference with oral 
communications, that is, telecommunication surveillance is allowed only upon previous 
judicial authorisation. Of course, the conditions under which a warrant can be obtained
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and the steps to be followed in order to obtain it are much more closely regulated in 
Chapter 119 than they are in the case-law of the Supreme Court on the fourth 
amendment. I will now refer to some of these conditions and steps.
First, as in Germany, interception is only allowed if there is probable cause that 
such interception may provide evidence of one of the crimes listed in § 2516. Second, 
both the application for a warrant and the warrant itself must specify the facts and 
circumstances which support the belief that an order should be issued (§ 2518), this 
including a description of the offence to be investigated, of the type of communication, 
o f the identity of the persons, if known, committing the offence and whose 
communications are to be intercepted and of the nature and location of the facilities from 
which or the place in which the communication is to be intercepted. However, this last 
requirement need not be fulfilled: (a) if it is shown that such specification is not 
practical (e.g. because the telecommunications are likely to be carried out from a mobile 
telephone), or (b) if it is shown that the person believed to be committing the offence 
and whose communications are to be intercepted intends to thwart interception by 
changing facilities, provided, in both these cases, that the person committing the 
offence and whose communications are to be intercepted are specified. Third, both the 
application and the judicial order must specify the period of time for which the 
interception is required or authorised, respectively. This must not last longer than 
necessary, and in any case, never longer than thirty days. Extensions of no longer than 
thirty days may be authorised if duly applied for, according to the above requirements. 
Fourth, Title 18 contemplates the possibility that a communication is in a code or 
foreign language and tacitly contemplates the act of deciphering the code or foreign 
language as implicitly authorised along with the interception. Finally, note that Title 18 
requires that, in order that surveillance can be authorised, it must be shown that other 
("normal") investigative methods have failed, are likely to fail or might be too 
dangerous; in other words, Title 18 regulates a condition of necessity for the 
interception of wire or electronic telecommunications.
As with the case-law of the Supreme Court on the fourth amendment, Chapter 
119 admits some exceptions to the judicial-order requirement. First, § 2511 (2) admits 
a 'normal-administrative-interception' exception to the prohibition of surveillance of 
telecommunications (yet, as was said in the context o f the fourth amendment, this 
appears more as a case of non-coverage rather than as a case of non-protection, at least 
to the extent that the exception refers to situations in which, in order for a 
telecommunication to take place, secrecy cannot exist). This exception allows an 
officer, employee or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, 
whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept,
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disclose or use telecommunications in the normal course of his employment while 
engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service, or 
to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service (see also § 2511
(3)(b)(iii)); yet a provider of wire communication services may not utilise service 
observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control 
checks. Second, § 2511 (2)(d) allows the interception o f telecommunications carried 
out with the consent of one of the parties in it (see also § 2511 (3)(b)(ii))210. Third, § 
2517 (5) recognises an open-view exception: it authorises the warrantless interception 
and later use of information obtained by lawful wire or electronic surveillance even if it 
relates to offences other than those specified in the order of authorisation or approval; 
the only requirement is that the original interception be lawful. This 'open-view rule' 
also applies to the providers of an electronic communication service to the public: if 
they inadvertently obtain information which appears to pertain to the commission of a 
crime, then they may divulge this information to a law enforcement agency. Finally, 
there is an exceptional-circumstance exception: in cases involving immediate danger of 
death or serious physical injury to a person, conspiratorial activities threatening national 
security interests or conspiratorial activities characteristic o f organised crime, previous 
judicial authorisation of the interception is not needed, provided that there are grounds 
upon which an order could be entered to authorise interception; yet, an ex post 
application for approval must be made within forty-eight hours of the start o f the 
interception, so that, if approval is denied, the interception can be immediately 
terminated.
2.2.2 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or FISA (Title 50, Chapter 36, 
Sections §§ 1801-1811 of the U.S.C.) was enacted in 1978 in order to regulate the 
surveillance of telecommunications for national security purposes, provided that a 
foreign power is involved in them. This issue had been avoided by Title III of the 
Omnibus Act, which thus created the so-called 'national security exception' to the 
statutory requirements imposed upon telecommunication surveillance. The FISA was 
enacted to fill this gap: it for the first time subjected the Executive to statutory restraints 
in conducting electronic surveillance of foreign powers for foreign intelligence
210However, Congress is presently working on a Bill (Telephone Privacy Act of 1993) to amend 
section 2511 so that surveillance of a piece of oral, wire or electronic communication made by a person 
not acting under colour of law can only be lawfully consented to by all parties to this act of 
communication.
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purposes211. Note however that Title 50 only authorises the interception of wire 
telecommunications: contrary to Title 18 of the U.S.C., Title 50 has not been updated 
since its enactment to cover the secrecy of non-wire electronic telecommunication.
As in the context of the fourth amendment and of Title 18 of the U.S.C., the 
interception of telecommunications must generally be authorised by the judiciary. In 
particular, it must be authorised by one of the members of the so-called Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which is composed of seven members 
designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from among federal district court 
judges. The Chief Justice also designates three federal appeal court judges to review 
denials o f applications for warrants. Members of these two courts are designated for 
periods of seven years (§ 1803).
Applications for a judicial order must be presented by a Federal officer once 
authorisation of the Attorney General and of the President of the United States has been 
obtained. As Title 18, Title 50 regulates the conditions under which a court order may 
issue and the steps to be followed in order to obtain it. Let me now refer to some of 
these conditions and steps (§ 1804). First, applications must contain the identity, if 
known, of the target o f the surveillance. Second, they must specify the facts and 
circumstances that justify the belief that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power 
and that the facilities or places under surveillance are being or about to be used by a 
foreign power; in addition, applications must contain some certification by an assistant 
of the President or by an executive branch official for National Security that the 
certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence information 
and that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain such information. Third, 
applications must also contain some certification from this latter official that the 
information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques 
and, further, a proposal for 'minimisation procedures'. Title 50 defines 'minimisation 
procedures' as those designed to minimise the acquisition and retention of information 
through surveillance and to prohibit its dissemination (§ 1801 (h)). Fourth, applications 
must specify the period of time for which the electronic surveillance is required. This 
period of time cannot be longer than one year or than ninety days, depending on 
whether the target is a foreign power, and may be renewed for up to the same period of 
time. In any case, surveillance may not continue once the information sought is
211The history and precedents of Chapter 36 of the U.S.C., as well as the content and potentialities of 
its provisions, have been commented on by A. R. Cinquegrana, "The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: the 
Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978", 137 Univ. Pa. 
L. Rev. 793 (1989). See also J. B. Anderson, "The Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978", 16 Vanderbilt J. of Transnational L, 231 (1983).
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obtained, unless applications show sufficient justification that additional information of 
the same type will be obtained thereafter (see also § 1805 (d)(1)).
Court orders must, first o f all, make it clear that there is probable cause to 
believe that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power and that the facilities or 
places under surveillance are being used or about to be used by a foreign power. 
Second, they must specify the identity, if known, of the target of the surveillance, the 
nature and location of the facilities and places at which electronic surveillance will be 
directed, the type of information sought and the type of communications subjected to 
surveillance, the means by which surveillance will be effected and whether physical 
entry will be used. Third, orders must specify that the proposed minimisation 
procedures can indeed be considered minimisation procedures under Title 50. Finally, 
courts must specify the period of time during which surveillance is to be approved.
A court order is not always required in the context of foreign intelligence 
surveillance, however. A first exception to the judicial order requirement is the case of 
surveillance directed solely at communications among or between foreign powers or 
which is targeted at property under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power, 
provided that it is highly unlikely that communications of a United States person is 
affected (§ 1802). Title 50 defines 'United States persons* as citizens and permanent 
resident aliens, as well as groups composed largely of such persons and United States 
corporations (§ 1801). Second, following a declaration of war, the President, through 
the Attorney General, may acquire foreign intelligence information without a court 
order for a period of up to fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war (§ 
1811). Third, no judicial order is needed in emergency cases. In such cases, the 
Attorney General may approve warrantless surveillance provided that, first, she 
immediately informs the FISC of this decision and, second, that she applies for a court 
order as soon as practicable and, in any case, within twenty-four hours. If approval 
should be denied, surveillance must terminate immediately or after the expiration of the 
twenty-four hour period mentioned above, whichever is earlier. Further, if approval is 
denied, the FISC must provide that any United State person named in the application or 
subject to electronic surveillance be informed of the application, of the period of the 
surveillance and of whether or not information was obtained during that period; yet, on 
an ex parte showing of good cause, the court may suspend this provision for up to 
ninety days or may even forgo ordering it. Fourth, § 1801 (f)(2) recognises a consent 
exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, note that Title 50 recognised only a very 
limited open-view exception to the warrant requirement: it states that information 
accidentally obtained in the context o f foreign telecommunication surveillance must be
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destroyed unless the content of the information thus obtained indicates a threat o f death 
or serious bodily harm to any person (§ 1806 (i)).
The primary purpose of FISA is the gathering of foreign intelligence 
information, yet it also allows the use as evidence o f information obtained through 
foreign intelligence surveillance. In this case, the Government must notify both the 
person against whom the evidence will be used and the court in which it intends to 
introduce the evidence (§§ 1807-1808). The court must then decide on the legality of 
the surveillance, even if no motion to suppress has been made. If the Attorney General 
files an affidavit stating that an adversary hearing or disclosure of information would 
jeopardise national security, then the court must make an in camera, ex parte 
determination of the legality o f the surveillance; it may only disclose portions of 
materials concerning the surveillance where such disclosure is necessary to make an 
accurate determination of the legality of surveillance.
This analysis of the USC shows that the statutory regulation of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications corrects much of the flexibility and of the restrictive 
terms of the protected scope of the right. At this level, the protected scope of this right 
is much clearer and more favourable to the right. In addition, as with the case of 
Germany, the USC only allows the interception of telecommunications for the 
prosecution of some listed crimes considered particularly serious. Further, the USC 
subjects telecommunication surveillance to a condition of necessity: surveillance is only 
allowed in as far as the same information cannot be obtained by other ('normal') 
investigative techniques, that is only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the 
extent that it is needed (in terms of the persons affected and of the duration of the 
measure)212. In the context of foreign intelligence surveillance the USC even requires 
that a proposal for 'minimisation procedures' be presented together with applications 
for judicial orders of surveillance. Finally, it is true that both Titles 18 and 50 of the 
USC recognise exceptions to the requirement that surveillance be authorised by the 
judiciary, yet either they are common-place exceptions (such as the consent, the open- 
view and the normal-administrative-interception exceptions), or they are exceptions 
justified by issues such as a declaration of war, or otherwise the USC requires that 
judicial authorisation be obtained immediately after the interception, as in the case of the 
exceptional-circumstance exception.
This now concludes my study of the protected scope of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications in the United States. The conclusions one can draw from the
2I2See Scott v. US, 436 US 128 (1978); Dalia v. US, 441 US 238 (1979).
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terms in which this protected scope is defined will be analysed by way of comparing 
them with the conclusions reached in the two preceding sections, that is in the context 
of the ECHR and Germany.
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Conclusions
As the three sections o f this chapter show, the ECHR, the German Basic Law 
and the Constitution of the United States define the protected scope of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications externally, that is they define the sphere within the 
coverage of this right in terms o f what may go without protection. In these three 
systems this sphere is defined through the imposition of certain requirements upon 
lawful interferences with the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. These 
requirements can be of two types. To begin with, interferences can be subject to 
substantive requirements or limits, which means that they may only be imposed within 
a certain sphere of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications (strictly speaking, this 
requirement defines the sphere of non-protection of the right). In addition to this, 
lawful interferences can be made to comply with a formal requirement. As the three 
sections above also show, these requirements are not regulated in the same terms in the 
ECHR, in Germany and in the United States. I will now try to point out the most 
important differences in the definition of the protected scope of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications in these three systems.
In the first place, the three systems under consideration subject restrictions of 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications to formal requirements, yet these formal 
requirements differ very much in character from one system to the other whereas the 
Constitution of the United State merely requires that restrictions of this right be 
imposed pursuant to a judicial warrant, the ECHR and the German Basic Law require 
that restrictions of this right be imposed pursuant to a law. The absence of a legislative 
reservation of power in the United States is to be regretted, for this requirement entails 
at least two important advantages: first, the legislative reservation of power contributes 
to making it clear what the protected scope of this right is and, second, it places the 
definition of this protected scope in the hands of the representatives of the people.
Indeed, the legislative reservation of power plays the important role of 
allocating the task of deciding on the scope of protection of this fundamental right with 
the representatives of the people. It is equally important is to insist upon clarity, 
particularly since Constitutions allow for different possible definitions of the protected 
scope of rights and let ordinary laws and courts choose one among them. Knowing that 
this choice must be primarily made by the law-maker makes it easier to identify the 
terms in which it has been made: it identifies the scope o f constitutional protection of 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications with the scope of its legal protection. In
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the absence of a legislative reservation power, as is the case in the United States, the 
protected scope of the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications must be 
primarily defined by the judiciary, hence on a much less solid basis* Moreover, in the 
United States the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is recognised as part of the 
right to privacy, so that the the definition of the protected scope of this right is bound to 
be subject to ill definition, as indeed is the case.
A quest for clarity is present in the legislative reservation of power imposed 
both in the ECHR and in the German Basic Law. In the ECHR, the Convention's 
organs have ruled that interferences are only lawful if they are allowed by law and, 
more particularly, by a law that makes interferences sufficiently foreseeable and is 
adequately accessible. In Germany, art. 19.1 of the Basic Law states that interferences 
are only lawful if they are made pursuant to a law which explicitly mentions the right 
interfered with (the right to the secrecy of telecommunications) and the constitutional 
provision in which the right is recognised (art 10). Recall, however, tnat the German 
Constitutional Court has developed the very unfortunate doctrine that compliance with 
the legislative reservation of power may sometimes be 'temporarily' dispensed with, in 
clear contradiction to the wording and the spirit of the Basic Law on this point.
One important thing should remain clear, however: the protected scope of a 
fundamental right should not only be defined by the imposition of formal requirements 
upon restrictions of the right, but also by subjecting its restrictions to substantive 
requirements. Thus, neither the legal reservation of power nor the judicial warrant 
requirement should be regarded as the sole condition to be fulfilled by 
telecommunication surveillance, that is, neither of the two should be regarded as a 
blank authorisation to the law-maker or to courts to impose any restriction at all upon 
privacy. Over and above having a particular source of authorisation, restrictions of this 
right should also be made to comply with substantive requirements. Let us now 
examine the extent to which the imposition of such substantive requirements has been 
respected in each of the three systems under consideration.
From the point of view of the substantial requirements, and secondly, the 
protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications appears to be defined 
in very similar terms in the three systems under consideration, i.e, on the basis of a 
balance. However, this balance is struck in different terms in the ECHR and Germany, 
on the one hand, and in the United States, on the other, so that the definition of the 
protected scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is significantly 
broader in the two former systems than in the latter.
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Both the organs of the Convention and the German Constitutional Court strike a 
balance in two phases. In the first phase, a balance is struck between the extent to 
which the exercise of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is restricted and the 
aim its restriction pursues. In the second phase, once a restriction has thus been 
justified, it must be evaluated on the basis of certain criteria. These criteria, which in 
Germany constitute the so-called 'principle of reasonableness' (Grundsatz der 
Verhaltnismafiigkeit), are the following: first, an interference with the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications must be adequate to reach its aim; second, it must be 
necessary for reaching this aim (i.e. there must not be a less intrusive and equally 
effective means to reach this aim); third, it must be proportionate to the aim in question. 
This pattern for a balance makes the protected scope of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications rather broad and well defined.
Balance in the United States is defined in much simpler terms. The Supreme 
Court departs from the assumption that any interest in law enforcement justifies an 
invasion of the right to privacy protected by the fourth amendment, hence of the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications included therein. The Court thus omits the step of 
the selection of the aims that may restrict the protected scope of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications or, rather, it regards the pursuance of any interest in law 
enforcement a legitimate aim. Once a judge has ascertained that an interest in law 
enforcement actually exists, then restrictions to the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications are automatically justified, irrespective of whether they are 
necessary and proportionate to the aim of law enforcement. The only requirement is that 
they be adequate to reach this aim (i.e. that there is probable cause). In sum, apart from 
the existence of an interest in law enforcement and from requiring that the measure of 
surveillance in question be adequate for fulfilling this interest, the Supreme Court does 
not impose any substantial requirement upon telecommunication surveillance.
In the United States, therefore, the protection of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is always subordinated to the interest in law enforcement and the 
protected scope of this right is mostly defined on formal grounds, i.e. by the warrant 
requirement. Moreover, even this requirement need not always apply. Exceptions to the 
application of the warrant requirement have been devised by the Supreme Court, most 
of which are justified on the grounds that in certain cases of searches and seizures the 
interest in law enforcement outweighs the interest in the protection of privacy that lies 
behind the issuance of a warrant, either because the former interest is very strong, or 
because the latter interest is very weak, or both. Most of these exceptions apply to 
telecommunication surveillance. Furthermore, decisions on whether a warrant 
exception applies in a particular case are often policy orientated and often end up
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subordinating to the interest in privacy to the needs of law enforcement, particularly if it 
appears ex post that the interference with privacy produced the desired results.
As a result, the Supreme Court has made the scope of protection accorded to the 
constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications into something both ill-defined 
and very restrictive. This restrictive approach to the protected scope of the constitutional 
right to privacy and to the secrecy of telecommunications is consistent with the more 
general attitude of the Supreme Court with respect to privacy: privacy is regarded as 
suspect, because it aims at safeguarding purely individualistic interests at the expense of 
the more general and valuable interests of society, such as the interests in law 
enforcement. The Supreme Court thus takes the view that the interest in law 
enforcement always outweighs the interest in the protection of privacy, to the extent that 
it even allows occasionally that restrictions of privacy not be subject to any formal 
restrictions.
In the end, much of the flexibility and of the restrictive terms of the protected 
scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in the United States is avoided 
in as far as it is also recognised and protected by statute. The protected scope of this 
right at the statutory level is defined in clearer and more permissive terms: restrictions 
of it are only allowed in certain particularly important cases of law enforcement and 
provided that they are the least intrusive means to reach their aims. Even the formal 
requirement that restrictions be authorised by the judiciary cannot be so easily 
dispensed with. Now, it is true that, unlike in the context o f the ECHR and Germany, 
United States statutes do not define the protected scope of the secrecy of 
telecommunications as a constitutional right. Yet the statutory regulation o f the 
protected scope o f this right has great influence upon its constitutional regulation. The 
reason is that the Supreme Court has established a reciprocal relationship between the 
statutory regulation of the secrecy of telecommunications and the fourth amendment, so 
that often they combine in the solution of cases of telecommunication surveillance. By 
drawing this relationship, the Supreme Court seems to have made up for the lack of the 
legal reservation of power. One ought to bear in mind, however, that this relationship is 
not a constitutional command and that it has been established by the Supreme Court of 
its own will. The constitutional and the statutory rights to the secrecy of 
telecommunications thus reihain two different rights, so that strictly speaking the 
protected scope of the former is not defined on the basis of the latter.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to a problem which poses itself both in 
Germany and in the United States, namely whether technology should be allowed to 
guarantee an area of absolute protection o f the right to the secrecy of
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telecommunications. The problem is posed by certain modalities of telecommunication 
which can offer an end-to-end encryption of the messages transmitted, so that third 
parties to an act of telecommunication cannot decipher the message in question. The 
question that is raised here is: should the encryption code be chosen and only known by 
the parties to an act of telecommunication, or should it on the other hand be allocated by 
the companies providing the telecommunication service? The crux of the question lies in 
the fact that only in this latter case can the government eventually have access to the 
content of an encrypted message. This circumstance speaks for the second solution, 
provided, of course, that an encrypted act of telecommunication be only interfered with 
on compliance with the same conditions which control the interception of a non- 
encrypted one.
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CHAPTER 6: THE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO THE SECRECY OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
The previous chapters have been concerned with the object of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications. In them I have tried to define both the coverage of this 
right and the sub-sphere within its coverage to which protection is theoretically granted. 
I have also tried to establish what structure the object of this right has, i.e. the 
relationship between its coverage and its protected scope. Now that the object o f the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications has been dealt with, I would like to enter an 
altogether different kind of consideration. In particular, I would like to concentrate on 
the extent to which the exercise of this right is actually accorded protection. This 
question is of central importance, for the recognition of a right and even the definition 
of its protected scope remain at the level of fruitless declarations of intentions if 
mechanisms are not devised to provide for the actual protection of this right. To be 
more precise, the holders of a fundamental right must be given the possibility of legal 
recourse against interferences with its exercise, so that it can be decided whether the 
protected scope of the right has been infringed upon and whether redress can eventually 
be obtained. This combination of the effective legal recourse actually available and the 
remedies eventually provided indicates the extent to which fundamental rights are 
actually protected, thus, the extent to which they are more than mere forms of words. 
Such a combination will be here referred to as the content of fundamental rights1.
Thus, whenever I refer to the content of fundamental rights, I will be referring 
to two elements. The first element is the ensemble of kinds of legal recourse that can be 
interposed against interference with the exercise of these rights. The availability of legal 
recourse is crucial for the actual protection of fundamental rights, to the extent that 
Constitutions tend to recognise an independent fundamental right to access to such 
recourse. Moreover, providing someone with legal recourse against violations of a 
fundamental right can be and has often been regarded as part of the objective positive 
obligations that this right imposes upon public authorities2. Furthermore, the question 
is still open of whether or not individuals have a subjective claim to the existence and
*See J. Jiménez Campo, "La Garantía Constitucional del Secreto de las Comunicaciones", 20 REDC 
35 at 38 (1987).
2In the BVerfGE 30,1 at 12, the Government of Hesse even claimed that the right to judicial recourse 
was part of the essential core of fundamental rights.
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availability of effective legal recourse against violations of their fundamental rights, be 
this claim part of each fundamental right, or of the specific fundamental right to 
recourse or of both3. The truth is that Constitutions usually do recognise a right to have 
recourse against the violation of fundamental rights and specify that this recourse be 
had before a public authority. This could not be otherwise given that, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, public authorities are the only direct addressees of 
fundamental rights. As such, public authorities are obliged not only to refrain from 
interfering with the exercise o f these rights, but also positively to provide for their 
actual protection even against public authorities themselves; providing recourse to 
violations of fundamental rights is therefore part of their duty in this field.
The existence and availability of legal recourse against interferences with the 
exercise of fundamental rights does not suffice for the actual protection of the rights, 
however. To this end, recourse must also be effective. Recourse is effective if it leads 
to a fair decision on the violation of a fundamental right and, if it is decided that the 
protected scope of the right has been infringed, to the provision of fair redress. 
Moreover, a fair decision and fair redress cannot result purely coincidentally; legal 
recourse can be called ’effective' only if they are designed systematically to produce fair 
decisions and provide fair redress4. This means, among other things, that recourse 
must be interposed before public authorities whose decisions can offer certain 
guarantees of independence and neutrality, guarantees which are characteristic, though 
perhaps not necessarily exclusive, of the judiciary branch of the State.
The second element o f the content of fundamental rights consists of the 
remedies provided in cases where the protected scope of these rights has been violated. 
It is this second element that constitutes the real core of the content of rights. For 
fundamental rights can be regarded as such and not as mere declarations of intention 
only in as far as there is a guarantee that redress can be obtained upon every violation of 
their protected scope; the existence and availability of effective mechanisms to react 
against interferences are just the means to reach this end. The existence of remedies is 
therefore the condition of existence of fundamental rights. A result of this dependence 
of rights upon remedies is that courts are under an obligation to provide these latter as 
part of their duty to enforce the Constitution and constitutional rights. On the basis of 
this duty, courts must first of all try to prevent violations of rights when this is still 
possible; they must also try to put an end to violations which have been initiated but not
3See Roben Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp. 444 et seq. 
The possibility that rights enshrine positive subjective claims to their actual protection has been 
discused in section 1 of chapter 3.
4In this context, see R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 446.
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yet completed (the so-called on-going wrongs). Finally, in cases where a violation has 
already occurred, courts must try to minimise its consequences, that is, they must seek 
to ensure that the fact that a right has been violated alters the exercise of this right as 
little as possible5.
Ideally, remedies should consist of a complete reparation of violations of 
fundamental rights, that is, ideally courts should seek to replace things in the state they 
were before a violation ever occurred, so as to erase the consequences of the violation 
completely. Total reparation is impossible, however, for as soon as a violation is 
committed some irreparable harm has already been done, i.e. somebody has been 
deprived of one of her rights for a certain period o f time. Only the prevention of 
violations can be complete, whilst the reparation for violations which have already 
occurred must necessarily be partial6. Of course, even if total reparation is not possible, 
courts are still under the obligation to bring things back to the state they were in before 
a violation occurred as far as this is still possible, that is, courts must erase the 
consequences of the violation of rights as much as possible. Yet, given that reparation 
can only be partial, additional compensation for violations is often provided, which 
generally consists of some pecuniary satisfaction.
In this chapter I will analyse the content of the secrecy of telecommunications as 
regulated in the European Convention on Human Rights, in Germany and in the United 
States. Generally speaking, the content of a fundamental right is not defined on the 
basis of recourse and remedies which are specific to the particular right alone but, 
rather, on the basis of recourse and remedies which a system generically provides for 
the protection of all or, at least, o f a number of fundamental rights or of rights in 
general. However, some recourse and remedies available for violations of the right to 
the secrecy o f telecommunications are specific to this right. Specific to this right is, first 
of all, the German system of recourse against measures of telecommunications 
surveillance adopted for reasons o f national security and for the protection of the 
democratic order, secondly, even more characteristic is the so-called 'exclusionary
5It has been noted that on the basis of its duty to enforce constitutional rights "the judiciary has a more 
limited range of choice in determining how to respond to litigants who complain about threatened or 
on-going wrongs than it does in determining how to respond to those complaining about fully 
accomplished wrongs". Whereas threatened and on-going wrongs must be, respectively, prevented and 
stopped, completed wrongs can only be compensated for, a field where courts enjoy wider 
discretionality (William C. Heffeman, "On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion", (1989) Wis. L 
Rev. 1193, at 1196). However, this distinction forgets that completed wrongs can give rise to on-going 
consequences and that stopping these consequences is as much a part of a court's duty to enforce 
constitutional rights as stopping on-going violations of rights (see page 33 below).
6In this context, on-going violations can be regarded as continuous sequences of independent completed 
wrongs. Under these premises, stopping an on-going wrong amounts to preventing the commission of 
future wrongs, whereas the past wrong remains completed, hence impossible to repair.
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rule', a remedy provided both in Germany and in the United States against unlawful 
interference with the right to the secrecy of telecommunications and which consists of 
the inadmission as evidence at trial of information obtained through unlawful
telecommunication surveillance.
Most of this chapter will concentrate on these two specific elements and, above 
all, on the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rale is not only a specific remedy against 
telecommunication surveillance; it is indeed the most important remedy against such 
measures, hence it is the most important element in the definition of the content of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications. A comparison between the German and the 
American exclusionary rule is therefore crucial in the comparison of the content of this 
right in these two systems. Moreover, studying the exclusionary rule is crucial because 
it adds further considerations to some of the ideas defended in the preceding chapters. It 
will show that understanding the right to privacy as a purely individualistic interest, 
disregarding the importance it has as a condition for free participation in society and at 
the political level in general leads to serious disadvantages for the protection of the 
right.
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Section 1: Formal Claims
Introduction
Each one of the three systems under consideration (the ECHR, Germany and 
the United States) has its own mechanisms for dealing with right violations. These 
mechanisms respond to a common principle: namely, that those who consider 
themselves victims of a violation of a right must be able to raise a complaint before an 
independent body, so that the body in question can decide whether or not the violation 
complained of actually occurred. In the following pages I will look at the aspects of 
these mechanisms which most directly affect the protection of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications in the ECHR, Germany and the United States. This will lead me to 
analyse, first, the way the concept of being a victim of a violation of this right has been 
interpreted in each of these three systems and, second, the peculiarities of the German 
system of available recourse to remedies against certain measures of 
telecommunications surveillance, namely against those measures adopted for reasons of 
national security and for the protection of the democratic order.
l. Ihe-Concfipt n i Yictim
1.1 The European Convention on Human Rights
The ECHR prescribes that victims of a Convention wrong must be able to raise 
a claim before a  national authority of the Contracting Party which is being accused of 
the violation in question (art. 13) and, eventually, also before the organs of the 
Convention (art. 25). Before analysing how the term victim is interpreted let me make 
two comments. Let me first of all point out that, in the context of domestic recourse, the 
ECHR (art. 13) does not specify the nature of the national authority in question; in 
particular, it does not require that this authority be part of the judiciary. It only requires 
that remedies be effective; yet the Court has ruled that in order to be "effective" 
according to art. 13 remedies must entail certain guarantees7, amongst which the 
independence of the authority in question has been taken to be particularly important8.
7See Colder v. U.K., judgment of 21 Feb. 1975, Series A. vol. 18, Par. 33, p. 16; Klass and others v. 
Germany, judgement of 6 sep. 1978, Series A, vol. 28, Par. 67, p. 30.
8See Silver and others v. U.K., judgment, Series A, vol. 61, Par. 116, p. 43; Campbell and Fell v.
U.K., judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A, vol. 80, Par. 127, p. 52.
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Second, note that the regulation of claims before the organs of the Convention has been 
altered by Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR9, which reforms the organic structure of the 
Convention. Protocol No. 11 introduces fundamental changes in the means made 
available for victims of a Convention wrong to raise a complaint against it before the 
organs of the Convention, with a view to improving the possibilities for individuals of 
exercising the right to raise such claims. Signed last May by all the High Contracting 
Parties except Italy, Protocol No. 11 will come into force one year after it has been 
ratified by all of them (art. 3 of Protocol No. 11).
Victims of a Convention wrong thus have a right to raise a complaint both 
before a national authority and, eventually, before the organs of the Convention, so that 
if the opportunity to make such a complaint is not made available to them, then they are 
victims of a second and independent Convention wrong. The question now is how the 
term 'victim' has been interpreted. The Convention organs have interpreted the term 
Victim' as embracing both direct and indirect victims of a Convention wrong. Direct 
victims of a Convention wrong are those who have suffered harm as a result of the 
violation o f one of the Convention rights. Indirect victims are those who have not 
suffered direct harm, yet who have a special personal relation with the direct victim of a 
violation and can show that the violation in question has affected them in their personal 
interests10. Direct victims can be both actual and potential. Actual victims are those who 
have been the object of a particular measure and have an arguable claim that this 
measure violates one of their rights as recognised in the Convention11. This is generally 
the case when a norm is actually applied to the applicant; yet the Convention's organs 
have also admitted that a person may be considered 'victim' by the mere existence of 
legislation which arguably violates the Convention and is applicable to him12. Potential 
victims are those who believe that they reasonably risk a violation of their rights as 
recognised in the Convention, yet they have no way to find out about this violation (for 
example, they fall under the scope of application of a provision that they think contrary
9For the text of Protocol No. 11, the new text of the Convention and comments on the reform, sec 
Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, "Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR Control 
Mechanism, as established by Protocol No. 11, signed on 11 May 1994" 15 H. R. L J. p. 81 (1994).
10See Ap. No. 1478/62,13 Coll Dec. 71, at 89 (cifr. Henri Delvaux, "The Notion of Victim under 
Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights” in Irene Maier (ed.). Protection of Human 
Rights in Europe. Limits and Effects. Proceedings of the Fifth international Colloquy about the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Heidelberg 1982. p. 31 at 52-53).
H See Klass and others v. Germany judgement. Series A, vol. 28, Par. 64-65, p. 29.
12In the judgment to Dudgeon v. U.K (22 Oct. 1987, Scries A. vol. 45), the Court stated that "the 
maintenance in force of ... legislation [prohibiting homosexual acts among consenting adults) 
constitutes a continuing interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life", even 
though the legislation in question had never been applied to him; for "cither he respects the law ... or 
he ... becomes liable to criminal prosecution" (Par. 41, p. 18). See also Norris v. U.K. (judgment of 
26 Oct. 1988, Series A, vol. 142, Par. 38, pp. 17-18) and Modinos v. Cyprus (judgment of 22 April 
1993, Series A, vol. 259, Par. 24, p. 11).
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to the Convention and there is a reasonable likelihood that this provision has been* is 
being or will be applied to them, yet they have no way to find out whether or not this is 
the case). Such a situation is not infrequent in the context o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, since it belongs to the rationale of telecommunication surveillance 
that its victims may not, or at least not in every case, be informed thereof13.
It should however remain clear that arts. 13 and 25 only apply to 'victims' of 
Convention wrongs, however broadly this term is defined. This means that they do not 
allow for abstract claims that a certain national measure violates a particular right 
recognised in the Convention (actio popularis); nor do they recognise a right to a 
domestic remedy against any alleged grievance, however ill-defined this might be: it 
recognises a right only to those who have an arguable complaint that they have been 
victims of a wrong recognised by the Convention, that is to those whose complaint in 
this respect is not "manifestly ill-founded"14. Whether or not these conditions are 
fulfilled muse be decided on the basis of the particular circumstances of each individual 
case15.
1 .2  G erm any
The German Basic Law grants victims of violations of fundamental rights 
recourse to the judiciary and, eventually, also to the Constitutional Court. The scope of 
each of these two different claims will be analysed below. Now I will only concentrate 
on the interpretation of the term 'victim'. In Germany, the term 'victim' has been 
interpreted exclusively as 'direct' victims, whether they are actual or potential. Actual 
victims are all those who claim that one of their rights has been infringed16. In order to 
be considered 'actual victims' of a violation, holders of fundamental rights are not 
required to show that they have suffered a violation of one of these rights but only to 
present an arguable claim; in other words, claimants can be considered actual victims of 
a constitutional violation if the possibility that this violation has occurred cannot be 
excluded beforehand17. Potential victims, on the other hand, are all those who fall
^fciass and others v. Germany, judgement of 6 Sep. 1978, Series A, vol. 28, Par. 34 ei seq.; see also 
Ap. No. 12175/86, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 May 1989, 67 D&R 88 at 99; Ap. No. 12327/86, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 9 May 1989,67 D&R 123 at 131.
14See Leander v. Sweden, judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A, vol.. 116, Par. 77 (a), p. 29. Within 
the context of the right to correspondence, see Boyle and Rice v. U.K., judgment of 8 July 1987, 
Series A, vol. 121, Par. 52-57, p. 23-24.
^  Boyle and Rice v. U.K., judgment. Series A, vol. 121, Par. 58, p. 24.
16See, e.g., BVerfGE 13,132 at 150; 27, 297 at 305.
17See W.-R Schenke, Art. 19 Abs 4, Par. 283-284, pp. 152-153, in Bonner Kommentar zum GG\ 
Hans-Uwe Erichsen, Staatsrecht und Verfassungsgerichtbarkeit /, 2. Auflage, München 1976, p. 90; S. 
Heindrichs, GG-Kommentar, Band I, München 1981, Art. 19 Abs. 4, Par. 44 p. 708;
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within the scope of a provision, the application of which could violate one of their 
fundamental rights, but who have no way of finding out whether or in what terms this 
provision is actually being applied to them* 18. As noted in the context of the ECHR, this 
latter is often the case in the context of the secrecy of telecommunications, for a 
condition for the success of a measure of surveillance is that its victims may not be 
informed thereof. In fact, an obligation to inform victims of such measures only exists 
from the moment when informing them does not endanger the pursuance of the aim that 
justified the surveillance19. So long as this is not the case, recourse to the judiciary 
against a measure of surveillance can only be had by potential victims, that is by those 
who believe that they are being victims unduly of such a measure of surveillance.
1 .3  The United States
According to the fifth and fourteenth amendments, nobody may be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law. Since the fourth amendment right 
and the right to the secrecy of telecommunications recognised therein are part of liberty 
(the general, negative liberty of the individual against the State), victims of measures of 
surveillance considered unlawful have a constitutional right to raise a formal claim 
against such measures. In particular, they can bring criminal action against the 
violators, an action for damages against them directly under the fourth amendment20 or 
even a civil suit for trespass under state law.
The terms in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the word 'victim' are 
very similar to the terms in which this word is interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights and by the German Constitutional Court. According to the Supreme 
Court, in order to be considered the 'victim' of a constitutional wrong (i.e. in order to 
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a measure), a person must show that 
he has directly suffered the consequences of a constitutional violation; in other words, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the term 'victim' as direct victims. Direct victims are 
above all actual victims, that is, they are persons who suffer or have suffered injury in 
the context of one of their constitutional rights. According to the Court, injury can be 
caused both by a particular executive measure and directly by the operation of the law. 
In this latter case, an allegedly unconstitutional legal provision can only be challenged
AUemativekommentar zum GC fur die BRDt Band I, Luchterhand 1984, Art. 19 Abs. 4, Par. 28 p. 
1237.
18BVerfGE 30,1 at 16-17; 67, 157 at 169.
19Art. 1 § 5.5 G 10; § 101 StPO, also cites the protection of public security and of somebody's 
personal security or life as reasons to avoid the giving of the relevant information.
20See 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, respectively.
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Aby someone who shows "not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or 
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its 
enforcement"21. To my knowledge, the Supreme Court has not yet had to decide 
whether there can be potential victims of a constitutional wrong, at least not in the 
context of searches and seizures. Victims of a fourth amendment violation are therefore 
only direct and have so far been only actual.
Yet the question of whether there can be potential victims of fourth amendment 
wrongs is crucial for the protection of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. 
As has been mentioned above, most often the persons who have suffered a measure of 
surveillance do not have a right to be informed thereof, on the grounds that the 
confidentiality of a measure of surveillance is a condition for the very success of this 
measure. In this context, it is particularly important that individuals are allowed to seek 
recourse against unlawful measures of surveillance which they only suspect have taken 
or are taking place, that is, it is particularly important to allow potential victims of a 
measure of surveillance to seek recourse against it. This is even more important in the 
United States, for here victims of a measure of surveillance have no 'right to be 
informed1 under any circumstance. There is only one exception to this rule: Section 
1806 of Title 50 of the USC provides that United States persons who have been subject 
to foreign intelligence surveillance carried out without a judicial order on the basis of an 
emergency must be informed thereof if the surveillance in question is not subsequently 
authorised by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, unless there is an ex parte 
showing of good cause not to do so.
Apart from that case, victims of telecommunication surveillance need never be 
informed of its existence, even though confidentiality is not always and indefinitely 
justified. In the end, surveillance usually comes to light only when it leads to the 
seizure of incriminating information by law-enforcing authorities who seek to introduce 
this information as evidence at a trial. This helps to explain why the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications and, more generally, the right against searches and seizures, is 
often understood as a right to the suppression of incriminatory evidence unlawfully 
obtained: only under these conditions do victims of such measures have a clear chance 
to object to them; otherwise, claims against measures of surveillance can only be raised 
on the basis of some suspicion. *28
21M. Shapiro &  Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, 5th ed., New York - London, 
1979, p. 69 (quoting Justice Brandeis concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US
288 at 346 (1936)).
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Being directly injured by a measure of surveillance or by the regulation of 
measures of surveillance is therefore a necessary condition to be considered the 'victim' 
of a violation of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications (whether injury need be 
’actual’ or can also be ’potential’), yet it is not a sufficient condition. Victims of a 
measure of surveillance have to comply with yet another requirement, a requirement 
which is characteristic o f the fourth amendment. As was explained in detail in chapter 
4, fourth amendment wrongs (these including telecommunication surveillance) only 
occur in as far as a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' has been violated. As a result, 
'victims' o f a fourth amendment violation arc those against whom a search and seizure 
is directed provided that they had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place 
searched or in respect of the item seized or, in our case, in the act of telecommunication 
subject to surveillance22.
2 . The peculiarities of the German Case
As announced above, direct victims of violations of constitutional rights can 
raise a claim before the ordinary courts and, eventually, before the Constitutional 
Court. The scope of each of these two different claims will be analysed in turn in the 
following pages.
2.1 Recourse to Ordinary Courts
2.1.1 Art. 19.4 of the Basic Law 
Art. 19.4
"Where rights arc violated by public authority the person affected shall have 
recourse to law. In so far as no other jurisdiction has been established such 
recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. The second sentence o f paragraph (2) 
of Article 10 shall not be affected by the provisions of this paragraph."
Art. 19.4 recognises a fundamental right to have recourse to ordinary courts to 
all those who have been victims of the violation of one o f their rights by a public 
authority, whether or not the right in question is recognised in the Basic Law or in 
ordinary legislation. On the basis of this right to  recourse, victims of a measure of 
telecommunication surveillance can challenge it if  they think that the measure violates
22See Jones v. US, 362 US 257 at 265 (1960); Alderman v. US, 394 US 165 at 172 et seq. (1969); 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128 at 143 (1978). Note that this definition of the term Victim' has been 
incorporated at the statutory level (Alderman v. US, 394 US 165 at 172 et seq. (1969)).
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their right to the secrecy of telecommunications. This possibility is regulated in §§ 23 et 
seq. of the Einjuhrungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (EGGVG), on which 
basis measures or decisions adopted by judicial authorities can be challenged before the 
Oberlandesgericht (OLG) by those who believe that such measures or decisions violate 
one of their rights23. In addition, victims of measures of surveillance can also interpose 
criminal action if they think that the surveillance complained of amounted to a crime (§§ 
201,202 or 354 of the Criminal Code).
The right recognised in art. 19.4 is not protected in every instance, however. 
According to the third sentence of this provision, there are certain circumstances under 
which the protected scope of the art. 19.4 right to recourse can be narrower than its 
coverage. This restriction of the protected scope of the right to judicial recourse is of 
particular importance to us, because it affects, precisely, the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications: the third sentence of art. 19.4 defines the scope of non-protection 
of the right it recognises by reference to art. 10.2 of the Basic Law, that is by reference 
to the provision where the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is recognised. Let 
us now see what this reference implies.
2.1.2 Art. 10.2.2 of the Basic Law
Art. 10.2.2:
"Where a restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the 
existence or security of the Federation or a Land the law may stipulate that the 
person affected shall not be informed of such restriction and that recourse to the 
courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by bodies and subsidiary bodies 
appointed by parliament."
Art. 10.2.2 was introduced together with the third sentence of art. 19.4 by the 
federal law of 24 June 1968, which amended the Basic Law. The circumstances under 
which art. 19.4 does not apply in the context of art. 10 have been specified and 
regulated by the law "restricting the secrecy of the mail, post and telecommunications 
(supplementing Art. 10 of the Basic Law)", of 13 of August 1968 (Gesetz zuArtikel 10 
Grundgesetz -G 10), a law about which something has already been said in the 
previous chapter. In order to understand the reasons for the enactment of art. 10.2.2,
23As used in this context, the expression 'judicial authorities' (,Justizbehorden) embraces courts in as far 
as they do not act with judicial independence, but it also embraces public prosecutors and even the 
police, these latter in as far as they act as law-enforcing officers (see Kleinknecht/Meyer, Kommentare 
zum Strafprozefiordnung, 40. neubearbeitete Auflage, Verlag C.H. Beck, EGGVG, § 23 at 2). This 
means that §§ 23 et seq. cover, first of all, the possibility of recurring against orders of surveillance, be 
these issued by courts or by the public prosecutor (see chapter 5 above) and, second, the possibility of 
recurring against measures of surveillance carried out by the police without the corresponding order.
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art. 19.4.3 and the G 10 it is imperative to look back to the very particular political 
context of post-war Germany.
Since the surrender o f Germany at the end of the Second World War, the 
protection of German national security and its democratic system had been guaranteed 
by the three occupying powers, i.e. France, Great Britain and the United States. In as 
far as needed to guarantee such protection, these three powers had also been entrusted 
with the surveillance of German telecommunications. This was still the situation in the 
1960s. By then, however, two ideas had become clean first, time seemed ripe for 
German authorities themselves to undertake surveillance activities in the fields of 
national security and the protection of democracy; second, in a State dominated by the 
rule of law, the surveillance of telecommunications, even if linked to the above- 
mentioned fields, had to be subject to certain guarantees.
According to the Convention on the Relations between the Three Powers and 
the Federal Republic of Germany of 26 May 1952, the prerogatives of the Three 
Powers in security matters would only be released upon the enactment of German 
legislation conferring similar prerogatives to German authorities. In other words, the 
creation of an efficient system of surveillance of telecommunications in the field of 
national security run by German authorities was a precondition for the expiration of the 
prerogatives of the Three Powers in the field. In the context of a constitutional State 
such as Germany, this new system of control had to be subject to certain constitutional 
guarantees; the trouble however was that the system also had to be to the satisfaction of 
the occupying powers and that these considered that the normal restrictions on the 
secrecy of telecommunications were inadequate in the context of restrictions justified 
for reasons of national security or for the protection o f the democratic system. Some 
compromise was therefore needed; in order that the surveillance of telecommunications 
carried out for the protection o f national security and democracy could be run by 
German authorities and subject to constitutional guarantees, the guarantees had to be 
less strict than those imposed in the context o f ordinary telecommunications 
surveillance. The enactment of art. 10.2.2 and its complementary G 10 was a result of 
this compromise. In sum, art. 10.2.2 and the G 10 came to complement the existing 
restrictions on the art. 10 rights, so that those imposed for reasons of national security 
or for the protection of the democratic system could be the object of specific regulation.
The constitutionality o f the federal law introducing arts. 10.2.2 and 19.4.3 of 
the Basic Law, as well as that of some provisions of the G 10 (art. 1 § 2.2.2, § 5.5 and
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§ 9.5, now § 9.624) was challenged before the Constitutional Court25. Recourse was 
sought against a background consisting of two point: first, that the person affected by 
surveillance never need be informed of this circumstance and, second, that those 
believing they are under surveillance have no recourse to the judiciary. The claim was 
that these two points violated art. 1 (right to the dignity of men), the essential core of 
art. 10.126, art. 19.4, art. 20 (principle of separation of powers), art. 79.3 
(constitutional amendments cannot affect the principles enunciated in arts. 1 and 20), 
art. 101.1.2 (right to one's lawful judge) and art. 103.1 (right to be heard before a 
court).
In a very controversial decision27, the Constitutional Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the amending law and of the G 10 in all but one point, i.e. the rule 
that the person under surveillance must not be informed thereof (art. 1 § 5.5). On the 
basis of the principle of proportionality, the Court stated that the prohibition against 
informing the victim of a surveillance must not be imposed in categorical terms: in order 
to be in agreement with the Basic Law and even with the law amending the Basic Law, 
this prohibition may only be imposed as long as it proves necessary for the success o f 
the investigation in course. Once this is no longer so, the principle of proportionality 
requires that the person affected be informed and given the possibility o f recourse to the 
judiciary against the surveillance in question28.
The above point of the decision of the Court seems reasonable. It appears as the 
result of a fair balance between two interests at stake, that is the protection of the art. 10 
right and of the art. 19.4 right to a judicial recourse, on the one hand, and the protection 
of national security and the democratic order, on the other. Much more debatable is the 
rest of the decision, in particular the conclusion that in the context of the G 10 a person
24Act of 13th Nov. 1978, BGBl. S. 1546.
25BVerfGE 30, 1. Three parallel claims of unconstitutionality were raised against the above 
provisions: the first one was raised by the Government of the Land of Hesse, the second by a group of 
judges and lawyers from Mannheim and the third by a lawyer from Frankfurt. The two latter claims 
were considered admissible on the grounds that the claimants had been made potential victims of the 
alleged constitutional violation (see p. 15 below) by the mere existence of the law (see BVerfGE 30,1 
at 16-17).
26Ihe Government of Hesse claimed that the right to judicial recourse is part of the essential core of 
fundamental rights (see BVerfGE 30,1 at 10).
27This decision has been the object of many a critical comment. See, e.g., Peter Häberle, "Die 
Abhörentscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 15.12.1970" (1971)72, pp. 145 et seq.; Hans 
Heinrich Rupp, "Anmerkung zum Rechtsprechung", (1971) NJWt pp. 275 et seq. Of special interest is 
the dissenting opinion of three respective members of the Court, particularly since this was the first 
time that members of the Court signed a separate opinion on the basis of § 30 (2) of the BVerfGG 
(introduced by law of 21 st of February 1970).
28BVerfGE 30,1 at 21. This rule only applies, by definition, to surveillance addressed to particular 
persons, not to so-called strategic surveillance, where no relevance is accorded to the identity of the 
persons whose telecommunications are intercepted (art 1 § 3 G 10).
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may be denied judicial recourse against a measure o f surveillance until he has been 
informed of the measure in question. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court 
departed from the idea that if a measure of surveillance is to be fruitful its victims ought 
not to be informed thereof. Allowing for judicial recourse, argued the Court, would 
amount to allowing case-by-case investigations and further discussions on the existence 
and legality of a measure of surveillance, all of which would bring the secret character 
of this to an end, with the subsequent impairment of its purpose. In the context of the G 
10, this purpose is the protection of national security and the democratic order. Denying 
recourse to the judiciary was thus regarded by the Court as a precondition for the very 
protection of national security and the democratic order, values the protection of which 
were accorded absolute preference over any other, even over the protection of 
fundamental rights29.
The above reasoning of the German Constitutional Court can be criticised on 
various grounds. To begin with, the idea that the protection of the democratic order 
must be given preference even over the protection of fundamental rights does not hold. 
For it disregards the fact that the protection of fundamental rights as well as the 
principle of separation of powers are themselves pillars of a democratic system and 
that, as the separate opinion to the majority decision put it, "it is a contradiction in itself 
that in order to protect the Constitution inalienable principles of the Constitution be 
sacrificed"30. Even the Court's reasoning in terms of the protection of national security 
is not convincing. In this context the Court is opposing the protection of fundamental 
rights against the protection of the public interest and establishing an automatic 
subordination of the former one to the latter. By doing so, the Court seems to forget 
that it belongs to the essence of fundamental rights that they be protected precisely 
against the interests of public power and that only in exceptional circumstances may the 
public interest justify restrictions on their exercise. It is therefore wrong to assume as 
the Court did that fundamental rights must automatically yield to the protection of the 
public interest, regardless of whether this was justified by exceptional circumstances. 
This result can only eventually be reached after striking a balance between the 
protection of the public interest and the protection of the right in question. No such 
balance was struck by the German Constitutional Court in the case at issue.
Moreover, if a balance had been struck between the protection of the public 
interest and the protection of the right to judicial recourse, it could only have led to one 
solution: denying recourse to the judiciary to victims of a measure of surveillance
29BVerfGE 30,1 at 18-19.
30BVerfGE 30,1 at 46 (my translation).
293
ibefore they have been informed of its existence imposes an unnecessary restriction 
upon the fundamental right to judicial recourse. In fact, means could have been devised 
to keep the secret character o f telecommunication surveillance while allowing for 
judicial recourse against it. In particular, the German legislation allows that a judicial 
investigation and even a judicial decision be to some extent kept secret from the parties 
to a case where the protection o f national security is at stake31. This implies that 
whenever a judicial claim is raised that an unlawful measure of surveillance might be 
taking place, courts can only inform the claimant of the existence of such a measure if 
this is judged unlawful or otherwise provided that notification would not impair the 
success of the surveillance. In any other case, the claimant would only be informed of 
the fact that there has been no infringement upon his rights, not of whether this is so 
because there has been no interception or because this has been carried out in a perfectly 
lawful way32. This solution could have and, on the basis of the principle of 
reasonableness, it ought to have been applied to the case at stake. In fact, it appears as 
an alternative and equally effective means to attain the pursued aim, a means which 
would not have entailed an encroachment upon fundamental rights. The suppression of 
judicial recourse must therefore be regarded an unnecessarily burdensome, hence 
unconstitutional restriction of the art. 19.4 right. Nor can the importance of suppressing 
judicial recourse be undermined by noting that recourse to the Constitutional Court can 
always be had. Constitutional recourse should not be taken as a substitute but as a 
complement of judicial recourse. Rather, the fact that constitutional recourse is not 
precluded only confirms the idea that also courts can guarantee the secrecy necessary 
for the success of measures of surveillance.
Finally, criticism can be laid not only on the fact that the Court did not strike a 
balance before it restricted the protected scope of the right to judicial recourse. Equally 
open to criticism is the reason why no such balance was struck, that is on which 
grounds the Court did not confront the interest in the protection of this right with the 
public interest which in its view justified the restriction of the protected scope of the 
right. The reason for this is that the law amending the Basic Law -that is the law that 
aimed at restricting the protected scope of the right to judicial recourse- was not 
examined by the Court as a law, but as if it already were part of the Basic Law itself. 
As a consequence, the Court did not study whether the restriction of the right to judicial 
recourse was constitutional; rather, it reasoned on the basis o f the principle of
31 For the possibility of secrecy both during the judicial investigation of a case and in the judicial 
decision, see Kleinknecht/Meyer, Kommentare zum Strafprozeß Ordnung, Einleitung, Par. 60, p. 14; § 
35, Par. 8, p. 132. See also Num. 213.1 of the Richtlinien für das Strafverfahren und das 
Bußgeldverfahren.
32This idea was also suggested by the Government of Hesse in its pleadings before the Constitutional 
Court (see BVerfGE 30,1 at 10).
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constitutional unity and tried to reconcile what it regarded as two existing constitutional 
provisions, i.e. the right to judicial recourse and the restriction that the protection of 
national security and of the democratic order imposed upon this right. Being considered 
part of the Constitution, the restriction as such could not be questioned.
In spite of the above criticism, the system of telecommunication surveillance 
allowed by art. 10.2.2 of the Basic Law and regulated by the G 10 was considered 
constitutional by the German Constitutional Court and even by the European Court of 
Human Rights33. Let us now look at the claims against violations of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications that this system provides.
2.1.3 The G 10 System
The control of measures of surveillance adopted on the basis of the G 10 is 
entrusted to two different organs, a Board and a Commission. The Board consists of 
five members of the Federal Parliament; the Commission consists of three members, 
one of whom, the President, must have the qualification required to be a judge. The 
three members of the Commission are elected for a legislative period by the Board after 
the Government has been heard on this point. They need not be members o f the 
Parliament; yet care is taken that, within the Commission as well as within the Board, 
the different political parties in Parliament are equally represented (Art. 1 § 9 (4)).
Every six months the Board must be informed by the responsible Minister of 
the measures of surveillance adopted by his Ministry during the six month period (Art. 
1 § 9 (1 » . Also the Commission must be informed of such measures: every month the 
responsible Minister must submit to the Commission a report including all the measures 
of surveillance he has ordered during the previous month. Acting with complete 
independence (Art. 1 § 9 (4)), the Commission must decide on the legality and 
necessity of those measures and order that the Minister in question immediately 
terminates measures considered illegal or unnecessary (Art. 1 § 9 (2)). Also once a 
month, the responsible Minister must report to the Commission on the cases in which 
the person affected by an interception has been informed thereof, as well as on the 
possible reasons for non notification in all other cases. If  the Commission considers 
that in some case information is required, this must be immediately arranged by the 
responsible Minister (Art. 1 § 9 (3)).
33Klass and others v. Germany judgement (Series A, vol. 28), where the European Court considered 
that the decision of the German Constitutional Court was in accordance with the Convention.
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Recall that, once the person affected by a measure of surveillance has been 
informed thereof, he can have recourse to the judiciary against this measure. To be 
more precise, this person can open an administrative judicial procedure so that courts 
can decide whether the decision o f the G 10 Commission that the measure of 
surveillance in question may be carried out was lawful. In such cases, courts must 
judge not only the formal legality and constitutionality of a measure of surveillance, but 
also the very opportunity of this measure over and above the opinion expressed by the 
G 10 Commission in this respect. In other words, courts must pronounce their own 
independent opinion on whether the requirem ents were fulfilled upon which 
telecommunication surveillance may be ordered on the basis of the G 10, i.e. whether 
there was "factual evidence for suspecting that a person ... plan[ned] to commit, [was] 
committing or [had] committed" one of the crimes listed in Art. 1 § 2.1 of the G 1034. 
This means that the G 10 Commission does not enjoy a margin to freely appreciate 
whether or not the above-mentioned requirements have been fulfilled; rather, the 
Commission's appreciation in this respect can eventually be subject to judicial control 
which goes beyond a control of arbitrariness and judges its very opportunity35
The above description of the G 10 might leave one with the impression that 
ultimately telecommunication surveillance is better controlled by an independent board 
rather than by the judiciary because possibly more protective of the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications. Indeed, the control exercised over measures of surveillance 
exercised by the G 10 Board and Commission seems much more serious and strict than 
the judicial control of these measures -generally speaking judges simply trust the good 
sense of the law enforcing agents and authorise most petitions for telecommunication 
surveillance without further consideration. That this is the way judicial control often 
works is highly regrettable. Yet it would be wrong to judge a system by its 
misfunctioning, but by the principles which sustain its adequate functioning as well as 
by its potential for functioning more adequately. The judiciary is conceived as being 
impartial inter partes in the solution o f conflicts and this makes it the branch of State 
best able to guarantee the protection o f rights; this is particularly the case in the context 
of fundamental rights. Where a first branch of the State (the executive) is accused of 
violating a fundamental right on the basis of means made available by another branch of 
the State (legislative), then cases ought to be solved by a third branch, i.e. by the
34Atl 1 § 2 Abs. 1 of the G 10, translation taken from the case of Klass and others, judgement of the 
European Court of Human Rights, p. 15.
35BVerwGE 87, 23 at 26-27.
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judiciary36. The independence o f courts even makes them suitable for the resolution of 
cases where a different court is accused of the violation of a fundamental right. In any 
case, the essential independence of the judiciary ought to be preferred to the accidental 
independence of an ad hoc body elected by Parliament when the restrictions imposed 
upon rights have to be controlled. A body similar to the G 10 Commission might be 
important to the end o f avoiding judicial misfunctioning, yet it should stand as part of 
the judiciary or at least work in close connection with it.
Moreover, one of the most striking features of the G 10 system is the absolute 
secrecy in which the activities of the G 10 Board and Commission are carried out. 
These two bodies are not required to account to anyone for what they do, either by 
publicising their decisions or otherwise. This is open to strong criticism. Even if in 
principle confidentiality is justified in the context o f telecommunication surveillance, 
particularly in the context of the measures of suveillance authorised by the G 10, to put 
one's faith in the absolute secrecy that characterises the functioning of the G 10 system 
seem too far-fetched; it deprives the system of any transparency, something which does 
not withstand the test of reasonableness studied in the last chapter. The G 10 system 
only allows for two controls. One is ordinary judicial control, yet this becomes possible 
only when the G 10 Commission itself decides that the person affected by a measure of 
surveillance must be informed thereof; the other is the control of the constitutionality of 
G 10 measures of surveillance by the Constitutional Court. I will now say a few words 
about the possibility of recourse to the Constitutional Court as a mechanism for the 
protection of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. Special attention will be 
paid to how this mechanism applies in the context of the G 10 system of 
telecommunication surveillance.
2 .2  Recourse to the Constitutional Court
The content of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is also defined by 
the possibility of recourse to the Constitutional Courts against measures of surveillance. 
This possibility is contemplated in a rt 93.1 of the Basic Law, which reads as follows.
36Admittedly, in as far as the judiciary is yet another branch of the State it cannot be said to be 
completely independent (the view that judicial independence cannot in truth be said to exist is 
convincingly sustained by Martin Shapiro in Courts. A Comparative and Political Analysis, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1981). Yet it at least has the credit of being the 
most independent or the least dependent branch of the State to decide cases of violations of fundamental 
rights.
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1Art. 93.1
'The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule:
4a. on constitutional complaints which may be filed by anybody claiming that 
one of their basic rights or one of their rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 
or under Article 33,38 ,101,103, or 1*04 has been violated by public authority"
The Federal Constitutional Court is the organ which guarantees that the Basic 
Law, this including fundamental rights37, is respected by all public authorities. This 
function is more closely regulated in the Law of the Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungs-gerichtgesetz -BVerfGG). Claims may be brought before the 
Constitutional Court by victims o f a violation of one of the constitutional provisions 
mentioned in art. 93.1.4a. by public authority. Previously, however, all judicial 
procedures available must be exhausted (§ 90 (2) 1); only exceptionally may claims be 
directly raised to and decided by the Court, namely if they involve questions of general 
importance or if any delay could entail irreparable harm for the claimant (§ 90 (2) 2). 
Claims addressed against judiciary or administrative decisions must be raised within 
one month of the definite decision on the issue being publicised or notified to the 
claimant (§ 93 (1)); those addressed against laws or other acts of sovereignty which 
cannot be judicially challenged must be raised within one year of their enactment (§ 93 
(2)).
It is worthy of note that in the context of art. 10.2.2, that is in the context of the 
scope of non-protection of art. 19.4, the first two rules mentioned above do not always 
find grounds for application; in particular, they cannot apply where the person affected 
by a measure of surveillance is not informed thereof. First, the rule that available 
judicial procedures be exhausted cannot apply where the claimant does not have 
recourse to the judiciary at all. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has stated that in 
such cases recourse to the G 10 Commission cannot be considered 'judicial' according 
to § 90 (2) 1, hence that it is not a necessary step before a claim may be brought before 
the Constitutional Court38. As a result, potential victims of violations of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications can bring their claims directly before the Constitutional 
Court. Second, the deadline of one month does not apply where notice as to the 
infringement upon a right is simply excluded. In such cases, potential victims of an art. 
10 wrong can bring their -direct- claims before the Constitutional Court any time, 
provided these claims are supported by sound suspicion o f an infringement upon the 
claimant's right39.
37BVerfGG in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung v. 12. Dezember 1985 (BGBl. IS. 2229), in particular 
in its §§ 90 et seq..
38BVeifGE 67, 157 at 170-171; see also BVerfGE 30,1 at 23.
39BVerfGE 67, 157 at 169-170.
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4
Conclusions
The above analysis shows that the mechanisms of complaint against violations 
of the secrecy of telecommunications available in the ECHR, Germany and the United 
States are essentially sim ilar these three systems recognise a right to have recourse to 
an independent body, which must decide whether or not a violation actually occurred 
and eventually must provide redress. However, it also shows that there are some 
important differences among these three systems.
A first difference concerns the concept of victims of a violation of the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications. In particular, note that this concept is subject to 
narrower interpretation in the context of the United States than in the context of 
Germany and of the ECHR. For one thing, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
not yet had a chance to decide on the existence of potential victims of the fourth 
amendment, in spite of the importance that recognising potential victims of the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications has for the protection of this right. For another 
thing, the interpretation of the concept of victims is strongly conditioned by the way the 
coverage of the fourth amendment is presently defined. Interpreted as a provision for 
the protection of privacy, the fourth amendment only recognises a right against searches 
and seizures which infringe upon privacy interests that society considers reasonable. As 
a result, the concept of a victim o f fourth amendment wrongs is subject to the ebbs and 
flows of the dominant social opinion as to the reasonableness of an expectation of 
privacy. On this basis, victims o f telecommunication surveillance are defined as those 
placed under a measure of surveillance with an expectation of privacy in the act of 
telecommunication in question, an expectation that society is willing to consider 
reasonable. As was explained in chapter 4, the expression 'reasonable expectation of 
privacy' has so far been interpreted in objective terms by the Supreme Court, so that for 
the time being, the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications (hence the 
concept of victims of this right) is not as ill-defined as it could become.
Second, the German system has an advantage over the other two ones. In 
Germany victims of a measure o f surveillance have a right to be informed thereof as 
soon as this does not endanger the investigation that justified the surveillance, so that if 
they think that their right to the secrecy of telecommunications has been violated they 
can actually make use of the mechanisms of protection o f this right Such a right to be 
informed is not imposed by the ECHR; nor does it exist in the United States. Here 
victims of a measure of surveillance only have a chance to object to it where the
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surveillance has led to information which law-enforcing authorities want to introduce as 
evidence at trial, unless a claim is raised on the basis of mere suspicion. The result is 
that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is too often confused with the right 
to the suppression of evidence illegally seized.
Finally, note that the United States stands as the only system of the three ones 
under consideration where victims (although it rests to be seen whether this covers 
potential victims) of a violation of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications are 
always assured recourse to the judiciary. The ECHR merely requires that the 
Contracting Parties provide victims of a Convention wrong with some kind of recourse 
in front of an arbitration body which must certainly offer certain guarantees such as 
independence, but which need not be part of the judiciary. The possibility of not 
providing judicial recourse has been developed in Germany. Here those who believe 
they have been victims of a violation of this right may not always confirm their 
suspicions by having recourse to the judiciary; instead, in the context of certain 
measures of surveillance they have to rely on the control exercised by a body created ad 
hoc by Federal Parliament or, eventually, have recourse before the Constitutional 
Court. This ad hoc body carries out its work of control in the greatest secrecy; indeed, 
it was introduced as a way to make sure that the secret character of certain particularly 
important measures of surveillance would be preserved even during the control of their 
constitutionality. Secrecy is clearly a condition for the success of such measures, the 
problem is that secrecy could also have been attained within the context of the judicial 
recourse. This alternative system of control thus imposes an unnecessary restriction 
upon the right to have recourse to the judiciary, hence a restriction that goes beyond the 
limits permitted by the constitutional principle of reasonableness. The restriction must 
therefore be considered unconstitutional.
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Section 2: Substantive remedies
Introduction
Violations of the secrecy of telecommunications are completed wrongs, in the 
sense that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is definitely and irreversibly 
violated with each single infringement upon that secrecy. This means that remedies 
against them cannot consist of bringing the violation in question to an end, as in the 
case of on-going wrongs. The only possible remedy is granting compensation to the 
victims of the wrong in question, compensation which is generally of a pecuniary 
character.
However, saying that a wrong is already complete and can therefore not be 
stopped, does not imply that the consequences of this wrong must also be complete, 
that is, that they have necessarily been exhausted. A good example of this is the case of 
violations of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications which end up in the seizure 
of information. Such violations are completed wrongs, yet their consequences are not 
exhausted so long as some use of the information seized is still being made. It thus 
appears that, although violations of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
cannot be stopped, yet the consequences of such violations in some cases can be 
prevented from occurring.
The three systems under consideration provide some compensation against 
violations of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. Parallelly, the United 
States and Germany have considered the problem of stopping the consequences of 
violations of this right and have devised a legal instrument to this end. This is the so- 
called 'exclusionary rule’, according to which information seized through unlawful 
measures of surveillance may not be used as evidence at trial. This rule has acquired 
such importance that it can be regarded as the most characteristic element of the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications in both these systems. The greatest part of the 
present section will be dedicated to studying this rule. Before, we will have a brief look 
at other compensations against violations of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications provided in the ECHR, Germany and the United States.
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1. Compensation Against Telecommunication Surveillance
1.1 The European Convention on Human Rights
As was seen in the previous section, the ECHR requires that victims of a 
Convention wrong be in a position to raise a claim against the wrong before a national 
authority. It also stresses that such recourse must be effective, which implies that they 
must be apt for the granting of a fair remedy if this be required. Yet the ECHR does not 
give many indications as to the particular remedies that must be provided against 
wrongs under the Convention. This question is fundamentally left to the discretion of 
the Contracting Parties, whilst the organs of the Convention are called upon to make 
sure that the remedies provided by the Contracting Parties meet certain standards.
This distribution of roles between the Contracting Parties and the Convention 
organs underlies both the present text of the Convention (arts. 32.2, 32.3,50) and the 
new text introduced by Protocol No. 11 (art. 41 and 46). The most relevant provisions 
are art. 50 and its future substitute art. 41, both o f which have a very similar 
wording40. Art. 50 reads as follows:
Article 50:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any 
other authority of a High Contracting Party, is completely or partially in conflict 
with the obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law 
of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences 
of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford 
just satisfaction to the injured party".
According to art. 50 (and to its future substitute art. 41), the Court shall afford 
just satisfaction to victims of Convention wrongs who have only obtained partial 
reparation from the national authorities in question. Thereby, the Convention does not 
place the Contracting Parties under any obligation to grant a particular degree of 
reparation for Convention wrongs, it does not even place it under the obligation to grant 
any reparation at all. Rather, art. 50 simply makes it clear that the reparation granted to 
victims of Convention wrongs can always be examined by the Court, which can always 
decide whether it would be advisable to afford some extra satisfaction.
40Fumre art. 41 reads as follows: *Tf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention 
or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only 
partial reparation to be made, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the 
injured party".
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Art, 50 seems to be assuming that total reparation for Convention wrongs can 
eventually be (indeed that it ought to be) granted. However, as was reasoned in the 
introduction to this chapter, total reparation for the violation of rights is simply 
unfeasible, which means that any reference to total reparation cannot be taken seriously. 
The impossibility of total reparation has often been acknowledged by the Court and 
taken into account in the interpretation of art. 50. The Court admits that art. 50 had in 
view cases where total reparation is possible but is precluded by internal law, yet it has 
stated that "common sense suggests [that a rt 50 should] also cover the case where the 
impossibility of restitutio in integrum follows from the very nature of the injury"41. The 
result is that the Court is entitled to provide just satisfaction in every case of violation of 
a Convention right that it decides. In this context, the Court does not regard claims 
under this provision as new petitions but as an 'annex' to the original claim that a 
Convention right was violated. Accordingly petitions under art. 50 need not be the 
object of a second, independent judgment, but can be examined within the judgment 
dealing with the merits, provided that the issue is ready for decision42.
In order that just satisfaction can be granted, the victim of a Convention wrong 
must have suffered certain damage as a result of the wrong. To this end, it docs not 
suffice that the person concerned has been considered a 'victim' by the Court. The 
Court has ruled that this circumstance does not deserve just satisfaction or, to be 
precise, it has ruled that the mere declaration that a Convention wrong has been 
committed is enough of a satisfaction for having been the victim of this wrong43. In 
order that additional pecuniary satisfaction can be granted, the party seeking satisfaction 
must show that the Convention wrong caused some additional damage and that there is 
a direct causal link between wrong in question and the damage44.
41 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium ("Vagrancy** Cases), judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A, 
vol. 6, Par. 14-16, p. 7-10.
42M.E. Mas, **Right to Compensation Under Article 50", The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, p. 775 at 779. This 
implies that exhausting domestic remedies is not an 'admissibility condition* for claims under art. 50 
(see the "Vagrancy" cases. Series A, vol. 6, Par. 14, pp. 1-8; see also M.E. Mas, "Right to 
Compensation..." at 780-781).
43See Colder v. U.K., judgment of 21 Feb. 1975, Series A, vol. 18, Par. 46, pp. 22-23; Silver and 
others v. U.K., judgment on art 50, Series A, vol. 67, Par. 10, pp. 6-7; Schonenberger and Durmaz v. 
Switzerland, judgment of 20 June 1988, Series A, vol. 137, Par. 36, p. 15; Kruslin v. France, 
judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A, vol. 176, Par. 39, p. 25; McCollum v. U.K., judgment of 30th 
Aug. 1990, Series A, vol. 183, Par. 37, p. 17; Campbell v. U.K., judgment of 25 March 1992, Series 
A, vol. 233, Par. 70, p. 23; Modinos v. Cyprus, judgment of 22 April 1993, Series A, vol. 259, Par.
30, p. 12.
44See Campbell and Fell v. U.K., judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A, vol. 80, Par. 134-136, p. 54; 
McCollum v. U.K., judgment of 30th Aug. 1990, Series A, vol. 183, Par. 36, p. 17; Margareta and 
Roger Andersson v. Sweden, judgment of 25 Feb. 1992, Series A, vol. 226, Par. 107, p. 32; Pfeifer 
and Plankl v. Austria, judgment of 25 Feb. 1992. Series A, vol. 227, Par. 50-51, p. 19.
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'Damages' can be both of a pecuniary and of a non-pecuniary character. The 
former kind embraces any possible material loss suffered by the victims o f a 
Convention wrong; the latter embraces, e.g., stress, loss of reputation, moral suffering 
or physical pain. Pecuniary damage is clearly easier to evaluate and to compensate for 
than the non-pecuniary damage. In the context of the right to respect for 
correspondence, non-pecuniary damage (when it has been regarded as the direct 
consequence of the violation of this right) has hardly ever been considered relevant 
enough to deserve compensation beyond the mere decision of the Court that there has 
been a violation of this right; to be more precise, pecuniary compensation has only been 
granted on two occasions, of which only one was concerned with the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications45.
1.2 Germany
The German system recognises a right to redress to all those who have been 
subject to unconstitutional measures o f telecommunication surveillance. As has been 
explained in the previous section, all those who know that they have been victims of a 
measure of surveillance and who believe this was unconstitutional can challenge it 
before the ordinary courts. On the other hand, those who only suspect that they are or 
have been victims of surveillance have recourse to courts only if this has been carried 
out in the context of ordinary law enforcement. In the context of the protection of 
national security or the democratic order it is for the G 10 Commission to control the 
lawfulness of every measure of surveillance. If the G 10 considers that a measure of 
surveillance has been unduly adopted, it must order the immediate termination of this 
measure (art, 1 § 9 (2) G 10).
In the context of ordinary law-enforcement, courts, in particular the OLG, must 
order the termination of unlawful measures of surveillance which have not yet been 
completely carried out (§28.1 of the EGGVG46). If surveillance has already been
45Herczegfalvy v. Austria, judgment of 24 Sep. 1992, Series A, vol. 244, Par. 100, p. 29; the other 
case, dealing with the freedom to engage in telecommunications, is Margareta and Roger Andersson v. 
Sweden, judgment of 25 Feb. 1992, Series A, vol. 226, Par. 107, p. 32.
^§§ 23 et seq. of the EGGVG complete the right to a remedy recognised in art. 19.4 of the Basic Law 
in the context of measures or decisions adopted by judicial authorities. The term 'judicial authorities' 
CJustizbehörden) embraces not only courts, in as far as they do not act with judicial independence, but 
also the Public Prosecutor and the police in as far as they act as law-enforcing officers (see 
Kleinknecht/Meyer, Kommentare zum Strafprozeßordnung, § 23 at 2). §§ 23 et seq. therefore apply in 
the context of decisions concerning the surveillance of telecommunications in ordinary law- 
enforcement, since as explained in chapter 5 this can be ordered by courts and, exceptionally, by the 
Public Prosecutor under closely regulated conditions and following closely regulated indications (in this 
sense, see Kleinknecht/Meyer, Kommentare van Strafprozeßordnung § 23 at 6,10).
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carried out, the OLG must order that things be brought back to the state they were in 
before the right to the secrecy of telecommunications was violated; should this not 
prove possible, upon the request of the person affected, the OLG must compensate for 
the violation with a statement that the measure in question was unlawful (§ 28.1 
EGGVG). The OLG also decides whether those who are or have been subject to a 
measure o f surveillance should be informed thereof (§ 28.2 EGGVG). If the 
Constitutional Court considers that a decision, whether judiciary or administrative, 
violates art. 10 it must declare it void and, if judicial remedies are available, send the 
issue back to a court competent by the matter (§ 95 (2) BVerfGG); if art. 10 is violated 
by a law, it must be declared void (§ 95 (3) BVerfGG).
1.3  The United States
In the previous section we saw that victims of violations of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications have recourse to different claims before the judiciary as 
ways to seek redress against such violations. If the competent court reaches the 
conclusion that a violation actually took place, then redress must be granted. This 
normally consists of pecuniary compensation. This is the case in the context of civil 
actions for damages against either state or federal officials47 or even against municipal 
corporations48 directly under the fourth amendment or in the context of a civil suit for 
trespass under state law; on the other hand, criminal prosecution49 cannot be used as a 
basis for civil action for damages, yet the fact that the violator is found guilty 
sometimes appears to the victim  of the violation as a more important moral 
compensation. However, the most characteristic remedy against fourth amendment 
wrongs is doubtless the so-called exclusionary rule. Studying this rule will be the 
purpose of the rest of this section.
47See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Court's judgement in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
F.B. of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971) respectively. On this latter, see W.E. Dellinger, "Of Rights and 
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword”, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (1972).
48See Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 US 658 (1978); Leatherman v. Tarrant 
City Narcotics Unit, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1993) (pending publication).
4918 U.S.C. § 242.
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2 .  The so-called Exclusionary  R ule
2.1 The United States
Indeed, the most characteristic remedy against fourth amendment wrongs is the 
so-called exclusionary rule. In the following pages I will first o f all examine how the 
rule started to be applied in the context of the fourth amendment; I will then comment 
on the different doctrinal positions adopted with respect to the rule and will suggest an 
alternative approach to it; finally, I will look at the way the rule has been and is 
presently interpreted by the Supreme Court. Note that all these comments also apply to 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications from the moment when it started to be 
considered as covered and protected under the fourth amendment.
2.1.1 The Origins of the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule dates back to the case of Boyd v. U.S., that is to the very 
origins of the doctrine of the Supreme Court on the fourth amendment. In this case, the 
Court suppressed some personal papers of the accused that the government had 
unreasonably seized and sought to introduce as evidence at trial against him. Personal 
papers unreasonably seized, the Court reasoned, cannot be introduced as evidence at 
trial against their lawful owner, for this would amount to forcing this latter to confess 
against himself; in other words, the introduction at trial of personal papers unlawfully 
seized would amount to a new constitutional wrong, namely to a violation of the fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination.
The reasoning of the Court in Boyd might appear more or less justified because 
it concerned the introduction of private papers as evidence at trial. Indeed, reading 
certain personal papers at court might be tantamount to having the person in question 
incriminate himself; this is notably the case with diaries, letters, etc. However, the 
Court immediately enlarged its reasoning to all kinds of private property, so that the 
introduction of any object lawfully possessed was thought to amount to making the 
lawful possessor incriminate himself. The importance thereby accorded to private 
property is apparent and is in accordance with the general spirit of the times. Private 
property was conceived as a prolongation of individual personality, to the extent that 
what it tells others about its lawful holder was considered as good as a declaration made 
by the holder himself and, eventually, as a confession.
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* The exclusionary rule was thus devised in the context of searches and seizures 
against property lawfully seized and resulted from a combined interpretation of the 
fourth and fifth amendments50. Yet* always within the context of searches and seizures 
of property lawfully held (i.e. in the context of searches and seizures materially 
unlawful) the exclusionary rule could easily have been deduced from the fourth 
amendment taken by itself. In particular, the rule can be seen as arising from two 
considerations: first* seizures of property lawfully held are on-going wrongs; second, 
bringing such on-going wrongs to an end is part of the courts's duty to enforce the 
Constitution. Seizures of property lawfully held are on-going wrongs in the sense that 
they do not come to completion the moment property is seized but* on the contrary, 
expand during the time in which property is unlawfully being kept from its lawful 
holder. Wrongs of this kind do not amount to definite violations of rights, given that as 
soon as they are brought to an end the violated right will be automatically enforced. 
Hence the courts’s duty actually to bring such wrongs to an end. In the context of the 
fourth amendment this means that whenever a seizure encroaches upon legitimate 
possessory interests courts must order that the property in question be returned to its 
lawful holder, with the immediate result that this property can no longer be used as 
evidence at trial.
In spite of the origins o f the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court also seems to 
have reasoned along the above lines. Already in its early case law there are examples of 
cases where the Court simply relied on the fourth amendment to rule that "papers 
wrongfully seized should be turned over to the accused”51, to which end it imposed the 
condition that "the accused" make a timely application in this respect52. Soon the
50Examples of this double constitutional ground of the exclusionary rule can be found in Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 US 43 (1906); Wilson v. US, 221 US 361 (1911); Couled v. US, 255 US 298 (1921); 
Agnello et at. v. US, 269 US 20 (1925); Marron v. US, 275 US 192 (1927); and even sporadically in 
later cases (see P, Stewart, "The Road to Mapp. v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases" 83 Col L Rev. 1365,1377 (1983)). 
5^Weeks v. US 232 US 383 at 398 (1914) (see the cases cited therein in support of this position); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US, 251 US 385 (1920). In this latter case, the application of the 
exclusionary rule had to rely on the fourth amendment, since companies do not enjoy the fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination.
52Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the common law, a collateral issue 
may not be brought up to inquire about the means by which evidence was obtained. Evidence presented 
at trial can only be questioned on its pertinence; the manner in which it was obtained must be the 
object of independent proceedings (Adam v. NY, 192 US 585 at 596 (1904); see references to common- 
law cases at 594 et seq.). Hence the requirement that the victim of a fourth amendment violation make 
a timely application for its return, so that this question is already decided when the item of evidence is 
used at trial (see Weeks v. US, 232 US 383, esp. 393 et seq. (1914)). This requirement, however, has 
not been interpreted in strict terms. In the Court's words, it embodies "an important social policy and 
not a narrow, finicky procedural requirement. [This] precludes application of the Rule so as to 
compel ... injustice" (Jones v. US, 362 US 257 at 264 (I960)). In this line, e.g., the Court has 
admitted unseasonable applications for return provided they were made as soon as the defendant knew of 
the seizure of his papers (Couled v. US (255 US 298 (1921)); moreover, the requirement has been 
altogether dispensed with where uncontroversial facts show that the evidence at stake was obtained in
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exclusionary rule would be exclusively justified on the basis o f the fourth 
amendment53. This shift in justification brought along a significant change in the 
understanding o f the exclusionary rule. Under a combined fourth-fifth amendment 
rationale, the rule was conceived as part of the object of the constitutional right against 
self-incrimination, that is it had the status of a constitutional right. Under a fourth 
amendment rationale, on the other hand, the rule is not a constitutional right and does 
not even have direct constitutional status: it is just a consequence of applying a remedy 
against the violation of a constitutional right.
So far the exclusionary rule has been exclusively related to wrongs which 
encroach upon the possessory interests protected by the fourth amendment. Soon 
however the Court started also to apply the rule in cases where no such possessory 
interests were at stake, that is, in cases of searches and seizures that are not materially 
but formally unreasonable. The grounds for this position were settled in the case of 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US54. Here the Court stated that the rule required not only 
that, if seized, property lawfully held be returned but also that it be not used or taken 
any notice of at all55. Property thus seized could therefore not be used as evidence even 
after having been returned to its lawful holder -it could not, e.g., be referred to at trial. 
In sum, courts were required to act as if  the unlawful seizure had never occurred. This 
doctrine implied an important enlargement of the framework of application of the 
exclusionary rule. In its new dimension the rule was no longer attached to the mere 
protection of lawful property but, rather, to the protection of the privacy interests 
inherent in lawful property. It is not property itself but the privacy interests inherent in 
property that require, first, that property lawfully held be not searched, second, that if 
such property is searched despite this the result of the search be not disclosed and, 
third, that if it is disclosed despite this the result be not used at all. The Court included 
these requirements within the scope of the exclusionary rule and introduced the theory 
that any use of evidence unlawfully obtained is "the fruit of a poisonous tree"56 and is 
thus to be rejected altogether.
In spite of the above enlargement of its scope of application, the exclusionary 
rule continued to be justified on the same basis as before: the Court continued to 
perceive the exclusionary rule as the consequence o f a certain remedy against a fourth
violation of the fourth amendment (see Agnello et cd. v. U.S., 269 US 20 (1925)), or where its 
application would amount to compelling a defendant to declare against himself. (Jones v. US).
53See, see P. Stewart, "The Road to Mapp v. Ohio ..." at 1377.
54Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US, 251 US 385 (1920).
55Ibid., at 392.
56The "fruit-of-a-poisonous-tree" metaphor was introduced in Nardone v. US, 308 US 338 at 341
(1939).
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amendment wrong, i.e. as a consequence of giving property unlawfully seized back to 
its lawful holder. As a matter of fact, the enlargement of the rule resulted from the idea 
that if the devolution of property is to make any sense at all it must preclude not only 
every direct use but also every indirect use of this property. The Court's prime concern 
was to avoid the position in which a fourth amendment possessory wrong could serve 
as a basis for a future lawful encroachment upon the privacy interests inherent in the 
property seized, in such a way that compliance with the fourth amendment would 
ultimately be justified through its previous violation57. In fact, if the fourth amendment 
were to allow the indirect use o f property as evidence it would be offering a clue as to 
how to avoid compliance with the fourth amendment itself; for it would be very easy to 
return the property unlawfully seized to its lawful holder, i.e. to avoid any direct use of 
it, and then use the information obtained through the unlawful seizure. The Court's 
prime concern was thus to avoid the fourth amendment becoming reduced to a mere 
"form of words"58.
We have thus far seen how the Silverthorne decision detached the exclusionary 
rule from the exclusive protection of property and attached it to the protection of the 
privacy interests inherent therein. Yet the Silverthorne decision went a step further and 
set the basis for the application of the exclusionary rule in all independent privacy 
wrongs: "[tjhe essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain 
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it 
shall not be used at all"59. With these words the Court was suggesting that the "fruit- 
of-a-poisonous-tree" theory ought to apply to searches and seizures which are unlawful 
on a purely formal basis. In other words, it was suggesting that the exclusionary rule 
ought to apply in all fourth amendment violations60.
Conceived as an instrument for the protection of independent privacy interests, 
the exclusionary rule presents the problem of its own justification. It certainly cannot be 
justified on the basis of the courts' duty to bring on-going wrongs to an end, for 
violations of privacy are "fully accomplished" wrongs61. That is they are wrongs
57An interesting analysis of the issue of compliance through violation in the above sense has been
made by W.C. Heffeman. "On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion" (1989) Wis. L.Rev. 1193 at 
1206 et seq. and 1229 et seq.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US, at 392. This argument had already been used in Weeks: "If letters 
and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an 
offence, the protection of the Fourth Amendment... is of no value" (Weeks v. US, at 393). 
^Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US, at 392 (1920) (emphasis added); Wong Sun v. US, 371 US 471 at 
485 (1963).
60In its new conceptual framework, the exclusionary rule has also justified the refusal to testify on 
questions based on information obtained in violation of the fourth amendment (see Lanza v. NY, 370 
US 139 (1962); Celbard v. US, 408 US 41 (1972)).
61 US v. Leon, 468 US 897 at 906 (1984).
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which both start and finish the very moment privacy is infringed upon, so that by the 
time some evidence is used at trial the violation of privacy can no longer be brought to 
an end62. Nor can the rule be justified on the basis o f the Court's reasoning in 
Silverthorne: the danger that a fourth amendment violation might be upheld because of a 
previous compliance with this provision does not exist in the context of independent 
privacy wrongs. The Supreme Court seems to have resented these difficulties, for as 
yet it has not provided any clear justification for the application of the rule in the context 
of privacy interests, as it had done in previous phases of its evolution. Studying what 
the grounds for the exclusionary rule can be in this context will be the objective of the 
following paragraphs.
2.1,2 Present Doctrinal Positions
The justification of the exclusionary rule is today one of the most controversial 
issues in the context of the fourth amendment. All the different positions adopted in this 
context seem to have a common point of departure: the exclusionary rule is a way to 
prevent future constitutional wrongs from occurring. Based on this assertion, 
justifications of the exclusionary rule have gone in two directions. The rule has been 
justified either as a remedy against fourth amendment violations or in purely preventive 
terms.
[A] The Rule as a Remedy
The exclusionary rule has been defended on the grounds that it is a remedy 
against fourth amendment privacy violations, in the sense that its application leads to 
the enforcement of this provision. The grounds on which this assertion lies are 
somewhat unorthodox. In particular, it claims that the rule enforces the fourth 
amendment because it can prevent future fourth amendment violations. The preventive 
force of the rule, it is argued, lies in the fact that it discourages infringements of fourth
62W.C. Heffeman has suggested that, in a less strict sense, fourth amendment privacy wrongs could be 
considered on-going. Even if there is not a continuous infringement of privacy interests, he claims, 
there is a continuous pattern of fourth amendment infringements, that is, "a pattern of arrests, searches 
and so on, in which each wrong is characterized by a similar violation of interests protected by the 
fourth amendment" ("On Justifying..." at 1201). Yet, the author himself admits that using the concept 
"on-going wrong" in this latter sense can be confusing and problematic. He then justifies the 
exclusionary rule on the following basis: every fourth amendment privacy wrong constitutes a pattern 
of wrongs which are not on-going, but independent from one another, yet such wrongs are connected in 
such a way that if a wrong is committed the next one appears as a threatened wrong and must, 
therefore, be prevented. Hence the obligatoriness of the exclusionary rule (ibid, at 1201-1202).
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amendment rights by making them unprofitable, that is by systematically barring the 
use at trial of any evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. In other 
words, the exclusionary rule is considered a remedy because it achieves a prospective 
enforcement of the fourth amendment.
The premises of the above position are highly questionable. It is, in fact, highly 
questionable whether measures of 'prospective enforcement' can be regarded as 
remedies. Remedies are ways o f reacting against violations that have already occurred. 
Their aim is to restore rights to the position they were before being violated or, should 
this not be possible, to offer a compensation of some kind. It is far from clear how a 
measure can be defined as a remedy on the basis o f its potential to prevent future 
violations. Even if, as a hypothesis, the exclusionary rule could be qualified as a 
remedy in the terms described above, this might justify that it be occasionally applied 
but not that it be applied in every single case. Indeed, it can be considered a 
constitutional requirement that remedies against fourth amendment wrongs exist and are 
duly applied so that this provision can be enforced, yet the Constitution offers no 
grounds why a particular remedy should be preferred to any other. This is why claims 
that the exclusionary rule is a remedy are usually complemented by the claim that it is 
not just a remedy, but the only effective remedy against fourth amendment violations 
actually available, a reason why its application is regarded as a constitutional command.
The existing remedies against violations o f the fourth amendment, so this 
argument goes, cannot be relied on as alternatives to the exclusionary rule. To begin 
with, such formal remedies have a very limited framework of application: fourth 
amendment victims can certainly undertake a criminal prosecution of the violators63; yet 
they must prove that the violation complained of was willful64. They can also seek an 
injunction against a fourth amendment violation by a law enforcing agency; yet they 
must prove that this agency has a policy that results in widespread fourth amendment 
violations or, moreover, that they themselves might be injured in the future by such a 
policy65. As was explained above, they can bring an action for damages against either 
state or federal officials directly under the fourth amendment, or a civil suit for trespass 
under state law; yet officers can oppose the defence of qualified immunity, which 
shields public officials from actions for damages unless their conduct was unreasonable 
in light of clearly established law66; moreover, many officers do not have the resources
6318 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
64See Screws v. US, 325 US 91 (1945).
65See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 US 362 (1976) and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 US 95 (1983), 
respectively.
66See Davis v. Scherer, 468 US 183; Elder v. Holloway et al. 127 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1994) (pending 
publication).
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to comply with a money judgement and compensate the victim of a fourth amendment 
violation. Furthermore, even within their limited framework, the above formal remedies 
are claimed to be totally ineffective in practice, since they do not actually give rise to 
any material remedy at all. The reason offered is that prosecutors, judges and juries are 
sympathetic to law enforcement officials and not to the usual victims of illegal searches 
and seizures. This gives the above remedies very little chance of success; not 
surprisingly, they are hardly ever used at all67.
The argument that there is no alternative remedy to the exclusionary rule is thus 
relied on to defend its application as a constitutional requirement. The rule is 
considered, first of all, a constitutional requirement under the fourth amendment, but 
also under the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The due-process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment imposes certain standards of criminal procedure which are 
considered implicit in the concept of ordered liberty68. The concept of ordered liberty 
implies the respect and protection of rights which are basic for a free society. Amongst 
these the Supreme Court has included the fourth amendment right against unlawful 
searches and seizures69. Therefore, insofar as the exclusionary rule is considered the 
only effective remedy against fourth amendment violations, its application is also a 
constitutional requirement under the fourteenth70.
[B] The Rule as a Preventive Measure
Several prevention arguments have been raised to justify the exclusionary rule. 
The one most often claimed is that the rule helps to deter future fourth amendment 
violations by the police. In this instance, however, deterrence is not regarded as the 
only effective remedy against -future- fourth amendment violations. The pursuance of 
deterrence through the exclusionary rule is thus not considered a constitutional
670n all the above questions, see C. Foote, 'Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual 
Rights" 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1955); Barrett, "Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches - 
A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 Cat. L. Rev." 565 (1955); Monrad G. Paulsen, "Safeguards in the 
Law of Search and Seizure" 52 Nw U. L. Rev. 65 (1957); J. Kaplan, "Search and Seizure: A No-Man's 
Land in the Criminal Law" 49 Cal. L. Rev. 474 at 486 et seq. (1961); B.C. Canon,"Is the 
Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion" 
62 KyL.J. 681 (1974); Y. Kamisar, 'The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: the Struggle 
to Make the Fourth Amendment more than an 'Empty Blessing'", 62 Judicature 337 (1979); P. 
Stewart, "The Road to Mapp. v. Ohio ..." 1383 (1983); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., "The exclusionary rule: An 
Essential Ingredient of the Fourth Amendment", (1983) The Supreme Court Review 283 at 296. See 
also the dissenting opinion of the Justices Murphy and Rutledge to Wolfv. US, at 41 et seq.
68These standards were primarily addressed to the states. On the development of the due-process clause, 
see Kamisar, "Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts" 43 
Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (1959).
69Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949).
7QMapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961).
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requirement; instead, it is regarded just as one possible policy within the framework of 
constitutional rights. In the case of evidence unlawfully seized, courts are confronted 
with a choice between deterring fourth amendment violations, on the one hand, and 
seeking effective law enforcement, on the other. The deterrence argument shows a 
general preference for the former option, yet it does not assume that the exclusionary 
rule must be applied in any event. Rather, it assumes that the particular circumstances 
of each case must be analysed, so as to measure the extent to which the interest in law 
enforcement is presently outweighed by the interest in deterring constitutional wrongs.
The support this argument offers to the exclusionary rule is very limited. It does 
not justify that evidence be always excluded, but only in as far as this might help to 
deter law enforcement agents from violating the fourth amendment in the future and, 
even then, only to the extent that the interest in such deterrence outweighs the interest in 
law enforcement. In fact, the deterrence argument has been more often used by the 
critics of the exclusionary rule than by its defenders. Justifying the rule on a deterrence- 
policy basis, they argue, can only lead to its suppression. In this context, it is claimed 
that the rule does not actually deter at all and that, even if it did, the social price it 
imposes is too high for it to be considered reasonable in policy terms71; after all, they 
conclude, the exclusionary rule is not a remedy against fourth amendment violations, 
hence it is not a means to enforce the fourth amendment, but is merely the result of a 
particular and costly policy72.
A second prevention argument focuses on the need to preserve judicial integrity. 
This argument claims that the admission at trial of evidence unlawfully seized amounts 
to the judicial legitimation of a wrong, thus to the participation of the judiciary in its 
com m ission73. The exclusionary rule is regarded as the only way to prevent the 
judiciary from getting involved in such "dirty business". As was the case of the
71 On this issue, see the study made by D.H. Oaks, "Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Searches and 
Seizures" 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970). See also W.R. La Fave, 'Improving Police Performance 
through the Exclusionary Rule. Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practice; Part. II: Defining the 
Norms and Training the Police", 30 Miss. L  Rev. 391 and 566 resp. (1965), where, without arguing 
for the uselessness of the exclusionary rule, the author points out its problems and deficiencies as a 
deterrence device. A more elaborated version of this argument has been developed by T.S. Schrock & 
R..C. Welsh, "Up from Calandra: the Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement", 59 Minn. 
L. Rev. 251 (1974). The authors claim that courts may not admit at trial evidence unlawfully seized 
because this would perpetuate the wrong that was committed through the unlawful seizure. Thus, 
courts must not apply the exclusionary rule because they are under the duty to prevent or to avoid the 
commission of future wrongs; they must apply it because they are under a duty to put a remedy to 
wrongs committed in the past. According to these authors, therefore the fourth amendment includes a 
right to the exclusionary rule. Compare this with the position held by W.C. Heffeman, "On Justifying
If
72See R.A. Posner,"Rethinking the fourth Amendment", (1981) The Supreme Court Review 49.
73This argument was first raised by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion to the case of Olmstead 
v. US (277 US 438 at 470 (1928)).
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previous prevention argument, the judicial-integrity argument does not justify that 
evidence be excluded whenever obtained in violation of fourth amendment rights, but 
only that it be excluded in cases where judicial integrity is at stake -for example, the 
exclusionary rule is not justified if an unlawful search and seizure was carried out in 
good faith, for judicial integrity is not endangered by the confirmation of an involuntary 
wrong. Within those limits, however, the judicial-integrity argument does impose 
exclusion as a rule. Admittedly, the need to preserve judicial integrity is not a 
constitutional requirement but is, as in the case of deterrence, the result of a policy 
choice. In cases where relevant evidence has been unlawfully seized, a choice has to be 
made between the interest in preserving judicial integrity, on the one hand, and the 
interest in encouraging effective law enforcement, on the other. This choice can be 
made on a case-by-case basis, after due balancing of the particular circumstances 
involved. Yet those who defend the judicial-integrity argument have adopted a general 
and abstract position with respect to this balance. In their view, "it is [i.e. it is always] 
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an 
ignoble part"74.
Still a third prevention argument has sometimes been raised: evidence 
unlawfully seized must be excluded insofar as its use would amount to the commission 
of a constitutional wrong by the judiciary. The wrong referred to is a due-process 
wrong. The possibility that the exclusionary rule be a constitutional requirement under 
the fourteenth amendment due-process clause has already been discussed above. 
Independently of those considerations, however, some commentators have noted that 
the due-process clause forbids the use o f evidence gathered in a manner which is not 
simply unlawful but, additionally, so brutal or unconscionable that it "shocks the 
conscience"75, that is that the admission at trial of evidence so gathered would amount 
to a due-process wrong76. This argument thus presents the exclusionary rule as the 
only way to prevent an imminent constitutional violation and, to the extent that this is 
so, as a rule which must be systematically applied. For one thing, courts' duty to 
enforce constitutional rights implies that they must take measures to prevent threatened 
constitutional wrongs from occurring77. Thus, as far as evidence obtained in a
74Ibid. at 470.
15Rochin v. California, 342 US 165 at 172 (1952).
76T.S. Schrock &  R..C. Welsh, "Up from Calandra ..." at 335 et seq.; W.C. Heffeman, "On 
Justifying at 1202. As the author here shows, the Court seems to reject the idea that the use at 
trial of evidence unlawfully obtained can be a new fourth amendment wrong.
77The role of courts in face of threatened wrongs has been studied by W.C. Heffeman, "On Justifying 
..." at 1196 et seq. Of particular interest is Heffeman's remark that the Supreme Court actually follows 
the above-suggested doctrinal line in the context of threatened fifth and sixth amendment wrongs in trial 
settings, that is, that the Court requires the judiciary to prevent such wrongs from occurring.
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"shocking" manner is concerned, the application of the exclusionary rule appears as a 
constitutional requirement.
The three arguments described above approach the exclusionary rule as a means 
o f preventing future constitutional violations. There is, however, a fundamental 
difference between the three arguments. The first one regards the exclusionary rule as 
the result of a policy option the application of which requires case-by-case policy 
considerations; the second one still regards the rule as a policy option, yet in this case 
the option has been made in very general, abstract terms, so that there is a whole 
spectrum of cases in which the exclusionary rule must be automatically applied without 
further consideration as to the particular circumstances; the third argument considers 
that in certain cases the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requirement.
2.1.3 An Alternative Approach to the Exclusionary Rule
I would now like to put forward a third approach to the exclusionary rule, as an 
alternative to both the ’prospective-remedy' and the 'preventive-policy' explanations of 
the rule which, to my knowledge, has not yet been adopted by American 
commentators. What this approach proposes is that the exclusionary rule be regarded, 
first, as a remedy in the ordinary sense of the word, that is, that it be regarded as a 
measure aimed at repairing past wrongs; second, it proposes that the rule be regarded as 
a remedy which must always be applied in fourth amendment violations independently 
of any policy considerations. I will now try to develop these two points.
First, the exclusionary rule must be regarded as a remedy because it helps to 
bring things back to the state they were in before the fourth amendment wrong 
occurred. This is true in the context of both property and privacy wrongs. In both these 
instances, the rule helps to enforce the fourth amendment by way of erasing the 
consequences of the fourth amendment wrong as far as this proves possible. In the 
context o f property wrongs, this is done by way o f bringing the on-going property 
wrong to an end; in the context of privacy wrongs, this is done by way of minimising 
the consequences of the wrong, that is by way of preventing the information gained in 
violation of a privacy interest from being publicised any further.
Second, the exclusionary rule must be applied in every case of violation of the 
fourth amendment. This is not because the rule is a remedy (some alternative remedies 
could always be applied), nor is it because it is the only effective remedy available 
against fourth amendment violations (the obligatoriness of the exclusionary rule would
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then be purely coincidental). The obligatory application of the rule results from the very 
nature of the remedy it provides, which consists of erasing the consequences o f the 
violation of the fourth amendment r ig h t For one thing, erasing the consequences of 
violations of constitutional rights is part o f the court’s duty to enforce these rights. 
Enforcing constitutional rights implies that means must be provided so that rights can 
be exercised free from unlawful interferences; it thus implies that if rights should be 
interfered with in their protected scope they must be restored to the position they were 
in before the interference in question occurred. Hence the obligatoriness of the 
exclusionary rule78.
2.1.4 The Position of the Supreme Court
Originally, the Supreme Court regarded the exclusionary rule as a constitutional 
right enshrined within the fifth amendment. Also when the rule started to be justified on 
the basis of the fourth amendment, the Court continued to regard it, somewhat 
irreflectively, as a constitutional right79. This position only changed in the case of Wolf 
v. i/580. Here the exclusionary rule was explicitly referred to as a remedy, to be more 
precise as a 'prospective remedy', yet it was not considered the only actual remedy 
against fourth amendment violations, that is, it was not regarded as a constitutional 
must. The doctrine introduced in Wolf was not immediately confirmed by the Court in 
subsequent cases. Rather, the Court struggled to reach the opposite aim, i.e. to 
minimise the effects o f the Wolf ruling and make the exclusion of evidence appear again 
as a constitutional requirement81. To this end, the judicial-integrity, the matter-of-due- 
process and the single-actual-remedy arguments were all put forward. The struggle did 
not prove very fruitful, however. Already in the 1960s82, the Court started clearly to 
defend the view that the exclusionary rule was a deterrence policy measure the 
application of which had to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The exclusionary rule 
cannot be a remedy, argued the Court, because it does not "cure the invasion of the 
defendant's rights which he has already suffered", since fourth amendment wrongs are
78Compare this approach to the exclusionary rule with the position defended by Heffeman, which was 
explained in footnote 62 above.
79See, e.g., Harris v. US, 331 US 145 (1947); McDonald et al v. US 335 US 451 (1948).
80338 US 25 at 28 (1949).
81For the most significant examples, see Elkins v. US, 364 US 206 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 
643 (1961); Abel v. US, 362 US 217 (1960); Wong Sun v. US, 371 US 471 (1963); Ker v. 
California, 374 US 23 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 US 89 (1964); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US 618 
(1965); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968).
s2Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968); Alderman v. US, 394 US 165 (1969).
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"fully accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure itself'83. Moreover, the Court 
called neither the judicial-integrity argument nor the 'matter-of-due-process' argument 
to play any significant part in the conception of the rule. This position has been 
sustained by the Court for many years. In some recent cases, the Court seemed to look 
at the exclusionary rule again as the only effective 'remedy* against fourth amendment 
violations, hence as a constitutional command84. For the time being, however, hopes 
that the Court's approach to the exclusionary rule might change have been dispelled by 
one the Court's latest statements on the issue: "the exclusionaiy rule is a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment 
rights through its deterrent e ffe c t... The Amendment does not expressly preclude the 
use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and exclusion is appropriate 
only where the rule's remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served"85.
It thus appears that, as the exclusionary rule started to apply as a means to 
protect the privacy interests guaranteed by the fourth amendment, the Court has tended 
to regard the rule either as a ’prospective remedy' or, preferably, as a policy measure, 
hence as a measure whose application has to be decided on balance. How can this 
misconception of the role of the exclusionary rule under the privacy interpretation of the 
amendment be explained? The most immediate answer is that the Court has never found 
any solid grounds to justify the application of the exclusionary rule under a privacy 
rationale, such as the grounds offered by the alternative interpretation of the rule 
suggested above. Indeed, under a privacy rationale the Court simply has not thought of 
the exclusionary rule as a means to bring things back to the state they were in before the 
fourth amendment wrong occurred. This is most probably due to the fact that, unlike 
violations of property interests, violations of privacy are not on-going wrongs but 
complete ones. The Court has never thought that courts have a duty to stop not only on­
going wrongs, but also the on-going consequences of completed wrongs.
The above answer is not fully satisfactory, however. One might still wonder 
what ever stopped the Supreme Court from thinking o f the exclusionary rule as a real 
remedy. This, of course, is just a matter for speculation. Yet one thing is clean 
regarding the application of the exclusionary rule as a matter of policy is in tune with 
the more general attitude of the Court towards the right to privacy, that is, it is in tune 
with its attitude of minimising the importance of protecting the right. As has been 
argued on previous occasions, the attitude of the Supreme Court towards the right to
s3U.S. v, Leon, 468 US 847 (1984); see also US v. Calandra, 414 US 338 (1974); Stone v. Powell, 
428 US 465 (1976).
84See James v. Illinois, 493 US 307 (1990); AT v. Harris, 495 US 14 (1990).
85Arizona v. Evans, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 1806 (pending publication) (emphasis added).
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privacy seems to rely on the following grounds: the right to privacy is selfishly held by 
individuals for the sole purpose of developing their own personality and is exercised 
even at the cost of depriving society and the State from information necessary for the 
promotion of the well-being and preservation of those individuals. This perception of 
the right to privacy as purely individualistic and opposed to the common good becomes 
particularly acute when its protection clashes with the interests of law enforcement. It is 
consistent with this that, when law enforcement is at stake, the Court avoids regarding 
the protection of privacy through the exclusionary rule as a matter of principle. Instead, 
it prefers to put things differently and strike a balance between the interest in protecting 
privacy through the potential deterrence of future violations, on the one hand, and the 
interest in actual law-enforcement, on the other. Needless to say, the result o f this 
balancing will not always be as favourable to the protection o f the right to privacy as it 
should.
Regarded as a policy measure, the decision whether or not the exclusionary rule 
applies in a particular case is the result o f striking a balance between the importance of a 
piece of evidence and the potential for deterrence inherent in the exclusion of this piece 
of evidence at trial. The balance which controls the application of the exclusionary rule 
must be and has always been struck on a case by case basis; yet, as in the case o f the 
definition of the protected scope of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has 
placed the results of this balance into more or less fixed exceptions to the application of 
the exclusionary rule. Let me mention the exceptions I have been able to single out.
First, the Court has imposed the so-called 'good-faith exception'86, according 
to which evidence unlawfully obtained may be admitted at trial if the law-enforcing 
agent that carried out the search and seizure in question reasonably believed that it was 
lawful. Indeed, under a deterrence rationale, no benefit derives from applying the 
exclusionary rule in such cases87. A particular consequence of this exception is that the 
Supreme Court's rulings on the fourth amendment only have prospective effect88. A 
second exception has been drawn from the idea that evidence unlawfully seized may be
8 6 U.S. v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); US v. Ceccolini, 435 US 268 (1978); Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 US 31 (1979); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 US 948 (1980); U.S. v. Leon, 468 US 
897 (1984); Massachussets v. Sheppard, 468 US 981 (1984). In the context of telecommunication 
surveillance, see Scott v. US, 436 US 128 (1978).
87As a result, however, the police is given some control over the application of the exclusionary rule, 
in clear contradiction with the deterrence rationale of the rule. The good-faith exception has been 
criticised on these grounds by W.J. Mertens &  S. Wasserstrom, "The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law", 70 The Georgetown L. J. 365
(1981).
^Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US 618 (1965); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 US 80 (1968); Desist v. US, 394 
US (1969); Kaiser v. NY, 394 US 280; US v. White, 401 US 745 (1970); US v. Peltier, 422 US 531 
0975).
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used at trial if it is obtained again by completely independent, lawful means. By way of 
stretching this idea to its limits the Court has arrived at the so-called 'inevitable- 
discovery exception'89. This exception applies to instances where the evidence at stake 
was not actually obtained by an independent, lawful source but where it would 
ultimately or inevitably have been thus obtained if  their unlawful acquisition had not 
previously occurred. Third, under certain circumstances the Court has admitted an 
impeachment exception*90 to the exclusionary rule. Only consideration of very weak 
deterrence interests, it has argued, actually suggest that evidence aimed at impeaching 
the credibility of a witness be suppressed on the basis that its search and seizure was 
unlawful. Finally, the Court has also admitted some miscellaneous exceptions: the rule 
does not apply, for example, when the piece of evidence at stake is the defendant's own 
body or identity91, nor does it apply in civil trials92, exceptions which have particular 
importance in cases of deportation of aliens, as will be seen in the next chapter. The 
civil-trial exception goes hand in hand with the idea, already referred to in the previous 
chapter, that the fourth amendment is primarily regarded as an aspect of criminal law, 
although nothing in the wording of this provision indicates that it should not apply in 
civil cases. The civil-trial exception could also find a plausible justification on the very 
origins of the exclusionary rule: as has been explained, this rule first arose as a result of 
interpreting the fourth amendment in combination with the fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination, a right which only applies in the context of criminal law93.
It is difficult to predict whether the above exceptions would continue to apply if 
the rule were regarded again as a 'prospecitve remedy'. Strictly speaking, regarding the 
exclusionary rule as a remedy implies that it must apply without exceptions in as far as 
a piece o f evidence derives from a constitutional wrong as the 'fruit of a poisonous 
tree'. The only 'exceptions' to the rule can be cases which fall outside the 'fruit-of-a- 
poisonous-tree rule' itself. This is for example the case of evidence unlawfully seized 
which is contemporaneously or subsequently obtained or re-obtained by completely 
independent, lawful means. Besides, the 'fruit-of-a-poisonous-tree rule' does not 
extend ad infinitum. To being with, it does not cover cases where the connection 
between the illegal search and seizure and the acquisition of the evidence in question is 
"speculative or indirect"94. In addition, the taint of the illegal act can be considered
%9 Williams v. Brewer, 430 US 387 at 407 (1977); Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431 (1984).
^See Walder v. US, 347 US 62 (1954); US v. Havens, 446 US 620 (1980). For a thorough analysis 
of the issue, see Mary Jo White, "The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary 
Rules" 73 Col L. Rev. 1476 (1973).
9^Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1974); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, at 1039.
92US v. Jams, 428 US 433 (1976); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032 (1984).
93Akhil Reed Amar, "Forth Amendment First Principles" 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 at 791 (1994).
94US v. Crews, 445 US 463 (1980); Segura v. US, 468 US 796 (1984); also in this sense, NY v. 
Harris, 495 US 14 (1990).
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purged if the illegal act is separated from the acquisition of evidence by a long enough 
lapse of time95 or by certain events the significance of which purges the original 
illegality -typically the voluntary yielding of evidence or the intervention of an 
independent magistrate96.
In spite o f all that, I think it unlikely that an interpretation of the exclusionary 
rule as a prospective remedy could overrule all the policy based exceptions to its 
application. My impression is based upon two considerations: first, these exceptions 
are deeply rooted in the case-law o f the Supreme Court; second, regarding the 
exclusionary rule as a prospective remedy cannot provide solid theoretical grounds for 
abandoning such well-established case law. The reason is that most exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule are justified on the basis of the potential for the exclusionary rule to 
deter future fourth amendment wrongs, which ultimately is also the aspect o f the 
exclusionary rule that the 'prospective remedy' doctrine stresses. In order that a change 
in case law could be achieved, the exclusionary rule would have to be regarded as a real 
remedy, that is as a means of bringing the consequences of the past violation of a right 
to an end, hence as a remedy that must be applied by courts as part of their duty to 
enforce constitutional rights. Before the Court can ever think of approaching the 
exclusionary rule as a real remedy against violations of privacy, however, its approach 
to the right to privacy would have to experience a more fundamental change. The Court 
would have to stop regarding this right as suspicious and as going against the common 
good and would have to start regarding it with a more sympathetic eye; it should even 
start giving this right its due as a basic condition for deliberation, for the free exercise 
of fundamental rights and for the existence and preservation of the democratic system.
To summarise, the way the Supreme Court has interpreted the exclusionary rule 
has been subject to fluctuations which reflect the doctrinal debate on the issue: the Court 
has regarded the rule sometimes as a 'prospective remedy', sometimes as a preventive 
measure imposed as a matter of policy. This latter position has prevailed since the late 
1960s. Since then the Court has decided on the application of the exclusionary rule by 
way of striking a balance between the interest in the protection of privacy, on the one 
hand, and the interest in law enforcement, on the other; moreover, the interest in the 
protection of privacy has not been measured by reference to the violation of privacy that 
already may have occurred, but by reference to the potential for deterrence inherent in 
the exclusion at trial of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. This 
approach to the exclusionary rule is in perfect tune with the attitude of the Court
95Wong Sun v. US, 371 US 471 at 485 (1963); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 US 687 (1982).
9(>Wong Sun v. US, 371 US 471 at 485 (1963); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 US 356 (1972); Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 US 590 (1975); US v. Ceccolini, 435 US 268 (1978).
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towards the right to privacy, which conceives it as a purely individualistic interest the 
protection of which ought to be minimised for the sake of the common good. In order 
that a fundamental change in the conception of the exclusionary rule can occur, the 
Court would thus have to depart from a doctrine more favourable to the right to privacy 
and to its protection.
2.1.5 The Exclusionary Rule in the USC
Chapter 119 o f Title 18 o f the USC explicitly regulates its own exclusionary 
rule, on the basis of which victims of illegal interception of wire or electronic 
telecommunications can move to suppress evidence thus illegally obtained in as far as it 
incriminates them (§§2515 and 2518 (10); see also § 2517 (5)). So does Chapter 36 of 
Title 50 of the USC (§ 1806 (e)-(h)). As opposed to the interpretation of the 
exclusionary rule attached to the fourth amendment, the statutory exclusionary rule is 
clearly provided as a remedy whenever evidence is the result of illegal interference with 
wire or electronic telecommunications97. Moreover, it is provided as a remedy in all 
kinds of trials and hearings, regardless of whether they are criminal or civil. This 
statutory exclusionary rule is clearly an improvement on the constitutional exclusionary 
rule. The only question is whether it has any influence over this latter.
The answer is that it does, in the same way as the statutory definition of the 
coverage and of the protected scope of this right influences the definition of the 
coverage and of the protected scope of this right at the constitutional level. As a result, 
there is a high chance that the exclusionary rule will apply with consistency in cases of 
telecommunication surveillance, since they will tend to be solved on statutory grounds. 
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court itself has admitted98, the constitutional and the 
statutory exclusionary rules are conceptually different. The relevance of this statutory 
exclusionary rule is thus more a matter of fact than a matter of theory and must be taken 
with the same reservations as the importance of the statutory definition of the protected 
scope of the right to the secrecy o f telecommunications. Strictly speaking, therefore 
violations of the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications are subject to 
the exclusionary rule in the same terms as other cases of unconstitutional searches and 
seizures are.
97However, according to the Supreme Court evidence need be suppressed only for a failure to satisfy 
statutory requirements that directly aim at limiting the use of wire-taping to situations clearly calling 
for such an extraordinary investigative device (US v. Donovan, 429 US 413 (1977)).
98Alderman v. £/S, 394 US 165 at 176 (1969). Here the Court drew a distinction between the 
congressual power to regulate an exclusionary rule and the exclusionary rule "for constitutional 
purposes". See also US v. Giordano, 416 US 505 (1974).
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2.2 Germany
The most characteristic remedy against violations of the secrecy of 
telecommunications is, in Germany as in the United States, the exclusionary ru le " . 
This rule has often been deduced from the Basic Law, yet it has a more solid and 
explicit basis in statutory law, which contemplates it as a remedy in cases where the 
protected scope of the statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications is infringed 
upon. As was explained in the previous chapter, the protected scope of this statutory 
right defines the protected scope o f the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. One can therefore rely on the statutory exclusionary rule as a 
remedy which applies when the protected scope of the constitutional right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications is infringed upon, hence as a constitutional remedy. I will start 
by looking at the statutory regulation of the exclusionary rule.
First of all, let me recall that the protected scope of the fundamental right to the 
secrecy of telecommunication is limited, among others, by two sets of norms. These 
are, on the one hand, §§ 94 et seq. of the StPO, which regulate the lawful interception 
of telecommunications for the purposes of ordinary law-enforcement and, on the other 
hand, the so-called G 10, which regulates such lawful interception for the purposes of 
national security and protection of the democratic order. Although neither of these two 
sets of norms explicitly regulates an exclusionary rule, both of them seem to impose it 
implicitly. Both StPO § 100b (5) and G 10 § 7 (3) state that information obtained 
through measures of surveillance may only be used for the prosecution of certain 
crimes. These are for the most part the crimes that may authorise a measure of 
surveillance: they are the crimes listed in § 100a and in G 10 § 2, respectively, together 
with the crimes listed in § 138 of the StGB in the context o f surveillance carried out 
under the G 10. Explicitly, these two provisions only ban the use of information 
obtained through telecommunication surveillance for the prosecution of non-listed 
crimes; yet, they implicitly refer to measures of surveillance carried out in accordance 
with the prescriptions of, respectively, § 94 et seq. and the G 10. One can therefore 
assume that both StPO § 100b (5) and G 10 § 7 (3) contain an implicit rule, i.e. they 
rule that, a fortiori, information gathered in a manner contrary to these provisions 
should not be admitted as evidence at trial. *
"The German exclusionary rule has been studied by W, Pakter, "Exclusionary Rules in France, 
Germany and Italy", 9 Hastings Inti and Comp. L. Rev. 1, at 38 et seq.(1985).
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StPO § 100 b (5) and G 10 § 7 thus impose what we could call an 'explicit 
material condition' and an 'implicit formal condition* in order that information obtained 
through surveillance may be used as evidence at trial. The formal condition is that 
information must have been legally obtained; the material condition is that information 
may only be used in the prosecution of some particular crimes100. Note that the use of 
information is not limited to the crime which initially justified the measure of 
surveillance. Information about other crimes accidentally obtained may be used at trial 
provided that the crime in question be included in the list referred to above. Moreover, 
if this condition is fulfilled information may be used at trial even against a third person, 
i.e. a person different from the one originally under investigation101. Beyond the limits 
of these two conditions, information obtained through surveillance may not be used at 
trial at all, not even indirectly102. Yet Germany does not have a well-developed doctrine 
of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" and at any rate this doctrine has not been taken to 
its last consequences; far from it, evidence has been admitted at trial when it appeared to 
be connected to or influenced by a measure of surveillance in too vague or remote a 
way. The extent to which this is or not the case can only be decided on the basis of the 
factual circumstances of every particular case103.
The statutory regulation of the exclusionary rule makes it a well-defined remedy 
which regularly applies whenever information obtained through surveillance does not 
fulfil the material and the -implicit- formal requirements imposed by the StPO § 100 b
(5) and G 10 § 7 (3) for the use of evidence at trial. It thus regularly acts as an accepted 
exception to the procedural rule that in the investigation of the truth any piece of 
evidence, so long as relevant, may be introduced at trial (StPO § 244.2). I would now 
like to note that in the case o f the StPO this statutory regulation is very recent104, yet 
even before it was enacted the exclusionary rule had been applied in this context in 
rather systematic terms105. Even more important is that, over and above its statutory
100A second material condition is embodied in the prohibition of intercepting certain privileged 
communications. This is notably the case with the oral conversations between a defendant and her 
lawyer (§ 148 StPO, see chapter 5); hence evidence obtained from the interception of such 
conversations may not be used at trial (see BGHSt 33,347).
101BGHSt 26, 298 at 302; (1979) NJW, 1370 at 1371; 29, 23 at 24; 29, 244 at 247; 32,10 at 15; 
BVerfGE 67,157 at 182.
102For example, an inadmissible tape recording cannot be replaced by a transcript of its contents or by 
the testimony of a police officer who listened to it (BGHSt 27,355 at 357; see also 29, 244 at 249 et 
seq.).
103See, e.g„ BGHSt 27, 355 at 358 (a suspect’s confession to a non-Iisted crime was deemed 
inadmissible because it was the result of having confronted the suspect with an unlawful tape 
recording); 32,68 at 71; 35,32 at 34 (a suspect's declaration was deemed admissible even though it 
resulted from an unlawful surveillance on the grounds that enough time has elapsed between the 
unlawful surveillance and the declaration as to detach the latter sufficiently from the former).
104§ 100 b (5) was introduced by Art. 3 of the law from 15th July 1992 (BGB1.1 S. 1302).
105Also the rule that information accidentally obtained can only be used for the prosecution or 
investigation of one of the listed crimes was most commonly followed (BGHSt 26,298 at 302; (1979)
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regulation, the exclusionary rule has been regarded as a constitutional requirement 
which must apply in cases of direct violation of art. 10 of the Basic Law, to the extent 
that the application of the statutory exclusionary rule has been considered a requirement 
deriving directly from the Basic Law* 106.
When studying the exclusionary rule in the United States I suggested a 
justification for applying this rule as a constitutional requirement in cases of violations 
of the constitutional right to privacy, in general, and of the constitutional right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications, in particular. I then defended the idea that the 
obligatoriness o f the exclusionary rule derives from the fact that it helps to restore the 
constitutional right to privacy or to the secrecy of telecommunications to the position it 
was in before it was ever violated. In particular, the exclusionary rule prevents the 
consequences of the violation privacy (the divulgence information obtained through a 
privacy wrong) from expanding any further, thereby helping to bring things back to 
their original state of secrecy, or at least as close to this state of secrecy as possible107. 
This justification can very well apply to the German case. It even has the support of the 
Constitutional Court, which has affirmed that the use at trial of evidence obtained in 
violation of the right to privacy constitutes another step in the violation of this right108. 
Also in the context of the right to the secrecy of telecommunication, the Court has 
affirmed that "[t]he encroachment upon the fundamental right of art. 10.1 of the Basic 
Law continues through the use as evidence at trial of the information protected by the 
secrecy of telecommunication"109. The obligatoriness of the exclusionary rule thus lies 
in the courts' duty to enforce the Constitution110.
NJW, 1370 at 1371; 29, 23 at 24). There are however exceptions: see, e.g. BGHSt 28, 129 ((1979) 
NJW, 990 at 992), where information obtained through wire-tapping was admitted against a third 
person in the prosecution of a non-listed crime upon the mere assumption of a connection between this 
non-listed crime and a listed one; see also the decision adopted by the 3rd. Camera of he Second Senat 
of the Constitutional Court on the 18th August 1987, according to which information accidentally 
obtained as a result of a lawful interference can be used for the prosecution of any crime ((1988) NJW, 
1075).
106BGHSt 19,273 (the court assumes the constitutional character of the exclusionary rule); 23,329 at 
331 (the question whether the rule is constitutionally imposed is left open); 29,244 at 249. See also 
BVerfGE 85,386 at 402.
107In Germany, this approach is also argued by T. Weigend, "Using the Result of Audio-Surveillance 
as Penal Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany” 24 Stanford J. Int’lL., 21 at 30 (1987).
108ßVerfGE 34, 238 at 250. See also Kaiser, "Verwertbarkeit von Äußerungen Dritter während 
überwachter Telefongespräche (§ 100a StPO)" (1974) NJW, pp. 349-350.
109B VerfGE 85,386 at 399 (my translation).
110This duty is explicitly imposed by art. 1.3 of the Basic Law; also § 28 EGGVG reminds us of the 
duty of courts to bring things back to the state they were in the context of the violation of a 
fundamental right by judicial authorities.
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Conclusions
The three systems under consideration recognise material remedies against the 
violation of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. Undoubtedly, the most 
significant of these remedies is the so-called exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is 
applied both in the United States and in Germany, whilst it is not contemplated in the 
ECHR. In fact, the Convention does not provide for measures to repair the violation of 
rights recognised therein; it only rules that, in the absence of total reparation, just 
satisfaction must be granted by the Court. As was argued above, only partial reparation 
for interferences with the secrecy of telecommunications is feasible; hence, according to 
the standards set by the Convention, just satisfaction always ought to be provided in 
cases where such interferences occur. However, the Convention organs are reluctant to 
accord just satisfaction unless some moral or other damage is actually shown which 
adds to the temporary deprivation of a Convention right in cases where no particular 
damage is shown, the Convention organs regard the favourable decision of the Court as 
a just satisfaction.
The ECHR therefore sets relatively low standards for the protection of the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications. Both Germany and the United States provide 
more effectively for the protection of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications than 
the ECHR. In these two systems, courts have a duty to enforce fundamental rights, 
hence they must try to prevent their violation or, at least, they must offer reparation as 
far as this proves possible. As already pointed out, the most significant remedy for 
violations of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is the exclusionary rule. I 
have argued that the role of this rule is to stop the on-going consequences of a violation 
of this right, by way of preventing the secrecy o f an act of telecommunication 
unlawfully intercepted from being broken any further. This is what makes the rule part 
of the duty of courts to enforce fundamental rights recognised in the Constitutions.
Unfortunately, the exclusionary rule is not always thus understood by courts 
and commentators. In fact, if we compare the exclusionary rule attached to violations of 
the fundamental right to the secrecy of telecommunications in Germany with that in the 
United States, then we can see that the rule is systematically and uncontroversially 
applied as part of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications only within the former 
system. In the United States, the Supreme Court has rather regarded the exclusionary 
rule as a policy measure or, eventually, as a remedy for which it cannot find any 
convincing grounds. This conception of the exclusionary rule has run parallel to the 
idea that the rule applies in order to protect the privacy interests guaranteed in the fourth 
amendment. As a matter of fact, this conception of the exclusionary rule is connected
325
with the Supreme Court's vision of privacy as an individualistic interest the protection 
of which ought to be minimised. A consistent application of the exclusionary rule in the 
United States thus requires that the right to privacy be regarded in a more positive light 
than it is at present; ideally, the right to privacy ought to be regarded as a condition for 
participation, as it is in Germany. > ■; ...
Now, it is true that both in Germany and in the United States a exclusionary 
rule is regulated by statute in cases o f telecommunication surveillance and that the 
statutory regulation of the rule prescribes that it apply systematically. The difference 
between Germany and the United States is that in the former system the systematic 
application of the exclusionary rule is also regarded as a constitutional requirement, 
which is not the case in the latter. In the United States, evidence obtained through 
unlawful telecommunication surveillance is excluded at trial only in as far as cases are 
solved on a statutory basis or, if they are solved on constitutional grounds, only in as 
far as the Supreme Court takes the statutory regulation as a pattern to be followed. The 
fact that the constitutional exclusionary rule depends upon its statutory equivalent is 
regrettable, for it is the constitutional regulation of a right that must grant this right the 
widest possible protection, so that it can be unconditionally guaranteed over and above 
inevitable fluctuations in statutes. Constitutional standards should be above and lead 
statutory standards; they should not be below and led by them.
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CHAPTER 7: THE SUBJECTS OF THE RIGHT TO THE SECRECY OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
As a closing point of my study o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, I will now discuss who are the subjects of this right. This last 
chapter will embrace two main areas. In section 1, I will discuss who are the 
addressees of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications (who can commit a 
violation of this right?); in section 2 ,1 will look at its holders (who is recognised as a 
possessor of this right?). In both these sections I will deal with issues that concern the 
subjects of fundamental rights generally speaking, and not only the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications. Yet if I have decided to dedicate this last chapter to the subjects 
of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications it is not only with a view to making as 
complete a study of this right as possible; it is also because some of the issues 
concerning the subjects of fundamental rights affect the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications in some particular way. Moreover, one of these issues is crucial for 
understanding the right and the way it can keep pace with recent social and 
technological developments, something I have defined as the final aim of this thesis. I 
am thinking in particular of the question of whether the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications can be exercised with third-party effects or 'Drittwirkung', i.e. 
whether this right can apply in private relationships. This question will occupy the 
major part of this chapter.
Studies of fundamental rights often start with an analysis of their subjects. I 
however have preferred to address this issue only at the end, once the object and the 
content of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications have already been discussed. 
This, I believe, will allow a better understanding of who the subjects of this right are, 
for we will be able to appreciate the extent to which the terms in which this right is 
recognised or protected may vary according to the holder of it or even to its addressee.
327
Section Is The Addressees of the Right to the Secrecy of
Telecommunications
It has been mentioned previously in this thesis that fundamental rights were 
conceived as instruments of defence against the State. Fundamental rights came to offer 
special guarantees against the State to certain areas o f civil society regarded as 
particularly important, thereby strengthening the line which the movement of thought 
known as 'modernity' had drawn between the State and civil society. The natural 
addressee of fundamental rights is therefore the various holders of public power. 
However, this century has led to the question being posed of whether fundamental 
rights should not also apply to private relationships. This is the first issue I will address 
in this section. Following it, I will discuss which public authorities are the addressees 
of fundamental rights in the federal systems of Germany and the United States; to be 
precise, I will discuss whether the German Lander and the American States are 
regarded as the addressees of fundamental rights recognised, respectively, in the federal 
Basic Law and the federal Constitution of the United States. Each of these two issues 
will initially be dealt with in general terms and subsequently within the context of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications.
1 . Public Pow er and the  'Drittw irkung*
i
Introduction ‘ * (
Fundamental rights are subjective rights of defence against the State. They are 
granted to the individual as 'public* rights, i.e. they are addressed against the public 
power and thus contrasted with the 'private' rights that individuals enjoy vis-à-vis other 
members of society. Public and private rights thus differ in their respective addressees. 
Often, they also differ in their respective object, that is, they also differ in the respective 
activity or area of reality they crystalise as a right: this is for example the case with the 
right to due-process, the right to access to court or with political rights, which can only 
be conceived as public rights against the State. This, however, need not be the case and 
there are areas of human reality which can be the object of both a public and a private 
right. The right to the secrecy of telecommunications is a good example of this: the 
secrecy of telecommunications is often recognised both as a fundamental right against 
State interference and as a private right against the interference of other individuals.
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The above scenario is at the origin of the recognition of fundamental rights. 
Generally speaking, this scenario is presently still valid: the line between society and 
the State continues to exist and continues to be in need of protection against the 
tendency of the State to trespass on it; also fundamental rights continue to stand for 
certain areas of society which are particularly important and which therefore deserve 
particular protection against the State. Nevertheless, something has changed since the 
time fundamental rights were first recognised. The line between society and the State 
may continue to exist, yet it is now significantly blurred; for nowadays the State carries 
out functions which in principle should correspond to civil society, and vice versa. In 
particular, I would like to stress that individuals often are in a position from which they 
can exert so much legal or de facto power over other individuals that they can threaten a 
right as much as the State can. The decision whether such individuals have private or 
public duties vis-à-vis other individuals, hence whether they are the addressees of 
private rights or of public rights (fundamental rights) is by no means easy. In fact, such 
situations may pose the question of whether fundamental rights ought to be applied 
among private individuals, that is, whether fundamental rights ought to apply with a 
'horizontal' or third party effect ('Drittwirkung').
There are borderline cases in which fundamental rights can to some extent still 
be conceived of as elements of the relationship between society and the State, the only 
problem being the definition of the term 'State'. To the extent that this is so, the 
question of whether or not fundamental rights have third party effect can be avoided. 
The core of this question lies in the application of fundamental rights in relationships 
which are solely and purely private. The application of fundamental rights in this 
context cannot be justified on the basis of a re-definition of the scope o f the terms 
'public' or 'State'; rather, it requires that the very expression 'fundamental rights' be 
re-defined, so that the rights in question appear to be something wider than, and 
qualitatively different from, elements of the relationship between the State and society.
Grounds for the 'Drittwirkung' of fundamental rights are offered by the idea 
that these are not merely subjective rights of the individual, but also objective values or 
institutional guarantees, i.e. objective components of the legal system. The point of 
departure for defenders of the 'Drittwirkung' is that, in as far as fundamental rights 
stand for objective values of the legal order, they should be respected by individuals as 
well as by public power. This does not amount to disregarding the dimension of 
fundamental rights as subjective rights of the individual against the State, not even the 
fact that this is the primary dimension of fundamental rights. Disregarding this would 
distort the concept of fundamental rights as public rights and would imply the end of 
the dividing line between the public and the private, something which might bring about
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more disadvantages than advantages: as one author has put it, "in 'privatising human 
rights' we may end up with a 'publicisation of the private' and renewed demands to be 
defended from the State"1. Defenders of the 'Drittwirkung' do not go as far as that. 
They do not claim that fundamental rights are or ought to be imposed on individuals in 
the same way as they are imposed on public powers; all they claim is that the objective 
dimension of fundamental rights influences private relationships, to the extent that it is 
the source of certain aspects of such relationships2.
The influence of fundamental rights upon private relationships can be regarded 
as either direct or indirect Most authors and courts hold that this influence can only be 
indirect: fundamental rights can only apply to private relationships in as far as these 
relationships are affected by the fact that the State has disregarded its obligations vis-à- 
vis fundamental rights, whether these obligations are of a negative or of a positive 
character. First, private relationships can be influenced by the State's disregard of its 
obligation not to infringe the exercise o f fundamental rights (a State's negative 
obligations); this is the case with private infringements upon a fundamental right which 
are confirmed by a judicial decision. Secondly, private relationships can also be 
influenced by the State's disregard of its obligation to provide for the actual protection 
of fundamental rights, this including the duty to provide for an adequate legal 
framework so that fundamental rights can be exercised by inter alia private individuals 
(a State's positive obligations). The State’s positive obligations obviously offer the 
broadest grounds for the 'Drittwirkung' of fundamental rights: on its basis, every 
private violation of a fundamental right can be said to stem from the State's inaction in 
protecting this right
Thus the question of the 'Drittwirkung' of a  fundamental right is triggered 
whenever laws do not offer sufficient protection to the exercise of fundamental rights 
against their violation by private individuals. A most significant example is the right to 
equality: most western States have officially abolished discrimination on the grounds of 
gender or race, yet they have not succeeded in stopping discrimination carried out by 
private individuals, discrimination which continues to take place at an alarming rate. 
Another example is the fundamental right to privacy, which civil society now starts to 
threaten in ways somewhat similar to those posed by public power, let us think, for 
example, of private investigators, private security bodies or the surveillance of 
employees by employers at the working place. Private investigators, employers and
1 Andrew Clapham, "The 'Drittwirkung' of the Convention", The European System for the Protection 
of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, p. 186 (emphasis in 
original, footnotes omitted).
2Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Nomos Veriagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1985, p. 489-490.
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even private telecommunication services also threaten the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications, hence the problem of the Drittwirkung' also arises in the context 
of this right. It is true that the secrecy of telecommunications is generally protected by 
statute against private interference. The question of the 'Drittwirkung' mostly arises in 
as far as coverage, scope of protection and content are more restricted in the case of the 
secrecy of telecommunications as a statutory right.
In the following pages I will analyse the extent to which the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunication is recognised with third-party effects in the ECHR, Germany and , 
the United States. Within the context of each of these systems, I will first of all look at 
the way the question of the 'Drittwirkung' of fundamental rights has been addressed.
This analysis will show that none of the systems under consideration includes private 
individuals among the direct addressees of fundamental rights, but each prefers to 
address the issue in an indirect way. Then I will apply the respective approaches of 
those systems to the 'Drittwirkung' in the context of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. Finally, in Germany and the United States I will look at the extent 
to which this right is recognised as a private right by statute, with a view to seeing how 
this recognition affects the issue of the ’Drittwirkung*.
1.1 The European Convention on Human Rights
The first point of departure for the question of the 'Drittwirkung' is art. 1 of the 
ECHR, according to which "[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I ..." (emphasis 
added). Art. 1 clearly defines the Contracting Parties as the only addressees of 
Convention rights. This is confirmed in art. 19, which speaks of "the engagements 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention" (emphasis 
added), and in art. 25, which states that "the Commission may receive petitions ... 
from any person ... claiming to be the victim o f a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties" (emphasis added). Also the new art. 34, which will replace art. 25 
of the Convention once Protocol No. 11 enters into force, is phrased in the same terms 
as this latter provision, save that the new art. 34 refers to the Court instead of to the 
Commission as the recipient of complaints.
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All the above provisions indicate clearly enough that Convention rights cannot 
be directly applied against private individuals3. In spite o f this, the question of the 
’Drittwirkung' has arisen in the context of the Convention. Some authors have 
suggested that certain Convention provisions recognise rights in such general terms that 
they are clearly meant to apply to relations among individuals. Ait. 8 is included among 
such provisions, for the first paragraph of this article is phrased in terms so "general 
and absolute" that it "constitutes an absolute imperative for the individual"4; moreover, 
since paragraph 2 only exceptionally allows interferences by public authorities, the 
conclusion is drawn that private interferences must be regarded as unconditionally 
forbidden5. This position is only defended by a minority, however, and in any event is 
not the position of the Convention organs. These apply the Convention to individuals 
only indirectly and at least in two different ways. Let us have a look at these two 
ways6.
[A] Inadmissibility o f Private Complaints which imply the Violation of a 
Convention Right
The Commission has rejected some applications that have been made to it on the 
grounds that they were seeking confirmation of the violation of some Convention right. 
To this end, the Commission relied on art. 17, which reads as follows:
Article 17
"Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or persons any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at 
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention"
This provision has been interpreted as offering grounds for the inadmissibility 
of applications which seek the protection of a Convention right the exercise of which is 
focused on the violation of some other Convention rights. Let me give the two most 
significant examples. The first example concerns the decision of the German 
Constitutional Court to outlaw the German Communist Party. The Communist Party
3On the other hand, the wording of art 13 also allows for the opposite reading. It states that victims of 
a Convention wrong "shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that 
the wrong in question has been committed by persons acting in their official capacity" (emphasis 
added).
4Jan de Meyer, "The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and Communications in 
Relations between Individuals, and the Resulting Obligations for State Parties to the Convention" 
Privacy and Human Rights -Reports and Communications on the third colloquy about the European 
Convention on Human Rights-, Chapter 4, p. 255 at 262-263.
5Ibid.
6Much of what will be said here relies on A. Clapham, "The 'Drittwirkung' of the Convention...".
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presented an application before the Commission alleging the violation of its freedom of 
thought (art. 9), freedom of expression (art. 10) and freedom of association (art. 11). 
The Commission rejected the application on the grounds that the Communist Party 
aimed at imposing the dictatorship of the proletariat» which would imply the destruction 
of a number of rights recognised in the Convention7. The second example concerns the 
prosecution and imprisonment o f the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of a Dutch political 
party for incitement to racial hatred. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman complained 
before the Commission that their right to freedom of expression (art. 10) had been 
violated, yet the application was rejected on the grounds that it went against the right 
not to be discriminated against on grounds of race (art. 3 and 14)8. In both these cases, 
the Commission denied the protection of a Convention right to individuals who were 
using or intending to use this very right in order to violate the rights of others 
recognised in the Convention. One could also read these decisions of admissibility to 
mean that, although the Commission granted that national authorities may have indeed 
interfered with a Convention right, yet it considered the interference as one that did not 
encroach upon the protected scope of the right in question because it was justified under 
art. 17 of the Convention.
[B] The Boundaries of the Responsibility of the Contracting Parties
Above it was said that the question of the 'Drittwirkung' of fundamental rights 
has been brought to the fore by the fact that the line between the State and civil society 
is becoming more a more blurred. A most immediate way to make the Convention 
rights applicable in private relationships would therefore be to enlarge the scope of the 
term 'State' for the purpose of the application of the Convention, so that cases in which 
the line between the State and society is not clear would fall into the former category. 
The Convention organs have not followed this line, however. The Commission prefers 
to reject applications against bodies whose nature is on the borderline between the 
public and the private9 or, rather, it prefers to leave the question unanswered10.
On the other hand, the responsibility of the Contracting Parties has been thought 
to cover the decisions of courts in private-law cases. This means that the Contracting 
Parties are responsible for the private violation o f a Convention right if this is
7Ap. No. 25(V57, Dec. Adm. Com. of 20 July 1957, 1 YB, p. 223.
8Ap. No. 8348/78 and 8406/78, Dec. Adm. Com. of 11 Oct. 1979, 18 D&R, p. 187.
9See A. Clapham, "The ’Drittwirkung' of the Convention ..." at 166-167.
10Ap. No. 4515/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 July 1971, 38 Coll. Dec., p. 86; Young, James and 
Webster v. U.K., judgement of 25 Nov. 1980, Series A, vol 44, Par. 49, p. 20.
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confirmed by a national court11. Although perfectly accepted12, this indirect way of 
applying the Convention in private relations has not been used very often, probably 
because not many applications have ultimately been concerned with a private violation 
of the Convention.
Undoubtedly, the most relevant mechanism fo r the application o f the 
Convention rights in private relationships is the doctrine of the positive obligations of 
the Contracting Parties13. As was discussed in chapter 4, it is settled doctrine of the 
Convention organs that the Convention imposes upon the Contracting Parties the 
obligation not only to refrain from every interference with Convention rights but also to 
take positive measures to ensure that these rights be actually exercised. The existence 
and scope of the positive obligations o f the Contracting Parties in the context of art. 8 
of the Convention were studied in detail in chapter 4. There we saw that the Contracting 
Parties are positively obliged to remove obstacles to the exercise of the rights 
recognised in art. 8 for which they can be held responsible, this including the obligation 
to provide for an adequate legal framework for the exercise of these rights; we also saw 
that the Convention organs define the scope of the positive obligations of the 
Contracting Parties not only on the basis of the criterion of responsibility but also on 
the basis of the balancing criteria which define the protected scope of the negative 
dimension of art. 8 rights, i.e. restrictions of these rights may be imposed if they are 
"necessary in a democratic society" for the pursuance of one of the aims specified in 
art. 8 .2 .1 would now like to add that the positive obligations of the Contracting Parties 
oblige them to remove obstacles and to provide for an adequate legal framework for the 
exercise of rights not only with respect to the public power but "even in the sphere of 
the relations of individuals between themselves"14. The positive obligations of the 
Contracting Parties is thus one of the indirect mechanisms through which the 
Convention is applied in private relations.
n Ap. No. 10153/82, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Oct. 1986, 49 D&R p. 67; Ap. No. 11002/84, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 8 March 1985, 41 D&R, p. 264; Ap. No. 11366/85, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 Oct. 
1986, 50 D&R p. 173; Markt Intern Verlag and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, judgment of 20 
November 1989, Series A, Vol. 165, Par. 27, p. 17.
12See K. J. Partsch, written communication in Privacy and Human Rights, answering to J. de Meyer, 
'The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life...", Chapter 4, p. 275 at 279. The author speaks in 
the context of applications claiming the right to guardianship of, or to visit, a child (respect for family 
life) and stresses that these applications are not addressed to the person who has the guardianship but 
against the public authority which has taken a decision about the guardianship or the visiting regime. 
However, Jan de Meyer prefers to see these cases as examples of direct 'Drittwirkung' (see J. de Meyer, 
’The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life...”, at 267-268).
13This point is also stressed by PJ. Duffy, "The Protection of Privacy, Family Life and other Rights 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (1982) Yearbook of European Law, pp. 
199-200.
14 X and Y v. The Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A, vol. 91, Par. 23, p. 11.
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Let me now give some examples of indirect 'Drittwirkung' through the doctrine 
of the positive obligations of the Contracting Parties. All these examples have been 
taken from the context of art. 8, for the simple reason that this is the provision I am 
most familiar with. A first example is the case of Airey v. Ireland15. In this case Mrs. 
Airey made Ireland responsible for the violation of her right to private life: she claimed 
that she had to suffer ill-treatment from her husband (who had been convicted and fined 
for this reason) because the excessive cost of legal representation prevented her from 
obtaining a legal separation and no legal aid was available for such proceedings. The 
Court found the Irish State responsible for the violation of Mrs. Airey's right to respect 
for private life, even if this right was actually impaired by Mr. Airey, a private person. 
Second, in the case of X and Y v. The Netherlands, the father of a mentally 
handicapped girl who had been sexually assaulted raised a complaint against The 
Netherlands for the violation of both his daughter's and his right to respect for private 
and family life. He claimed that these rights were violated because under Dutch law 
neither the girl (she was mentally handicapped) nor her father (he was not the victim of 
the assault) could prosecute the assaulter. The Court found a violation of the positive 
obligations of the State to enable the exercise of rights, even if in this case the right in 
question was exercised against a private person. In a third case. Power and Raynor v. 
U.K.16, the Court had to decide whether the noise created by Heathrow airport violated 
the private life of the people living in the neighbourhood. Although the airport is 
privately owned, the Court reasoned in terms of the positive obligations of the State to 
ensure the exercise of the rights recognised in art. 8, even if upon the facts it finally did 
not find that the Government o f the United Kingdom had committed any Convention 
wrong.
The above paragraphs summarise the way the Convention organs approach the 
issue of the application of the Convention rights in private relationships. This issue has 
not yet been dealt with in the context of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, 
yet one can easily apply the above-mentioned rationales to this particular framework. 
This means that the Convention organs might be reluctant to find some public action in 
private violations of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications if these involve no 
clear responsibility of the Contracting Party accused of the violation; on the other hand, 
it also means that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications must be enforced by 
national courts even when the right is violated by private parties and that the 
Contracting Parties are obliged to adopt positive measures to enable the exercise of this 
right stretching to the private sphere, including adequate legislative protection of the
5^Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 Oct. 1979, Series A, Vol. 32, Par. 33, p. 17.
^Power and Raynor v. U.K., judgement of 21 Feb. 1990, Series A, Vol. 172, Par. 39, p. 18.
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right. The extent to which individuals will have to found a Convention wrong upon the 
private violation of their right to the secrecy of telecommunications depends on the 
extent to which the right is sufficiently protected as a ‘private' right within a national 
system. In the following pages I will address this question in the context of Germany.
1.2 Germany
1.3.1 The Application of Fundamental Rights in Private Relationships: the Case of the
Secrecy of Telecommunications
The idea that fundamental rights are primarily rights o f defence against the State 
is widely accepted in Germany17. It is also widely accepted that fundamental rights also 
have an objective dimension. Le. that they stand as objective values of the legal system 
imposed by the Constitution; even the idea that fundamental rights influence private 
relationships can be considered to be uncontroversial. The question that remains 
controversial is the way in which fundamental rights influence private relationships.
The most common view is that fundamental rights apply in private relationships 
only in an indirect way. This is precisely the position adopted by the Constitutional 
Court18. The case-law of the Court portrays the idea developed above that fundamental 
rights apply in private relationships in as far as these are influenced by the State's 
violation of its obligations vis-à-vis fundamental rights. Indeed, the Court holds that the 
State must both respect and actively provide for the exercise of fundamental rights, 
even in the context of private relationships. According to the Court, the State violates its 
negative obligation of respect when a judge upholds a situation in which an individual 
interfered with the exercise of a fundamental right. Originally, there may have been a 
purely private violation, yet this acquires public character as soon as it is confirmed by 
a judicial decision, since with this decision the judiciary (hence the State) is actively 
contributing to an interference with the exercise of a right19. Further, according to the 
Court, the State's positive obligation actively to provide for the exercise of fundamental 
rights can also be violated by the judiciary; this is the case when courts tolerate a private 
infringement of a fundamental right, that is, when courts do not explicitly uphold such 
an infringement, yet disregard the fact that it has taken place, and thereby they implicitly
17See, e.g., Badura, ¡Commentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Art. 10, Par. 20, p.14; Maunz-Diirig- 
Herzog, GGKommentar, Art. 10, p. 18; Pappeimann, Ait. 10, GGKommentar ed. by Ingo von Mflnch, 
Par. 6, p. 435.
18See BVerfGE 7, 198 at 207; 25, 256; 34,269 at 280; 39,1 at 41 et seq.; 42,64 at 73-74; 42, 143 
at 147 et seq.; 50,290 at 337; 52,131 at 166; 84,192 at 195; 89,214 at 232.
19BVerfGE 7,198 at 203.
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allow it20. In principle, this positive obligation could also be violated by the law-maker 
and the executive, namely when they do not provide an adequate normative framework 
for the protection of the exercise of fundamental rights even against interferences 
carried out by private persons. Yet, the Constitutional Court has not yet decided this 
point.
The main stream position in Germany, supported by the Constitutional Court, 
therefore, is that fundam ental rights have an indirect third party effect or 
'Drittwirkung'. Defenders o f a direct 'Drittwirkung' are in a minority21. Note, 
however, that the results o f an indirect and of a direct ’Drittwirkung’ basically 
co incide22. Under both these theories, fundamental rights ultimately apply in 
relationships among individuals and under both of them are ultimately called on to do 
so by the judiciary. Thus the indirect 'Drittwirkung' merely helps to justify that 
fundamental rights apply in the context o f private relationships; once this much has 
been accomplished, the application of fundamental rights in this context takes place in 
rather direct, straightforward terms.
All the above considerations apply in the context of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications as recognised in art. 10 of the Basic Law. The question of the third 
party effect of this particular right has not yet been addressed by the Constitutional 
Court, yet it has been addressed by both the Federal Court o f Appeals 
(Bundesgerichtshof) and the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht)23. Both 
these courts have reasoned in the terms explained above: the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is primarily a subjective right of the individual against the State, yet 
it is also an objective value of the legal order imposed by the Constitution and as such 
influences private relationships. After having stated this, however, both the Federal 
Court of Appeals and the Federal Labour Court have proceeded to apply the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications against private individuals in what would seem to be a 
very direct manner. One could nevertheless argue that both courts rely upon the implicit 
assumption that it is their duty both to respect and to provide for fundamental rights in 
private relationships.
20BVerfGE 25,256.
21 Hans Carl Nipperdey is regarded as the founder of the direct ’Drittwirkung' and the First Senate of the 
Federal Labour Court {Bundesarbeitsgericht) as the main defender of this theory (see Alexy. Theorie der 
Grundrechte, at 428; Christian Starck, "Constitutional Definitions and Protection of Rights and 
Freedoms" in Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law according to the German Basic Law 
(Ch. Starck ed.) pp. 47-48, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1987).
^See Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, at 481 et seq.
23See, e.g„ BAGE 1 March 1973 ((1973) NJW, p, 1247); BAGE 27 May 1986 ((1987) NJW, p. 674 
et seq.); BGHE(ZR) 20 Feb. 1990 ((1991) JR, p. 67 el seq.).
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Recognising third party effects on the right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
has particular importance in at least two fields. The first field is the surveillance by 
employers of telecommunications engaged in by employees at the working place. 
Courts usually regard these situations as covered by art. 10 of the Basic Law on the 
basis of an indirect 'Drittwirkung'. However, they usually think that these situations 
fall outside the protected scope of this provision24: on balance, courts argue, it is 
justified for employers to have a right to survey the telecommunications carried out by 
their employees during working hours, in order to control the efficiency of work and 
the use that is being made of the working premises. In other words, courts argue that it 
is reasonable that employers have a right to survey their em ployees' 
telecommunications and that this right can be considered implicit in every labour 
relationship.
That the right to the secrecy of telecommunication is accorded such low 
importance in the context of labour relationships is regrettable, particularly if we 
compare this with the importance that the Constitutional Court accords to the right to 
privacy when exercised vis-à-vis public authorities. In the public sphere, the right to 
privacy appears as a condition for the existence of a constitutional democratic system, 
for which its protection is enhanced. In the context of labour relationships, on the other 
hand, the right to privacy is not thought to play such a role. Drawing such a sharp 
distinction between the public and the private sphere when assessing the importance of 
privacy is wrong, however. Generally speaking, free participation requires an area of 
seclusion and secrecy not only from the State but also from society, so that providing 
the necessary means for the adequate protection of privacy against society ought to be 
regarded as a priority positive obligation of the State (whether or not it is subjective) 
deriving from the right to privacy25. In addition to this, employers are in a position 
from which they can infringe the privacy of their employees much more systematically 
and with much greater consequences than other members o f civil society. Employers 
can gain information about their employees more easily than other people can, but 
above all they can use this information very powerfully, notably as a condition for 
employment. As a result, employers can endanger the free participation of employees in 
public life to a greater extent than other members of civil society. This is why attaching 
such low importance to the right to privacy in labour relationships is wrong. It is wrong 
particularly since it implies subordinating this right to interests of such limited 
importance as the general well-being of the work place or the efficiency o f the 
productive system. The automatic subordination of the right to the secrecy of
24BAGE 1 March 1973 ((1973) NJW, p. 1247); BAGE 27 May 1986 ((1987) NJW, p. 674 et seq.); 
see also OVGE Bremen 18 Die. 1979, (1980) /Z, p. 405 et seq.
^This idea is confirmed in BVerfGE 84,192 at 194 et seq.
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telecommunications to such interests is thus out of proportion, hence unconstitutional. 
This is not to deny that certain limits to the exercise of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications at the work place might be necessary for the sake of efficiency and 
productivity. Yet in order that these limits can be held constitutional they must be 
imposed on the basis of the principle of reasonableness (see chapter 5), in particular 
after having struck a due balance between the different interests at stake and after 
having acknowledged the importance that the interest in the protection of privacy also 
has in labour relationships.
In addition to being unreasonable, restrictions of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications at the work place must be considered unconstitutional also on 
different grounds. If the exercise of this right is covered by art. 10 of the Basic Law, 
something we take as a point o f departure, then limitations to its protected scope are 
constitutional only if they are authorised by law (arts. 10.2 and 19.1 of the Basic Law), 
which is not the case with the limitations at issue. Courts have surmounted this 
difficulty on the basis of at least two different arguments. A first argument26 is that 
employees implicitly renounce their right to the secrecy of their telecommunications at 
the working place when they sign a labour contract, since they know that surveillance 
of employees' telecommunications is a general practice. A second argument27 is that 
surveillance of employees' telecommunications is a 'structural limitation* of the 
protected scope of this right o f the same kind as the limitations of this right imposed by 
the post and telecommunication services as part of their normal functioning; moreover, 
in order to avoid the requirement that they be authorised by law, this 'structural 
limitation' is also regarded as an 'inherent limitation' to the coverage of the art. 10 
right.
Both these arguments lie open to criticism. The argument that employees 
implicitly renounce their right to the secrecy of telecommunications when they sign a 
labour contract raises the question of whether consent to surveillance allegedly implicit 
in a labour contract is freely granted or whether it is formed by the necessity of finding 
a job. As for the argument that surveillance of telecommunications at the work place is 
an inherent structural limitation to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, it is 
not at all clear how telecommunication surveillance can be inherent in the functioning of 
a company. Moreover, over and above these difficulties, this argument must be rejected 
as an aspect of the doctrine o f 'inherent limitations', a doctrine that was criticised at 
length in chapter 3.
26See BAGE 1 March 1973 ((1973) M ,  p. 1247); OVGE Bremen, 18 Die. 1979, (1980) 7Z, p. 405 
et seq.
27See BAG decision of 27 May 1986 ((1987) NJW, p. 674 at 676).
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In sum, courts think that art. 10 of the Basic Law, applied with indirect 
'Drittwirkung', covers a right to the secrecy of telecommunications vis-à-vis the 
employer, yet they generally think that, on balance, the right ought not to be considered 
protected under art. 10 .1 believe that this limitation to the protected scope of art. 10 is 
unconstitutional, both because it is not authorised by law and because, in my view, it is 
clearly out of proportion.
A second field in which the third party effect of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is particularly relevant is the field of the privatisation of 
telecommunications services28. § 1 (4) of the Gesetz uber Fernmeldeanlagen (FAG) 
saw some liberalisation of telecommunication services by means of restricting the 
traditional monopoly of the State to the classical telephone service. Moreover, this last 
sector will also be liberalised in the very near future29. This circumstance poses the 
question of the third party effects of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in as 
far as this right must also be protected vis-à-vis the telecommunication service, since 
this is no longer run by the State. Yet this question has thus far been avoided by the 
FAG, which has introduced a statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
against private persons who run a telecommunication service (§ 10 FAG). The FAG 
thus supports the idea developed above that the question of the 'Drittwirkung' of 
fundamental rights mostly arises in as far as a particular right is not sufficiently 
protected against private parties by statute. I would now like to continue to look at the 
extent to which German laws protect the secrecy of telecommunications against 
violations by private individuals.
1.2.2 The Secrecy of Telecommunication against Private Individuals as a Statutory 
Right
The secrecy of telecommunications is protected against private individuals in 
several statutory provisions. § 202 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch 
-StGB) makes it a crime to violate the secrecy of an act of written telecommunication.
28The privatisation of telecommunication services is surrounded by a heated doctrinal debate as to its 
compatibility with art. 87.1, which grants the federation the administration of the federal post. 
According to some commentators, this provision forbids the private administration of the post, whereas 
according to others it only is one element in the distribution of competences between the federation and 
the Länder. The terms and the background of this debate have been summarised by Bernhard Großfeld & 
Helmut Janssen, "Zur Organisation der Deutschen Bundespost" 46 DÖV 424 (1993).
29For some notes on the context and on the implications of the liberalisation of telecommunication 
services, see T. Blanke &  D. Sterzel, "Ab die Post? Die Auseinandersetzung um die Privatisierung der 
Deutschen Bundespost" 26 Kritische Justiz 278 (1993).
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This provision contemplates a penalty of up to three years imprisonment or a fine for 
any person who, w ithout authorisation, opens a closed piece o f written 
telecommunication which is not addressed to her, or finds out about the content of such 
a piece of telecommunication by any other means. The same penalty is provided for any 
person who, without authorisation, gets to know the content of a closed item of written 
telecommunication ("of an item telecommunication the content of which is especially 
protected") which is not addressed to her, even if this piece of telecommunication has 
previously been opened by a different person.
For its part, § 201 of the StGB protects the secrecy of oral telecommunications. 
It punishes with a penalty of up to three years imprisonment or with a fine, any person 
who, without authorisation, records somebody's "not privately spoken words", uses 
words thus recorded or publicly reports them or their main content; the same penalty is 
provided for any unauthorised person who, with a listener device, listens into words 
privately spoken and which were not addressed to her, as well as who publicly reports 
the words thus obtained. However, publicly informing of words illegally listened into 
or recorded is not a crime if it is done in order to protect public interests of overriding 
importance.
The penalty of up to three years imprisonment, which can be raised to up to five 
years imprisonment, or a fine if the above-mentioned crimes against the secrecy of 
written and oral telecommunications arc committed by a civil servant or by an employee 
in a public service with a violation of their special duty to respect the confidentiality of 
the spoken word (§§ 201 (3) and 354 (2) 1). Such employees are also punished with 
five years imprisonment or with a fine if they pass onto a third person information they 
have obtained as part of the normal development of their job. The addressees of this 
right, it is true, are public employees; yet the same penalty is provided for persons 
entrusted by the postal system to carry out postal activities or for private individuals 
who carry out a telecommunication service for the public. Finally, I would like to note 
that even a private person is only allowed to inform a third person about details 
concerning an act of telecommunication upon authorisation, even if these details have 
been obtained through lawful means and outside the framework of a telecommunication 
service; absent authorisation, any such information is punished with up to two years 
imprisonment (§ 354 (4)). These penalties protect not only the secrecy of the content of 
an act o f telecommunication but also the secrecy of its surrounding circumstances (§ 
354 (5)).
The above statutory provisions seem to offer the secrecy of telecommunications 
adequate protection against private persons. The coverage of these provisions is similar 341
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to the coverage of art. 10 of the Basic Law. As in art. 10, the StGB protects the secrecy 
of telecommunications in as far as this is inherent in the act of telecommunication in 
question: § 201 only protects the secrecy of "not publicly spoken words"; similarly § 
202 only protects the secrecy of letters with respect to their content and provided that 
they are duly closed. In addition, the StGB protects the secrecy of both the content and 
the circumstances surrounding an act of telecommunication in as far as they do not lie in 
open view. On this issue, note that employees of a telecommunication service or any 
other person who has lawfully come to know about the details of such surrounding 
circumstance are not allowed to reveal them to third persons to whom they remain 
unknown. Finally, as in art. 10, the StGB recognises for each party to an act of 
telecommunication a right to the secrecy of this even vis-à-vis the other party (right to 
the confidentiality of one’s words), so that neither may record a conversation nor agree 
to a third person's surveillance without the consent o f the other party to the 
conversation. There is however one point in which the coverage of the statutory right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications is narrower than its constitutional equivalent: the 
StGB contains no provision against the interference with the secrecy of electronic 
telecommunications, such as E-mail, whereas the secrecy of such modalities of 
telecommunications is implicit in the art. 10 general recognition of a right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications.
Victims of a violation of the statutory right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
have a criminal and a civil action for recovery against the persons who have committed 
the violation in question. Yet it is not clear whether they can also move to suppress 
incriminating evidence eventually obtained by private persons through illegal 
telecommunication surveillance. Rather, within the context of the secrecy of oral 
telecommunications § 201 seems to suggest the opposite, for it allows divulgence of 
words illegally listened into or recorded if its purpose is to protect public interests of 
overriding importance. At least in the context of certain particularly serious crimes, this 
provision excludes the application of the exclusionary rule.
This circumstance constitutes a reason why it might be advantageous for 
individuals to have art. 10 of the Basic Law applied in the context of private 
relationships. Over and above such particular cases, however, the application of art. 10 
with third party effects has a clear advantage for individuals, namely it has the 
advantage of recognising individuals a constitutional right, with all the advantages of 
broad recognition and stability that this implies over purely statutory rights and, in 
addition, with the possibility of bringing cases of violations o f this right before the 
Constitutional Court.
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1.3 The United States
1.3.1 The Application of Fundamental Rights in Private Relationships: the Case of the
Secrecy of Telecommunication
In the United States, the question of whether fundamental rights apply in private 
relationships has been raised within the context of the right to the equal protection of 
laws recognised in the fourteenth amendment. According to Section 1 of this provision 
"[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws". This sentence of the fourteenth amendment was enacted with the purpose of 
banning racial discrimination, a pervasive practice in the United States. Although 
explicitly addressed only against the states, it has often been argued that the fourteenth 
amendment aimed at banning racial discrimination also in private relationships30. 
Whether or not this was the intention of the amendment, the truth is that courts have 
actually tried to attain this aim while respecting the literal wording of the fourteenth 
amendment. To this end, it would have been easy to rely on the idea that the provision 
imposes upon the states not only negative obligations but also the positive obligation to 
enhance the equal protection of laws, an idea discussed in chapter 3. However, courts 
have tended to disregard the positive obligation doctrine in this context and have 
preferred to ban private discrimination on the basis of a direct application of the 
negative obligations imposed by this amendment.
The means used to this end has been the so-called 'state action' doctrine: courts 
have not been willing to apply the fourteenth amendment in every private relationship, 
but only in as far as discriminatory conduct is "fairly attributable to the states"31, i.e. in 
as far as some kind of'state action' is involved in an act of discrimination. It is difficult 
to draw a general picture of the terms in which courts have defined the expression 'state 
action', since decisions have tended to be orientated to the solution of each particular 
case; yet some commentators32 have tried to systematise the courts' approach to this 
issue. I will adopt a classification of 'state action' situations into two groups33. The
30This point is developed by John Silard, "A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the ’State Action’ 
Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee", 66 Col. L. Rev. 855 (1966).
3lLugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922 at 937 (1982).
32Silard, "A Constitutional ForecastThomas P. Lewis, "The Meaning of State Action", 60 Col. 
L. Rev. 1083 (1960); Charles L. Black, "The Supreme Court 1966 Term. Foreword: 'State Action’, 
Equal Protection and California's Proposition", 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69 (1967); Samuel Estreicher, 
"Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: the Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the 
Reconstruction Era Amendments" 74 Col. L. Rev. 449 (1974); David S. Elkind, "State Action: 
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity", 74 Col. L Rev. 656 (1974).
33Elkind, "State Action: Theories for Applying..."
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first group embraces cases in which there has been a private assumption of government 
powers and functions; the second group embraces cases in which the government is 
involved in a private activity. Let me draw the general traits of these two groups.
Let us first look at the private assumption of government powers and functions. 
There is private assumption of government powers and functions when a private person 
possesses power or performs a function that "traditionally [has been] the exclusive 
prerogative of the State"34. This is the case, e.g., with a company-owned town35, with 
a city park which is privately run36 or with a shopping complex so large that the Court 
regards it as the "functional equivalent" of a town business block37. In all these cases, 
the Supreme Court has seemed to regard the relevant constitutional amendments as 
limitations not merely upon government, but upon governmental powers generally. Of 
course, the extent to which governmental power is exercised (i.e. the extent to which 
'state action' exists) depends upon the extent to which there is private monopoly control 
over a resource which is essential for the exercise of a fundamental right.
The second group contains cases in which government is involved in a private 
activity. This can take place in various ways. First of all, government is involved in a 
private activity if it grants power to private persons so as to enable or, at least, enhance 
the efficacy of an activity; in other words, there is 'state action' when private persons 
have power which derives solely from government, whether this power is granted 
directly or indirectly38. Second, government is also involved in private activity when it 
merely aids or supports private parties in the exercise of an activity which they would 
carry out without the aid; aid might consist of money, tax exemptions or deductions, 
awards of contracts, etc., and must be so significant that it is justified for constitutional 
standards to be imposed upon the whole activity39. Third, there is 'state action' when
34Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 US 715 at 722 (1961).
35 Marsch v. Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946). The Court ruled that, on the basis of the first amendment, 
this town could not prevent a Jehovah's Witness from distributing religious literature (as will be 
explained below, the Supreme Court has ruled that fundamental rights are incorporated in the fourteenth 
amendment).
^  Evans v. Newton, 382 US 296 (1966). Even if privately run, a city park cannot be operated as a 
segregated facility.
37Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 381 US 308 (1968). The Court ruled that the 
shopping centre in question could not prohibit picketing against a store on the premises, on the basis 
that no equivalent alternative existed, since effective picketing outside the wall was impractical.
38There is a direct grant of power, e.g., when private bodies are granted power to determine government 
policy: in Smith v. Allwright (321 US 649 (1944)) the Court found that liability to run in a general 
election upon success in primaries amounted to party control of the elective process, hence to 'state 
action'. There is indirect grant of power, e.g., when an existing activity is offered government protected 
status: in Reitman v. Mulkey (387 US 369 (1967)) the Court found 'state action' in discrimination by 
landlords, since this was supported by an amendment to the California Constitution which protected the 
absolute freedom of property owners to refuse to sell or rent their property to anyone.
39A typical case of aid is the public funding of private schools: see, e.g., Milonas v. Williams, 691
F.2d. 931 at 940 (10th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 460 US 1069 (1983).
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the government uses private persons to carry out its own activities or to achieve its own 
purposes, even if it does not provide these persons with special power or support and 
does not even regulate the activity in question. Such situations are known as 'agency' 
situations and are regarded as cases of'state action' on the grounds that the government 
cannot free itself from constitutional duties and limitations by delegating responsibility 
to the private sector. A good example is the case of airport searches and seizures carried 
out by private airline employees or even the case of prisons privately run40. Finally, the 
Supreme Court has stated that, at least in some instances, there is 'state action* in the 
judicial enforcement of private rights, although it has not specified what these instances 
are exactly41.
Note that all the above modalities of 'state action' could be read as examples of 
the states' positive obligations under the fourteenth amendment: they can all be 
interpreted to mean that, if a state allows private individuals to exercise governmental 
power, or if it gets involved in a private activity, then the state in question has the duty 
to make sure that the activity in question respects the equal-protection clause. Yet, 
courts have preferred to reason on the basis of the fourteenth amendment as a source of 
negative obligations for the public power of the states and then adopt a flexible 
interpretation of the expression 'public power*. Be that as it may, the result is that 
courts have been applying the fourteenth amendment to certain private relationships; 
this is also true for the rights 'incorporated' in the amendment, an issue which will be 
dealt with below. Amongst the 'incorporated* rights there is the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications recognised in the fourth amendment. This right can therefore apply 
in private relationships via the 'state action' doctrine.
Some of the above-mentioned modalities o f 'state action' could apply in the 
context of the fourth amendment right to the secrecy o f telecommunications. This is the 
case with the judicial enforcement of private rights, with 'agency' situations such as the 
development of private telecommunication services or the authorisation of private 
prisons, as well as with the private assumption of government powers by, for example, 
private investigators, at least when they pursue evidence for criminal prosecution42. 
However, some instances o f interception o f telecommunications by private parties
40The development of private prisons in the United States as well as the issue of the protection of 
fundamental rights within these prisons is studied in Note 'Inmates* Rights and the Privatisation of 
Prisons", 86 Col L. Rev. 1475(1986).
41The most famous case is Shelley v. Kraemer (344 US 1 (1948)), where the Court ruled that 
restrictive private covenants do not violate the fourteenth amendment if they are voluntarily adhered to; 
yet they cannot be judicially enforced, since then there would be 'state action'.
42For the more general issue of the application of the fourth amendment right in cases of searches and 
seizures carried out by private security personnel, see Steven Euller, "Private Security and the 
Exclusionary Rule", 15 Harv. Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 649 (1980).
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remain outside the scope of state action, such as interceptions carried out by employers 
within their companies, by private investigators within the context of a civil case, for 
example in a case of divorce, or even interspousal telecommunication surveillance. 
Moreover, even in cases where 'state action' could be involved, the Supreme Court has 
not applied this doctrine to private interceptions of telecommunications. This 
circumstance is certainly influenced by the fact that the secrecy of telecommunications is 
protected against private interceptions at the statutory level. Indeed, to the extent that the 
secrecy of telecommunications against private parties is protected by statute as widely 
and as effectively as it is protected by the fourth amendment, the need to have recourse 
to this latter is not felt so urgent. Let us now have a look at the statutory protection of 
the secrecy of telecommunications in private relationships.
1.3.2 The Secrecy of Telecommunication against Private Individuals as a Statutory 
Right«
Section 3623(d) of Title 39 of the U.S.C., recognises a statutory right to the 
secrecy of written telecommunications. Both the coverage and the protected scope of 
this statutory right essentially overlap with the coverage and the protected scope of its 
equivalent constitutional right. As the fourth amendment, § 3623(d) only guarantees the 
secrecy of first class mail, i.e. of mail sealed against postal inspection (see chapter 4). 
Similarly, as the fourth amendment, § 3623(d) imposes a warrant requirement upon the 
opening of first class mail, yet, § 3623(d) only admits an 'ordinary administrative 
divulgence' exception and a 'consent' exception (see chapter 5) to the warrant 
requirement; moreover, consent may only be given by the addressee. This means that 
the protected scope of the secrecy of written telecommunications it recognises is wider 
than that of the equivalent constitutional right. In addition, the remedies provided 
against violations of the constitutional and the statutory right to the secrecy of written 
telecommunications are identical, since both the criminal action of Title 18 § 242 of the 
U.S.C. and the civil action of Title 42 § 1983 of the U.S.C. can be brought against the 
violation of "any righ ts ... secured by the Constitution or laws" (emphasis added). In 
sum, the secrecy of written telecommunications seems to enjoy wider protection as a 
statutory than as a constitutional right, since § 3623(d) admits fewer exceptions to the 
warrant requirement than the Supreme Court in the context of the fourth amendment. 43
43I will now analyse the provisions of the U.S.C. presently in force; I would however like to note that
U.S. Congress is drafting a Bill which aims, among other things, at preventing abuse of electronic 
monitoring in the workplace (Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act of 1993); moreover, a second 
Bill is being drafted which authorises electronic monitoring by employers under certain circumstances 
(Telephone Privacy Act of 1993). It is to be expected that these Bills will regulate telecommunications 
surveillance in the workplace.
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The U.S.C. also recognises a statutory right to the secrecy of wire and 
electronic communications. Chapter 119 of Title 18 (§§ 2510-2520) protects the 
secrecy of telecommunications vis-à-vis any third person, whereas Chapter 36 of Title 
50 (§§ 1801-1811) protects the secrecy of telecommunications against violations carried 
out under colour of law. Let me now refer to these two chapters in turn.
[A] Chapter 119 of Title 18
Chapter 119 of Title 18 applies to interstate and foreign, wire and electronic 
telecommunications, as well as to wire and electronic telecommunications which affect 
interstate or foreign commerce (§ 2510). § 2511 punishes with not more than five years 
imprisonment or a fine or both the willful interception of the above-mentioned types of 
telecommunication44, the willful use of intercepting devices already installed and the 
willful disclosure or use o f the content of intercepted communication by any person 
knowing or having reason to know that the information in question has been thus 
obtained, each of which amounts to an independent offence. If one of the above 
offences is not committed for a tortious or illegal purpose or for the purpose of 
commercial gain and if it affects a radio communication that is not scrambled or 
encrypted, then punishment is less severe: it consists o f a fine of not more than $ 500 if 
the communication is the radio portion of a cellular telephone communication, a public 
land mobile radio service or a paging service communication, and of a fine, or not more 
than one year imprisonment, or both, if the communication is not one of these. The 
above prohibition to intercept also applies to persons or entities providing a wire or 
electronic communication service to the public: these persons or entities may not 
intentionally divulge the contents of any communication to any person or entity other 
than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such an 
addressee or intended recipient (§2511 (3)(a)). In addition, § 2512 punishes with a 
fine of not more than $ 10,000 or not more than five years imprisonment or both the 
intentional manufacture, distribution, possession and advertising or devices which are 
prim arily useful for the surreptitious interception of wire and electronic 
telecommunications. Note that neither the expression 'wire communication' nor the 
expression 'electronic communication' covers "the radio portion of a cordless telephone 
communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base 
unit" (§ 2510).
44This Chapter also recognises a right to the secrecy of 'oral communications', i.e. of 
"communications uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject 
to interception under circumstances justifying such expectations" (§2510 (2)). Yet, these person-to- 
person communications will not be mentioned here, since the right to their secrecy remains outside the 
scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, which is the concern of this thesis.
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Chapter 119 follows the doctrine developed by the Supreme Court according to 
which the right to the secrecy of telecommunication only covers 'secrecy' in as far as 
this is inherent in the act of telecommunication in question. To begin with, § 2511 (2)
(c) and (d) allow the interception o f telecommunications carried out by, or with the 
consent of, one o f the parties to it45. In addition, § 2511 (2)(g)(i) does not ban the 
interception of or access to "an electronic communication made through an electronic 
communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is 
readily accessible to the general public"; "readily accessible to the general public" means 
that a communication is not scrambled or encrypted, transmitted through particular 
radio frequencies not accessible to all or otherwise withdrawn from the general public 
(§ 2510 (16)), i.e. a communication "readily accessible to the general public" is what in 
this thesis I call an 'open-channel' communication. Chapter 119 is however not very 
rigourous in that it seems to classify the above provisions as exceptions to the protected 
scope of the statutory right against telecommunication surveillance, whereas they must 
rather be regarded as exceptions to the coverage o f this right (it states, "it shall not be 
unlawful under this chapter", instead of, 'it shall not be an interception under this 
chapter'). Finally, Chapter 119 only condemns the surveillance of the 'content' of 
telecommunications, i.e. the surveillance o f "any information concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of that communication", but not the surveillance o f the 
circumstances surrounding an act of telecommunication. The use of a 'pen register*,
i.e. a mechanical device which records only the numbers dialed on a telephone line, is 
thus not unlawful under this Chapter46.
Victims of an illegal measure of surveillance have both a civil and a criminal 
cause against the person who has carried it out (§§ 2511 (4)(a) and 2520). They can 
recover appropriate relief, this including equitable or declaratory relief, damages, 
punitive damages in appropriate cases and a reasonable attorney's fee and other 
litigation costs reasonably incurred. Damages are less high if the interception is of a 
radio communication transmitted on frequencies not readily available to the general 
public but which is not scrambled or encrypted, provided that the conduct is not for a 
tortious or illegal purpose or for commercial advantage or gain. Note, however, that
45RecaII, however, that, as noted in chapter 5, Congress is presently working on a Bill (Telephone 
Privacy Act of 1993) to amend section 2511 so that surveillance of an act of oral, wire or electronic 
communication made by a person not acting under the colour of law can only be lawfully consented to 
by all parties to the act of communication.
46This provision was introduced by the Privacy Act of 1986; even before the Supreme Court had ruled 
that the use of a pen register was allowed under 18 USC. See US v. NY Telephone Co., 434 US 159 
(1977). This view was even supported by the Senate Report on Title III of the Omnibus Act. according 
to which "the proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls. The use of a 
'pen register1, for example, would be permissible" (ibid, at 167-168).
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good faith reliance on the lawfulness of the interception stands as a complete defence 
against civil and criminal actions.
In addition, according to §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) victims of illegal interception 
of wire or electronic telecommunications can move to suppress evidence so obtained in 
as far as it incriminates them; that is, these sections regulate an exclusionary rule. This 
circumstance was commented on in chapter 6, where I stressed that this statutory 
exclusionary rule is regulated in unconditional terms, so that it applies whenever 
evidence has been obtained in violation of Chapter 119, even at civil trials. I would 
now like to add that Chapter 119 makes no distinction as to who has committed the 
illegality in order that an item of evidence can be suppressed; it therefore seems that the 
exclusionary rule also applies in the context of evidence illegally obtained by private 
individuals.
[B] Chapter 36 of Title 50
Whilst Chapter 119 o f Title 18 penalises any illegal surveillance of wire and 
electronic telecommunications, Chapter 36 of Title 50 specifically penalises illegal 
surveillance made under colour of law. In particular, this Chapter (§ 1809) makes it an 
offence (punishable with a fine of not more than $ 10,000 or imprisonment for not 
more than five years or both) to engage in electronic surveillance under colour of law, 
except as authorised by statute, as well as to disclose information obtained under colour 
of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that the 
information was thus obtained, except if disclosure is authorised by statute. This 
provision overlaps with the provisions of Chapter 119 commented on above, which 
condemns every measure o f illegal surveillance of telecommunications without 
distinction; this means that the prohibition of telecommunication surveillance regulated 
in § 1809 is relevant only in as far as either the coverage of this provision or the 
remedies it provides against violations of the secrecy of telecommunications, is wider 
than the coverage or the content of the corresponding provisions of Chapter 119.
Let me start with the content. Chapter 36 provides the same remedies against 
violations of the secrecy o f telecommunications as Chapter 119: victims of illegal 
telecommunication surveillance have both a civil and criminal cause against the person 
who has carried it out; they are also entitled to recover damages, punitive damages, a 
reasonable attorney's fee and other investigation and litigation costs reasonably incurred 
(§ 1810). Note that Chapter 36 does not admit good faith as a defence against these 
actions. In addition, Chapter 36 (§ 1806 (e)-(h)) regulates an exclusionary rule in very 
similar terms to Chapter 119. 349
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As for the coverage of § 1809, this provision is in some sense narrower, in 
some sense wider, than the corresponding provisions of Chapter 119 of Title 18. The 
right recognised in Chapter 36 is narrower in as far as it only covers the secrecy of wire 
telecommunications. Enacted in 1978, this Chapter has not been updated to cover the 
secrecy of non-wire electronic telecommunication, which means that this is only 
protected under the general provisions of Chapter 119. On the other hand, the right 
recognised in Chapter 36 is wider in as far as it covers not only the secrecy of the 
content of telecommunications, but also the secrecy of "any information concerning the 
identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or 
meaning of that communication"; in other words, Chapter 36 covers the secrecy of the 
circumstances surrounding an act of telecommunication. Only in this latter respect does 
Chapter 36 add something new to the provisions of Chapter 119.
[C] Conclusions
The conclusion one can draw from the above summary of the relevant 
provisions of the U.S.C. is that the statutory and the constitutional right to the secrecy 
of wire and electronic telecommunications are extremely similar and, if at all, this right 
is more broadly defined at the statutory level -e.g., the secrecy of the circumstances 
surrounding an act of telecommunication is occasionally covered as a statutory right. 
Only in one respect is the coverage of the fourth amendment widen as will be explained 
below, this latter applies both to interstate and to intrastate telecommunications, 
whereas the U.S.C. only applies to intrastate telecommunications if some interstate or 
foreign interest is at stake. However, as will also be explained below, the question of 
whether the exclusionary rule attached to the fourth amendment applies in intrastate 
cases has been and is far from uncontroversial.
For its part, the actual protection accorded to the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is defined in much clearer terms at the statutory level. This is 
primarily true of the exclusionary rule. The utmost merit of the statutory exclusionary 
rule is that it is explicitly conceived as a remedy, that is as a rule which undisputably 
applies whenever the victim of illegal wire or electronic surveillance is incriminated by 
the evidence thus obtained, provided that he duly moves to suppress this evidence. This 
means that it applies independently of whether the illegality has been committed by 
private persons or by the public power. Moreover, the exclusionary rule is not reserved 
for criminal cases but applies at every trial, hearing or other proceeding before a court, 
including civil ones.
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The above considerations seem to indicate that statutes protect the secrecy of 
telecommunications better than the fourth amendment. There seems to be no compelling 
reason, therefore, to make the fourth amendment apply in private relationships in the 
context of wire and electronic telecommunications. Nonetheless, one ought not to 
forget the advantages of having a right recognised at the constitutional level: 
constitutional rights entail certain guarantees of broad and stable recognition that a 
statutory right does not possess, hence the importance of recognising a right at the 
constitutional level, even if  it operates over and above the statutory recognition and 
protection of this right.
Conclusions
Fundamental rights are primarily regarded as subjective rights of the individual 
in the ECHR, Germany and the United States. Yet these three systems have also faced 
the problem that these rights are sometimes under particular threat from private 
individuals and have devised different ways of giving them third party effect. The 
Convention organs rely upon the idea that the Convention imposes upon the 
Contracting Parties the positive obligation to provide for an adequate legal framework 
for the protection of rights in private relationships, hence that in cases of private 
violations of rights they can be made responsible if they have not performed their 
positive duties adequately. In Germany, the Constitutional Court also relies upon the 
State's duties, both negative and positive, vis-à-vis fundamental rights in order to apply 
these rights with third party effect. Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States 
prefers to apply fundamental rights in private relationships on the basis of the so-called 
'state action' doctrine, according to which a state is responsible for the private violation 
of a right if this violation is 'fairly attributable to the state', that is, if there is a sufficient 
nexus between this violation and the activities of the state. All these positions accord a 
sufficient basis for the application of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
against private persons, yet some of them have more potential for this than others. The 
potential of the 'state action' doctrine to apply fundamental rights with third party effect 
is much more limited than that of the doctrine o f the State's negative and positive 
obligations (it for example does not necessarily justify the exercise of the constitutional 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications vis-à-vis the employer) and, o f these two, 
the doctrine of the State's positive obligations offers the broader grounds to the third 
party effect of fundamental rights. Indeed, this latter doctrine has potential for 
boundless application of fundamental rights in private relationships.
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I would also like to note that when applied in private relationships the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications and more generally the right to privacy deserve the 
same attention as in the context of the relationship between an individual and the State. 
In both these contexts privacy appears as a condition for free debate and participation» 
hence its protection is imposed as a requirement for the existence of a constitutional 
democratic State. This is particularly true in labour relationships, where the position of 
the employer accords her a great deal of power to hinder the employee's free 
participation in public life. Here more than in any other private relationship the interest 
in the protection of privacy, hence the interest in the protection of the secrecy of 
telecommunications, should enjoy a position of favour when balanced against any other 
interests, such as the well-being or efficient functioning of the work place.
2 . Federalism
Introduction ><
In the preceding pages I have argued that public power is the only direct 
addressee of the fundamental right to the secrecy of telecommunications and of 
fundamental rights in general. In the context of federal countries, a further question 
concerning the addressees of fundamental rights must still be answered: do fundamental 
rights recognised at the federal level only apply vis-à-vis federal authorities, or do they 
also apply vis-à-vis the authorities of the states which integrate the federation? This 
question arises both in Germany and in the United States. Moreover, it arises 
irrespective of the fact that the German Länder and the American states have their own 
Constitutions and that some of these Constitutions recognise their own right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications. In other words, the point at issue is to what extent the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications as recognised in the German Basic Law and 
in the Federal Constitution of the United States (i.e. the secrecy of telecommunications 
as a federal constitutional right) applies vis-à-vis the authorities of the German Länder 
and of the American states, respectively. The German Basic Law is very clear in this 
respect: some of its provisions state that all the rights that the Basic Law recognises as 
fundamental can be exercised against all public authorities, these including the 
authorities of the Länder47. In the United States, state authorities are also to some 
extent regarded as the addressees of the fourth amendment's right, hence of the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications included therein. This however is not stated in the
47See arts. 1.3,23, 28.3 of the Basic Law; see also §§ 94.2 and 94.4 of the Law of the Constitutional 
Court -Bundesverfassungsgerichtgesetz.
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Federal Constitution, but is the result of the way the Supreme Court has interpreted 
certain constitutional provisions and must therefore be regarded as one of the many 
contributions that the case-law of the Supreme Court has made to the American 
constitutional system. The following pages will be dedicated to analysing the 
interpretative trend o f the Supreme Court that has led to the application of the fourth 
amendment right to the secrecy o f telecommunications in the states. I will first look at 
the extent to which this right applies vis-à-vis state authorities; second, I will consider 
the extent to which the exclusionary rule which is attached to the fourth amendment 
applies at state trials.
2.1 The U.S. States as Addressees of the Fourth Amendment
The federal Constitution of the United States does not explicitly affirm that the 
Bill of Rights embodied in its first eight amendments must apply to the states. 
Originally, the Supreme Court tended to interpret this silence as a sign that the first 
eight amendments only limit the power of the Federal Government; this interpretation 
was even regarded as "one o f the settled principles of the Federal Constitution"48. 
Eventually, however, the Court started to develop the doctrine that federal constitutional 
rights can also apply to the states. To this end, it relied on the due-process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, according to which "no state shall... deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law"49. The Court stated, in particular, that 
certain rights are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process 
of law, hence they apply to the states50. In other words, the due-process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment was interpreted to mean that it incorporates the application of 
federal constitutional rights to the states. This doctrine has prevailed over the years. 
Note however that the Court has never affirmed that the whole of the Bill o f Rights is 
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment51; moreover, according to the Court a right 
need not be explicitly included in the Bill of Rights in order to be considered
48Feldman v. US, 322 US 487 (1944); see also Brown v. New Jersey, 175 US 172 (1899); Ohio ex 
rel Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 US 445 (1904); Jack v. Kansas, 199 US 372 (1905); U.S. v. Lanza, 260 
US 377 (1922).
490n the due process of law, see Annotations 18 L Ed 2d 1388 and 23 L Ed 2d 985.
50See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45 (1932); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937).
5^though some members of the Supreme Court hold that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the 
Bill of Rights in its totality (see Annotation 18 L ed 2d 1388 at 1390, note 3), the majority of the 
Court has never adopted this view: see, e.g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 US 640 (1948); Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 US 25 (1949); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 US 121 (1959); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961); 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964).
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incorporated52. The due-process clause has been interpreted as incorporating rights in 
as far as they are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, whether or not they are 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution; in other words, the due-process clause has 
been interpreted to mean that it incorporates 'fundamental rights'53. An increasing 
number of federal rights have been held to be 'fundamental'. Among these, and 
contrary to what was the original trend of the Court, there is the fourth amendment right 
against searches and seizures, hence the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. At 
present, this right is applied against the states via the fourteenth amendment54.
The fourth amendment right is uncontroversially regarded as part of the concept 
of ordered liberty, therefore as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment. This, 
however, does not necessarily imply that the fourth amendment applies vis-à-vis the 
states in exactly the same terms as it applies vis-à-vis federal authorities. Originally, the 
Court held that the rights incorporated in the fourteenth amendment needed to apply 
against the states only to the degree necessary to comply with a requirement of fairness. 
This doctrine, which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of 'selective 
incorporation', was later abandoned by the Court for the so-called doctrine o f 'direct 
application', which is the one presently followed55. According to this doctrine, the 
'incorporated' rights apply vis-à-vis the states to the same extent and under the same 
standards as they are applicable in federal courts. Yet this theory does not imply that a 
right need to be incorporated in the fourteenth amendment as a whole; on the contrary, 
rights can be 'incorporated' partially. To be precise, a right is only 'incorporated' in as 
far as it is deemed to be part of the concept of ordered liberty, i.e. in as far as it is 
deemed 'fundamental'. Only to this extent does a right apply in the states in the same 
terms as it applies at the federal level. In the context of the fourth amendment, the 
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures (i.e. against unreasonable telecommunication surveillance), together with the 
standards of reasonableness developed by the Supreme Court, are 'fundamental* and 
must apply in the states56. More controversial is the 'fundamental' character of the so-
52A good example of this is the incorporation of the general 'right to privacy' which the Supreme 
Court saw as implicit in the 'penumbras' and 'emanations' of particular constitutional rights (Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
53As explained in the General Introduction, in the United States 'fundamental rights' are most 
commonly defined, precisely, as those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty".
54See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949); Schwartz v. Texas. 344 US 199 (1952); Elkins v. 
US, 364 US 206 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 US 23 (1963); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964); Stanford v. Texas, 379 US 476 (1965); Berger v. N.Y., 388 US 
41 (1967).
55See Annotations 18 L Ed 2d 1388 at 1395 and 23 L Ed 2d 985 at 987.
56See Ker v. California, 374 US 23 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 US 89 (1964).
354
called 'exclusionary rule' attached to the fourth amendment guarantee. This is an issue 
which deserves more lengthy comment.
2 .2  The U.S. States as Addressees o f the Fourth Amendment's
'Exclusionary Rule'
W hether or not the exclusionary rule applies in cases where the fourth 
amendment has been violated by state authorities has been and is a controversial issue. 
The Supreme Court has divided this issue into two questions: first, can evidence 
unlawfully obtained by state agents, without the participation of federal authorities, be 
used in federal trials? and, second, can evidence unlawfully obtained by state agents be 
used in state trials? Let me now deal in turn with these two questions.
In spite of its being addressed within the issue of the application of the 
exclusionary rule, the first question really concerns the addressees of the fourth 
amendment. For the focus of discussion is not whether the exclusionary rule applies 
beyond the federal framework; rather, the question is whether, within the framework of 
federal trials, the exclusionary rule applies in cases in which the fourth amendment has 
been violated by state authorities; in other words, the question is whether or not a 
violation of the fourth amendment by state authorities must be taken notice of at federal 
trials.
Initially, the federal use of evidence unlawfully obtained by the states was 
accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court only insisted upon one point: such evidence 
could not be admitted at a federal trial if federal authorities acting under colour of their 
federal office had taken any part in the unlawful search and seizure in question; it could 
only be admitted if state authorities had handed it over to federal authorities, as it were, 
on a "silver platter"57. This position went hand in hand with the idea that the fourth 
amendment is not binding upon the states, hence it was rejected as soon as the fourth 
amendment was considered 'incorporated' in the fourteenth amendment58. The practical 
consequences of the so-called 'silver platter' doctrine also contributed to its own 
overruling; for this doctrine allowed federal law-enforcement officials to rely on their 
state colleagues in order to obtain evidence which could not have been used at trial if 
they had themselves obtained it. It thus offered federal officials an easy way to get *35
51 Byars v. US, 273 US 28 at 33 (1926); Lustig v. US, 338 US 74 at 79.
5S Elkins v. US, 364 US 206 at 212-213 (1960); see also Rios v. US, 364 US 253 (1960); Chapman 
v. US, 365 US 610 (1961); Preston v. US, 376 US 364 (1964).
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around the application of the exclusionary rule, thus endangering the deterrence effects 
of applying the rule at a strictly federal level59.
As opposed to the previous one, the question of whether evidence unlawfully 
obtained by state authorities can be used at state trials focuses directly on the application 
of the exclusionary rule against state authorities. The decisive point therefore is whether 
the exclusionary rule is incorporated within the fourteenth amendment, that is, whether 
the application of the exclusionary rule is a requirement implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. Furthermore, whether or not this is the case depends on whether or not 
the exclusionary rule is regarded as essential to the enforcement of rights which are 
considered part of the concept of ordered liberty, in our case whether it is essential to 
the fourth amendment right against searches and seizures and the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications included therein.
The issue of whether the exclusionary rule is essential to the enforcement of the 
fourth amendment was studied in chapter 6. There it was explained that during the 
dominance of the property reading of the fourth amendment the rule was systematically 
applied by the Supreme Court, which regarded it as an essential ingredient of the fourth 
and the fifth amendments taken together. The problem is that, at that time, the fourth 
amendment itself was not considered applicable to the states, hence the question of 
whether the rule should apply at the state level did not even arise. On the other hand, 
when in 1949 the Court incorporated the fourth amendment into the fourteenth it also 
denied that the rule was essential to the amendment, thus that it was applicable to the 
states60. If was necessary to wait ten more years to see this doctrine overruled and the 
exclusionary rule applied at state trials61. The position thus reached was not long lived, 
however. The position of the Supreme Court as to the applicability of the rule at state 
trials has fluctuated along with the changes in the doctrine of the Court concerning 
whether the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the fourth amendment62, 
something that was explained in chapter 6. Incidentally, note that by now most states 
have attached an exclusionary rule to the violation of their own constitutional provision 
against unlawful searches and seizures, so that the applicability of the federal 
exclusionary rule to the states does not have the practical consequences that it used to 
have63.
59Elkins v. US, 364 US 206 at 217-218 (1960).
^Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 US 199 (1952).
™Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 US 23 (1963).
62For example, in California v. Greenwood and Van Houten (486 US 35 (1988)) the Court stated again 
that the exclusionary rule did not belong to the core of the fourth amendment, hence that it did not 
apply at state trials via the fourteenth amendment.
63See Appendix to the opinion of the Court in Elkins v. US, 364 US 206 (1960).
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Section 2: The Holders of the Right to the Secrecy of
Telecommunications
That fundamental rights were first recognised as rights o f defence to the 
individual against the State is sufficiently well known. I would now like to look at the 
scope of the term ’individual* as used in this context. This leads to two questions: first» 
is eveiy individual, i.e. every physical person, the holder of fundamental rights? It is 
clear that fundamental rights are recognised for citizens who have full legal capacity: the 
only doubts are whether, and if so to what extent, aliens and minors can also be 
regarded as holders of rights. The second question is, are physical persons the only 
holders o f fundamental rights? To what extent should legal persons not also be 
regarded as holders?
All these questions will be addressed in this section. In particular, I will analyse 
the extent to which aliens, minors and legal persons are the holders of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications in the ECHR, Germany and the United States. Dealing 
with the case of aliens and minors will prove easier than dealing with the case of legal 
persons as the holders of rights. As the following pages will show, aliens are 
uncontroversially regarded as holders of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
within the three systems under consideration, whilst minors might only have some 
problems in this respect in the United States. On the other hand, the question of 
whether legal persons are the holders of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, 
moreover of what legal persons can be the holders of this rights, presents much more 
difficult features.
i . Aliens
1.1 Some Notes on the Evolution of the Legal Status of Aliens
Since ancient times, the issue of the legal status of aliens has been the object of 
the attention of legal systems. Despite this, the recognition and protection o f certain 
fundamental rights for aliens is a rather recent phenomenon. A first step in this direction 
was taken in the context of natural-law theories, to be precise, in the declarations of
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rights enacted at the end of the eighteenth century64. References to 'natural rights' or to 
rights of 'all men* abound in these declarations. In spite of this, the declarations of 
rights of the late eighteenth century were not conceived as Charters of human rights. As 
a product of the prevailing liberal theories, declarations of rights were enacted, instead, 
as part of the 'social contract' which was thought to give rise to the State; in particular, 
they were enacted as instruments to protect the dividing line between the State and civil 
society65. It should not come as any surprise then that, in this contractual framework, 
certain rights were only recognised for citizens66; moreover, declarations of rights were 
at times ambiguous as to whether citizenship was a precondition even for the actual 
protection of natural-law rights, even though these rights admittedly belonged to all 
individuals67.
More definite steps in the direction of the recognition and protection of 
fundamental rights for aliens have been taken in more recent decades. These steps have 
come hand in hand with the abandonment of contractual theories and the rise o f a more 
participatory conception of the relationship between society and the State. As a result of 
this evolution, citizenship is no longer considered a definite criterion for the recognition 
of fundamental rights; rather, attention is now focused on the functional position that a 
given individual occupies within the State. Indeed, "alien" stands for a relatively well- 
defined functional position of individuals, yet it is this functional position and not the 
condition of being alien itself that determines the extent to which aliens are the subject 
of fundamental rights.
The move from contractualist to functionalist theories in the application of 
fundamental rights appears particularly clear in the United States. The clarity to be 
perceived in the American case is at least partly due to the fact that here the change has 
been carried through piecemeal by the Supreme Court and is thus relatively easy to 
follow. At the beginning of this evolution, during the nineteenth century and the first
64These were the Declarations of Rights of eight of the twelve original American states (of which the 
first was the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)), the U.S, Federal Bill of Rights (1789) and the 
Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (1789).
65In this context, these declarations followed the same line as the documents which preceded them 
(think of, e.g., the English Magna Charta of 1215, the Petition of Right of 1628 or the Bill of Rights 
of 1689). All these documents were unmistakably drawn in purely contractual terms -they amounted to 
a contract between the sovereign and the people-, although in these cases contractualism was not liberal 
(modem) in character, but responded to a feudalist philosophy.
66The title of the French Declaration is very telling in this regard. In addition, articles 6 and 14 of the 
Declaration recognise political rights only in citizens.
67Xhe Virginia Declaration, e.g., in spile of recognising certain rights for "all men", was made "by the 
Representatives of the good people of Virginia" to declare "which rights do pertain to them and their 
posterity, as the basis and foundation of Government*' (emphasis added). The French Declaration also 
combines the proclamation of natural human rights with provisions as to citizens* right to claim 
against human rights violations (see in general the preamble and the example of art. 11).
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third of the twentieth, most fundamental rights were only accorded to citizens. This 
situation was the result of the prevailing contractualist approach to the State, but was 
also conditioned by republicanism, which, together with liberalism, was the most 
influential trend of thought in the first 150 years of American history68. The focal aim 
of republicanism is the attaining of the common good of the ’nation', which is 
conceived as the ensemble o f citizens. In order that the common good be attained, all 
citizens must participate in the political process, to which end they must stand as 
autonomous individuals. In this framework, citizens are accorded certain rights and 
liberties which are essentially liberal in character, yet these rights and liberties are not 
regarded as goals in themselves: they are mere means to ensure individual autonomy or 
otherwise to attain the common good, hence the level of protection of these rights and 
liberties must change according to the circumstantial requirements of the common good. 
As is easy to infer, this framework did not favour the recognition of fundamental rights 
for aliens in nineteenth-century and early eighteenth-century America69. Aliens were 
not citizens; this means that they were detached from the nation and from the pursuance 
of its well-being, hence they could not be granted fundamental rights; furthermore, as a 
consequence of their detachment from the common good, aliens were regarded as 
untrustworthy. This circumstance provided American public power with sound 
grounds to distinguish aliens from citizens70 and even granted it complete discretion for 
the exclusion and deportation o f aliens. Nevertheless, in some cases the pursuit of the 
common good seemed favourable to the recognition of certain rights for aliens: this was 
the case for rights of a procedural character, which appear as objective patterns of 
behaviour for public power which are morally desirable71; similarly, aliens were 
granted a right to work, since economic liberty is regarded as the key-stone of national 
common good72.
The second third of the twentieth century witnessed a shift from a contractual- 
republican to a functional conception of the State73. In this new framework, citizenship 
is no longer regarded as a definite criterion determining the protection of rights; instead,
68See P.P. Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America, Oxford 1990, pp. 317 et seq.
69This issue is carefully studied in "Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens" 96 Harv.L.Rev. 
1286(1983).
70See, e.g., Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). The possibility of excluding aliens from 
land ownership, on account of the sanctity accorded to citizens' private property, is a case in point: see, 
e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien. 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield 
v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923).
71See e.g. Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) and Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 
238 (1896), in which the Supreme Court extended the scope of, respectively, the fourteenth amendment 
(at the time understood as a guarantee of 'formal' due process) and the fifth and sixth amendments to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.
72See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 US 33 (1915).
73See 'Immigration Policy..." at 1303 et seq.
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account is now taken of the actual participation of a given person in society, that is, 
account if taken of the functional position that a person has within the State taken as a 
whole. This functional approach brought about important consequences for the legal 
status of aliens in the United States. To begin with, public power under this conception 
enjoys greater discretion to exclude aliens than to deport them74, since in this latter case 
aliens have already entered American society and play a certain role therein. Moreover, 
once aliens are in the United States, whether or not legally75, they can be holders of 
constitutional rights. In this respect, attention must be paid to the functional position 
that aliens occupy within society, to the circumstances in which they claim the 
recognition of a given right, even to the consequences that recognising a certain 
fundamental right to an alien might entail for the community. Once a sufficient 
functional nexus exists, discrimination against aliens in the recognition and even in the 
protection of fundamental rights is considered "inherently suspect”76 and can only be 
justified in as far as the community benefits from it77. Moreover, this justification is the 
object of a strict interpretation by the Supreme Court78; it is most typically applied in 
the context of governmental or representative functions, so that political rights are 
systematically denied to aliens79.
Thus far we have dealt with the evolution in the conception of the State and the 
way it has influenced the evolution o f the status of aliens. Along with this evolution, 
the recognition o f rights for aliens has been influenced by a second circumstance, i.e. 
by the development, particularly after the second World War, of international 
instruments for the protection of human rights. The human rights thus recognised
74The power to exclude aliens is still considered "inherent in sovereignly .... a power to be exercised 
exclusively by the political branches of the government" (Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 US 753, 765
(1972) , unless the entering alien has previously lived in the United States -cases which must be solved 
in similar terms to deportation cases (see London v. Plasencia, 459 US 21 (1982)). In deportation 
cases, on the other hand, the alien’s functional position in American society must be taken into account 
and balanced against the interest involved in her deportation (see, e.g.. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 US 135, 
154 (1945), where a deportation order was reversed on the basis of the aliens' deep roots in America).
75Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) is a very telling example. The Supreme Court held that 
undocumented children are protected by the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause in their right 
to public education, on the basis that undocumented aliens have real social and economic participation 
in society.
76Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
77It has been noted that federal discrimination has more often been upheld than discrimination 
contained in state legislation (Note, "A Dual Standard for State Discrimination against Aliens" 92 
Harv. L Rev. 1516 (1979)). The possible involvement of national interests, together with the political 
character of the decisions made by Congress or the President on immigration and naturalization 
(decisions thus precluded to judicial review) are cited as reasons for the lesser protection of aliens at the 
federal level.
78For example, aliens can be elected for the state civil service (Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) ) and for public education (Nyquist v. Mauchlet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)); they can also be admitted 
to the bar (In re Grifiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)).
79See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 US 67 (1976); Foley 
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 68 (1978); Arnbach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 
454 U.S. 432 (1982).
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coincide, substantially, with the fundamental rights protected by national constitutions, 
hence the great influence that the former have had upon the latter. This influence has 
been felt at two different levels. At the purely theoretical level, international conventions 
have reinforced the idea that certain rights do not only belong to all individuals, but 
must also be guaranteed to all, independently of citizenship. At the practical level, 
international conventions enshrine certain mechanisms to ensure that national rights, 
insofar as they are also proclaimed at the international level, are duly guaranteed to both 
citizens and aliens by the ratifying countries.
1 ♦ 2 T he R ight to the Secrecy of Telecom m unications
The above paragraphs should have illustrated the evolution involved in the 
status of aliens as well as some of the reasons which conditioned this evolution. Let us 
now look at how this evolution has affected the recognition of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications to aliens. The following paragraphs will focus on aliens as holders 
of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in the ECHR, Germany and the 
United States.
1.2.1 The European Convention on Human Rights
The ECHR is a clear example of the evolution of the legal status of aliens. First 
of all, the Convention is evidence of the important role that supranational instruments 
have played in the recognition and protection of fundamental rights within the ratifying 
nations. Furthermore, the holders of the rights recognised in the ECHR are defined in 
functional terms and not on a contractual basis. The holders of the Convention rights 
are defined in art. 1, which reads as follows:
Article 1:
"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention" (emphasis 
added)
According to this provision, the High Contracting Parties must guarantee 
Convention rights to all persons, independently of their nationality or status, provided 
that they are under their actual authority and responsibility. This applies even to 
nationals o f States which are not parties to the Convention, as well as to stateless 
persons; moreover, art. 1 applies regardless of whether the person in question is inland 
or abroad. As pointed out by the Commission, "the obligations undertaken by the High
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Contracting Parties in the Convention are essentially of an objective character" and do 
not aim "to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High Contracting Parties"80.
1.2.2 Germany
The German Basic Law recognises the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications as a right for every individual. TTiis is also the case for most rights 
recognised as fundamental in the Basic Law81. It therefore seems that, at the time of the 
making of the Constitution, the idea already prevailed that the universal recognition of 
fundamental rights ought to be regarded as the rule, whereas the restriction of certain 
rights to citizens ought to be regarded as the exception. It is also worthy of note that 
secrecy of telecommunications is one of the few rights that has always been recognised 
not only to Germans but to all individuals82.
This circumstance could arguably have been influenced by a historical anecdote: 
the secrecy of telecommunications was for the first time explicitly proclaimed as a 
fundamental right, with appeals to the "droit du gens", as a reaction against the opening 
of letters the addressees of which were aliens. It was first recognised by the French 
’Assemblée Nationale' in 179083 as a response to the fact that city authorities had 
opened some letters while they were on their way to their addressee. The opening of 
letters was certainly no unusual thing at the time. The problem was that these particular 
letters had official character and, moreover, that they were addressed to foreign political 
personalities (in particular to two Spanish Ministers), so that their opening could give 
rise to a diplomatic issue. Thus, the incident which triggered attention towards the 
importance of protecting the secrecy of telecommunications involved the right to 
secrecy enjoyed by foreign personalities.
80Ap. 788/60, Dec. Adm. Com of 11 January 1961. YB IV 116 (138-140). See also Ap. 6780/74, 
6950/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 26 May 1975, YB XVIII p. 82 at 118; Ap. 7289/75, 7349/76, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 14 July 1977, YB XX p. 372 at 402.
81The only exceptions are freedom of assembly (art. 8), freedom of association (art. 9), freedom of 
movement (art 11) and the right to choose a trade, occupation or profession (art. 12).
82A s the Basic Law, preceding constitutions simply stated in generic terms that the secrecy of 
telecommunications is inviolable. See also Badura, in Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, art. 10, 
p.16; Maunz-Diirig-Herzog, GGKommentar, Art. 10, p. 19; Mangoldt Klein, Das Bonner GG, Art. 10, 
II5, p. 336; Pappermann, Art 10, GGKommentar by Ingo von Miinch, Par. 4, p. 434.
83Decree of the French 'Assemblée Nationale' enacted on the 10th of August 1790, Archives 
Parlementaires de 1787 à I860, Première Série, Tome XVII, Paris, 1984, pp. 695 et seq.
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1.2.3 The United States
V
The Supreme Court o f the United States only started to deal with aliens' fourth 
amendment rights some decades ago, at a time when the functionalist approach to rights 
already prevailed and the reading of the amendment was already guided by an interest in 
the protection of privacy. In this context, the Court has had no trouble affirming that the 
coverage o f the fourth amendment embraces aliens, even illegal aliens84, in the same 
terms as it embraces citizens, for according to the Supreme Court there exists a 
"sufficiently strong nexus between the Unites States and the targets o f such 
searches"85.
Nevertheless, the protected scope o f the right against searches and seizures is 
narrower in the context of aliens than in the context of nationals. This is notably the 
case in admission and deportation cases86. Border87 searches and seizures may be 
carried through88 without a warrant and even without probable cause89 provided that j
there is "reasonable suspicion"90 that a particular alien is illegally in the country. The l
same suffices in the stopping of persons on the street conducted by agents of the 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) and with the aim of deporting illegal 
aliens. Moreover, searches for illegal aliens at fixed inland checkpoints do not even 
require reasonable suspicion91. O f course, citizens might also be the occasional victims 
of all these searches and seizures, so that aliens might not be the only persons affected
S4Au Yi Lau v. INS. 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); INS v. Lopez* 
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
85Note, "A Dual Standard...’* at 1679.
86At the statutory level, admission and deportation searches and seizures are regulated in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USCS § 1357(a)(1)). § 287(a)(3) of this Act authorizes agents 
without a warrant "within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States, to 
board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway 
car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle..." (probable cause is not mentioned). As for the expression 
"reasonable distance", 25-air-mile distance has been considered too wide to be reasonable (Almeida- 
Sanchez v. U.S. 413 US 266, 272-273 (1973)). Its § 287(a)(1) authorizes any officer or employee of 
the INS without a warrant "to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to 
be or to remain in the United States".
87The Supreme Court found that the term ’border* covers also a border's functional equivalents, such as 
a station by the border, the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border or an airport 
CMmeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 413 US 266, 272-273 (1973)).
88"The Border Patrol conducts three types of surveillance along inland roadways, ... permanent 
checkpoints ..., temporary checkpoints ... and ... roving patrols" (Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 413 US 
266,268 (1973))
s9U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873, 880-881 (1975), where this exception to both the warrant and 
the probable-cause requirements is justified by "the importance of the governmental interest at stake, 
the minimal intrusion of a brief stop and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border"; 
the validity of its execution is dependent on its proportionality with the reasons justifying it.
90”Reasonable suspicion", as required by the Supreme Court, must be found according to the 
characteristics of the area, by information about recent illegal border crossings in the area, by the aspect 
of the vehicle or by the persons behaviour and appearance. Yet, taken alone, this latter indication does 
not suffice to justify "reasonable suspicion" (U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873 at 881 (1975).
91 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 US 5436 (1976).
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by the limitation of the protected scope of the fourth amendment that they imply. 
However, this does not change the fact that these searches and seizures are theoretically 
addressed only to aliens, i.e. to people who can eventually be deported from the 
country. This means ideally that, if no error has been committed, nationals would not 
be subject to the above limitations of the protected scope of the fourth amendment; the 
fact that they sometimes are must be considered purely accidental.
On the other hand, the content o f the fourth amendment right is not subject to 
restrictions specifically aimed at aliens. Yet, aliens are particularly affected by two 
general exceptions to the use of the exclusionary rule introduced by the Supreme Court: 
they are affected, first, by the fact that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil 
proceedings, since deportation proceedings are civil92, second, they are also affected 
by the fact that the rule does not apply when the item of evidence at stake is the 
defendant's own body or identity93.
So far we have dealt with the position of aliens in the context of the fourth 
amendment Let us now focus on aliens' right to the secrecy of telecommunications as 
recognised in this provision. In principle, this right is subject to the limitations imposed 
both on the protected scope and on content of an alien’s fourth amendment rights. Note 
however that some of these limitations hardly find any scope of application in the 
context of the secrecy of telecommunications. This is notably the case o f those which 
affect the protected scope of an alien's fourth amendment rights. These limitations 
apply in the context of border searches and seizures, street stops by INS agents or 
searches at inland checkpoints, that is, they apply in contexts where the possibility of 
an interception of a piece of telecommunication is hardly imaginable. No additional 
restriction has been imposed upon the protection and/or the content of an alien's right to 
the secrecy of telecommunication by the Supreme Court. The Court seems to take the 
view that the functional position o f aliens in the context of interferences with 
telecommunications does not differ from the position of citizens. No functional reason 
seems to suggest that either the scope of protection of this right or the remedies 
available in the case of its violation should be narrower in the case of aliens94.
92INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032 (1984).
93Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1974); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza. 468 US 1032 at 1039 (1984).
94At the statutory level, however, some functional distinction is made in the context of foreign 
intelligence surveillance, between United States persons (i.e. citizens and permanent resident aliens), on 
the one hand, and foreigners, on the other. According to § 1802 USC, measures of foreign intelligence 
surveillance which are highly unlikely to affect a U. S. person need not be authorised by the judiciary.
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2 .  M in o rs
I will now refer to minors as a second group of doubtful holders of the 
fundamental right to the secrecy of telecommunications. In principle, age is not a 
condition on being the holder of a fundamental right -with exceptions such as the case 
of the right to vote. Nevertheless, the question may arise as to what extent minors have 
the necessary capacity or maturity actually to be considered the holder of a particular 
fundam ental right. Now, being the holder o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunication does not seem to require a particular level of maturity, yet problems 
start to arise when one turns to the interest which lies behind the recognition of the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications, i.e. the interest in the protection of privacy. As 
was explained in chapter 1, the concept of privacy enshrines an element of volition, so 
that privacy only exists -hence a right to privacy can only be claimed- in as far as 
privacy is voluntarily chosen. The problem is that volition requires a certain level of 
maturity, a level which not all minors might have, even if they are able to hold a 
telephone conversation or to write a letter. Referring back to privacy therefore implies 
that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications can only be exercised by persons 
who have acquired a certain level of maturity.
A turn to the concept of privacy is inevitable in the context of the United States, 
for here the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications is recognised as 
part of the fourth amendment since the concept o f privacy has controlled the 
interpretation of this provision. Moreover, the Supreme Court openly defines the 
coverage o f the fourth amendment on the basis of the concept of privacy. As was 
explained in chapter 4, privacy is conceived in this context as a reasonable expectation 
of privacy which society is ready to accept as such. This means that the Supreme Court 
could (and looking at its case-law on the coverage of the fourth amendment, it probably 
would) deny the right to the secrecy of telecommunications to persons who lack the 
maturity to expect his telecommunications to be private, i.e. secret; moreover, the Court 
could deny this right to persons who lack the maturity to have an expectation of secrecy 
which society is ready to accept as reasonable.
On the other hand, turning to privacy or even to personality is not a necessary 
step either in Germany or in the ECHR. The reason is that in these two contexts the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications is recognised as a right independent of 
privacy. It is true that privacy remains the background interest for the recognition of 
this right, yet it is one thing to help in interpreting this right and quite a different thing 
for it to act as a direct source of the definition for its holders. As an independent right, 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunication is defined in objective terms, i.e. it is
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defined on the basis of the scope of the terms 'secrecy' and 'telecommunications', so 
that no subjective element such as volition comes to qualify the definition of the right It 
can therefore be concluded that the maturity of a person has no influence upon her 
being the holder of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications and that a person can 
be the holder of this right from the moment she can be a party to an act of 
telecommunication95.
3 . Legal Persons
Introduction
Finally, I will deal with the issue of whether legal persons are the holders of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications. The central question is whether and, if so, 
to what extent, legal persons can be the holders of this right; to put it in the words of 
art. 19.3 of the German Basic Law, the question is to what extent the nature of this 
right permits it to be exercised by legal persons. For it is obvious that not every right 
can be exercised by a legal person: let us think, e.g., o f the right to life or to human 
dignity. Is this or is this not the case w ith . the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications? This question clearly leads to a more fundamental one, i.e. 
whether a legal person can be a party to an act of telecommunication. When the legal 
representative o f a legal person takes part in an act of telecommunication, whose right 
to the secrecy of telecommunication is at stake? Is it this person's right or the right of 
the legal person she represents?
The answ er to this question is clearer in the context of written 
telecommunications, for the role of the actual natural person who writes and reads what 
is to be communicated is less relevant than the role of the natural person who speaks in 
oral telecommunications. Letters, telegrams, even E-mail messages can be addressed to 
and even sent by a legal person as such, so that the particular natural person who 
actually receives or sends the message can be irrelevant and sometimes is not even 
specified. I therefore believe that a legal person can be regarded as a party to an act of 
written telecommunications. Once this is accepted, saying that legal persons can also 
take part in oral telecommunications appears as a small step to take; for in the end the 
idea that it is the legal person who communicates through its legal representative also 
applies to that case. In my opinion, therefore, legal persons can take part in
95Note that in Germany minors are allowed to use the postal service even if the do not have full legal 
capacity to act (§ 8.1.2 Postgesetz).
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telecommunications, hence that they have a fundamental right that the secrecy o f their 
telecommunications be respected.
The conclusion that legal persons have a right to the secrecy of the 
telecom m unications in which they take part is shared by some German 
commentators96. Also the Supreme Court of the United States has reached a similar 
conclusion in the context o f the fourth amendment right against searches and 
seizu res97, in spite of the fact that this provision only refers to "people” and 
"persons”98. This conclusion applies in the context of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications recognised within the fourth amendment; for if legal persons can 
have a right that their premises be not searched and their property be not seized, they 
can also have a right that letters or E-mail messages sent by or to them as legal persons 
be not surveyed.
With the above conclusion, however, the question whether legal persons can 
have a right to the secrecy of telecommunications is not yet completely solved. It still 
has to be decided which legal persons can be the holders of this right. The recognition 
of this right for domestic legal persons of private law is uncontroversial. Doubts arise 
with respect to foreign legal persons, to legal persons under public law and, finally, 
with respect to organisations without legal personality. In the following paragraphs I 
will analyse to what extent these three categories of legal persons or, more generally, of 
organisations, are holders of fundamental rights. Questions on this issue have been 
posed in the context of the ECHR and Germany, where the relevant provisions are, 
respectively, art. 25 of the ECHR and art. 19.3 of the German Basic Law. According 
to art. 25 of the ECHR, complaints before the Commission may be raised by "any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals"; according to art. 19.3 
of the German Basic Law, ”[t]he basic rights shall apply also to domestic legal persons 
to the extent that the nature of such rights permits". I will now analyse the way these 
two provisions or, more generally, their respective legal systems, deal with the three 
categories of legal persons mentioned above, i.e. organisations without legal 
personality, foreign legal persons and legal persons under public law.
96In this context, see Badura, Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Par. 25, p. 16; Mangoldt-Klein, 
Das Bonner Grundgesetz* Art. 10, II 6, p. 337; Papperraann, "Art. 10” GGKommentar by Münch, Par. 
4, p. 434; Maunz-Dürig-Herzog, Art. 10, GGKommentar, Art. 10, Par. 22, p. 19.
97Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Silverthorne Lumber 
Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
98See the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan to Hale v. Henkel (cit. at 78) and the joint dissenting 
opinion of Justice Brewer and the Chief Justice (at 85)
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3.1 Organisations without Legal Personality
Art. 25 of the ECHR does not exclusively mention legal persons as holders of 
the Convention rights; rather, it more generally refers to organisations or groups of 
individuals, which implies that legal personality is not a requirement for being the 
holders of the Convention rights. That this is the case has been confirmed by the 
Commission".
On the other hand, art. 19.3 of the German Basic Law explicitly refers to "legal 
persons", whereby it seems to be discarding entities without legal personality as 
holders of fundamental rights. However, one commentator* 100 has argued that the fact 
that only legal persons are mentioned does not imply that entities without legal 
personality are not holders of fundamental rights; on the contrary, it is argued, the fact 
that legal persons are mentioned implies "a fortiori" that entities without legal 
personality must also be holders of fundamental rights. For one thing, such entities are 
essentially closer to natural persons, i.e. to the natural holders of fundamental rights, 
than legal persons are. This position seems supported by the doctrine of the 
Constitutional Court on the holders of fundamental rights. According to the Court, 
"fundamental rights are above all rights of the individual... [hence] regarding juristic 
persons as holders of fundamental rights is only licit when the creation and activity of 
these persons is expression of the free development of private natural persons"101. This 
rationale seems to be open to the recognition of fundamental rights to organisations 
without legal personality. This point of view has the advantage of harmonising the 
recognition of rights under the German Basic Law and under the ECHR. Nevertheless, 
the Constitutional Court has so far preferred to leave this question unanswered102.
3 .2  Foreign Legal Persons
Art. 25 of the ECHR refers to any persons, non-governmental organisations 
and groups of individuals as holders o f the Convention rights. This definition must be 
qualified on the basis of art. 1 of the ECHR, however. As was observed when 
studying the rights of aliens above, art. 1 does not go as far as to rule that holders of 
the Convention rights must only be the nationals of the Contracting Parties, yet it does
"Ap. No. 6538/74, Dec. Adm. Com. of 21 March 1975,2 D&R, p. 90 at 95-96; Ap. 7565/76, Dec. 
Adm. Com. of 7 March 1977,9 D&R, p. 117 at 118; Ap. No. 8652/79, Dec. Adm. Com. of 15 Oct. 
1981, 26 D&R, p. 89.
100Hendrichs, "Art. 19" in GGKommentar, ed. by Ingo von Münch, p. 701.
101BVerfGE 21. 362 at 369; 61.82 at 101.68 193 at 205-206; 75,192 at 195-196 (my translation).
102BVerfGE 3,19 at 22.
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rule that the holders of the Convention rights are only those under the jurisdiction of 
one of the Contracting Parties. A look at art. 1 in conjunction with art. 25 suggests that 
holders o f the Convention rights are not just any non-governmental organisations and 
groups o f individuals, but only non-governmental organisations and groups of 
individuals in as far as they act subject to the legal rules of a Contracting Party, even if 
they do not have their headquarters in the confines of a Contracting Party (i.e. even if 
they are not nationals of a Contracting Party).
If the wording of art. 25 of the ECHR appears to be overly permissive with 
respect to the nationality of the legal persons which can be the holders of the 
Convention rights, the wording of art. 19.3 of the German Basic Law, on the other 
hand, is too narrow for it exclusively refers to 'domestic' legal persons. In private 
international law, the expression 'domestic legal persons' refers to legal persons which 
have their headquarters in Germany. This definition is most commonly accepted within 
the context of art. 19.3103, yet some commentators have raised their voice against it on 
the grounds that it is too narrow. In particular, it has been suggested that a legal person 
should be regarded as 'domestic' (i.e. as the holder of fundamental rights) if it is so 
recognised as a legal person in Germany, i.e. if it is granted legal capacity to act as a 
legal person in Germany and is therefore 'under German jurisdiction'104. This 
interpretation is attractive because it results from a functionalist approach to the 
recognition of fundamental rights: it makes the term 'domestic' embrace legal persons 
as far as they are actually subjected to German law. In addition, it helps to harmonise 
the recognition of rights under the German Basic Law and under the ECHR. The 
Constitutional Court has taken some steps towards the acceptance of this interpretation 
of art. 19.3, The Court has ruled105 that legal persons with their headquarters outside 
Germany are also holders of the so-called 'procedural' fundamental rights (although the 
Court has referred to arts. 101 et seq. this conclusion also applies to arts. 17, 19.4), 
that is they can have access to German courts if they act under German jurisdiction. 
This is, however, as far as the Constitutional Court has been prepared to go; it has not 
more generally recognised fundamental rights for foreign legal persons106.
103K. M. Meeseen, "Ausländische juristische Personen als Träger von Grundrechten" (1970) JZ 602 at 
604. Commentators generally accept that this definition would change if the law-maker decided to re­
define the expression in the context of international private law (ibid.).
104This interpretation is supported by Hendrichs, "An. 19" in GGKommentar, Par. 32, p. 701.
105BVerfGE 12,1 at 8; 18, 441 at 447; 21, 326 at 373.
106See, e.g., BVerfGE 18, 441 at 447 (the Court left the question unsolved of whether a foreign legal 
person could be the holder of the rights recognised in arts. 2.1,3.1 and 14); 23,229 at 236 (the Court 
denied that a French "Association culturelle" could claim the violation of fundamental rights).
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The question now is, can the right to the secrecy of telecommunications be 
listed as a procedural right to this effect? I believe that this question ought to be 
answered in the affirmative. For it seems absurd to me that public authorities are 
required to behave differently vis-à-vis a firm's telecommunications depending on 
whether the office in German soil of those whose telecommunications are being 
intercepted is either the headquarters of this firm or just one of its branches. In other 
words, it seems absurd to me that only the interception of the form er's 
telecommunication is subject to certain procedural requirements, whilst the latter’s can 
be freely intercepted. Every legal person under German jurisdiction ought to have a 
right to the secrecy of its telecommunications, so that these can only be intercepted 
where there is prior compliance with certain requirements which are specified by law, 
most of which of a procedural nature.
3.3 Legal Persons of Public Law
Art. 25 of the ECHR exclusively refers to "non-governmental" organisations, 
hence it excludes from among the holders of the Convention rights legal persons 
"which exercise public functions on behalf of the State"107. This exclusion can be 
interpreted in absolute terms, so that legal persons of public law may never be holders 
of the Convention rights; yet it can also be interpreted in functional terms, which would 
imply that public legal persons cannot be the holders of Convention rights only in as far 
as they exercise public functions on behalf of the State or that their public character 
affects the way they act in private legal relations. This second reading seems coherent 
with the functionalist approach adopted by the Convention organs in other fields, such 
as in the recognition of rights to aliens. The Convention organs have not yet adopted a 
clear position on this issue, however. They have for example recognised the 
Convention rights to religious organisations even if they are public-law corporations, 
for they do not exercise public power; on the other hand, they have left the question 
open of whether public enterprises can be the holders of these rights108.
As opposed to the Convention organs, the German Constitutional Court has 
long since addressed the question whether legal persons of public law can be the 
holders of fundamental rights. The point of departure is art. 19.3, which contains a hint
107Ap. 5767/72, 5922772, 5929-31/72, 5953-57/72. 5984-88/73 and 6011/73, Dec. Adm. Com. of 31 
May 1974, YB XVII p. 338 (352); 46 Colt. Dec. p. 118 (125-126).
108On this issue, see H.C. Krüger &  C.A. Norgaard, "The Right of Application", The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 
p. 657 at 666.
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at the functionalist approach suggested above: art. 19.3 recognises fundamental rights 
to legal persons Mto the extent that the nature of such rights permits". On the basis of 
this expression, the Constitutional Court has reasoned that it is in the nature of 
fundamental rights that they be recognised for individuals, so that legal persons are 
only holders of these rights in as far as they give expression to the free development of 
private natural persons. From here, the Court continues to say that "these conditions are 
fulfilled by legal persons o f private law" but not by legal persons of public law "in as 
far as they cany out a public duty"109. To the extent that this is so, public legal persons 
cannot be regarded as holders o f fundamental rights; for one thing, to the extent that 
they carry out a public duty public legal persons belong to the public sphere, hence they 
are not the holders but the addressees of fundamental rights110.
There are cases, however, in which public legal persons relate to the public 
sphere from outside the public sphere itself and are, therefore, in the same position of 
subordination to and independence from the public sphere as a private individual is111. 
In such cases, public legal persons can be the holders of fundamental rights. 
Subordination and independence from the public sphere typically characterise the 
exercise of the so-called 'procedural fundamental rights'. In fact, these rights can be 
regarded as objective rules o f behaviour that the Constitution imposes upon certain 
branches of the State and the Constitutional Court has had no problem in ruling that 
legal persons of public law are holders of these rights112. This position of 
subordination and independence is more difficult to find in the context of other 
fundamental rights -what we could call 'substantial' fundamental rights. The reason is 
that public legal persons usually relate to these fundamental rights from the standpoint 
of the particular status they have vis-à-vis the public sphere, that is, they do not relate to 
these fundamental rights from the same position as a private individual does. The Court 
has only recognised 'substantial' fundamental rights to public legal persons when these 
carry out an activity which typically belongs to the exercise of a particular fundamental 
right. This is the case with Universities in the context of the freedom of "art and 
science, research and teaching" (art. 5.3); of public media in the context of the freedom 
of the press (art. 5.1.2); o f the Church in the context of the "freedom of faith, of 
conscience, of creed, religious" and of the freedom to the "undisturbed practice of
109BVerfGE 21, 362 at 369; 45, 63 at 78; 61, 82 at 101. 68 193 at 206; 75, 192 at 196 (my 
translation).
110BVerfGE 21,362; 61,82 at 100-101; 68,193 at 205; 75.192,195 et seq; 78,101 at 102.
11 ^ Subordination' must be complemented with 'independence', for otherwise we might simply be 
facing the relation among different bodies of the public power on the basis of 'competence' (see 
BVerfGE 21,362 at 368 et seq; 45,63 at 79; 61,82 at 103; 68,193 at 205 et seq; 75,192 at 196; see 
also Erichsen, Staatsrecht und Verfassimgsgerichtbarkeit I. München 1976, p. 173).
1I2See BVerfGE 3, at 363; 6, 45; 13,132; 21.362 at 373; 61, 82 at 104.
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religion" (art. 4); or of professional associations of public law in as far as they 
represent and defend the professional interests of their members113.
In sum, the Constitutional Court does not give a definite answer to the question 
of whether legal persons of public law are included under art. 19.3. Rather, the Court 
approaches this question in functional terms: whether or not legal persons of public law 
are the holders of fundamental rights "depends on the role that a public legal person 
plays when it is affected by an act of the public power" which might amount to the 
violation of a fundamental right114. How does this conclusion apply to the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications? What is the role of public legal persons vis-à-vis the 
public power in the context of this right? These questions have not been raised before 
the Constitutional Court, yet it would most probably simply avoid giving a definite 
answer. What the Court would most probably do -what indeed ought to be done- is to 
look at the position that a legal person has with respect to the public sphere in the 
context of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, i.e. whether a legal person is 
in the same position of subordination and independence from the public sphere which 
carries out an interference as is a private individual.
Let me now summarise the above notes on legal persons as holders of the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications. In principle, legal persons can be holders of the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications in the ECHR, Germany and in the United 
States. The question is -which legal persons can be holders of this right and concerns, in 
particular, foreign and public legal persons and organisations without legal personality. 
Neither in the context of the ECHR nor in Germany has this question been fully 
addressed, yet the tendency seems to be to address it in functionalist terms and look at 
the particular position of a particular legal person vis-à-vis the public sphere. These 
issues have not yet been dealt with by the Supreme Court of the United States, although 
it is highly likely that the Court would approach this issue in the same functionalist 
terms as it approaches others, such as the status of aliens; thus, before deciding 
whether foreign and public legal persons and organisations without legal personality are
113See BVerfGE 15, 256 at 262; 18, 385 at 386; 31, 314 at 322; 59, 231 at 254; 68, 193 at 207; 70, 
1 at 20-21. The position of the Constitutional Court with respect to public legal persons as holders of 
rights is analysed by Otto Seidl, "Gnmdrechtsschutz juristischer Personen des öffentlichen Rechts in der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts" Festschrift für W. Zeidler, Band 2, Walter de Gryter, 
Berlin - New York, p. 1459.
114BVerfGE 68, 193 at 208 (my translation). This position is shared, e.g., by Hendrichs, "Art. 19" in 
GGKommentar, p. 706-707; Erichsen, Staatsrecht und Verfassungsgerichtbar keit I, pp. 167 et seq. 
Some commentators have argued against this functional interpretation on the grounds of the 'unity of 
the public power'; yet this Unitarian view of the public sphere seems to me to be too simplistic to 
account for the present structure of the public sphere (for this issue, see Erichsen, Staatsrecht und 
Verfassungsgerichtbarkeit I, p. 174).
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the holders of a fundamental right, the Court is likely to look at the actual role that each 
particular organisation or legal person plays in society and vis-à-vis the public sphere.
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Conclusion
i
I started this thesis with a concrete claim. I claimed that the right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications is best guaranteed in systems where three basic ideas are 
respected. These ideas were presented as follows: [1] the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications ought to be regarded as essentially liberal in character, hence as a 
negative right of defence against the State; yet this right should also be supplemented by 
a positive subjective dimension; [2] the protection o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications ought to be regarded as a condition for the free participation of 
individuals in public life; [3] the conceptual boundaries of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications ought to be well defined on the basis of a clear unifying rationale. 
Having these three ideas in mind, I then proceeded to compare the way the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications is recognised and protected in the ECHR, in the German 
Basic Law and in the Federal Constitution of the United States, in order to test the 
extent to which my initial claim was correct. I hope to have argued convincingly that it
is. By way of conclusion, I would now like to summarise the most pertinent points of 
this comparison.
The practical advantages o f approaching the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications as essentially liberal in character should be clear from the study of 
its structure. To be more precise, the advantages should have become clear upon 
comparing the consequences of conceiving fundamental rights as two-level structures 
according to liberal patterns, with the consequence of conceiving them as single-level 
structures according to an institutional or a social approach to these rights. This was the 
purpose of chapter 3. Here we saw that the three systems under consideration recognise 
the right to the secrecy of telecommunications basically as a negative right with a two- 
level structure, yet this structure is consistently respected only in the context of the 
ECHR. This implies that the coverage of the negative right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is defined on purely conceptual grounds only in the context of the 
ECHR, while in Germany and the United States it is also defined on the basis of non- 
conceptual considerations (the so-called 'inherent limitations') introduced by courts. In 
other words, in Germany and in the United States certain limitations on the negative 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications are not regarded as restrictions on its 
protected scope, but as part of its very definition. As a result, these limitations need not 
comply with the requirements imposed upon restrictions of the protected scope o f this 
right (they for example need not be the result of a balance or be subject to strict
interpretation), but apply in the same unconditional manner as do the conceptual 
boundaries of a right
Chapter 3 thus illustrated the advantages o f respecting the basically liberal 
character of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications and the two-level structure 
attached to it. Only where this structure is respected is the coverage of this right defined 
as widely as possible on conceptual grounds, while its limitations are consistently made 
to comply with certain requirements and are subject to strict interpretation and 
application. This does not mean that the right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
ought not to have a positive dimension, since this has a single-level structure. It was 
part of my initial claim that a positive dimension, even a positive subjective dimension, 
is perfectly compatible with a liberal approach to this right as long as it complements 
and does not replace its basic negative one. Indeed, so long as this is the case, the right 
to the secrecy of telecommunications ought to have a positive subjective dimension, 
because this implies more efficient protection of this right.
The case of the ECHR should have confirmed the idea that recognising a 
positive right to the secrecy o f telecommunications is compatible with the basic negative 
dimension of this right and that it favours its more efficient protection. Indeed, we saw 
in chapter 4 that both these dimensions coexist in perfect harmony in the ECHR.
According to the organs o f the Convention, the Contracting Parties have not only the 
negative obligation to refrain from interfering with the secrecy of telecommunications; 
in addition, they have the positive obligation to provide for an adequate legal and 
institutional framework to ensure that telecommunications can actually be held in 
secrecy. Moreover, the holders of this right have a subjective claim that these positive 
obligations be fulfilled. This clearly places holders of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications in a much more favourable position vis-à-vis the exercise of this 
right than they are in the German context and that of the United States, where this right 
has not been recognised as containing a positive subjective dimension.
One of the advantages of the positive subjective dimension of the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications is that it offers a strong basis for the application of this 
right with indirect third party effect. In the context of the ECHR, a Contracting Party 
can be made responsible for a private violation of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunication whenever this can be attributed to the fact that the Contracting Party 
in question has not complied with its positive obligations vis-à-vis the right. 
Admittedly, the State's positive subjective obligations are not the only grounds for the 
application of fundamental rights in private relationships. The German Constitutional 
Court, for example, relies both upon the State's positive and negative duties toward 375
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fundamental rights (in particular, it relies upon the duties of the judicial branch of the 
State), whereas the Supreme Court of the United States relies exclusively upon a state's 
negative duties and applies fundamental rights in private relationships on the basis of 
the so-called 'state action' doctrine. As we saw in chapter 7, all these positions permit 
the application of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications with third party effect. 
Yet we also saw that the doctrine of the positive obligations developed by the organs of 
the Convention allows the widest application of this right in private relationships; in 
principle, it allows the application of this right in virtually any kind of private 
relationship. At the other extreme lies the American 'state action' doctrine, on the basis 
of which a right applies with respect to private persons only in as far as the conduct of 
the persons in question is "fairly attributable to the states", either because there has been 
a private assumption of government powers and functions or because the government is 
involved in a private activity. This covers, for example, the application of the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications vis-à-vis private telecommunication services or 
private prison staff, but not necessarily vis-à-vis employers. The potential that the 
judiciary branch offers for applying this right with third party effect in Germany lies 
somewhere in between these two extremes.
So much for the first of the three leading ideas o f my study. Throughout this 
thesis I have also tried to illustrate the disadvantages that an individualistic conception 
of privacy has for the protection o f the right to privacy, in general, and of the right to 
the secrecy o f telecommunications, in particular. I have taken the case of the United 
States as an example of such a conception. In the United States the right to privacy 
seems regarded as suspect. In particular, the right to privacy seems geared up to 
protecting individual preferences for secrecy and seclusion at the expense o f the 
common good, which requires higher levels of publicity. This can be felt in every detail 
of the Supreme Court's approach to the right to privacy guaranteed in the fourth 
amendment. To begin with, the definition of the coverage of the fourth amendment 
right is left in the hands of society, that is it is left in the hands of the major enemy of 
privacy. According to the Supreme Court, the fourth amendment guarantees an interest 
in privacy only in as far as an expectation of privacy is at stake which society is ready 
to accept as 'reasonable'. Moreover, according to the Court society cannot accept as 
'reasonable' an expectation o f privacy in a situation where privacy does not exist de 
facto, whereby the right to privacy is deprived of its prescriptive role. The Court thus 
seems to be trying to compensate for the antisocial tendencies of privacy; the result is 
that it is imposing serious restrictions upon the scope o f privacy that is accorded 
constitutional attention.
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Also the protected scope of the fourth amendment right is defined in restrictive 
terms. The Supreme Court subordinates the right to privacy guaranteed by this 
provision to any interest in law enforcement. According to the Court» privacy can be 
infringed for the prosecution of any crime at all» independently of any consideration as 
to the reasonableness of the infringement; in other words, whether there is a less 
intrusive way to prosecute the crime in question and whether the intrusion is 
proportionate to its aim is irrelevant. All that is required is that an interest in law 
enforcement is at stake and that the intrusion upon privacy interests is adequate to 
pursue this interest. In principle» both these circumstances must be checked by an 
independent magistrate, yet there are cases where the interest in law enforcement is 
considered so much stronger than the privacy interests at stake that it even justifies that 
this step be avoided, thus depriving privacy of its only formal guarantee.
Finally, the suspect character of privacy can be felt in the approach of the 
Supreme Court to the exclusionary rule, that is to the rule according to which evidence 
seized in violation of the right to privacy may not be used at trial. The Court does not 
regard the exclusionary rule as a means o f bringing the on-going consequences of a 
privacy wrong to an end. Rather, the rule is regarded as a measure aimed at preventing 
future privacy wrongs. Looked at as a means o f deterrence o f future wrongs, the 
application of the exclusionary rule has not always been considered obligatory but, 
more often than not, has been considered a matter of policy. Whether or not evidence 
unlawfully seized is excluded at trial is decided after having struck a balance between 
the potential for deterrence of future wrongs inherent in the exclusion, on the one hand, 
and the relevance of the evidence in question, on the other. In such a balance, the 
former hypothetical interest will usually yield to the latter and more concrete one. In 
sum, the importance the Court accords to violations of privacy is not such that it should 
justify a serious loss of relevant evidence.
In order to illustrate more clearly the disadvantages of conceiving privacy as an 
individualistic interest, I have compared this vision of privacy with its complete 
opposite. To be precise, I have compared it with a vision of privacy as a condition for 
free individual participation in the public life, hence as a condition for the existence of a 
constitutional democratic State conceived in discourse-theoretical terms. As was 
explained in chapter 1, this participatory vision of privacy is explicitly held by the 
German Constitutional Court. According to the Constitutional Court, the right to 
privacy is recognised in art. 2.1 of the Basic Law as an aspect of the right to the free 
development of one's personality and is conceived as a right to the control over one's 
area of seclusion and secrecy. The coverage of this right is by no means left in the 
hands of society. Nor can the right to privacy be restricted in an automatic manner for
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the protection of just any conflicting interest, even if this is an interest in law- 
enforcem ent1. This right can only be restricted on the basis of the principle of 
reasonableness, which requires that restrictions pursue aims of overriding importance 
(in the case of law enforcement, for example, restrictions must aim at protecting 
particularly serious crimes), that they be adequate means and the least intrusive means 
to attain their aims and, finally, that they be proportionate to the aims they pursue, that 
is that they be imposed as a result of a balance between the interest in the protection of 
privacy, on the one hand, and the interest in pursuing the aim in question, on the other. 
In addition, the use at trial o f evidence obtained through a privacy wrong is considered 
part of this wrong and therefore forbidden by the Constitution2. These general 
considerations apply with particular clarity in the context of the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications. As in the case of privacy, the coverage of this right is defined on 
objective grounds without reference to  social considerations, its protected scope is 
defined on the basis of the principle o f reasonableness and, finally, the exclusionary 
mie applies systematically in cases of unconstitutional telecommunication surveillance.
Taken alone, the German case also offers an example of the advantages that a 
participatory approach to privacy has over a purely individualistic approach. For it is 
true that the German Constitutional Court conceives of privacy in participatory terms, 
yet in the context of certain private relations other courts have shown an attitude 
towards the right to privacy that does not conform with a participatory vision of this 
right. This is particularly the case with the right to the secrecy of telecommunications as 
exercised in the context of labour relationships. In chapter 7 we saw that the Federal 
Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) has admitted that the fundamental right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications applies with third party effect vis-à-vis the employer. 
We also saw, however, that this Court tends to subordinate the protection of this right 
to the well-being of the work place in a rather automatic manner. The Federal Labour 
Court thus seems to disregard the idea that the protection of privacy should be enhanced 
as a condition for free participation in public life and that this is so also when the right 
to privacy is exercised against private individuals. Indeed, this is even more so when 
the holder of the right to privacy is subject to a power relationship with respect to the 
individual against whom this right is exercised, as is the case with the relationship 
between the employee and the employer.
*See BVerfGE 84,192 at 195. With reference to law enforcement, see BVerfGE 34,238 at 249, where 
the Constitutional Court affirmed that the right to privacy in one's spoken word can only be restricted 
for the prosecution of particularly serious crimes.
2B VerfGE 34,238 at 250 is a clear example of the application of the principle of reasonableness and of 
the exclusionary rule in this context.
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Let me finally come to the third leading idea of this thesis. In chapters 4 and 5 1 
have tried to illustrate the advantages of defining both the coverage and the protected 
scope of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications in clear terms. I have tried to 
illustrate the advantages of a clear definition by comparing the recognition of this right 
in the ECHR and in Germany, on the one hand, and in the United States, on the other. 
In the two former systems, the right to the secrecy of telecommunications is recognised 
in clear terms and by reference to a clear rationale, so that there can be little doubt as to 
when it is at stake. In consonance with this, the protected scope of this right is defined 
in terms which are also rather clear (as clear as they can possibly be, given that the 
protected scope of a right is the result of striking a balance between this right and other 
conflicting interests) and reasonably wide. In the United States, on the other hand, the 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications is recognised within the fourth amendment 
as part of the right to privacy, defined in rather loose terms.
That the definition of privacy and of the right to privacy is far from clear cut 
was discussed in chapter 1. Even if, as was proposed in that chapter, privacy is 
understood as secrecy and seclusion, the conceptual boundaries of the right to privacy 
remain rather loose, much looser than those o f the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications when this is independently recognised. The ill-defined character of 
privacy affects both the coverage and the protected scope of the fourth amendment 
right. Its coverage is defined by the existence of a 'reasonable expectation of privacy1. 
Its protected scope, in as far as it is defined by the warrant requirement, is drawn out 
on the basis of policy considerations concerning the extent to which an interest in 
privacy is at stake that is more worthy of protection than the general interest in safety 
and law enforcement. As a result, the boundaries of both the coverage and the protected 
scope of the fourth amendment right appear rather shaky. If we now put this 
circumstance together with the attitude of the Supreme Court of minimising the 
importance of privacy, then we can see that these two aspects of the Court's doctrine on 
the fourth amendment are perfectly complementary. On the one hand, leaving the 
coverage of the fourth amendment right in the hands of society contributes to its ill 
definition, and so does the subordination of the protected scope of this right to the 
interest in law enforcement. On the other hand, the ill-defined character of privacy also 
helps the Court to minimise the importance of the right to privacy; indeed, it provides a 
broad margin for the Court to portray its mistrust of this right and to restrict both its 
coverage and its protected scope at wish.
In spite of being recognised as an aspect of privacy, however, the right to the 
secrecy of telecommunications has so far escaped ill definition in the United States. So 
far it has escaped even the negative consequences of the individualistic approach to
379
privacy. This has been made possible by the existence of a statutory right to the secrecy 
of telecommunications. The secrecy of telecommunications has traditionally received 
clear and generous statutory protection in the USC, namely since the enactment of the 
Communication Act in 19343. This Act tried to make up for the fact that, under the 
property reading of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court denied that the right to 
the secrecy of telecommunications was included within the Bill of Rights. By way of 
compensation, the Communication Act not only recognised this right but also granted it 
nearly absolute protection, that is it subjected its protection to very limited exceptions. 
Currently, the definition of both the coverage and the protected scope of this right in the 
USC is still clear and generous; the USC even imposes the systematic application of the 
exclusionary rule in cases of unlawful telecommunication surveillance. The clarity of 
the statutory regulation of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications determines that 
relatively few cases on this right need arrive before the Supreme Court and that most of 
these cases need not be determined on constitutional grounds. Rather, the Supreme 
Court tends to deal with the right to the secrecy of telecommunications on the basis of 
statutory patterns, both because it has the policy of avoiding constitutional issues 
whenever possible and because the statutory regulation of this right is in any case 
clearer and more complete. Eventually, the Court combines a statutory with a 
constitutional level of reasoning, but even then it relies for the most part on statutory 
patterns when deciding on the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. As a result, 
the Supreme Court most often deals with a right to the secrecy of telecommunications 
which is clearly defined and broadly protected.
This situation is not ideal, however. It is not ideal that, to a great extent, the 
clear and generous definition o f the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications be left up to the ebbs and flows of political majorities, for this 
betrays the role of this right as a defender of the position of minorities and as a 
guarantee of a correct political discourse. At present, statutory concern with the 
protection of telecommunications seems high, yet there is no guarantee that it will be so 
tomorrow; indeed, the role of the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications should be to guarantee precisely that. Moreover, as the Supreme 
Court has sometimes affirmed, the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications ultimately remains different from the statutory version of this right. 
We therefore have a scenario in which the statutory right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications is both well defined and systematically protected via the 
exclusionary rule, yet where its corresponding constitutional right is neither. The higher 
standards set by the statutory regulation of this right might make the deficiencies of its
3Act of June 19, 1934, c. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, U.S.C.
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corresponding constitutional right appear less obvious and as a result their solution 
might appear less urgent; nevertheless, these deficiencies subsist. The constitutional 
right to the secrecy of telecommunications continues to be part of the right to privacy 
and this continues to be ill-defined and regarded as suspicious. In the context of the 
secrecy of telecommunications, these deficiencies might come to light more clearly any 
time, particularly if there should be a change in the statutory approach to this right. 
Only the coverage of the constitutional right to the secrecy of telecommunications has 
so far been defined in rather clear terms on purely constitutional grounds. Cases on this 
issue have however been so few that it is difficult to predict whether, should the 
occasion arise, the Supreme Court would not prefer to define also this sub-sphere of 
the fourth amendment on sociological grounds, which is its better established doctrine.
These were then the leading ideas of the thesis. Of course, throughout this 
comparative study other issues have arisen which were not necessarily related to these 
ideas. I hope to have dealt with them convincingly. At this point, I would only like to 
recall one aspect of the German regulation of the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications which deserves particularly strong criticism. I am thinking of art.
10.2.2 of the Basic Law as developed by the G 10. In chapter 6 we saw that art. 10.2.2 
of the Basic Law authorises the possibility, regulated by the G 10, that individuals who 
suspect that their telecommunications have been or are being intercepted have no 
recourse to the judiciary if the interception has been or is being carried out for the 
protection of national security or of the democratic system. Instead, the lawfulness of 
such interceptions is controlled by a non-judicial board created ad hoc by Parliament 
and whose work is carried out in the greatest secrecy. This, I believe, constitutes an 
unreasonable restriction of the constitutional rights to the secrecy of telecommunications 
and to judicial recourse. Admittedly, the restriction has a legitimate aim (it aims at 
keeping secret information about measures of surveillance of particular importance); I 
however think that it is unnecessary to attain it. Indeed, it seems to me that information 
about telecommunication surveillance could be kept secret even if measures of 
surveillance are subject to judicial review.
Let me now go back to my original claim as to how the secrecy of 
telecommunications can be best guaranteed. If my claim is correct, it then suggests that 
certain changes in the approach to this right are advisable in some of the systems I have 
studied in this thesis, most notably in that of the United States. To begin with, the two- 
level structure of the negative right to the secrecy of telecommunications should be 
respected consistently both in Germany and in the United States. This should not prove 
difficult to achieve, since both the German Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
of the United States rely on a basic two-level structure of the righ t Arguing that this
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structure should be respected in every case without exception can thus be taken as a 
simple quest for coherence in the case-law of these two Courts.
More difficult might be for these two Courts to recognise a positive subjective 
dimension to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications, because this implies 
granting the individual particularly powerful claims against the public power. Indeed, 
since the organs of the ECHR do not belong to a particular national legal system, they 
are in a more comfortable position to develop a doctrine which both strengthens the 
position of individuals vis-à-vis the public power and imposes positive burdens, even 
financial burdens upon the public power. They only need be careful not to go too far, 
so as not to antagonise the Contracting Parties, upon which the successful functioning 
of the Convention ultimately depends. National courts are bound to be less strict with 
the national public power. For them to impose such positive duties upon national public 
power and thus restrict its margin of policy action, on the other hand, they must believe 
that a particularly important right is at stake. The right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications might appear important enough in Germany, where the protection 
of individual privacy is regarded as a  pillar of the constitutional democratic State on 
discourse-theoretical grounds. It is much less likely that this right can appear important 
enough in the United States.
In order that the position of the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications can be improved in the United States, the Supreme Court's 
approach to privacy would need to undergo a radical change. The Supreme Court 
would have to stop regarding privacy as suspect and perceive it with a more positive 
eye, ideally even as a condition for free individual participation in public life. This 
would favour the recognition of a positive subjective dimension to the right to privacy, 
hence to the right to the secrecy of telecommunications. A more positive approach to the 
right to privacy would also help to compensate for the loose boundaries of this right 
and would accord it a more solid stand when balanced against other interests; 
moreover, it would constitute the first and fundamental step towards making the 
exclusionary rule apply as a real remedy against privacy wrongs. Being recognised as 
part of the right to privacy, the position of the constitutional right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications would be improved with such a doctrinal change.
Things could however be even better for the secrecy o f telecommunications in 
the United States if only this were recognised as an independent fundamental right; at 
least its boundaries as a fundamental right should be clearly defined as a sub-area of the 
all embracing right to privacy. Also in the ECHR and Germany the consistent 
protection of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications requires that it continues to
382
be defined in clear terms. This implies that the coverage of this right should not be 
enlarged to embrace open-channel modes of telecommunication. The secrecy of 
telecommunications carried out through open channels may be worthy of constitutional 
protection, yet this should not be granted at the expense of the efficient protection of 
closed-channel telecommunications. In order to protect the former while preserving 
protection o f the latter, the secrecy of open-channel telecommunications should be 
regarded as an aspect of the right to privacy.
383

Bibliography
ACKERMAN, Bruce A.: "The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution", 93 The 
Yale L. J. 1013 (1984).
A L E X  Y , Robert: Theorie der Grundrechte, Nomos Verlagsgesellshaft, Baden-Baden,
1985.
'Rights, Legal Reasoning and Rational Discourse", (1992) Ratio Juris 143.
"A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason", (1992) Ratio Juris 
231.
AMAR, Akhil Reed: "Forth Amendment First Principles", 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757
(1994).
AM ELUNG, Knut: "Zur dogm atischen E inordnung strafprozessualer 
Grundrechtseingriffe", (1987) JZ 737.
ANDERSON, Judith B: "The Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978", 16 Vanderbilt J. of Transnational L., 231 (1983).
APPLEGATE, John & GROSSMAN, Amy: "Pen Registers after Smith v. Maryland", 
15 Harv. Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 753 (1980).
ARE, Mario: "Interesse alla Qualificazione e Tutela della Personalità", in Studi in 
memoia di AAsquini, Cedam, Padova 1965, Vol. V, p. 2193.
ARENDT, Hannah: On Revolution, 1965, Penguin Books, reprinted 1990
BADURA: "Art. 10" in Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, C.F. Müller Juristische 
Verlag, 20. Lieferung, Heideiber 1968.
BARREN: "W. & B., The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev., 193 (1890): 
Demystifying a Landmark Citation", 13 Suffolk U. L. Rev., 875 (1979).
BARRETT: 'Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches - A Comment on 
People v. Cahan", 43 Cal. L. Rev. 565 (1955).
BÄR, Wolfgang: "Überwachung des Gemmeldeverkehrs - Strafprozessuale Eingriff­
möglichkeiten in den Datenverkehr", (1993) Computer und Recht 578.
"Zugriff au Femmeldedaten der Bundespost TELEKOM oder Dritter - 
Strafprozessuale Eingriffsmöglichkeiten in den Daten verkehr", (1993) 
Computer und Recht 634.
BEDINGFIELD, David: 'Privacy or Publicity? The Enduring Confusion Surrounding 
the American Tort of Invasion of Privacy", 55 Modern L. Rev. I l l  (1992).
BENDA, Ernst & KLEIN, Eckard: Lehrbuch des Verfassungsprozeßrechts, C.F. 
Müller Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg, 1991
BENN, Stanley I.: A Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1988.
mm T ir^nnnttiK
BERLIN, Isaiah: Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, London 1969.
BLACK, Charles L.: "The Supreme Court 1966 Term. Foreword: 'State Action', 
Equal Protection and California's Proposition", 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69 (1967).
BLANKE, Thomas & STERZEL, Dieter: "Ab die Post? Die Auseinandersetzung um 
die Privatisierung der Deutschen Bundespost" 26 Kritische Justiz 278 (1993).
BLECKMANN, Albert: Staatsrecht II, Allgemeine Grundrechtlehren, Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, Köln-Berlin-Bonn-München, 1985.
BLOUSTEIN, Edward J: 'Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: an Answer to Dean 
Prosser", 39 New York Univ. L. Rev. 963 (1964).
BOSTWICK, Gary L: "A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate 
Decision", 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1447 (1976).
BÖKENFÖRDE, Emst-Wolfgang: "Grundiechtstheorie und Grundrechtsinterpietation"
(1974) NJW 1529.
BRADLEY, Craig M: "Constitutional Protection for Private Papers", 16 Harv. Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 461 (1981).
BURBAN, Jean-Louis: Le Conseil de VEurope. Presses Universitaires de France. 
Collection "Que sais-je?", 1985
CANARIS, Claus-Wilhelm: "Grundrechtswirkungen und Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip 
in der richterlichen Anwendung und Fortbildung des Privatrechts", (1989) JuS 
161.
CANON, Bradley C.:"Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and 
a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion" 62 Ky L. J. 681 (1974).
CINQUEGRANA, Americo R.: "The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: the Background 
and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978", 137 
Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 793 (1989).
CLAPHAM, Andrew: "The 'D ritt Wirkung' of the Convention", The European System 
for the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht- 
Boston-London 1993, p. 186
CONSTANT, Benjamin: "The Liberty of the Ancients compared with that of the 
M odems" (in Benjamin Constant. Political Writings. Trans, and ed. 
Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge Univesity Press, 1988, p. 307.
CORWIN, Edward S.: "The ’Higher Law' Background, III", 42 Harv. L. Rev. 365 
(1928-29).
CRAIG, Paul P.: Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America, Clarendon Press,Oxford 1990.
CRUZ VILLALON, Pedro: 'Formación y Evolución de los Derechos Fundamentales",
25-27 REDC 35 (1989).
'F1 Legislador de los Derechos Fundamentales", Anuario de Derecho Público y 
Estudios Políticos, p. 7, Granada 1989.
385
De CUPIS, I Diritti della Personalità, Milano 1959, vol. I.
DELLINGER, W. Erhard: "Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword", 85 
Harv. L. Rev. 1532(1972)
"La Reforma Constitutional en Alemania: entre Etica y Seguridad Jurídica", 84 
Revista de Estudios Políticos 69 (1994).
DELVAUX, Henri: "The Notion of Victim under Article 25 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights", in Irene M aier (ed.), Protection of Human 
Rights in Europe. Limits and Effects. Proceedings of the Fifth International 
Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights, Müller, 
Heidelberg 1982, p. 31.
DEWEY, John: "Logical Method and Law", 10 The Cornell L. Q. 17 (1924-25).
DIXON, Robert G. Jr.: "The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an 
Expanded Law on Privacy?", in The Right o f Privacy. A Symposium of the 
implications of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Pennock and 
Chapman (ed.), Da Capo Press, New York 1971, p. 8.
Von DOEMMING, Klaus-Berto, FÜSSLEIN, Rudolf Werner & MATZ, Werner: 
'[Entstehungsgeschichte der Artikel des Grundgesetzes", 1 Jahrbuch des 
Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 1 (1951).
DOERNBERG, Donald L.: '"The Right of the People': Reconciling collective and 
Individual Interests under the Fourth Amendment", 58 New York Univ. L. 
Rev. 259 (1983).
DRZEMCZEWSKI, Andrew & MEYER-LADEWIG, Jens: 'Principal Characteristics 
o f the New ECHR Control Mechanism, as established by Protocol No. 11, 
signed on 11 May 1994", 15 Human Rights L. J. 81 (1994).
DUFFY, P J .: "The Protection of Privacy, Family Life and other Rights under Article 8 
o f the European Convention on Human Rights", (1982) Yearbook of European 
Law 190.
DÜRIG, G unter "Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde", 81 AÖR 117 
(1956).
DWORKIN, Ronald: Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London 1977.
DWORKIN, Roger B.: 'Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: the Limits 
o f Lawyering", 48 Indiana L. J. 329 (1973).
EBERLE, Carl-Eugen: "Datenschutz durch Meinungsfreiheit" (1977) DÖV 306.
EISSEN, Marc-André: "The Principle of Proportionality", The European System for 
the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht- 
Boston-London, 1993, p. 125.
ELKIND, David S.: "State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to 
Private Activity", 74 Col. L. Rev. 656 (1974).
EMERSON, Thomas I.: "Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine", The Right of Privacy. 
A Symposium on the Implications of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), Pennock and Chapman (ed.), Da Capo Press, New York 1971, p. 31.
386
ERICHSEN, Hans Uwe: Staatsrecht und Verfassungsgerichtbarkeit 1 ,2 Aufl. Beck. 
München 1976.
ERVIN, Sam J. Jr.: "The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of the Fourth 
Amendment", (1983) The Supreme Court Review 283.
ESTREICHER, Samuel: "Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: the 
Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments", 
74 Col L. Rev. 449 (1974).
EULLER, Steven: 'Private Security and the Exclusionary Rule", 15 Harv. Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 649 (1980).
FAWCETT, James Edward Sanford: The Application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Article 8). Clarendon Press, 2nd ed., Oxford 1987.
FEINBERG, Wilfred: "Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy", 48 Col. L. Rev. 
713 (1948).
FOOTE, Caleb: 'Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights", 39 Minn.
L. Rev. 493 (1955).
FRANKENBERG, Günter "Die Freiheit und die Verhältnisse", 17 Kritische Justiz 
437 (1984).
FRIEDMAN, Lawrence M.: A History of American Law, Simon & Schuster, New 
York, 1973.
FRAENKEL, Osmond K.: "Concerning Searches and Seizures", 34 Harv. L. Rev., 
361 (1920-1921).
FRANKENBERG, Günter "Die Freiheit und die Verhältnisse. Anmerkungen zu den 
Beschlüssen des BVerfG zur Kunstfreiheit ("Anachronistischer Zug") und zur 
"strategischen Überwachung" gemäß § 3 G 10", 17 Kritische Justiz 437 at 440 
et seq. (1984).
FRIED, Charles: ’Privacy", 77 Yale L. J. AIS (1968).
FROWEIN, Jochen Abr.: "The Federal Republic of Germany", in M. Delmas-Maiy 
(ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. 
International Protection versus National Restrictions, pp. 121-129. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. The Netherlands, 1992.
GARCIA DE ENTERRIA, Eduardo, LINDE, Enrique, ORTEGA, Luis Ignacio & 
SANCHEZ MORON, Miguel: El Sistema Europeo de Protección de los 
Derechos Humanos. Civitas, 2nd. ed., Madrid 1983.
GAVISON, Ruth: 'Privacy and the Limits of Law", 89 Yale L. J. 421 (1980).
GORDON, Harold R.: 'R ight of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and 
History", 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 553 (1960).
GÖSSEL, Karl Heinz: "Verfassungsrechtliche Verwertungsveibote im Strafverfahren",
(1984) JZ 361.
387
GRABITZ, Eberhard: 'D er Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts", 98 AÖR 568 (1973).
GROSS, Hyman: "The Concept of Privacy", 42 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 35 (1967).
GROßFELD Bernhard & JANSSEN, Helmut: "Zur Organisation der Deutschen 
Bundespost" 46 DÖV 424 (1993).
GUSY, Christoph: "Der Schtz vor Überwachungsmaßnahmen nach dem Gesetz zur 
Beschränkung des Art. 10 GG", (1981) NJW 1581.
GUTTERIDGE, H.C.: "Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy", (1931) The Law 
Quarterly Review 203.
HÄBERLE, Peter: "Die Abhörentscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 15.
12. 1970", (1971) JZ 145
Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Artikel 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz, Müller 
Juristische Verlag, Heidelberg 1983.
"Grundrechte und parlamentarische Gesetzgebung im Verfassungsstaat - das 
Beispiel des deutschen Grundgesetzes", 114 AÖR 361 at 389 (1989).
HEFFERMAN, William C.: "On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion", (1989) 
Wis. L. Rev. 1193.
HENDRICHS, Sigurd: "Art. 19", Grundgesetzkommentar, Hrg. von Ingo von 
Miinch, 2. Auflage München 1981, Band I, p. 690.
HENKIN, Louis: Trivacy and Autonomy", 74 Col. L. Rev. 1410 (1974).
HERBERT, Georg: 'D er Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte", (1985) EuGRZ 321.
HESSE, Konrad: "Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland", (1978) EuGRZ 427.
Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 16., 
ergänzte Auflage, C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg 1988.
HEYDE, Wolfgang: "Regelungsspielraum des Gesetzgebers bei Grundrechten", 
Festschrift für Wolf gang Zeidler, Walterde Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 1987, 
Band 2, p. 1429.
HOLMES, Stephen: Benjamin Constantand the Making of Modern Liberalism, Yale 
University Press, New Haven 1984.
HOFSTADTER and HOROWITZ, The Right of Privacy, Central Book Co., New 
York 1964.
HUND, Michael: "Staatliche Schutzpflichten statt Teilhaberechte?", Festschrift f ir  
Wolf gang Zeidler, W alter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 1987, Band 2 p. 
1445.
JARASS, Hans D.: 'D as allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht im Grundgesetz", (1989) 
NJW 857.
388
JIMENEZ CAMPO, Javier: "La Garantía Constitucional del Secreto de las 
Comunicaciones", 20 REDC 35 (1987).
KAISER, Eberhard: "Verwertbarkeit von Äußerungen Dritter während überwachter 
Telefongespräche (§ 100a StPO)", (1974) NJW 349.
KAL VEN, Harry Jr.: "Privacy in Tort Law -Were Warren and Brandéis Wrong?" 31 
Law and Contemporary Problems 326 (1966).
KAMIS AR, Yale: "Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later Illegal State Evidence in State and 
Federal Courts", 43 Minn. L. Rev. 1083 (1959).
"The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: the Struggle to Make the 
Fourth Amendment more than an Empty Blessing"', 62 Judicature 337 (1979).
KAPLAN, John: "Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law", 49 
Cal. L. Rev., 474 (1961).
R.W. KASTENMEIER, Robert W ., LEAVY, Deborah & BEIER, David: 
"Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective", (1989) Wise. L. Rev. 
715.
KAUPER, Paul G.: "Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and 
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case", in The Right of Privacy. A Symposium 
on the implications of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Pennock 
and Chapman (ed.), Da Capo Press, New York 1971, p. 39.
KLEINKNECHT, Theodor, MEYER, Karlheinz & MEYER-GOSSNER, Lutz: 
Kommentare zum Strafprozeßordnung, 40. neubearbeitete Auflage, Verlag
C.H. Beck, München 1991.
KONVITZ, Milton R.: "Privacy and the Law: a Philosophical Prelude", 31 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 212 (1966).
KRAUSE, Harry D.: "The right to privacy in Germany - Pointers for American 
legislation?", (1965) Duke L. J. 483.
KRÜGERt Herbert: 'D er Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte i.S. des Art. 19 GG", (1955) 
DÖV 597.
KRÜGER, H.C. & NORGAARD, C.A.: "The Right of Application", The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, p. 657.
LA FAVE, Wayne R.: 'Improving Police Performance through the Exclusionary Rule. 
Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practice; Part. II: Defining the Norms 
and Training the Police", 30 Miss. L. Rev. 391 and 566 resp. (1965)
LARREMORE, Wilburg: 'The Law of Privacy", 12 Col. L. Rev. 693 (1912).
LEWIS, Thomas P.: "The Meaning o f State Action", 60 Col. L. Rev. 1083 (1960).
LIPSET, H arold K.: "The W iretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Private 
Investigator's View", 44 Minn. L. Rev. 873 (1960).
LISLE: "The Right of Privacy (a Contra View)", 19 Ky. L. J. 137 (1931).
389
LLEWELLYN, Karl. N.: "A Realistic Jurisprudence -The Next Step" 30 Col. L. Rev. 
432 (1930).
"Some Realism about Realism - An Answer to Dean Pound", 44 Harv. L. Rev. 
1222 (1930-31).
"The Constitution as an Institution", 34 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1934).
"The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: the Problem of Juristic Method", 
49 The Yale L.J. 1355 (1940).
LUDWIG, Friedrick J.: ’"Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy", 
32 Minn L. Rev. 734 (1948).
LUSKY, Louis: "Invasion of Privacy: a Clarification of Concepts", 72 Col. L. Rev. 
693 (1972).
MACDONALD, Ronald St. John: "The Margin o f Appreciation", The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1993, p. 83.
Von MANGOLD, Hermann & KLEIN, Friedrich: "Art. 10" in Das Bonner 
Grundgesetz, Verlag Franz Vahlen Gmb H., Berlin und Frankfurt a.M. 1966, 
Band I, p. 334.
MAS, M.E.: "Right to Compensation Under Article 50", The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston- 
London, 1993, p. 775.
MAUNZ-DÜRIG-H ERZOG: "Art. 10" in Kommentar xum Grundgesetz, Verlag C.H. 
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München 1994, Band I.
McDONALD, Gordon J.: "Stray Katz, is Shredded Trash Private?", 79 Cornell L. 
Rev. 452 (1994).
MEDINA GUERRERO, Manuel: La Vinculación Negativa del Legislador a los 
Derechos Fundamentales -Trabajo de investigación presentado en concuso para 
provisión de plaza de Profesor Titular, Universidad de Sevilla, España, 1992.
MEESEEN, Karl Matthias: "Ausländische juristische Personen als Träger von 
Grundrechten", (1970) JZ 602.
MERTENS, William J. & WASSERSTROM, Silas: "The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law", 70 The 
Georgetown L. J. 365 (1981).
De MEYER, Jan: "The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and 
Communications in Relations between Individuals, and the Resulting 
Obligations for State Parties to the Convention", Privacy and Human Rights 
(Reports and Communications Presented at the Third Colloquy about the 
European Convention on Human Rights), Ed. by A.H. Robertson, Manchester 
Univ. Press, Manchester 1973. Chapter 4, p. 255.
MULLER, Friedrich: Normbereiche von Einzelgrundrechten in der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1968.
390
Die Positivitdt der Grundrechte. Fragen einer praktischen 
Grundrechtsdogmatik, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1969.
NEGLEY, Glenn: "Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy"* 31 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 319 (1966).
NIMMER, Melville B.: "The Right of Publicity", 19 Law and Contemporary Problems 
203 (1954).
NIZER, Louis: "The Right of Privacy -A Half Century Developments", 39 Mich. L. 
Rev., 526, 531-534 (1941).
NOTE (anon.): 12 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1912).
NOTE (anon.): "The Right to Privacy Today", 43 Harv. L. Rev., 297 (1929-30).
NOTE (anon.): 30 Cornell L. Q. 398 (1945).
NOTE (anon.): 'Eormalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy 
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments", 90 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1977).
NOTE (anon.): "A Dual Standard for State Discrimination against Aliens", 92 Harv. L  
Rev. 1516 (1979).
NOTE (anon.): "The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America", 94 Harv. L 
Rev. 1892 (1981).
NOTE (anon.): "Immigration Policy and the Rights o f Aliens", 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1286 
(1983).
NOTE (anon.): "Inmates' Rights and the Privatisation of Prisons", 86 Col. L. Rev. 
1475 (1986).
OAKS, Dallin H.: "Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Searches and Seizures", 37 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970).
O'BRIEN, Denis: "The Right to Privacy", 2 Col. L. Rev. 437 (1902)
OSSENBUHL, Fritz: "Die Interpretation der Grundrechte in der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts", (1976) NJW 2100.
PAKTER, Walen 'Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany and Italy", 9 Hastings Int'l 
and Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
PAPPERMANN, "Art. 10" in Grundgesetzkommentar, Hrg. von Ingo von Miinch, 2. 
Auflage Miinchen 1981, Band I, p. 433
PARENT, W.A.: "Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy", 20 Am. Phil. Q. 341 
(1983).
PARTSCH, K.J.: Written communication in Privacy and Human Rights, answering to
J. de Meyer, "The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and 
Communications in Relations between Individuals, and the Resulting 
Obligations for State Parties to the Convention" Privacy and Human Rights 
(Reports and Communications Presented at the Third Colloquy about the 
European Convention on Human Rights), Ed. by A.H. Robertson, Manchester 
Univ. Press, Manchester 1973. Chapter 4, p. 275.
391
ut
PAULSEN, Monrad G.: "Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure" 52 Nw U. L. 
Rev. 65 (1957)
PECES-BARBA, Gregorio: Los Derechos Fundamentales. Univ. Madrid, Madrid 
1983.
PECK, Robert S.: "Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New 
Technological Age", 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 893 (1984).
PEREZ LUÑO, Antonio E.: Derechos Humanos, Estado de Derecho y Constitución, 
Tecnos, Madrid, 1984;
PEREZ ROYO, Javier: Introducción a la Teoría del Estado, Barcelona 1980.
'L a  Reforma de la Constitución", 22 Revista de Estudios Políticos 7 (1986).
PIEROTH, Bodo & SCHLINK, Bemhard: Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II, 4th ed. 
Heidelberg 1988.
POLAKIEWICZ, Jörg: "El Proceso Histórico de la Implantación de los Derechos 
Fundamentales en Alemania", 81 Revista de Estudios Políticos 23 (1993).
POSNER, Richard A.: "The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court", 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 173 (1979).
'Rethinking the 4th Amendment", (1981) The Supreme Court Review 49.
POUND, Roscoe: "Do we Need a Philosophy of Law?", 5 Col. L. Rev., 339 (1905);
"Mechanical Jurisprudence", 8 Col. L. Rev., 606 (1908).
"Liberty of Contract", 18 Yale L. Rev., 454 (1908-09).
"Common Law and Legislation", 21 Harv. L. Rev., 383 (1907-08).
"The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence I, II, III", 24 Harv. L. 
Rev., 591 (1910-11), 25 Harv. L. Rev. 140 (1911-12), ibid, at 489, resp.
"Interests of Personality", 38 Harv. L. Rev. 343 (1915).
"Judge Holmes's Contributions to the Science of Law", 34 Harv. L. Rev., 449 
(1920-21).
"The Theory of Judicial Decision: I, II, III", 36 Harv. L. Rev., 641, 802, 940 
resp. (1922-23).
"The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence", 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1930-31).
PRATT, Walter F.: "Warren and Brandeis Argument for a right to Privacy", (1975) 
Public Law 161.
PROSSER, William L.: 'Privacy", 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
RIALS, Stéphane: La Déclaration des Droits de THomme et du Citoyen, Hachette 
1988.
392
RIGAUX, François: "Liberté de la vie privée", (1991) Revue Internationale de Droit 
Comparée 541.
ROSENSTEIN, Samuel: 'The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and 
Satellite Descramblers: Towards Preventing Statutory Obsolescence", 76 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1451 (1992).
ROßNAGEL, Alexander "Das Recht auf (tele-kommunikative) Selbstbestimmung", 23 
Kritische Justiz 267 (1990)
ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques: Du Contrat Social, in Écrits Politiques, Le livre de poche, 
Paris 1992.
RÜPKE, Giselher: Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz der Privatheit, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1976.
RUPP, Hans Heinrich: "Anmerkung zum Rechtsprechung", (1971) NJW 275 
"Vom Wandel der Grundrechte", (1976) NJW 161.
SCHAPPER, Claus-Henning & SCHAAR, Peter. "Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen 
von ISDN-Nebenstellenanlagen", 12 Computer und Recht 773 (1990).
SCHATZSCHNEIDER, Wolfgang: 'Temmeldegeheimnis und Telefonbeschattung",
(1981) NJW 268.
SCHAUER, Frederick: "'Private* Speech and the 'Private' Forum: Givhan v. Western 
Line School District", (1979) The Supreme Court Review 217.
SCHENKE, W.-R.: "Art. 19.4" in Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, C.F. Möller 
Juristische Verlag, 47 Lieferung, Heideiber 1983.
SCHLINK, Bernhard: Abwägung im Verfassungsrecht, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 
1976.
"Freiheit durch Eingriffsabw ehr - Rekonstruktion der klassischen 
Grundrechtsfunktion", (1984) EuGRZ 457.
SCHNEIDER, H: Die Güterabwägung des Bundesverfassungsgericht bei 
Grundrechtskonflikten, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1979.
SCHNEIDER, Ludwig Der Schutz des Wesensgehalt von Grundrechte nach Art. 19 
Abs. 2 GG, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin 1983.
SCHOEMAN, Ferdinand David (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy. An 
Anthology. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1984.
SCHOLZ, Rupert: 'Das Grundredcht der freien Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit in der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts", 100 AÖR 80 and 265
(1975).
SCHRÖCK, Thomas S. & WELSH, Robert C: "Up from Calandra: the Exclusionary 
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement", 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251 (1974).
SCHUPPERT, Gunnar Folke: "Art. 10", in Reihe Alternativekommentar, Kommentar 
zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, Hermann Luchterhand 
Verlag, Neuwied und Darmstatd, 1984. Band I, p. 894.
393
SCHWARTZ, Paul: "The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: 
Towards an American Right of Informational Self-Determination", 37 Am. J. of 
Comp. L. 675 (1989).
"Das Übersetzen im Datenschutz: Unterschiede zwischen deutschen und 
amerikanischen Konzepten der Privatheit'", (1992) RDV 8.
SEIDL, Otto: "Gmndrechtsschutz juristischer Personen des öffentlichen Rechts in der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts" Festschrift ß r  W. Zeidler, 
Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1987. Band 2, p. 1459.
SHAPIRO, Martin & TRESOLINI, Rocco J.: American Constitutional Law, 5th ed., 
New York - London 1979.
SHAPIRO, Martin: Courts. A Comparative and Political Analysis, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1981.
SHILS, Edward: "Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes", 31 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 281 (1966).
SILARD, John: "A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the 'State Action’ Limit on the 
Equal Protection Guarantee", 66 Col. L. Rev. 855 (1966).
SILVER, Edward S.: "The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's 
View", 44 Minn. L. Rev. 835 (1960).
SIMITIS, Spiros: "Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society" 135 U. Pa. L. Rev., 
707 (1987).
"Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung - Grundbedingung einer 
verfassungskonformen Informationsordnung" (1984) NJW 398.
SIMITIS, Spiros, DAMMANN, Ulrich, MALLMANN, Otto & REH, Hans-Joachim: 
Kommentar zum Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
Baden-Baden 1978.
STARCK , Christian: "The Constitutional Definition and Protection of Rights and 
Freedoms" in Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law according to 
the German Basic Law, (Ch. Starck ed.), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden- 
Baden 1987.
STEIKER, Carol S.: "Second Thoughts About First Principles", 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
820 (1994).
STELZER, Manfred: Das Wesensgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz der 
Verhältnismäßigkeit, Springer-Verlag, Wien - New York, 1991.
STEWART, Potter: "The Road to Mapp. v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure 
Cases", 83 Col. L. Rev. 1365 (1983).
STRÖMHOLM, Working Paper on the Right of Privacy, Nordic Conference of Jurists, 
Stockholm, 1967.
SUMMERS, Robert S.: 'Pragmatic Instrumentalism", 66 Cornell L. Rev. 861 (1981).
SUNDBY, Scott E.: ""Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?" 94 Col. L. Rev. 1751 (1994).
394
SUNSTEIN, Cass R.: "Beyond the Republican Revival", 97 The Yale L. J. 1539 at 
1566 etseq. (1988).
TOMKOVICZ, James J.: "Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded 
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province", 36 The Hastings L. 7. 645(1985).
THOMAS, Tim A.: "Constitutionality of Searching Premises Without Warrant as 
Incident to Valid Arrest" -Annotation, United States Supreme Court Reports, 
108 LEd 2d 987 (1992).
TWINING, William: Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, Widenfeld and 
Nicolson, London 1973.
VELU, Jacques: "The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to 
Respect for Private Life, the Home and the Communications" Privacy and 
Human Rights (Reports and Communications Presented at the Third. Colloquy 
about the European Convention on Human Rights). Ed. by A.H. Robertson, 
Manchester Univ. Press, Manchester 1970. Chapter one, p. 12.
WAGNER, John F. Jr., "Law Enforcement Officer’s Authority, under Federal 
Constitution's Fourth Amendment, to Stop and Briefly Detain, and to Conduct 
Limited Protective Search of or 'Frisk', for Investigative Purposes, Person 
Suspected of Criminal Activity -Supreme Court Cases", (Annotation) United 
States Supreme Court Reports, 104 L Ed 2d 1046 et seq. (1991).
"Supreme Court's Views as to Constitutionality of Inventory Searches", (Annotation) United States Supreme Court Reports, 109 L Ed 2d 776 et seq.(1992).
WALZ, Stephan: "Datenschutz und Telekommunikation (II) - Konsequenzen des 
Poststrukturgesetz", (1990) Computer und Recht 138,
WARREN, Charles & BRANDEIS, Louis D., "The Right to Privacy", 4 Harv. L. 
Rev. 193 (1890).
WEBER-GRELLET, Heinrich: Beweis- und Argumentationslast im Verfassungsrecht 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtssprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1979.
WECHSLER, Herbert: 'Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" 73 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1 (1959).
WEIGEND, Thomas: "Using the Result of Audio-Surveillance as Penal Evidence in the 
Federal Republic of Germany", 24 Stanford J. M l  L. 21 (1987).
WEINBERGER, Ota: "Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against Pseudo- 
Arguments in Practical Philosophy", (1992) Ratio Juris 253.
WELLINGTON, Harry H.: "Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double 
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication", 83 The Yale L. /. 221 (1973).
WENDT, Rudolf: "Der Garantiegehalt der Grundrechte und das Übermaßverbot", 104 
AÖR 414 (1979).
395
WHITE, Mary Jo: "The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary 
Rules", 73 C o l  L .  R e v . 1476 (1973).
WINFIELD, Percy H.: "Privacy", 47 L .  Q .  R e v . ,  23 (1931).
WULFING, Thomas: G r u n d r e c h t l i c h e  G e s e t z e s v o r b e h a l t e  u n d  G r u n d r e c h t s s c h r a n k e n , 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1981.
'i
!
396
I

iHMit
LIST OF CASES
T he European Convention on H um an R igh ts
Cases decided bv the Court
Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium. 
Judgment (merits) of 23 July 1968, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 6; Op. Com. of 24 June 
1965, Series B vol. 3-4.
De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (Vagrancy cases). Judgment of 18 June 1971, Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 12; Op. Com. of 19 July 1969, Series B vol. 10.
Golder v. the U.K. Judgment of 21 Feb. 1975, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 18; Op. Com. of 1 
June 1973, Series B, vol. 16.
Handyside v. the U.K. Judgment of 7 Dec. 1976, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 24; Op. Com. of 
30 Sept. 1976, Series B, vol. 22.
Klass and others v. Federal Republic of Germany. Judgment of 6 Sep. 1978, Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 28; Op. Com. of 30 Sept. 1975, Series B, vol. 26.
The Sunday Times v. the U.K. Judgment of 27 Oct. 1978, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 30; Op. 
Com. of 18 May 1977, Series B, vol. 28.
Marckx v. Belgium. Judgment of 13 July 1979, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 31; Op. Com. of 10 
Dec. 1977, Series B, vol. 29.
Airey v. Ireland. Judgment of 9 Oct. 1979, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 32; Op. Com. of 8 March 
1978, Series B, vol. 30.
Guzzardi v. Italy. Judgment of 6 Nov. 1980, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 39; Op. Com. of 7 Dec. 
1978, Series B, vol. 35.
Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium. Judgment of 6 Nov. 1980, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 40; Op. 
Com. of 1 March 1979, Series B, vol. 36.
Young, James and Webster v. the U.K. Judgment of 25 Nov. 1980, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 
44; Op. Com. Series B, vol. 39.
Dudgeon v. the U.K. Judgment of 22 Oct. 1981, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 45; Op. Com. of 13 
March 1979, Series B, vol. 40.
Silver and others v. the U.K. Judgment of 25 March 1983, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 61; Op. 
Com. of 11 Oct. 1980, Series B, vol. 51.
Malone v. the U.K. Judgment of 2 Aug. 1984, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 82; Op. Com. of 17 
Dec. 1982, Series B, vol. 67.
Campbell and Fell v. the U.K. Judgment of 28 June 1984, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 80; Op. 
Com. of 12 May 1982, Series B, vol. 65.
X and Y v. the Netherlands. Judgment of 26 March 1985; Op. Com. of 5 July 1983. Publ. 
Court Series A, vol. 91.
397
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. die £/X Judgment of 28 May 1985; Op. Com. of 12 May 
1983. Publ. Court Series A, vol. 94.
Rees v. the U.K. Judgment of 17 Oct. 1986; Op. Com. of 12 Oct. 1984. Publ. Court Series A 
vol, 106.
Gillow v. the U.K. Judgment of 24 Nov. 1986; Op. Com. of 3 Oct. 1984. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 109.
Johnston and others v. Ireland. Judgment of 18 Dec. 1986; Op. Com. of 5 March 1985. Publ. 
Court Series A, vol. 112.
Leander v. Sweden. Judgment of 26 March 1987; Op. Com. of 2 Dec. 1986. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 116.
O. and H. v. the U.K. Judgments of 8 July 1987; Op. Com of 3 Dec. and 18 Oct. 1985. Publ. 
Court Series A, vol. 120.
W., B. and R. v. the U.K. Judgments of 8 July 1987; Op. Com. of 4 Dec. 1985. Publ. Court 
Series A, vol. 121.
Olsson v. Sweden. Judgment of 24 March 1988; Op. Com. of 2 Dec. 1986. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 130.
Boyle and Rice v. the U.K. Judgment of 27 April 1988; Op. Com. of 7 May 1986. Publ. Court 
Series A, vol. 131.
Schonenberger and Durmaz v. Swizerland. Judgment of 20 June 1988; Op. Com. of 12 Dec. 
1986, Publ. Court Series A, vol. 137.
Schenk v. Swizerland. Judgment of 12 July 1988; Op. Com of 10 May 1987. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 140.
Norris v. Ireland. Judgment of 26 Oct. 1988; Op. Com. of 12 March 1987. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 142.
Chappell v. the U.K. Judgment of 30 March 1989; Op. Com of 14 Oct. 1987. Publ. Court 
Series A, vol. 152.
Eriksson v. Sweden. Judgment of 22 June 1989; Op. Com of 14 July 1988. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 156.
Gaskin v. the U.K. Judgment of 7 July 1989; Op. Com. of 13 Nov. 1987. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 160.
Markt Intern Verlag and Klaus Beermann v. Germany. Judgment of 20 Nov. 1989; Op. Com. of 
18 Dec. 1987. Publ. Court Series A, vol. 165.
Powell and Rayner v. the U.K. Judgment of 21 Feb. 1990; Op. Com. of 19 Jan. 1989. Publ. 
Court Series A, vol. 172.
Kruslin v. France. Judgment of 24 April 1990; Op. Com. of 14 Dec. 1988. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 176.
McCallum v. the U.K. Judgment of 30 Aug. 1990; Op. Com. of 4 May 1989. Publ, Court 
Series A, vol. 183.
398
Cossey v. the U.K. Judgment of 27 Sept. 1990; Op. Com. of 9 May 1989. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 184.
Moustaquim v. Belgium. Judgment of 18 Feb. 1991; Op. Com. of 12 Oct. 1989. Publ. Court 
Series A, vol. 193.
Mar gar eta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden. Judgment of 25 Feb. 1992; Op. Com. of 3 oct. 
1990. Publ. Court Series A, vol. 226.
Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria. Judgment of 25 Feb. 1992; Op. Com. of 11 Oct. 1990. Publ. 
Court Series A, vol. 227.
Campbell v. the U.K. Judgment of 25 March 1992; Op. Com. of 12 July 1990. Publ. Court 
Series A, vol. 233.
Beldjoudi v. France. Judgment of 26 March 1992; Op. Com. of 6 Sept. 1990. Publ. Court 
Series A, vol. 234.
Liidi v. Switzerland. Judgment o f 15 June 1992; Op. Com. of 6 Dec. 1990. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 238.
Herczegfalvy v. Austria. Judgment of 24 Sept. 1992; Op. Com. of 1 March 1991. Publ. Court 
Series A, vol. 244.
Olsson v. Sweden (No. 2). Judgment of 27 Nov. 1992; Op. Com. of 17 April 1991. Publ. 
Court Series A, vol. 250.
Funke, Cremieux and Miailhe v. France. Judgments of 25 Feb. 1993; Op. Com. of 8 Oct. 1991. 
Publ. Court Series A, vol. 256.
Modinos v. Cyprus. Judgment of 22 April 1993; Op. Com. of 3 Dec. 1991. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 259.
Klass v. Germany. Judgment of 22 Sept. 1993; Op. Com. of 21 May 1992. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 269.
Keegan v. Ireland. Judgment of 26 May 1994; Op. Com. of 17 Feb. 1993. Publ. Court Series 
A, vol. 290.
Cases decided bv the Committee of Ministers
X. v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (79) 5, of 12 June 1979,19 D&R
p. 66.
McVeigh and others v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (82) 1, of 24 
March 1982, 25 D&R, p. 15.
T. v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (86) 12, of 4 Dec. 1986,49 D&R 
p. 5.
Farrant v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DR (87) 3, of 12 Feb. 1987, 50 
D&R p. 5.
J. v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (89) 17, of 15 June 1989,61 D&R 
p. 37.
399
/ .  v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (89) 27, of 19 Sep. 1989,63 D&R 
p. 34.
Hewitt and Harman v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (90) 36, of 13 
Dec. 1990, 67 D&R p. 88.
Chester v. the U.K. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (90) 37, of 13 Dec. 1990,68 
D&R p. 65.
Decisions of Admissibility of the Commission
Ap. No. 250/57 (legalisation of the German Comunist Party), Dec. Adm. Com. of 20 July 1957, 
1 YB p. 223.
Austria v. Italy. Ap. No. 788/60 Dec. Adm. Com. of 11 Jan. 1961, YB IV p. 116.
X v. Denmark. Ap. No. 1329/62, Dec. Adm. Com. of 7 May 1962,9 Coll. Dec., p. 53.
X  v. the R.F.G. Ap. No. 1289/61, Dec. Adm. Com. of 4 Oct. 1962, 9 Coll. Dec. p. 50.
X v. the FJt.G. Ap. No. 1307/61, Dec. Adm. Com. of 4 Oct. 1962, 9 Coll. Dec., p. 53.
X v. the Netherlands. Ap. No. 1449/62, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 Jan. 1963,10 Coll. Dec., p. 1. 
X  v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 1628/62, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Dec. 1963,12 Coll. Dec., p. 61. 
Wemhoff. v. the F. R.G. Ap. No. 2122/64, Dec. Adm. Com. of 24 Sept. 1964, 15 Coll. Dec.,
p. 1.
X v. the FJi.G. Ap. No. 2516/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 23 May 1966, 20 Coll. Dec., p. 28.
X v. Norway. Ap. No. 2792/66, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Oct. 1966, 21 Coll. Dec., p. 48.
X v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 2566/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1967, 22 Coll. Dec., p. 35.
X  v. the FJi.G. Ap. No. 2375/64, Dec. Adm. Com. of 7 Feb. 1967, 22 Coll. Dec., p. 45
X  v. the F.R.G. Ap, No. 2413/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 Dec. 1966, 23 Coll. Dec., p. 1.
X v. Austria. Ap. No. 2291/64, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 June 1967, 24 Coll. Dec., p. 20.
Courcy v. the U.K. Ap. No. 2749/66, Dec. Adm. Com. (final) o f 11 July 1967, 24 Coll. Dec. 
p. 98.
X  v. the Netherlands. Ap. No. 2648/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1968,26 Coll. Dec., p. 26. 
X v. the FJl.G. Ap. No. 2699/65, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 April 1968, 26 Coll. Dec., p. 33.
X v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 2822/66, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1968, 26 Coll. Dec., p. 42.
X  v. Ireland. Ap. No. 3717/68, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Feb. 1970, 31 Coll. Dec., p. 96.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 4004/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 March 1970,33 Coll. Dec., p. 18.
Grace v. the UJC. Resolution of the Committee of Ministers DH (89) 21, of 19 Sep. 1989,62
D&R, p. 22.
400
X V. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 4121/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 March 1970, 33 Coll. Dec., p. 23.
X v. Luxemburg. Ap.No. 4144/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 March 1970,33 Coll Dec., p. 27.
X v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 4101/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 25 May 1970, 34 Coll. Dec., p. 20.
X v. Norway. Ap. No. 3444/67, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 July 1970,35 Coll. Dec., p. 37.
X v. Sweden, Ap. No. 3788/68, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 July 1970,35 Coll. Dec., p. 56.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 4133/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 July 1970, 36 Coll. Dec., p. 61.
X v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 4351/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 5 Oct. 1970, 36 Coll Dec., p. 83.
X v. the FJi.G. Ap. No. 4396/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 Dc. 1970, 36 Coll. Dec., p.88.
X v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 4284/69, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 Feb. 1971, 37 Coll. Dec., p. 74.
X v. the FJt.G. Ap. No. 4445/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 April 1971, 37 Coll. Dec., p. 119.
X and the Association o fZ  v. the U.K. Ap. No. 4515/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 July 1971, 38 
Coll. Dec. p. 86.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 4471/70, Dec. Adm. Com. (final) of 9 Feb. 1972, 39 Coll. Dec., p. 47.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 4623/70, Dec. Adm. Com. (partial) of 19 July 1971, 39 Coll. Dec., p. 
63.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 5442/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 20 Dec. 1971,1 D&R p. 41.
X v. Austria. Ap. No. 4622/70, Dec. Adm. Com. of 22 March 1972, 40 Coll. Dec., p. 15.
X and Y v. the U.K. Ap. No. 5459/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 23 March 1972, 40 Coll. Dec., p. 
IS.
X v. Belgium. Ap. No. 4960/71, Dec. Adm. Com. of 19 July 1972, 42 Coll Dec., p. 49.
X v. Denmark. Ap. No. 5132/71, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 July 1972, 43 Coll Dec., p. 57.
X v. Austria. Ap. No. 5416/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 30 March 1974, 46 Coll. Dec., p. 88.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 5852/72, Dec. Adm. Com. of 8 July 1974, 46 Coll. Dec., p. 136.
X v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 6577/74, Dec. Adm. Com. of 19 Dec. 1974, 1 D&R p. 91.
Cyprus v. Turkey. Ap. No. 6780/74, 6950/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 26 May 1975, YB XVIII p. 
82.
Ap. No. 7180/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 7 Oct. 1976 (unpublished), Council of Europe, Digest o f 
Strasgourg case-law, 1984. vol. 3, p. 176.
X and Y v. Switzerland. Ap. No. 7289/75, 7349/76, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 July 1977, YB XX 
p. 372.
X v. Switzerland. Ap. No. 7736/76, Dec. Adm. Com. o f 9 May 1977,9 D&R, p. 206. 
XandYv. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 7816/77, Dec. Adm. Com. of 19 May 1977, 9 D&R p. 219.
401
Y v. the U.K. Ap. No. 6870/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 May 1977,10 D&R, p. 37.
Caprino v. the V.K. Ap. No. 6871/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 3 March 1978,12 D&R, p. 14.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 7215/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Oct. 1978,14 D&R, p. 66.
Bertrand Russel Peace Foundation Ltd, v. the U,K, Ap. No. 7597/76, Dec. Adm. Com. of 2 
May 1978, 14 D&R, p. 122.
X v. the U,K. Ap. No. 8065/77, Dec. Adm. Com. of 3 May 1978,14 D&R, p. 246.
X v. the U.K. Ap. No. 7308/75, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Oct. 1978, 16 D&R p. 32.
X v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 8383/78, Dec. Adm. Com of 3 Oct. 1979,17 D&R p. 228.
A, B, C and D v. the F.R.G. Ap. No. 8290/78, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Dec. 1979, 18 D&R, p. 
176.
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands. Ap. No. 8348/78 and 8406/78, Dec. Adm. 
Com. of 11 Oct. 1979,18 D&R, p. 187.
McFeeley v. the U.K. Ap. No. 8317/78, Dec. Adm. Com. of 15 May 1980,20 D&R p. 44.
X. and Y. v. Belgium. Ap. No. 8962/80, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 May 1982, 28 D&R, p. 112.
X, Y andZ v. the U.K. Ap. No. 9285/81, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 June 1982,29 D&R p. 205.
G. S. and M. v. Austria. Ap. No. 9614/81, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Oct. 1983, 34 D&R p. 119.
Boyle v. the U.K. Ap. No. 9659/82, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 March 1985,41 D&R, p. 91.
Vander Heijden v. the Netherlands. Ap. No. 11002/84, Decl Adm. Com. of 8 March 1985, 41 
D&R, p. 264.
Mersch and others v. Luxembourg. Ap. No. 10439/83, 10440/83, 10441/83, 10452/83, 
10512/83 and 10513/83, Dec. Adm. Com. of 10 May 1985, 43 D&R, p. 34.
Baggs v. the U.K. Ap. No. 9310/81, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 Oct. 1985, 44 D&R, p. 13.
M.S. and PS. v. Switzerland. Ap. No. 10628/83, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 Oct. 1985, 44 D&R, 
p. 175.
Schenk v. Switzerland. Ap. No. 10862/84, Dec. Adm. Com. o f 6 March 1986, 46 D&R, p. 
123.
Andersson and Kuilman v. Sweden. Ap. No. 11776/85, Dec. Adm. Com. of 4 March 1986, 46 
D&R, p. 251.
Rayner v. the U.K. Ap. No. 9310/81, Dec. Adm. Com. o f 16 July 1986, 47 D&R p. 5. 
Johnson v. the U.K. Ap. No. 10389/83, Dec. Adm. Com. of 17 July 1986,47 D&R 72.
Winer v. the V.K. Ap. No. 10871/84, Dec. Adm. Com. of 10 July 1986, 48 D&R, p. 154.
T. v. the U.K. Ap. No. 8231/78, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 Oct. 1983, 49 D&R p. 5.
Z. and E. v. Austria. Ap. No. 10153/82, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Oct. 1986,49 D&R, p. 67.
N. v. Sweden. Ap. No. 11366/85, Dec. Adm. Com. of 16 Oct. 1986,50 D&R, p. 173.
K v. the U.K. Dec. Adm. Com. o f 15 Oct. 1986, 50 D&R p. 199.
Spillmann v. Switzerland. Ap. No. 11811/85, Dec. Adm. Com. of 8 March 1988, 55 D&R p. 
196.
Funker v. France. Ap. No. 10828/84, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Oct. 1988,57 D&R p. 5.
Khanam v. the U.K. Ap. No. 14112/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 14 Dec. 1988,59 D&R p. 267.
L. v. Norway. Ap. No. 13564/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 8 June 1988, 65 D&R, p. 210.
Vearncombe and Herbst v. the U.K & Clemens and Spielhagen v. the F.R.G., Ap. No. 
12816/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 18 Jan. 1989,65 D&R, p. 186.
S. v. France. Ap. No. 13756/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 17 May 1990,65 D&R, p. 250.
Ouinas v. France. Ap. No. 13756/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 12 March 1990,65 D&R, p. 265.
T. S and F.S. v. Italy. Ap. No. 13274/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 6 Sep. 1990, 66D&R, p. 164. 
Wakefield v. the U.K. Ap. No. 15817/89, Dec. Adm. Com. o f 1 Oct. 1990,66 D&R, p. 251. 
Hewitt and Harman v. the U.K. Ap. No. 12175/86, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 May 1989, 67 D&R
p. 88.
N. v. the U.K. Ap. No. 12327/86, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 May 1989, 67 D&R p. 123. 
Costello-Roberts v. the U.K. Ap. No. 13134/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Dec. 1990, 67 D&R,
p. 216.
A. v. France. Ap. No. 14838/89, Dec. Adm. Com. of 5 March 1991, 69 D&R p. 286.
G. v. Austria. Ap. No. 12976/87, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 Oct. 1991,71 D&R 45.
K. v. Sweden. Ap. No. 13800/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 1 July 1991, 71 D&R, p. 94.
Chave v. France. Ap. No. 14461/88, Dec. Adm. Com. of 9 July 1991, 71 D&R, p. 141.
A.D. v. the Netherlands. Ap. No. 21962/93, Dec. Adm. Com. of 11 Jan. 1994, 76-A D&R, p. 
157.
Priplata v. the Tcheque Republic. Ap. No. 22964/63, Dec. Adm. Com. o f 12 Oct. 1994 
(pending publication).
Germ any
Decisions of the Constitutional Court
BVerfGE 1,97 (decision of 19 Dec. 1951)
BVerfGE 1,167 (decision of 20 March 1952)
BVerfGE 2,1  (decision of 23 Oct. 1952)
Santilly v. Italy. Ap. No. 11634/85, Dec. Adm. Com. of 13 Oct. 1986, 49 D&R, p. 81.
BVerfGE 2,121 (decision of 10 Feb. 1953) 
BVerfGE 2,266 (decision of 7 May 1953) 
BVerfGE 3,19 (decision of 1 August 1953) 
BVerfGE 3,359 decision of 26 Feb. 1954) 
BVerfGE 3,383 (decision of 3 June 1954) 
BVerfGE 4,52 (decision of 20 Oct. 1954) 
BVerfGE 4,219 (decision of 21 July 1955) 
BVerfGE 5,13 (decision of 25 May 1956) 
BVerfGE 6,32 (decision of 16 Jan. 1957) 
BVerfGE 6, 45 (decision of 16 Jan. 1957) 
BVerfGE 6,290 (decision of 21 March 1957) 
BVerfGE 6,389 (decision of 10 May 1957) 
BVerfGE 7,198 (decision of 15 Jan. 1958) 
BVerfGE 7,377 (decision of 11 June 1958) 
BVerfGE 8,214 (decision of 12 Nov. 1958) 
BVerfGE 9,63 (decision of 17 Dec. 1958) 
BVerfGE 9,73 (decision of 7 Jan. 1959) 
BVerfGE 9,213 (decision of 17 March 1959) 
BVerfGE 10, 234 (decision of 15 Dec. 1959) 
BVerfGE 10,302 (decision of 10 Feb. I960) 
BVerfGE 11,234 (decision of 22 June I960) 
BVerfGE 12,45 (decision of 20 Dec. 1960) 
BVerfGE 13,132 (decision of 30 Oct. 1961) 
BVerfGE 13,225 (decision of 29 Nov. 1961) 
BVerfGE 15,126 (decision of 14 Nov. 1962) 
BVerfGE 15,288 (decision of 19 Feb. 1963) 
BVerfGE 15,226 (decision of 19 Dec. 1962) 
BVerfGE 15,256 (decision of 16 Jan. 1963) 
BVerfGE 15,288 (decision of 19 Feb. 1963) 
BVerfGE 16, 147 (decision of 22 May 1963) 
BVerfGE 16,194 (decision of 10 June 1963) 
BVerfGE 17,108 (decision of 25 of July 1963) 
BVerfGE 17,269 (decision of 4 March 1964) 
BVerfGE 18,385 (decision of 17 Feb. 1965) 
BVerfGE 18,441 (decision of 7 April 1965) 
BVerfGE 19,330 (decision of 14 Dec. 1965) 
BVerfGE 20,150 (decision of 5 August 1966) 
BVerfGE 20,351 (decision of 17 Nov. 1966) 
BVerfGE 21,92 (decision of 12 Jan. 1967) 
BVerfGE 21,261 (decision of 4 April 1967) 
BVerfGE 21,362 (decision of 2 May 1967) 
BVerfGE 22,114 (decision of 28 June 1967) 
BVerfGE 22,180 (decision of 18 July 1967) 
BVerfGE 23,229 (decision of 19 March 1968) 
BVerfGE 24,33 (decision of 25 June 1968) 
BVerfGE 24,367 (decision of 18 Dec. 1968) 
BVerfGE 25,1 (decision of 18 Dec. 1968) 
BVerfGE 25,236 (decision of 25 Feb. 1969) 
BVerfGE 25,256 (decision of 26 Feb. 1969) 
BVerfGE 25,371 (decision of 7 May 1969) 
BVerfGE 26,215 (decision of 19 June 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,1 (decision of 16 July 1969) 
BVerfGE 27, 88 (decision of 14 Oct. 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,211 (decision of 14 Nov. 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,297 (decision of 17 Dec. 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,344 (decision of 15 Jan. 1970) 
BVerfGE 28,21 (decision of 18 Feb. 1970) 
BVerfGE 28,36 (decision of 18 Feb. 1970)
404
BVerfGE 2» 121 (decision of 10 Feb. 1953) 
BVerfGE 2,266 (decision of 7 May 1953) 
BVerfGE 3,19 (decision of 1 August 1953) 
BVerfGE 3,359 decision of 26 Feb. 1954) 
BVerfGE 3,383 (decision of 3 June 1954) 
BVerfGE 4,52 (decision of 20 Oct. 1954) 
BVerfGE 4,219 (decision of 21 July 1955) 
BVerfGE 5,13 (decision of 25 May 1956) 
BVerfGE 6 ,32  (decision of 16 Jan. 1957) 
BVerfGE 6, 45 (decision of 16 Jan. 1957) 
BVerfGE 6,290 (decision of 21 March 1957) 
BVerfGE 6,389 (decision of 10 May 1957) 
BVerfGE 7,198 (decision of 15 Jan. 1958) 
BVerfGE 7t 377 (decision of 11 June 1958) 
BVerfGE 8,214 (decision of 12 Nov. 1958) 
BVerfGE 9,63 (decision of 17 Dec. 1958) 
BVerfGE 9,73 (decision of 7 Jan. 1959) 
BVerfGE 9,213 (decision of 17 March 1959) 
BVerfGE 10,234 (decision of 15 Dec. 1959) 
BVerfGE 10,302 (decision of 10 Feb. 1960) 
BVerfGE 11,234 (decision of 22 June I960) 
BVerfGE 12,45 (decision of 20 Dec. 1960) 
BVerfGE 13,132 (decision of30O ct. 1961) 
BVerfGE 13,225 (decision of 29 Nov. 1961) 
BVerfGE 15,126 (decision of 14 Nov. 1962) 
BVerfGE 15,288 (decision of 19 Feb. 1963) 
BVerfGE 15,226 (decision of 19 Dec. 1962) 
BVerfGE 15,256 (decision of 16 Jan. 1963) 
BVerfGE 15,288 (decision of 19 Feb. 1963) 
BVerfGE 16,147 (decision of 22 May 1963) 
BVerfGE 16,194 (decision of 10 June 1963) 
BVerfGE 17,108 (decision of 25 of July 1963) 
BVerfGE 17,269 (decision of 4 March 1964) 
BVerfGE 18,385 (decision of 17 Feb. 1965) 
BVerfGE 18,441 (decision of 7 April 1965) 
BVerfGE 19,330 (decision of 14 Dec. 1965) 
BVerfGE 20,150 (decision of 5 August 1966) 
BVerfGE 20, 351 (decision of 17 Nov. 1966) 
BVerfGE 21,92 (decision of 12 Jan. 1967) 
BVerfGE 21,261 (decision of 4 April 1967) 
BVerfGE 21,362 (decision of 2 May 1967) 
BVerfGE 22,114 (decision of 28 June 1967) 
BVerfGE 22,180 (decision of 18 July 1967) 
BVerfGE 23,229 (decision of 19 March 1968) 
BVerfGE 24,33 (decision of 25 June 1968) 
BVerfGE 24,367 (decision of 18 Dec. 1968) 
BVerfGE 25,1 (decision of 18 Dec. 1968) 
BVerfGE 25,236 (decision of 25 Feb. 1969) 
BVerfGE 25,256 (decision of 26 Feb. 1969) 
BVerfGE 25,371 (decision of 7 May 1969) 
BVerfGE 26,215 (decision of 19 June 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,1 (decision of 16 July 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,88 (decision of 14 Oct. 1969) 
BVerfGE 27, 211 (decision of 14 Nov. 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,297 (decision of 17 Dec. 1969) 
BVerfGE 27,344 (decision of 15 Jan. 1970) 
BVerfGE 28,21 (decision of 18 Feb. 1970) 
BVerfGE 28,36 (decision of 18 Feb. 1970)
404
BVerfGE 28,66 (decision of 24 Feb. 1970) 
BVerfGE 28,243 (decision of 26 May 1970) 
BVerfGE 28,264 (decision of 26 May 1970) 
BVerfGE 30,1 (decision of 15 Dec. 1970) 
BVerfGE 30,47 (decision of 15 Dec. 1970) 
BVerfGE 30, 250 (decision of 9 March 1971) 
BVerfGE 30, 292 (decision of 16 March 1971) 
BVerfGE 31,58 (decision of 4 May 1971) 
BVerfGE 31, 229 (decision of 7 July 1971) 
BVerfGE 31, 314 (decision of 27 July 1971) 
BVerfGE 32, 40 (decision of 12 Oct. 1971) 
BVerfGE 32, 373 (decision of 8 March 1972) 
BVerfGE 33,1 (decision of 14 March 1972) 
BVerfGE 33,171 (decision of 10 May 1972) 
BVerfGE 33, 303 (decision of 18 July 1972) 
BVerfGE 34, 238 (decision of 31 Jan. 1973) 
BVerfGE 34, 269 (decision of 14 Feb. 1973) 
BVerfGE 34, 293 (decision of 14 Feb. 1973) 
BVerfGE 34,384 (decision of 14 March 1973) 
BVerfGE 35, 5 (decision of 27 March 1973) 
BVerfGE 35, 35 (decision of 11 April 1973) 
BVerfGE 35, 79 (decision of 29 May 1973) 
BVerfGE 35, 185 (decision of 30 May 1973) 
BVerfGE 35,202 (decision of 5 June 1973) 
BVerfGE 35, 311 (decision of 16 May 1973) 
BVerfGE 35, 377 (decision of 17 July 1973) 
BVerfGE 36,383 (decision of 5 March 1974) 
BVerfGE 38, 348 (decision of 3 July 1973) 
BVerfGE 40,121 (decision of 18 June 1975) 
BVerfGE 40, 276 (decision of 29 Oct. 1975) 
BVerfGE 41,251 (decision of 27 Jan. 1976) 
BVerfGE 41, 329 (decision of 11 Feb. 1976) 
BVerfGE 42, 64 (decision of 24 March 1976) 
BVerfGE 42,143 (decision of 11 May 1976) 
BVerfGE 42, 229 (decision of 16 June 1976) 
BVerfGE 42,234 (decision of 16 June 1976) 
BVerfGE 42, 263 (decision of 8 July 1976) 
BVerfGE 45,63 (decision of 7 June 1977)) 
BVerfGE 45,187 (decision of 21 June 1977) 
BVerfGE 45,400 (decision of 22 June 1977) 
BVerfGE 48,29 (decision of 1 March 1978) 
BVerfGE 48,127 (decision of 13 April 1978) 
BVerfGE 48, 396 (decision of 20 June 1978) 
BVerfGE 50,290 (decision of 1 March 1979) 
BVerfGE 52,131 (decision of 25 July 1979) 
BVerfGE 53,366 (decision of 25 March 1980) 
BVerfGE 54,148 (decision of 3 June 1980) 
BVerfGE 56,170 (decision of 5 Feb. 1981) 
BVerfGE 58,300 (decision of 15 July 1981) 
BVerfGE 59,231 (decision of 13 Jan. 1982) 
BVerfGE 61, 82 (decision of 8 July 1982) 
BVerfGE 64,72 (decision of 4 May 1983) 
BVerfGE 65,1 (decision of 15 Dec. 1983) 
BVerfGE 67,157 (decision of 20 June 1984) 
BVerfGE 68, 193 (decision of 31 Oct. 1984) 
BVerfGE 69,1 (decision of 24 April 1985) 
BVerfGE 70,1 (decision of 14 May 1985) 
BVerfGE 70, 35 (decision of 14 May 1985)
405
BVerfGE 72,155 (decision of 13 May 1986) 
BVerfGE 75,40 (decision of 8th April 1987) 
BVerfGE 75,192 (decision of 14 April 1987) 
BVerfGE 78,101 (decision of 23 Manch 1988) 
BVerfGE 80,137 (decision of 6 June 1989) 
BVerfGE 80,367 (decision of 14 Sept. 1989) 
BVerfGE 82,236 (decision of 26 June 1990) 
BVerfGE 83,130 (decision of 27 Nov. 1990) 
BVerfGE 84,192 (decision of 11 June 1991) 
BVerfGE 84,239 (decision of 27 June 1991) 
BVerfGE 85,386 (decision of 25 March 1992) 
BVerfGE 87,153 (decision of 25 Sept. 1992) 
BVerfGE 87,234 (decision of 17 Nov. 1992) 
BVerfGE 88,87 (decision of 26 Jan. 1993) 
BVerfGE 89,69 (decision of 24 June 1993) 
BVerfGE 89,214 (decision of 19 Oct. 1993) 
BVerfGE 90,145 (decision of 9 March 1994) 
BVerfGE 90,255 (decision of 26 April 1994) 
BVerfGE 90,263 (decision of 26 April 1994)
Decisions of Other Courts
BGHE(St) 19,273 (decision of 24 March 1964)
BVerwGE 23,347 (decision of 11 March 1966)
BVerwGE 27,360 (decision of 22 Nov. 1967)
BVerwGE 32,129 (decision of 3 June 1969)
BGHE(St) 23, 329 (decision of 29 Sept. 1970)
BAGE, (1973) NJW 1247 (decision of 1 March 1973) 
BGHE(St) 26,298 (decision of 15 March 1976)
BGHE(St) 27,355 (decision of 22 Feb. 1978)
BGHE(St) 28,129 (decision of 30 August 1978) 
BGHE(St), (1979) NJW 1370 (decision o f 23 Jan. 1979) 
BGHE(St) 29,23 (decision of 20 Juni 1979)
OVGE Bremen, (1980) JZ 405 (decision o f 18 Die. 1979) 
BGHE(St) 29,244 (decision of 18 April 1980)
BGHE(St) 31,296 (decision of 16 March 1983)
BVerwGE, (1984) A71V2112 (decision of 15 March 1984) 
BVerwGE 7 6 ,152.(decisionof 25 April 1984)
BGHE(St) 33,217 (decision of 9 May 1985)
BGHE(St) 33,347 (decision of 5 Nov. 1985)
BAGE, (1987) NJW 674 (decision of 27 May 1986) 
BGHE(St) 34,39 (decision of 9 April 1987)
BGHE(St) 34,397 (decision of 9 July 1987)
BGHE(St) 35,32 (decision of 6 August 1987)
BGHE(ZR), (1988) NJW 1016 (decision o f 13 Oct. 1987) 
BVerwGE 79,110 (decision of 15 March 1988)
BGHE(St) 36,205 (decision of 23 May 1989)
BGHE(ZR), (1991) JZ 67 (decision of 20 Feb. 1990) 
BVerwGE 87,23 (decision of 17 Oct. 1990)
BGHE(St) 32 ,10  
BGHE(St) 32,68
The United S tates 
Ex Parte Jackson, 96 US 727 (1877)
406
s muti
Boydv. US, 116 US 616 (1886)
y/cJt Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
Wong W/ng v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 (1896)
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 US 172 (1899)
Ohio ex rei Lloyd v. Dolison, 194 US 445 (1904)
Adams v. NY, 192 US 585 (1904)
Jack v. Kansas, 199 US 372 (1905)
Z/o/e v. Z/enJfce/, 201 US 43 (1906)
Wilson v. US, 221 US 361 (1911)
Olmstead v. US, Green v. Same, Mcinnis v. Some, 227 US 438 (1928) 
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914)
WeeJh v. US, 232 US 383 (1914)
Truax v. Raich, 239 US 33 (1915)
Perlman v. US, 247 US 7 (1918)
Silverîhorne Lumber Co., Inc., et al. v. US, 251 US 385 (1920) 
Gouled v. US, 255 US 298 (1921)
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 US 465 (1921)
US v. Lanza, 260 US 377 (1922)
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)
Webb v. OÆWert, 263 U.S. 313 (1923)
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923)
Carroll v. US, 267 US 132 (1925)
Agnello v. US, 269 US 20 (1925)
Byars v. US, 273 US 28 (1926)
McGuire v. US, 273 US 95 (1927)
Marron v. US, 275 US 192 (1927)
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. US, 282 US 344 (1931)
US v. Lefkowitz, 285 US 452 (1932)
Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45 (1932)
Grow v. US, 287 US 124 (1932)
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937)
Nardone v. US, 308 US 338 (1939)
US v. C/055/C, 313 US 299 (1941)
Goldstein v. US, 316 US 114 (1942)
Goldman v. US <£ Shulman v. Same, 316 US 129 (1942)
Smz7A v. Allwringht, 321 US 649 (1944)
US v. Mitchell, 322 US 65 (1944)
Feldman v. US, 322 US 487 (1944)
Screws v. US, 325 US 91 (1945)
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 US 135, 154 (1945)
Marsch v. Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946)
Zap v. US, 328 US 624 (1946)
Harris v. US, 331 US 145 (1947)
Johnson v. US, 333 US 10 (1948)
Bute v. ///mow, 333 US 640 (1948)
Trupiano v. US, 334 US 699 (1948)
McDonald v. US, 335 US 451 (1948)
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949)
US v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 (1950)
Johnson v. Eisenträger, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)
Rochin v. California, 342 US 165 (1952)
On Lee v. US, 343 US 747 (1952)
Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 US 1 (1952)
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 US 199 (1952)
Wälder v. US, 347 US 62 (1954)
Irvine v. California, 347 US 128 (1954)
Benanti v. US, 355 US 96 (1957)
Rathbun v. US, 355 US 107 (1957) 407
407
m m i^ ijsumuwwwHiwwwmuiUijil» H>. !I;»?■ W W I* .  ^^
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 US 121 (1959)
Abel v. US, 362 US 217 (1960)
Jones v. US, 362 US 257 (1960) : •
Elkins v. US, 364 US 206 (1960)
Rios v. US, 364 US 253 (1960)
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 US 381 (1961)
Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 US 458 (1961)
Silverman v. US, 365 US 505 (1961)
Chapman v. US, 365 US 610 (1961)
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 US 715 (1961)
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961)
Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop, at 104 East Tenth St.f Kansas City, Missouri, et al., 367 US 
717(1961)
Lanza v. N.Y., 370 US 139 (1962)
Wong Sun v. US, 371 US 471 (1963)
Lopez v. US, 373 US 427 (1963)
Rosoto v. Warden, 11L ed 2d 15 (1963)
Ker v. California, 374 US 23 (1963)
Preston v. US, 376 US 364 (1964)
Stoner v. California, 316 US 483 (1964)
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964)
Beck v. Ohio, 379 US 89 (1964)
Stanford v. Texas, 379 US 476 (1965)
Lamont v. Postmaster Oral, of the US, 381 US 301 (1965)
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965)
Linkettler v. Walker, 381 US 618 (1965)
James v. Louisiana, 382 US 36 (1965)
Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan VAlley Plaza, 381 US 308 (1968)
Ginzburg v. US, 383 US 463 (1966)
Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966)
Osborn v. US, 385 US 323 (1966)
Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 (1967)
Warden v. Hayden, 387 US 294 (1967)
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 US 369 (1967)
Camara v. San Francisco, 387 US 523 (1967)
See v. Seattle, 387 US 541 (1967)
Berger v. NY, 388 US 41 (1967)
Katz v. US, 389 US 347 (1967)
Kolod v. US, 390 US 136 (1968)
Sam Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 US 629 (1968)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 US 543 (1968)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)
Sibron v. NY, 392 US 40 (1968)
Lee v. Florida, 392 US 378 (1968)
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 US 80 (1968)
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 US 503 (1969)
Alderman v. US, Ivanov v. US, Butenko v. US, 394 US 165 (1969)
Desist v. US, 394 US 244 (1969)
Kaiser v. NY, 394 US 280 (1969)
Giordano v. US, 394 US 310 (1969)
Taglianetti v. US, 394 US 316 (1969)
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 US 731 (1969)
Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 (1969)
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. US, 397 US 72 (1970)
US v, van Leeuwen, 397 US 249 (1970)
Williams v. US, 401 US 646 (1971)
US v. White, 401 US 745 (1970)
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
408
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971) 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971)
US v. Biswell, 406 US 311 (1972)
Adams v. Williams, 407 US 143 (1972)
US v. US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 US 297 (1972)
Gelbard v. US & US v. Egan, 48 US 41 (1972)
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 US 753 (1972)
USv. Dionisio, 410 US 1 (1973)
US v. Mara, 410 US 19 (1973)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218 (1973)
Almeida-Sanchez v. US, 413 US 266 (1973)
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 US 433 (1973)
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 US 496 (1973)
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
In re Grifiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
US v. Robinson, 414 US 218 (1973)
US v. Kahn, 415 US 143 (1974)
US v. Matlock, 415 US 164 (1974)
US v. Edwards, 415 US 800 (1974)
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 US 396 (1974)
US v. Giordano, 416 US 505 (1974)
US v. Chavez, 416 US 562 (1974)
Air Pollution Variance Board of State of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corporation, 416 US 861 
(1974)
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 US 539 (1974)
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1974)
US v. Peltier, 422 US 531 (1975)
US v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873 (1975)
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 US 362 (1976)
US v. Watson, 423 US 411 (1976)
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 US 67 (1976)
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364 (1976)
US v. Janis, 428 US 433 (1976)
GM. Leasing Corporation v. US, 429 US 338 (1977)
US v. Donovan, 429 US 413 (1977)
Wahlen v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977)
US v. Ramsey and Kelley, 431 US 606 (1977)
Carey v. Population Service Int’L, 431 US 678 (1977)
Nyquist v. Mauchlet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977)
US v. Chadwick, 433 US 1 (1977)
Nixon v. Administrator ofGral. Services et al., 433 US 425 (1977)
US v. NY Telephone Co., 434 US 159 (1977)
Procunier v. Navarrette, Jr., 434 US 555 (1978)
Foley v. Connelie, 435 US 68 (1978)
US v. Ceccolini, 435 US 268 (1978)
Scott v. US, 436 US 128 (1978)
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 US 307 (1978)
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 US 499 (1978)
Zurcher v. Daily, 436 US 547 (1978)
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385 91978)
Brennan and Brennan v. US Postal Service, 439 US 1345 (1978)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979)
US v. Caceres, 440 US 741 (1979)
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)
Dalia v. US, 441 US 238 (1979)
Dunaway v. NY, 442 US 200 (1979)
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. NY, 442 US 319 (1979)
Smith v. Mariland, 442 US 735 (1979)
409
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 (1979)
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 US 31 (1979)
US v. Creus, 445 US 463 (1980)
Payton v. AT, 445 US 573 (1980)
US v. Havens, 446 US 620 (1980)
Colorado v. Bannister, 449 US 1 (1980)
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 US 594 (1981)
Robbins v. California, 453 US 420 (1981)
AT v. Belton, 453 US 454 (1981)
C ate// v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)
Waj/uragtort v. Chris man, 455 US 1 (1982)
US v. John Doe, 456 US 605 (1982)
P/y/er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
London v. Plasencia, 459 US 21(1982)
C/7y of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 US 95 (1983)
F/or/V/a v. Payer, 460 US 491 (1983)
US v. P/ace, 462 US 696 (1983)
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 US 756 (1983)
7V/jc v. Williams, 464 US 431 (1984)
Hudson v. Palmer & Palmer v. Hudson, 468 US 517 (1984)
Block v. Rutherford, 468 US 576 (1984)
US v. Karo, 468 US 705 (1984)
US v. ¿eon, 468 US 897 (1984)
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 US 981 (1984)
ZjVS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032 (1984)
/Vew Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 US 325 (1985)
Maryland v. Macon, 472 US 463 (1985)
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367 (1987)
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 US 321 (1987)
O'Connor v. Ortega,480 US 709 (1987)
Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78 (1987)
AT v. Burger, 482 US 691 (1987)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 US 868 (1987)
California v. Greenwood and Van Houten, 486 US 35 (1988)
Florida v. Riley, 488 US 445 (1989)
Skinner v. Railway Labour Exec. Assn., 489 US 602 (1989)
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 US 656 (1989) 
US v. Sokolow, 490 US 1 (1989)
Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386 (1989)
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 US 401 (1989)
James v. Illinois, 493 US 307 (1990)
US v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259 (1990)
Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325 (1990)
Smith v. Ohio, 494 US 541 (1990)
Florida v. Wells, 495 US 1 (1990)
Harris v. NY, 495 US 14 (1990)
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 US 91 (1990)
US v. Ojeda Rios, 495 US 257 (1990)
Horton v. California, 496 US 128 (1990)
Alabama v. White, 496 US 325 (1990)
Michigan Dep. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 US 177 (1990)
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991)
Florida v. Jimeno, 114 L Ed. 2d 297 (1991)
California v. Acevedo, 114 L  Ed. 2d 619 (1991)
Florida v. Bostick, 115 L Ed. 2d 389 (1991)
Department of State v. Ray, 116 L Ed. 2d 526 (1991)
Soldal v. Cook County, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992) (pending publication)
410
Leatherman v. Tarrant City Narcotics Unit, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1993) (pending publication) 
Withrow v. Williams, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (pending publication)
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993) (pending publication)
Elder v. Holloway et ah, 111 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1994) (pending publication)
Powell v. Nevada, 128 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1994) (pending publication)
Arizona v. Evans, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 1806 (pending publication)
411

îUUliUitiUl


I
itì&iiiU&Uì

